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LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

THE HISTORY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT SINCE
INDEPENDENCE, WITH SELECTED READINGS

HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS
Professor of Latin American Studies
The American University

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF WASHINGTON, D. C.

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L A T I N A M E R I C A N T H O U G H T

*"The whimsical, various fire, in the rhymes and ideas of men,
Buried in books for an age, exploding and writhing again,
And blown a red wind round the world, consuming the lies in
its mirth."*

— Vachel Lindsay

(From *"Here's to the Spirit of Fire,"* Collected Poems by
Vachel Lindsay, rev. ed. New York: Macmillan, 1952. By
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FOREWORD

This book expresses the profound conviction of the author that the realities of Latin American life and history can be best understood through the ideas of Latin Americans who have endeavored to explain the experience of their people as independent nations and the aspirations to which they cling. It is also a product of the writer's years of interpreting this Latin American experience to North American students. More specifically, it is the core of materials assembled over the years for the use of students of the history of social thought in Latin America, in a class which the author has taught at The American University.

This book would not have been possible without the exciting pioneer work of Professor William Rex Crawford of the University of Pennsylvania, Alfredo Poviña of Argentina, José Medina Echeverría, formerly of Spain and Mexico, now of Chile, Aníbal Sánchez Reulet of Argentina, and three Mexicans: Francisco Larroya, Leopoldo Zea, and the late Samuel Ramos.

An even greater debt is owed to the Latin American authors, living and dead, whose ideas fill most of the pages of this volume. Those who are living have been uniformly encouraging and cooperative in the author's effort to disseminate their ideas among North American students. Dr. José A. Figueres, former president of Costa Rica, personally prepared the English translation of his speech which is included. To the late José Vasconcelos of Mexico, the author has a great intellectual and spiritual obligation, contracted over the past three decades, which is here acknowledged.

My thanks are due to Professor O.A. Kubitz of the University of Illinois for the biographical sketch and translation of Bilbao and to Professor Harry Kantor of the University of Florida for the biographical sketches of Figueres and Betancourt. To both of them I am also indebted for numerous helpful suggestions and criticisms. Dr. F. Warren O'Reilly gave similar help with Mariano Moreno.

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the following translators, who have also been his students, and whose generous gift of their time and intelligence is one of the abiding rewards of teaching. They are identified by their initials at the end of the appropriate passages: Elina Agüero, Juan J. Castillo, Marie-Berthe Dion, William Himel, Daniel Matamoras C., Linda M. Mondragón, Jorge Morales Yordán, Robert L. Nelson, Luis Passalacqua Christian, Takasuyo Lillian Takashita, Duryee Van Wagenen, and Erika Wolf. Jean Lust helped to make the selections from Da Cunha's Os sertões, and Francis Moriarty assisted in the laborious task of checking references.

A research grant given by the Washington Evening Star and awarded by the Faculty of the American University enabled the author to complete this work. Its publication has also been assisted by a grant from The Friends of the United States of Latin America (FUSLA). It is a personal pleasure to thank the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, México, for many courtesies extended to the author while completing this manuscript and, particularly, to Ingeniero Fernando Macías Rendón for numerous courtesies.

Washington, D. C.

February 1, 1961

HAROLD EUGENE DAVIS

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1

INTRODUCTION: ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF LATIN AMERICAN THOUGHT

The daring reader who ventures to explore books written by Latin Americans upon social and political topics is likely to be baffled by the contradictions encountered on every hand. He finds a literature which seems to be at once highly theoretical and eminently practical, profound and superficial, novel and traditional, autonomous and borrowed. These seeming contradictions, for they are more seeming than real, may explain why writers on the subject have often gone to one or the other extreme — either presenting the thought as a pale, attenuated, corrupted version of European social philosophy, having little connection with realities of the Latin American scene or, going to the other extreme, naively picturing a thought which has no roots in the past, either European or American.

A frankly objective acceptance of these contradictions, seeming or real, becomes more important as the development of social thought in Latin America increasingly engages the attention of scholars.¹ This increased interest has developed

1. Two pioneering works may be noted specially: L. L. Bernard, article on Latin America in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. IX and W. Rex Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, (Cambridge; Harvard University, 1944). Among the general works by Latin American scholars, the following may be noted: Leopoldo Zea, *Dos etapas del pensamiento en hispanoamérica* (México: El Colegio de México, 1949), Manfredo Kempff Mercado, *Historia de la filosofía en Latinoamérica* (Santiago, Chile: Zig Zag, 1958), and Francisco Larroyo, *La filosofía americana* (México: Universidad Autónoma de México, 1958). More specialized works will be referred to later, but the reader may note at this time that the Committee on the History of Ideas, Commission on History, Pan American Institute of Geography and History, has sponsored a series of national studies of the subject and in 1959 initiated a journal devoted to that theme, the *Revista de Historia de las Ideas* (Quito: Editorial Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana).

within the past two decades and for varied reasons. Students of the history of ideas have sought a meaningful interpretation of Latin American development. The more professional philosophers have been led, through increased cultural exchange, to discover that their colleagues, whether north or south of the Rio Grande, discourse on many of the same problems that command their own interest. Political scientists, sociologists, and economists, seeing that Latin American experience may provide a key to some of the problems of the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa, have been concerned to understand the philosophies with which Latin Americans have interpreted their social and political problems. Students of international law and organization have discovered a rich literature of international law with unique characteristics, while those concerned with the contemporary scene, in a more general sense, have been intrigued with the ferment of ideas among a population which is growing rapidly in numbers and wealth and may some day be one of the great powers of the earth — to see if its leaders of thought throw light on the reasons for its political divisions and unsolved internal problems.

A few general observations on the nature of Latin American social thought may be appropriate at this point. Usually, during the more than a century and a quarter since independence, the influences defining new trends have come largely from European sources. Since the culture of Latin Americans is part of the larger culture of the western world, their thought has naturally been formed largely within European models, with occasional influences from the United States. This does not mean that their writers have shown no originality. On the contrary, they have often given voice to distinctive concepts of their own. In part, this is because Latin American culture, in many ways, has been something more than an "experience" of Europeans in America² reflecting the American scene. Many of these "experiences" have been profoundly American. Their significance has appeared especially in the literature on the sociology of politics, which Latin Americans have sometimes called simply sociology, American sociology, or national (e. g. Argentine) sociology. While in the past this literature usually

2. Commenting on the Hegelian view of America, Edmundo O'Gorman remarks, "Por eso todo lo americano ha tenido ese sello de ser 'una experiencia.'" *Fundamentos de la historia de América* (México: Imp. Universitaria, 1942) p. 131.

INTRODUCTION

sought the American element merely in environment and its effects, it sometimes sought more basically American elements, in the nature of values. On the other hand, present-day writers who condemn this kind of thought as "evolutionist" or "positivist" have sometimes seemed to reject all significance of American experience in the essential substance of American ideas. But rejection is often no more than apparent, as we shall see. American ideas remain a significant part of the Latin American heritage and find expression in writers of diverse schools.

Some twentieth century authors, seeking a more autonomous American thought, provide the contemporary emphasis on *indigenismo* (Indianism) —"redeeming" the Indian populations in America.³ This autonomous tendency has found strongest expression, of course, in countries of Indian and mestizo populations, but something similar has also appeared in the literature of Brazil and of the Caribbean regions in which Negroes form an important segment of the population. The writings of Arthur Ramos and Gilberto Freyre of Brazil, and those of Fernando Ortiz of Cuba, provide examples. It is more surprising to find expressions of this autochthonous tendency in a country like Argentina, which has a predominantly European immigrant population. Yet the Argentine Ricardo Rojas provides an example in his call for a new and essentially American esthetics, erected around values derived from American geography and indigenous culture elements (in his *Eurindia*).

The influence of the United States upon Latin American thought has not been negligible. During the independence movements North American political concepts gained wide acceptance. One Venezuelan scholar has spoken of that "anxious curiosity which surged from one region of America to another

3. On *Indigenismo* see Bette Salz, "Indianism," in *Social Forces*, XI (Nov. 1944) pp. 441-69; Alejandro Lipschutz, *Indoamericanismo y la raza india* (Santiago, Chile: Nascimento, 1937) and his *Indoamericanismo y el problema racial de las Américas*, (Santiago: Nascimento, 1944); Juan Comas, *Ensayos sobre indigenismo* (México: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1953): the excellent Introduction to Aida Cometta Manzoni, *El indio en la poesía de América española* (Buenos Aires: Joaquín Torres, 1939); and Luis Villoro, *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México* (México: El Colegio de México, 1950).

from the moment the young Yankee democracy took shape." ⁴ Later, the ideas of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the New England Transcendentalists were embraced by the "Generation of 1837" in Argentina, the "Generation of 1841" in Chile, and similar groups elsewhere. The ideas of the Horace Mann common school revival were translated into Argentine thought by Domingo F. Sarmiento and the school teachers he invited from the United States. In the twentieth century, closer cultural contacts with the United States have also influenced Latin American social thought, sometimes indirectly. A few North American writers have had considerable direct influence, notably William James and John Dewey. The anthropological thought of Franz Boas and the vitalism and scientific organicism of the Anglo-American Alfred North Whitehead have had considerable direct influence in later years. But in general, the social thought of Latin America has continued to reflect European philosophical trends during the past century, the influences from Anglo-America being less fundamental. Thought derived from Latin American experience continues to find expression largely in specific, concrete concepts and in matters of application.

Ibero-America, of course, derives a persistently Roman Catholic spirit from Portugal and Spain. In addition, the vigorous tradition of Roman Law in the Iberian world seems to have contributed a rational-authoritarian cast to the thought of all peoples of Spanish and Portuguese speech — an influence still discernible in Ibero-America today, after more than a century of political independence. Protestantism soon lost the initial small foothold gained in Spain in the writing of Juan de Valdés and through the humanism of Luis Vives. During the Catholic Counter Reform Catholic theology and philosophy achieved extraordinary consistence, but lost some of the vigor produced elsewhere by philosophical controversy. Hence certain aspects of scholastic philosophy survived with more strength in the Spanish and Portuguese worlds than in northern Europe.

By the eighteenth century, however, a significant change was occurring in the Iberian world. The rationalistic and natural law thought penetrated slowly under French cultural

4. Mariano Picón-Salas, "Historia hispano-americana," *Obras selectas* (Madrid-Caracas: Edime, 1953) p. 834.

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and political influence, finding expression in such eighteenth century Spanish writers as Fray Benito Gerónimo Feijóo. Traditional cultural and intellectual obstacles prevented rapid acceptance of some of these new ideas in the Spanish-Portuguese world, but ultimately they came.

In the New World these European concepts often took on different meanings because of factors peculiar to the American environment. To understand how this happened it is necessary to notice certain general traits indigenous to American thought. The first characteristic, derived from a combination of American and European elements, is the exaggerated consciousness of being Spanish or Portuguese displayed by upper class criollos in colonial society. This essentially creole aspect of American mentality, frequently noted by travelers, was partly the product of a class consciousness based upon the subjugation of the Indian and upon Negro slavery. The fact that the creole mentality retained this class-racial basis helps to explain why it could react in such contradictory expressions as that of sympathy for the Anglo-American planters in their eighteenth century revolt against Europe and the twentieth century sympathy for Spain expressed in Pan Hispanism.

A second indigenous trait in the Latin American thought — also a reaction to European influences — is a spirit of optimism closely connected with a general tendency to revolt against authority. This optimism was the essence of the creole spirit in the independence movement. Because the creole rebels regarded Spain and Portugal as moribund they gave a somewhat different tone to French Revolutionary rationalism and anticlericalism when it passed to America. Their optimism in respect to things American resembles the anti-Britain feeling in the United States. As in the latter country, it helps to explain the general tendency to reject scientific and deterministic views of history even while asserting a historical basis for the principles they defended. Both this social optimism and the exaggerated creole sense of being Spanish or Portuguese expressed attraction and repulsion toward European culture — a psychological ambivalence of love-hate — as well as creole social class consciousness. Without an understanding of this creole mentality it is impossible to understand how Latin American social thought could be consistently and aggressively preoccupied with problems of social reform for a century and

a half and yet escape close identification with European class-conscious socialism.

A basic sociological fact also helps to explain this seeming paradox. Europe and America differed essentially in respect to what the nineteenth century euphemistically called the "social problem." Because Europe was rapidly urbanizing, the European problem was that of the rising working class — the workers' movement— the verbal and political expression of which was socialism. Social conditions in America were different. Because America was mainly rural, having a constant labor shortage in relation to great undeveloped resources and at the same time a large depressed population of conquered Indians and liberated slaves, her "social problem" centered around the complicated process of socio-ethnic change. The essence of the problem was the emergence of a proletariat of characteristically landless agricultural workers of an amorphous and mixed ethnic background — a background which contrasted sharply with the firm cultural heritage fixed upon the European workers by centuries of social evolution.

Despite this cultural difference nineteenth and twentieth century social thought in both Latin American and Europe has found a common denominator — a common preoccupation — in the fundamental socio-economic-political movement which Ortega y Gasset termed the revolt of the masses — the rise of the common man to political influence and all the changes accompanying that rise. In both hemispheres its basic themes and problems have been those of democracy, industrialization, urbanization, socialism (or its obverse, social Christianity), nationalism, and internationalism. This movement is, of course, the central process of modern history, and it is very American. The American and French Revolutions provided much of its dynamism, while the American contribution to its later phases has also been notable. Latin America has been a great laboratory of this democratic experiment — the "revolt of the masses" — for more than a century. Its democratic successes have reinforced the American optimism which its failures have not quenched. Both have contributed more than is often realized to the realities of the social thought of our times, even when Americans have seemed to be lisping the sentiments and adopting the poses of European philosophers.

INTRODUCTION

One of the characteristic ways in which American optimism has appeared in social thought is in the form of Utopianism. The Christian prototype of this idea — the concept of the Kingdom of God and of the imminent second coming of Christ — found early expression in America in such diverse forms as the Puritan settlement in Massachusetts and the Christian communities organized by Spanish missionaries in Chiapas and Michoacán, in Mexico, and by the Jesuits in Paraguay. The incipient rationalism of the Renaissance easily developed the idea of America as the land uncorrupted by civilization where a better social order might be achieved, if indeed it did not already exist.

Finally, we may notice the idea of the New World as somehow basically different from and superior to the old. This concept found expression in colonial America, as well as in England, Spain, Portugal, and other parts of Europe, and was the source of much of the persistent European idea of America as the land of hope and opportunity for the oppressed. But the opposite idea, the concept of America as an inferior continent, possessed of inferior flora and fauna, a land which could never hope to achieve more than a watered down version of European civilization, also found frequent expression in Europe. It originated in the first contacts of Europeans with the New World, seemed to find scientific verification in the writings of the French scientist Buffon and philosophical expression in the view of Hegel that America was a land without a history. Latin Americans reacted to this attitude in much the same vein in which Thomas Jefferson answered Buffon, in his *Notes on Virginia*,⁵ and the Americanism optimism expressed by Jefferson had its effect, not only upon the American mind, but upon European thought as well, as it contributed to the Occidental concept of the good society.

The following pages consist mainly of selections from some of the great books which have expressed Latin American social thought. Passages have been chosen for translation on a highly selective basis, preference being given to works which express

5. On this subject see the several works of Lewis Hanke on Las Casas, particularly the *Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1949); Silvio Zavala, *Filosofía política de la conquista de América* (México; Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947); and Edmundo O'Gorman. *op. cit.*

general social philosophy rather than to those dealing with more specific and concrete ideas in any of the various social fields. Some of them are from works which have gained a deserved place in literature, and the reader must understand that the translations seldom do adequate justice to the literary qualities of the originals. Care has been taken to represent as many as possible of the various, sometimes opposing trends and strands of thought. It is regrettable that Colombia, Panamá, Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Bolivia are not represented, while from other countries several writers are included. Every country has had writers who might be studied with profit, but to have included all would have made a book of disproportionate size, as well as destroying the desired balance among the various phases and trends. One lack in this balance may be noted here — the virtual absence of representation of the conservative or reactionary opinion, especially during the early nineteenth century, which was opposed to independence and distrusted self-government. Such ideas were not uncommon but it was difficult to find them in suitable form for translation. Hence conservative thought is represented chiefly, in this earlier phase, by what may be more appropriately called moderate thought.

Short critical essays introduce the reader to each of the four principal historical phases in the social thought: (1) The Enlightenment and Independence, (2) Romantic Liberalism and Utilitarianism, (3) Positivism and evolutionary thought in the late nineteenth century, and (4) twentieth century trends. A brief biographical and critical sketch also introduces each selection.

PART ONE

The Enlightenment and Independence

THE THOUGHT OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Independence descends upon Latin America as the final act of a drama of which the preceding acts were played elsewhere, at some previous time, by other actors. The thought which accompanies independence gives a similar impression of lacking what should logically have come before. Hence it appears prematurely skeptical, at times verging on the pessimistic, even though the ideas of the independence leaders were basically like those which excited the leaders of the North American and French Revolutions. But the Latin American leaders could not escape the effect of the momentous developments in Europe during the quarter-century following the North American Revolution, the social reactionism of the Napoleonic and Metternick eras.

An assault on scholastic philosophy had been well under way in the Spanish American universities during the eighteenth century. The ideas of Cartesian and Lockian rationalism had been more widely accepted than is often believed. The influence of such scholars as the Portuguese Luis Antonio Verney (1713-1792), the Spanish priest, Benito Gerónimo Feijóo, and the Peruvian Pedro Peralta Barnuevo, had caused widespread discussion of Newton's law of universal gravitation, Etienne Bonnot Condillac's sensationalism, the natural moral philosophy of Nicolas de Malebranche, and even the pantheism of Baruch Spinoza. Although these new ideas were not always accepted fully, their discussion prepared Latin American leaders to accept the ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and the Abbé Raynal.¹

The schoolmen and their philosophy were too deeply intrenched of course, to be easily and completely defeated. In Guatemala, scholars insisted on qualifying Newton's law, while Thomists and Scotists still disputed there as late as 1816. The Cuban philosopher Félix Varela found scholasticism still firmly entrenched in Cuba in the early years of the nineteenth

1. See John Tate Lanning, *Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1940) pp. 61-89; also Arthur P. Whitaker and others, *Latin America and the Enlightenment* (New York: D. Appleton - Century, 1942).

century.² Moreover, since Latin American independence was several decades later than that of North America, the eighteenth century natural law philosophy came to its leaders filtered through the experience of the French and American Revolutions and changed by the conservative and sometimes pessimistic spirit of the Napoleonic and Metternich eras. The author who exercised the greatest single influence upon the Latin American leaders seems to have been Rousseau. Next to him must be ranked the Abbé Raynal, whose *Philosophical and Political History of the Two Indies* was widely read. Moreover, the Latin American leaders of independence already reflect in some respects the dawning nineteenth century romantic liberalism and the concepts of utilitarianism. At the same time, the persistence of scholasticism in Spanish thought made the conflicts over ideas particularly sharp in Spanish America, while American social and ethnic factors imposed special limitations, both upon the application of the new ideas and upon their dynamic force.

Insofar as the new concepts were an expression of the aspirations of a rising urban middle class, they encountered a less solid basis in Latin America than in Anglo-America, where interests of fishing, trade, shipping, and industry had come to occupy an important place in society and had supplied a kind of leadership to the independence movement which Latin America got in less degree. Brazilian and Argentine leaders were the nearest in character to the Anglo-American independence leaders in this respect. Yet even here the character and mentality of the leadership may more accurately be described as that of a kind of Fronde.

Generally, throughout Spanish and Portuguese America, the leaders of independence were class conscious creoles who thought chiefly of liberating themselves from the "tyranny" of a "decadent" Spain. They accepted the principles of natural law in the realms of politics, economics and social morality, and were familiar with the ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, the Physiocrats, Adam Smith and Condorcet. Jeremy Bentham had a special following. The economics of the independence leaders was that of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith's *laissez-faire*, but their concept of the ideal society in America also embraced a

2. José Manuel Mestre, *De la filosofía en la Habana* (Habana: Ministerio de Educación, 1952). (Originally published 1851). Pp. 33-40.

INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

traditional element derived from their study of the great code of Spanish colonial legislation, the Laws of the Indies. At times, as in the notable sermon of December 12, 1794 in which Fray Servando Teresa de Mier gave a new and American version of the appearance of the Virgin of Guadalupe, they even sought more strictly American cultural origins in the indigenous cultures of America.³

But while independence leaders commonly sounded this note of conscious Americanism, the note of nationalism was weak and infrequent. Nationalism came later in Latin, particularly Spanish America, emerging from the struggle for national stability which followed the tragic break up of the former Spanish empire into political fragments. The leaders of independence generally held an optimistic belief in the natural goodness of men and in a natural progress in human affairs, but they were often led by their sense of the gravity of their social and ethnic problems to expressions of great pessimism. Such expressions occur in both Simón Bolívar and José San Martín. The general tendency, however, was to blame these problems on the Conquest and on Spanish (or Portuguese) tyranny, assuming that American leadership could deal effectively with them. Moreover, Latin Americans often accepted eighteenth century Europe's severe self-criticism at its face value, and added to their rejection of European authority in America an opinion that Spain was decadent and impoverished.

Almost unanimously the leaders of independence accepted the idea of a natural order of freedom and progress in politics, economics, science, and morality. But when they applied these ideas to the American scene they displayed sharp differences as to policies and measures. These differences were mainly of a practical sort, concerned with the measures to be employed, but they often revealed fundamental diversities in social and political outlook, as the following selections show.

Monarchists, like San Martín, preferred liberal monarchy to republicanism because they believed Spanish American leadership, unsupported by the tradition of monarchy, would be unable to control popular violence and anarchy. They were the "aristocratic fronde" of the early independence movements in Chile, Argentina, and elsewhere. Others, more influenced by the example of the United States, believed that the federal

3. Fray Servando Teresa de Mier, *Memorias* (México: Ed. Porrúa, 1946) I, 5-98.

republic was the form of government best adapted to what they believed to be a Latin American need for decentralizing government and limiting the absolute authority within which Spanish colonial administration had developed. The views of part of this group were tinged with the social conservatism of provincial creole leaders who welcomed the freedom from Spanish restraint but feared the reforming tendencies of the more radical leaders. The latter group of so-called "exaltados," relatively few in number, coupled their federalism with a program of liberal, particularly anticlerical reforms.

Simón Bolívar, in his devotion to republicanism, contrasts sharply with San Martín. Bolívar admired the British constitution and believed that Latin America was not prepared for the federal form of organization. But, his skepticism concerning the illiterate masses of Indians, mestizos, and Negroes was tempered with an optimistic confidence in the ability of the independence leaders to close ranks in an aristocracy of merit and virtue in order to effect stability and prosperity. Fernández de Lizardi, essentially a spokesman of the dominant creole class of Mexico, threatened from one side by Spanish authoritarianism and from the other by the unrest of the masses represented in the Hidalgo uprising, moved from monarchism to republicanism, expressing the same general social liberalism but with overtones of the dawning social utopianism. Mariano Moreno of Argentina is one of the most "exaltados" of the independence leaders in his devotion to the principles of economic liberalism; he is anti-federal and monarchist. José Cecilio del Valle of Honduras accepted monarchism under the Plan of Iguala, but after the overthrow of Iturbide embraced the federalism of Central America. His social philosophy combines the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham with utopian ideals. The note of Americanism is less obvious in Moreno, but is readily discernible in Bolívar, Fernández de Lizardi, and Valle.

SIMON BOLIVAR (1783-1830)

VENEZUELA

Bolívar was the Liberator of northern Spanish South America and the founding father of five republics. After seven years of bitter frustration and defeat he led the armies of Colombia and Venezuela in brilliant victories which wrested those two countries, as well as Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, from Spanish control. He was also a leader of men's minds, shaping the political mentality of a generation of leaders who had been his lieutenants in the war for independence.

He was born in Caracas, Venezuela, on July 24, 1783, the son of a wealthy marquis who owned copper and silver mines, cacao plantations, and many Negro slaves. While Bolívar broke sharply with the political interests of his family, he could not completely escape the influence of his class and his thought retains something of the aristocratic note which characterized so much of the liberalism of his day.

As a philosopher, Bolívar was a dilettante. He displays little originality, except in his dramatic application of ideas to practical situations, especially in the political realm. Yet it is interesting to note how he grasped the meaning of the social revolution which was accompanying political independence and its bearing upon the problem of reforming and creating political institutions. This understanding was what caused him to be troubled by the political difficulties which lay ahead. It also explains his two principal proposals for achieving political stability: the life-time presidency and the formation of a union or league of the Spanish American republics. In both he may well have been influenced by the proposal which Francisco Miranda made to William Pitt in 1790 to create "one vast constitutional monarchy" in America, governed by an emperor descended from the Incas, with a Senate appointed by the Inca for life and a lower legislative house elected by popular suffrage.¹ Both of Bolívar's proposals were rejected during his life-time, but they left their imprint upon such leaders as Santa Cruz of Bolivia, Flores of Ecuador, and Páez of Venezuela. The twentieth century has brought a clearer realization of the extent to which Bolívar grasped the realities of his day and

1. Ricardo Piccirilli, *San Martín y la política de los pueblos* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Gure S.R.L., 1957) pp. 100-101.

understood the political needs of the revolutionary movements. Some of the resulting expressions of this reappraisal of Bolívar take on the character of a virtual cult of Bolívarismo.

His thought was mainly the product of the natural law utopianism of the Enlightenment, colored by the romantic liberalism of the early nineteenth century and by an emphasis upon Americanism, but with occasional overtones of the disillusionment of the Napoleonic era. He accepted the compact theory of the state. Society, he believed, was a product of liberated minds and wills, cemented together by good customs and by sentiments of honor, love, and loyalty. Economics was not a prominent aspect of his thought as a whole and, so far as it appears, seems phrased largely within the concepts of the French physiocrats. But he had imbibed enough rational utilitarianism to conceive that the structure of the state must be supported by the interests of individuals and groups. Upon them, he believed, fell the responsibility for developing the morality and customs which were the essence of all institutions. Thus, his proposed life-time presidency, far from being conceived as an instrument for tyranny, was intended as a unifying and stabilizing center of the nation, which would permit the operation of an essentially aristocratic state. He was also influenced notably by Rousseau's idea that democracies sometimes require dictators.

The selections which follow come from two distinct periods in Bolívar's career. The address to the Congress of Angostura was delivered in the early stages of the military success which ultimately liberated Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. The reference to Volney's *Ruins of Palmyra* is especially significant, as indicating the extent to which the historical view of law was tending to replace or modify the natural law thinking, producing a somewhat more conservative tendency.

The address to the Congress of Bolivia, although only a few years later, came after the final defeat of the Spanish arms at Ayacucho. In this address he presented his controversial proposal for a life-time presidency, incorporated in the first Bolivian constitution, a proposal which has often been mistaken for monarchy in disguise. Obviously impressed by the apparent success of the life-term presidency in Haiti, Bolívar envisaged similar authoritarian republics in Spanish America. But he remained consistent in his anti-monarchism as he did in his

devotion to the abolition of Negro slavery. The proposal for an hereditary senate and a fourth, or moral power of government did not emanate from a philosophy of social reactionism, but was, rather, an effort to consolidate in the national structure all of those who had led and supported the revolutionary movement, whatever their political views. His persistent concern with the ethnic and sociological basis of political life and institutions is noteworthy. It was this concern which led him to urge a strong presidency and limited democracy.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The best collection of Bolívar's writings is the eleven volume *Cartas del Libertador*, edited by the Venezuelan Vicente Lecuna (Caracas and New York, 1929-1930 and 1947). The two volume *Selected Writings of Bolívar* (Caracas and New York: Banco de Venezuela, 1951) from which the following pages are taken, was compiled by Lecuna and edited by Harold A. Bierck, Jr. Lecuna wrote numerous other works on the Liberator which should be consulted by the serious student. Among the biographies are such old works as Felipe Larrazabal, *La Vida y Correspondencia General del Libertador Simón Bolívar*, first published in 1863, and the three volume biography by O'Leary. Among the numerous biographies in English, the one by Gerhard Masur (Albuquerque, N.M., 1948) is recommended. The December 1930 issue of the *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* is a valuable symposium on Bolívar.

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE INAUGURATION
OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS
IN ANGOSTURA, February 15, 1819

BY SIMÓN BOLÍVAR

(From Lecuna and Bierck, *Selected Writings of Bolívar*. New York and Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, 1951. I, 173-197. By permission of the publisher).

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Let us review the past to discover the base upon which the Republic of Venezuela is founded.

America, in separating from the Spanish monarchy, found herself in a situation similar to that of the Roman Empire when its enormous framework fell to pieces in the midst of

the ancient world. Each Roman division then formed an independent nation in keeping with its location or interests; but this situation differed from America's in that those members proceeded to reestablish their former associations. We, on the contrary, do not even retain the vestiges of our original being. We are not Europeans; we are not Indians; we are but a mixed species of aborigines and Spaniards. Americans by birth and Europeans by law, we find ourselves engaged in a dual conflict: we are disputing with the natives for titles of ownership, and at the same time we are struggling to maintain ourselves in the country that gave us birth against the opposition of the invaders. Thus our position is most extraordinary and complicated. But there is more. As our role has always been strictly passive and our political existence nil, we find that our quest for liberty is now even more difficult of accomplishment; for we, having been placed in a state lower than slavery, had been robbed not only of our freedom but also of the right to exercise an active domestic tyranny. Permit me to explain this paradox.

In absolute systems, the central power is unlimited. The will of the despot is the supreme law, arbitrarily enforced by subordinates who take part in the organized oppression in proportion to the authority that they wield. They are charged with civil, political, military, and religious functions; but, in the final analysis, the satraps of Persia are Persian, the pashas of the Grand Turk are Turks, and the sultans of Tartary are Tartars. China does not seek her mandarins in the homeland of Genghis Khan, her conqueror. America, on the contrary, received everything from Spain, who, in effect, deprived her of the experience that she would have gained from the exercise of an active tyranny by not allowing her to take part in her own domestic affairs and administration. This exclusion made it impossible for us to acquaint ourselves with the management of public affairs; nor did we enjoy that personal consideration, of such great value in major revolutions, that the brilliance of power inspires in the eyes of the multitude. In brief, Gentlemen, we were deliberately kept in ignorance and cut off from the world in all matters relating to the science of government.

Subject to the threefold yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice, the American people have been unable to acquire

knowledge, power, or virtue. The lessons we received and the models we studied, as pupils of such pernicious teachers, were most destructive. We have been ruled more by deceit than by force, and we have been degraded more by vice than by superstition. Slavery is the daughter of Darkness; an ignorant people is a blind instrument of its own destruction. Ambition and intrigue abuse the credulity and experience of men lacking all political, economic, and civic knowledge; they adopt pure illusion as reality; they take license for liberty, treachery for patriotism, and vengeance for justice. This situation is similar to that of the robust blind man who, beguiled by his strength, strides forward with all the assurance of one who can see, but, upon hitting every variety of obstacle, finds himself unable to retrace his steps.

If a people, perverted by their training, succeed in achieving their liberty, they will soon lose it, for it would be of no avail to endeavor to explain to them that happiness consists in the practice of virtue; that the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of tyrants, because, as the laws are more inflexible, everyone should submit to their beneficent austerity; that proper morals, and not force, are the bases of law; and that to practice justice is to practice liberty. Therefore, Legislators, your work is so much the more arduous, inasmuch as you have to reeducate men who have been corrupted by erroneous illusions and false incentives. Liberty, says Rousseau, is a succulent morsel, but one difficult to digest. Our weak fellow-citizens will have to strengthen their spirit greatly before they can digest the wholesome nutriment of freedom. Their limbs benumbed by chains, their sight dimmed by the darkness of dungeons, and their strength sapped by the pestilence of servitude, are they capable of marching toward the august temple of Liberty without faltering? Can they come near enough to bask in its brilliant rays and to breathe freely the pure air which reigns therein?

Legislators, meditate well before you choose. Forget not that you are to lay the political foundation for a newly born nation which can rise to the heights of greatness that Nature has marked out for it if you but proportion this foundation in keeping with the high plane that it aspires to attain. Unless your choice is based upon the peculiar tutelary experience of the Venezuela people — a factor that should guide you in

determining the nature and form of government you are about to adopt for the well-being of the people — and, I repeat, unless you happen upon the right type of government, the result of our reforms will again be slavery.

The history of bygone ages affords you examples of thousands of governments. Visualize the nations that have shone in brightest splendor and you will be grieved to see that virtually all the world has been, and still is, the victim of its governments. You will note numerous systems of governing men, but always their purpose has been to oppress them. If our habit of looking upon the human species as being led by its own shepherds did not diminish the horror of so distressing a spectacle, we should be stunned to see our docile species grazing upon the surface of the earth, like meek flocks destined to feed their cruel keepers. Nature, in truth, endows us at birth with the instinctive desire for freedom; but, be it laziness or some tendency inherent in humanity, it is obvious that mankind rests unconcerned and accepts things as they are, even though it is bound forcibly in fetters. As we contemplate humanity in this state of prostitution, it would appear that we have every right to persuade ourselves that most men hold this humiliating maxim to be the truth: It is harder to maintain the balance of liberty than to endure the weight of tyranny. Would that this maxim, which goes counter to the morality of Nature, were false. Would that this axiom were not sanctioned by man's lack of concern respecting his most sacred rights!

Many ancient and modern nations have shaken off oppression; yet those who have enjoyed even a few precious moments of liberty are rare, as they have speedily returned to their old political vices; because peoples rather than governments repeatedly drag tyranny in their train. The habit of being ruled makes them insensible to the attractions of honor and national prosperity, and they regard with indifference the glory of living in the free sway of liberty, under the protection of laws dictated by their own free will. The records of the universe proclaim this awful truth.

Only democracy, in my opinion, is amenable to absolute liberty. But what democratic government has simultaneously enjoyed power, prosperity, and permanence? On the other

hand, have not aristocracy and monarchy held great and powerful empires together century after century? Is there any government older than that of China? What republic has lasted longer than Sparta or Venice? Did not the Roman Empire conquer the earth? Has not France had fourteen centuries of monarchy? Is there any nation greater than England? Yet these nations have been or still are aristocracies and monarchies.

Despite these bitter reflections, I experience a surge of joy when I witness the great advances that our Republic has made since it began its noble career. Loving what is most useful, animated by what is most just, and aspiring to what is most perfect, Venezuela, on breaking away from Spain, has recovered her independence, her freedom, her equality, and her national sovereignty. By establishing a democratic republic, she has proscribed monarchy, distinctions, nobility, prerogatives, and privileges. She has declared for the rights of man and freedom of action, thought, speech, and press. These eminently liberal acts, because of the sincerity that has inspired them, will never cease to be admired. The first Congress of Venezuela has indelibly stamped upon the annals of our laws the majesty of the people, and in placing its seal upon the social document best calculated to develop the well-being of the nation, that Congress has fittingly given expression to this thought.

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The more I admire the excellence of the federal Constitution of Venezuela, the more I am convinced of the impossibility of its application to our state. And, to my way of thinking, it is a marvel that its prototype in North America endures so successfully and has not been overthrown at the first sign of adversity or danger. Although the people of North America are a singular model of political virtue and moral rectitude; although that nation was cradled in liberty, reared on freedom, and maintained by liberty alone; and—I must reveal everything—although those people, so lacking in many respects, are unique in the history of mankind, it is a marvel, I repeat, that so weak and complicated a government as the federal system has managed to govern them in the difficult and trying circumstances of their past. But, regardless of the effectiveness of this form of government with respect to North America, I must say that it has never for a moment entered my mind to compare the position and character of two states as dissimilar as the English-

American and the Spanish-American. Would it not be most difficult to apply to Spain the English system of political, civil, and religious liberty? Hence, it would be even more difficult to adapt to Venezuela the laws of North America. Does not *L'Esprit des lois* state that laws should be suited to the people for whom they are made; that it would be a major coincidence if those of one nation could be adapted to another; that laws must take into account the physical conditions of the country, climate, character of the land, location, size, and mode of living of the people; that they should be in keeping with the degree of liberty that the Constitution can sanction, respecting the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, resources, number, commerce, habits, and customs? This is the code we must consult, not the code of Washington!

The Venezuelan Constitution, although based upon the most perfect constitutions from the standpoint of the correctness of its principles and the beneficent effects of its administration, differed fundamentally from the North American Constitution on one cardinal point, and, without doubt, the most important point. The Congress of Venezuela, like the North American legislative body, participates in some of the duties vested in the executive power. We, however, have subdivided the executive power by vesting it in a collective body. Consequently, this executive body has been subject to the disadvantages resulting from the periodic existence of a government which is suspended and dissolved whenever its members adjourn. Our executive triumvirate lacks, so to speak, unity, continuity, and individual responsibility. It is deprived of prompt action, continuous existence, true uniformity, and direct responsibility. The government that does not possess these things which give it a morality of its own must be deemed a nonentity.

Although the powers of the President of the United States are limited by numerous restrictions, he alone exercises all the governmental functions which the Constitution has delegated to him; thus there is no doubt but that his administration must be more uniform, constant, and more truly his own than an administration wherein the power is divided among a number of persons, a grouping that is nothing less than a monstrosity. The judicial power in Venezuela is similar to that of North America: its duration is not defined; it is temporary and not

for life; and it enjoys all the independence proper to the judiciary.

The first Congress, in its federal Constitution, responded more to the spirit of the provinces than to the sound idea of creating an indivisible and centralized republic. In this instance, our legislators yielded to the ill-considered pleadings of those men from the provinces who were captivated by the apparent brilliance of the happiness of the North American people, believing that the blessings they enjoy result exclusively from their form of government rather than from the character and customs of the citizens. In effect, the United States' example, because of their remarkable prosperity, was one too tempting not to be followed. Who could resist the powerful attraction of full and absolute enjoyment of sovereignty, independence, and freedom? Who could resist the devotion inspired by an intelligent government that has not only blended public and private rights but has also based its supreme law respecting the desires of the individual upon common consent? Who could resist the rule of a beneficent government which, with a skilled, dextrous, and powerful hand always and in all regions, directs its resources toward social perfection, the sole aim of human institutions?

But no matter how tempting this magnificent federative system might have appeared, and regardless of its possible effect, the Venezuelans were not prepared to enjoy it immediately upon casting off their chains. We were not prepared for such good, for good, like evil, results in death when it is sudden and excessive. Our moral fibre did not then possess the stability necessary to derive benefits from a wholly representative government; a government so sublime, in fact, that it might more nearly befit a republic of saints.

Representatives of the People! You are called upon to confirm or to suppress whatever may appear to you worthy of preservation, modification, or rejection in our social compact. The task of correcting the work of our first legislators is yours. I should like to say that it is your duty to cloak some of the charms that are displayed in our political code; for not every heart is capable of admiring all beauty, nor are all eyes able to gaze upon the heavenly light of perfection. The Book of the Apostles, the teaching of Jesus contained in that divine

work, so sublime and so sacred, that Providence has sent us for the betterment of mankind, is now a rain of fire in Constantinople; indeed, Asia would burst into fiery flames if this Book of Peace were suddenly imposed upon her as a code of religion, law, and customs.

Permit me to call the attention of the Congress to a matter that may be of vital importance. We must keep in mind that our people are neither European nor North American; rather, they are a mixture of African and the Americans who originated in Europe. Even Spain herself has ceased to be European because of her African blood, her institutions, and her character. It is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy where we belong in the human family. The greater portion of the native Indians has been annihilated; Spaniards have mixed with Americans and Africans, and Africans with Indians and Spaniards. While we have all been born of the same mother, our fathers, different in origin and in blood, are foreigners, and all differ visibly as to the color of their skin: a dissimilarity which places upon us an obligation of the greatest importance.

Under the Constitution, which interprets the laws of Nature, all citizens of Venezuela enjoy complete political equality. Although equality may not have been the political dogma of Athens, France, or North America, we must consecrate it here in order to correct the disparity that apparently exists. My opinion, Legislators, is that the fundamental basis of our political system hinges directly and exclusively upon the establishment and practice of equality in Venezuela. Most wise men concede that men are born with equal rights to share the benefits of society, but it does not follow that all men are born equally gifted to attain every rank. All men should practice virtue, but not all do; all ought to be courageous, but not all are; all should possess talents, but not everyone does. Herein are the real distinctions which can be observed among individuals even in the most liberally constituted society. If the principle of political equality is generally recognized, so also must be the principle of physical and moral inequality. Nature makes men unequal in intelligence, temperament, strength, and character. Laws correct this disparity by so placing the individual within society that education, industry, arts, services, and virtues give him a fictitious equality that

is properly termed political and social. The idea of a classless state, wherein diversity increases in proportion to the rise in population, was an eminently beneficial inspiration. By this step alone, cruel discord has been completely eliminated. How much jealousy, rivalry, and hate have thus been averted!

Having dealt with justice and humanity, let us now give attention to politics and society, and let us resolve the difficulties inherent in a system so simple and natural, yet so weak that the slightest obstacle can upset and destroy it. The diversity of racial origin will require an infinitely firm hand and great tactfulness in order to manage this heterogeneous society, whose complicated mechanism is easily damaged, separated, and disintegrated by the slightest controversy.

The most perfect system of government is that which results in the greatest possible measure of happiness and the maximum of social security (*seguridad social*) and political stability. The laws enacted by the first Congress gave us reason to hope that happiness would be the lot of Venezuela; and, through your laws, we must hope that security and stability will perpetuate this happiness. *You* must solve the problem. But how, having broken all the shackles of our former oppression, can we accomplish the enormous task of preventing the remnants of our past fetters from becoming liberty-destroying weapons? The vestiges of Spanish domination will long be with us before we can completely eradicate them: the contagion of despotism infests the atmosphere about us, and neither the fires of war nor the healing properties of our salutary laws have purified the air we breathe. Our hands are now free, but our hearts still suffer the ills of slavery. When man loses freedom, said Homer, he loses half his spirit.

Venezuela had, has, and should have a republican government. Its principles should be the sovereignty of the people, division of powers, civil liberty, proscription of slavery, and the abolition of monarchy and privileges. We need equality to recast, so to speak, into a unified nation, the classes of men, political opinions, and public custom. Let us now consider the vast field of problems yet to be traversed. Let us focus our attention upon the dangers we must avoid. Let history serve us as a guide in this survey. First, Athens affords us the most brilliant example of an absolute democracy, but at

the same time Athens herself is the most melancholy example of the extreme weakness of this type of government. The wisest legislator in Greece did not see his republic survive ten years; and he suffered the humiliation of admitting that absolute democracy is inadequate in governing any form of society, even the most cultured, temperate, and limited, because its brilliance comes only in lightning flashes of liberty. We must recognize, therefore, that, although Solon disillusioned the world, he demonstrated to society how difficult it is to govern men by laws alone.

The Republic of Sparta, which might appear to be but a chimerical invention, produced more tangible results than all the ingenious labors of Solon. Glory, virtue, morality, and, consequently, national felicity, were the results of Lycurgus' legislation. Although two kings in one state meant two monsters to devour it, Sparta had little to regret because of its dual throne; whereas Athens promised itself a most brilliant future replete with absolute sovereignty, free and frequent election of magistrates, and moderate, wise, and politic laws. Pisistratus, the usurper and tyrant, accomplished more for Athens than did her laws; and Pericles, although also an usurper, was her most useful citizen. The Republic of Thebes existed only during the lifetimes of Pelopidas and Epaminondas; because there are times when men, not principles, constitute governments. Codes, systems, statutes, wise as they may be, are useless works having but small influence on societies: virtuous men, patriotic men, learned men make republics.

The Roman Constitution brought power and fortune such as no other people in the world have ever known. It did not provide for an exact distribution of powers. The consuls, senate, and people were alternately legislators, magistrates, and judges; everyone participated in all powers. The executive, comprising two consuls, was subject to the same weakness as was that of Sparta. Despite this weakness, the Republic did not experience the disastrous discord that would appear to have been unavoidable in a magistrature composed of two individuals with equal authority, each possessing the powers of a monarch. A government whose sole purpose was conquest would hardly seem destined to insure the happiness of a nation; but an enormous and strictly warlike government lifted Rome to the highest splendor of virtue and glory, and made of this earth a Roman dominion, thereby demonstrating to man what

political virtues can accomplish and the relative unimportance of institutions.

Passing from ancient to modern times, we find England and France attracting the attention of all nations and affording them a variety of lessons in matters of government. The evolution (*revolución*) of these two great peoples, like a flaming meteor, has flooded the world with such a profusion of political enlightenment that today every thinking person is aware of the rights and duties of man and the nature of the virtues and vices of governments. All can now appreciate the intrinsic merit of the speculative theories of modern philosophers and legislators. In fact, this political star, in its illuminating career, has even fired the hearts of the apathetic Spaniards, who, having also been thrown into the political whirlpool, made ephemeral efforts to establish liberty; but, recognizing their incapacity for living under the sweet rule of law, they have returned to their immemorial practices of imprisonment and burnings at the stake.

Here, Legislators, is the place to repeat what the eloquent Volney says in the preface of his *Ruins of Palmyra*: "To the newborn peoples of the Spanish Indies, to the generous leaders who guide them toward freedom: may the mistakes and misfortunes of the Old World teach wisdom and happiness to the New." May the teachings of experience be not lost; and may the schools of Greece, Rome, France, England, and North America instruct us in the difficult science of creating and preserving nations through laws that are proper, just, legitimate, and, above all, useful. We must never forget that the excellence of a government lies not in its theories, not in its form or mechanism, but in its being suited to the nature and character of the nation for which it is instituted.

Among the ancient and modern nations, Rome and Great Britain are the most outstanding. Both were born to govern and to be free and both were built not on ostentatious forms of freedom, but upon solid institutions. Thus I recommend to you, Representatives, the study of the British Constitution, for that body of laws appears destined to bring about the greatest possible good for the peoples that adopt it; but however perfect it may be, I am by no means proposing that you imitate it slavishly. When I speak of the British government,

I only refer to its republican features; and, indeed, can a political system be labelled a monarchy when it recognizes popular sovereignty, division and balance of powers, civil liberty, freedom of conscience and of press, and all that is politically sublime? Can there be more liberty in any other type of republic? Can more be asked of any society? I commend this Constitution to you as that most worthy of serving as model for those who aspire to the enjoyment of the rights of man and who seek all the political happiness which is compatible with the frailty of human nature.

Nothing in our fundamental laws would have to be altered were we to adopt a legislative power similar to that held by the British Parliament. Like the North Americans, we have divided national representation into two chambers: that of Representatives and the Senate. The first is very wisely constituted. It enjoys all its proper functions, and it requires no essential revision, because the Constitution, in creating it, gave it the form and powers which the people deemed necessary in order that they might be legally and properly represented. If the Senate were hereditary rather than elective, it would, in my opinion, be the basis, the tie, the very soul of our republic. In political storms this body would arrest the thunderbolts of the government and would repel any violent popular reaction. Devoted to the government because of a natural interest in its own preservation, a hereditary senate would always oppose any attempt on the part of the people to infringe upon the jurisdiction and authority of their magistrates. It must be confessed that most men are unaware of their best interests and that they constantly endeavor to assail them in the hands of their custodians — the individual clashes with the mass, and the mass with authority. It is necessary, therefore, that in all governments there be a neutral body to protect the injured and disarm the offender. To be neutral, this body must not owe its origin to appointment by the government or to election by the people, if it is to enjoy a full measure of independence which neither fears nor expects anything from these two sources of authority. The hereditary senate, as a part of the people, shares its interests, its sentiments, and its spirit. For this reason it should not be presumed that a hereditary senate would ignore the interests of the people or forget its legislative duties. The senators in Rome and in the

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House of Lords in London have been the strongest pillars upon which the edifice of political and civil liberty has rested.

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The creation of a hereditary senate would in no way be a violation of political equality. I do not solicit the establishment of a nobility, for, as a celebrated republican has said, that would simultaneously destroy equality and liberty. What I propose is an office for which the candidates must prepare themselves, an office that demands great knowledge and the ability to acquire such knowledge. All should not be left to chance and the outcome of elections. The people are more easily deceived than is Nature perfected by art; and, although senators, it is true, would not be bred in an environment that is all virtue, it is equally true that they would be raised in an atmosphere of enlightened education. Furthermore, the liberators of Venezuela are entitled to occupy forever a high rank in the Republic that they have brought into existence. I believe that posterity would view with regret the effacement of the illustrious names of its first benefactors. I say, moreover, that it is a matter of public interest and national honor, of gratitude on Venezuela's part, to honor gloriously, until the end of time, a race of virtuous, prudent, and persevering men who, overcoming every obstacle, have founded the Republic at the price of the most heroic sacrifices. And if the people of Venezuela do not applaud the elevation of their benefactors, then they are unworthy to be free, and they will never be free.

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Nothing is as disturbing to harmony among the powers of government as their intermixture. Nothing is more dangerous with respect to the people than a weak executive; and if a kingdom has deemed it necessary to grant the executive so many powers, then in a republic these powers are infinitely more indispensable.

If we examine this difference, we will find that the balance of power between the branches of government must be distributed in two ways. In republics the executive should be the stronger, for everything conspires against it; while in monarchies the legislative power should be superior, as

everything works in the monarch's favor. The people's veneration of royal power results in a self-fascination that tends greatly to increase the superstitious respect paid to such authority. The splendor inherent in the throne, the crown, and the purple; the formidable support that it receives from the nobility; the immense wealth that a dynasty accumulates from generation to generation; and the fraternal protection that kings grant to one another are the significant advantages that work in favor of royal authority, thereby rendering it almost unlimited. Consequently, the significance of these same advantages should serve to justify the necessity of investing the chief magistrate of a republic with a greater measure of authority than that possessed by a constitutional prince.

A republican magistrate is an individual set apart from society, charged with checking the impulse of the people toward license and the propensity of judges and administrators toward abuse of the laws. He is directly subject to the legislative body, the senate, and the people: he is the one man who resists the combined pressure of the opinions, interests and passions of the social state and who, as Carnot states, does little more than struggle constantly with the urge to dominate and the desire to escape domination. He is, in brief, an athlete pitted against a multitude of athletes.

Therefore, let the entire system of government be strengthened, and the balance of power be drawn up in such a manner that it will be permanent and incapable of decay because of its own tenuity. Precisely because no form of government is so weak as the democratic, its framework must be firmer, and its institutions must be studied to determine their degree of stability. Unless this is done, we must plan on the establishment of an experimental rather than a permanent system of government; and we will have to reckon with an ungovernable, tumultuous, and anarchic society, not with a social order where happiness, peace, and justice prevail.

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The formation of a stable government requires as a foundation a national spirit, having as its objective a uniform concentration on two cardinal factors, namely, moderation of the popular will and limitation of public authority. The extremes, which these two factors theoretically establish, are

difficult to define in practice; but it can well be conceived that the maxim that must guide them is mutual limitation and concentration of power, in order that there may be the least possible friction between the popular will and the constituted public authority. The science of achieving this balance is acquired almost imperceptibly, through practice and study. Progress in the practice of this science is hastened by progress in the enlightenment of the people, and integrity of mind and spirit speeds the progress of enlightenment.

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Popular education should be the primary concern of the paternal love of Congress. Morality and enlightenment are the foundations of a republic; morality and enlightenment constitute our primary needs. From Athens let us take her censors and domestic tribunals; and, having effected a holy alliance of these moral institutions, let us revive in the world the idea of a people who, not content to be free and strong, desire also to be virtuous. From Sparta let us take her austere institutions; and, when from these three springs we have made a fountain of virtue, let us endow our republic with a fourth power having jurisdiction over the youth, the hearts of men, public spirit, good customs, and republican ethics. Let us establish an Areopagus to watch over the education of our youth and to promote national enlightenment.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS OF BOLIVIA
(From Lecuna and Bierck, *Selected Writings of Bolívar*,
II, 596-606)

Lima, May 25, 1826.

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Legislators! Your duty compels you to avoid a struggle with two monstrous enemies, who, although they are themselves ever locked in mortal combat, will attack you at once. *Tyranny* and *anarchy* constitute an immense sea of oppression encircling a tiny island of freedom that is perpetually battered by the forces of the waves and the hurricane that ceaselessly threatens to submerge it. Beware, then, of the sea that you are about to cross in a fragile bark with so inexperienced a pilot at the helm.

My draft of a constitution for Bolivia provides for four branches of government, an additional one having been devised without affecting the time-honored powers of any of the others. The electoral (legislative) branch has been accorded powers not granted it in other reputedly very liberal governments. These powers resemble, in great part, those of the federal system. I have thought it expedient and desirable, and also feasible, to accord to the most direct representatives of the people privileges that the citizens of every department, province, and canton probably desire most. Nothing is more important to a citizen than the right to elect his legislators, governors, judges, and pastors. The electoral college of each province represents its needs and interests and serves as a forum from which to denounce any infractions of the laws or abuses of the magistrates. I might, with some truth, describe this as a form of representation providing the rights enjoyed by individual governments in federal systems. In this manner, additional weight has been placed in the balance to check the executive; the government will acquire greater guarantees, a more popular character, and a greater claim to be numbered among the most democratic of governments.

Every ten citizens will elect one elector, and thus the nation will be represented by a tenth of its citizens. Ability is the only prerequisite for this post. It is not necessary to possess property to have the august right of representing popular sovereignty. The elector must, however, be able to write out his ballots, sign his name, and read the laws. He must be skilled in some trade or useful art that assures him an honest living. The only disqualifications are those of crime, idleness, and utter ignorance. Understanding and honesty, rather than wealth, are the sole requirements for exercising the public trust.

The legislative body is so composed that its parts will necessarily be in harmony. It will not find itself divided for lack of an arbiter, as is the case where there are only two chambers. Since this legislature has three parts, disagreement between two can be settled by the third. The issue is thus examined by two contending parties and decided by an impartial third party. In this way no useful law is without effect; at least it shall have been reviewed once, twice, and a third time before being discarded. In all matters between two contending

parties, a third party is named to render the decision. Would it not be absurd, therefore, if, in matters of the deepest concern to the nation, this expedient, dictated by practical necessity, were scorned? The chambers will thus observe toward each other the consideration which is indispensable in preserving the unity of the Congress, which must deliberate without passion and with the calm of wisdom. Our modern congresses, I shall be told, consist of only two houses. This is because England, which has provided the model, was forced to have the nobility and the people represented in two chambers; and, while the same pattern was followed in North America where there is no nobility, it may be presumed that the habits acquired under British rule inspired this imitation. The fact is that two deliberating bodies are always found to be in conflict. It was for this reason that Sieyès insisted on only one — a classic error.

The first body (I propose) is the Chamber of Tribunes. It has the right to initiate laws pertaining to finance, peace, and war. It exercises the immediate supervision of the departments administered by the executive branch with a minimum of interference by the legislative branch.

The Senators enact the codes of law and the ecclesiastical regulations and supervise the courts and public worship. The Senate shall appoint the prefects, district judges, governors, *corregidores*, and all the lesser officials in the department of justice. It shall submit to the Chamber of Censors nominations for members of the Supreme Court, archbishops, prebendaries, and canons. Everything relating to religion and the laws comes within the province of the Senate.

The Censors exercise a political and moral power not unlike that of the Areopagus of Athens and the censors of Rome. They are the prosecuting attorneys (*fiscales*) against the government in defense of the Constitution and popular rights, to see that these are strictly observed. Under their aegis has been placed the power of national judgment, which is to decide whether or not the administration of the executive is satisfactory.

The Censors are to safeguard morality, the sciences, the arts, education, and the press. The Censors exercise the most fearful yet the most august authority. They can condemn to

eternal opprobrium arch criminals and usurpers of the sovereign authority. They can bestow public honors upon citizens who have distinguished themselves by their probity and public service. The sceptre of glory has been placed in their hands, for which reason the Censors must possess integrity and a conduct above reproach. For any trespass on their part, however slight, they shall be prosecuted. To these high priests of the laws I have entrusted the preservation of our sacred tablets, as it is for them to denounce the violators of these laws.

The President of the Republic, in our Constitution, becomes the sun which, fixed in its orbit, imparts life to the universe. This supreme authority must be perpetual, for in non-hierarchical systems, more than in others, a fixed point is needed about which leaders and citizens, men and affairs can revolve. "Give me a point where I may stand," said an ancient sage, "and I will move the earth." For Bolivia this point is the life-term President "*presidente vitalicio*." Upon him rests our entire order, notwithstanding his lack of powers. Not only has he been rendered headless in order that none may fear his intentions, but his hands have been tied so that he can do no harm.

The President of Bolivia enjoys many of the powers of the [North] American chief executive but with limitations that favor the people. His term of office is that enjoyed by the President of Haiti. For Bolivia, I have borrowed the executive system of the most democratic republic in the world.

The island of Haiti, if you will permit the digression, was in a state of perpetual insurrection. Having experimented with an empire, a kingdom, and a republic, in fact every known type of government and more besides, the people were compelled to call upon the illustrious Petion to save them. After they had put their trust in him, Haiti's destinies pursued a steady course. Petion was made President for life, with the right to choose his successor. Thus, neither the death of that great man nor the advent of a new president imperiled that state in the slightest. Under the worthy Boyer, everything has proceeded as tranquilly as in a legitimate monarchy. There you have conclusive proof that a *life-term president, with the power to choose his successor*, is the most sublime inspiration amongst republican regimes.

Legislators, from this day forth liberty will be indestructible in America. Observe the savage character of our continent, which of itself bars a monarchical order, for the deserts invite independence. Here, there are not great nobles or churchmen. Our wealth has amounted to little, and it is no greater today. The Church, though not without influence, is far from seeking domination as it is satisfied to insure its own preservation. Without these supporting factors, tyrants cannot survive, and, should any ambitious soul aspire to make himself emperor, there are Dessalines, Christophe, and Iturbide to warn him of what he may expect. No power is harder to maintain than that of a newly crowned prince.

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The constitutional limitations upon the President of Bolivia are the narrowest ever known. He can appoint only the officials of the Ministries of the Treasury, Peace, and War; and he is Commander in Chief of the army. These are his only powers.

Administration is the province of the Cabinet, which is responsible to the Censors and subject to the close vigilance of every legislator, governor, judge, and citizen. The revenue officers and soldiers, who are agents of the Cabinet alone, are hardly the persons calculated to make it the object of public affection, and therefore its influence will be next to nothing.

Of all the higher officials, the Vice President is the one with the most limited power. He must obey both the legislative and the executive branches of a republican government. From the former he receives the laws, and from the latter his instructions, and he must proceed between these two branches, following the narrowest of paths, with precipices on either side.

The President of the Republic will appoint the Vice President, who will administer the affairs of the state and succeed the President in office. By means of this device we shall avoid elections, which result in that great scourge of republics — anarchy, which is the handmaiden of tyranny, the most imminent and terrible peril of popular government. Compare the tremendous crises in republics when a change of rulers takes place with the equivalent situation in legitimate monarchies.

The most perfect guarantees have been provided for the individual. *Civil liberty* is the one true freedom; the others

are nominal, or they affect the citizens slightly. The inviolability of the individual — the true purpose of society and the source of all other safeguards — is guaranteed. *Property rights* will be covered by a civil code, which you should wisely draft in due time for the good of your fellow-citizens. I have left intact that law of laws — *equality*. Neglect it, and all rights and safeguards will vanish. We must make every sacrifice for it and, at its feet, cast the dishonored and infamous relics of slavery.

Legislators, slavery is the negation of all law, and any law which should perpetuate it would be a sacrilege. What justification can there be for its perpetuation? Examine this crime from every aspect and tell me if there is a single Bolivian so depraved as to wish to sanctify by law this shameless violation of human dignity. One man owned by another! A man reduced to a chattel! An image of God coupled to the yoke like a beast! Where are the legal claims of the enslavers of men?

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Legislators, I shall mention one item which my conscience has compelled me to omit. A political constitution should not prescribe any particular religion, for, according to the best doctrines, fundamental laws guarantee political and civil rights, and, since religion has no bearing upon these rights, it is by nature indefinable in the social organization, because it lies in the moral and intellectual sphere. Religion governs man in his home, within his own walls, within himself. Religion alone is entitled to examine a man's innermost conscience. Laws, on the contrary, deal with surface things; they are applicable outside the home of a citizen. If we apply these criteria, how can a state rule the conscience of its subjects, enforce the observance of religious laws, and mete out rewards and punishments, when the tribunals are in Heaven and God is the judge? Only the Inquisition could presume to do their work on earth. Would you bring back the Inquisition with its burnings at the stake?

Religion is the law of conscience. Any law that imposes it negates it, because to apply compulsion to conscience is to destroy the value of faith, which is the very essence of religion. The sacred precepts and doctrines are useful, enlightening, and spiritually nourishing. We should all avow them, but the obligation is moral rather than political.

JOSE JOAQUIN FERNANDEZ DE LIZARDI
(1776-1827)

México

The chief fame of Fernández de Lizardi arises from his authorship of a picaresque novel, *El Periquillo Sarniento* (The Itching Parrot). Because of the essential Americanism and nationalism of this novel and of his other works, critics speak of him as the founder of Mexican national literature. But his authorship of *The Mexican Thinker* (*El Pensador Mexicano*), a journal or series of pamphlets published in 1812-1814, gave him almost equal fame as a leader in the shaping of political and social ideas during the Mexican movement for independence.

In social thought as in literature, Fernández de Lizardi represents the transition from the natural law rationalism of the American and French Revolutions to the newer romantic liberalism. Moreover, he was essentially a spokesman of the dominant creole class whose position was threatened, not only by Spanish authority, but by the unrest of the masses stirred by the Hidalgo uprising. His attacks upon the shiboleths of creole society were vitriolic, his proposals for social reform were always democratic in direction, and he was anything but aristocratic in his personal life. Yet, as in the case of Bolívar and many of his contemporaries, his thought has aristocratic overtones and an attitude of noblesse oblige which reveals the prejudices and interests of his social class. He was an ardent defender of the masonic order and mildly anti-clerical, if anything from his sharply critical pen may be described as mild.

Until his last years, Lizardi favored Mexican autonomy within the structure of Spanish monarchy, fearing the social revolutionary effects of a sudden transition to a republic. Like others of his class, he supported Iturbide's plans for Mexican independence until the latter revealed himself in the role of an American Napoleon by having himself proclaimed emperor. The *Conversations of the Peasant and the Sacristan* was first published shortly after Iturbide's overthrow, in the midst of the constitutional discussions which led to the adoption of the Constitution of 1825. Behind the tongue-in-cheek humor, which is sharply critical of bigotry, superstition, and authoritarianism in general, may be seen the romantic liberal concept of the good society, with its reliance upon natural virtue, its belief

in freedom of the will, its emphasis upon moral education, upon the abolition of monopolies, and upon simple humanitarian and political reforms. The influence of the utilitarianism of Bentham may be seen, and much of what may be called social and economic utopianism, as in the suggestions for agrarian reform and agricultural colonies. In its very form, of course, the work is a utopia. Echoes of Lizardi's earlier monarchism also appear, as well as numerous suggestions of his aristocratic distrust of popular tendencies.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The *Conversaciones del payo y el sacristán* was published in two volumes of some 200 pages each in Mexico by D. Mariano Ontiveros, in 1824. Selections from this and other writings of Fernández de Lizardi are most readily available in the edition, Biblioteca del Estudiante Universitario, under the title *El Pensador Mexicano* (Mexico: La Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1940), including a critical study by Agustín Yáñez. The excerpt which follows is translated from that edition.

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POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF AN
IMAGINARY REPUBLIC

BY JOSÉ JOAQUÍN FERNÁNDEZ DE LIZARDI

(From *Conversaciones del payo y el sacristán*. Translated from *El pensador mexicano* by Agustín Yáñez. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1940, pp. 133-181).

S. [Sacristán] So Congress has now taken a recess?

P. [El payo] What is a recess, *compadre*?

S. I think it is a suspension of the sessions.

P. They will not open again until next January?

S. So they say.

P. Caramba, what a long vacation!

S. But they need it. The señores have worked hard.

P. I wish I knew what public and general benefits the republic could see in the labors and anxieties the legislature has undergone during the last five months.

S. They must be very great; but since it is a work requiring much time, time alone will tell. That is, they have treated very grave affairs, not even neglecting to give rewards to importers of guanacos, camels, and other beasts of prey, which ought to bring great benefit to the republic.

P. That is why I have always wanted to be a deputy, because the opportunity to serve one's country with his talents is a very great thing.

S. Certainly so; I have also been plagued with similar desires; and now there occurs to me a scheme whereby the two of us may satisfy this furious appetite that we have to be legislators.

P. And how can that be, *compadre*, since we are mere laymen, sacristans and ranchers?

S. Don't let that bother you; the task of reforming the world is easy, especially if the reforms are made without opposition. Plato made his Republic, Fenelon his *Telemaque*, Thomas Moore his *Utopia*, Father Causinio¹ his *Holy Court*, and others likewise. So what obstacle can you see to our making a Mexican constitution, destroying abuses, and opening the doors of abundance and general welfare with our wise laws?

P. *Compadre*, are you crazy? What greater obstacle can there be than our obvious ignorance? What do we know

1. Nicolas Caussin, Jesuit confessor of Louis XIII (1583-1651)?

about public law, politics, economics, or the countless trifles which one must know to carry out the difficult task of a legislator?

S. You surely drown yourself in shallow water. What makes you think that a deputy must know so much? No, friend. Being patriotic and having good intentions is enough, plus knowing how to quote at the right time Montesquieu, Filangieri² Benjamín Constant, Payne, Madame Stael, Bentham, and other classical authors. *Ave María purísima!* With that one can pass for a Seneca; and if the deputy knows a little about the English constitution and the Napoleonic Code, then, indeed, there is nothing more to be asked for.

P. But all this does not convince me, compadre, because we don't even know that.

S. But we are patriotic.

P. That virtue helps, but it is not enough to make a legislator, if he lacks knowledge. A medical charlatan, however kind a heart he may have, will kill the patients he treats with his good intentions, because he lacks medical science; thus a political charlatan will make bad laws, however much patriotism he may spew out.

S. But why do we need to worry about our mistakes? What chance is there that our laws or our ideas will be put into practise or have to be obeyed? Whom will they injure, however ridiculous and stupid they may be? No one. Then what harm do we need to expect from our new laws?

P. And if by pure chance we happen to say something good, will it be admitted? No. Then what reward will come to us for these favors? It's all foolish compadre. Cast out that ill thought. Remember that we are not men of letters; that you are nothing but a sacristan, and I nothing but a country fellow.

S. That does not scare me. I have seen ranchers who seem to be men of letters and men of letters who seem to be ranchers. So, bang! Our hands to the job, and let us organize the republic to our own taste. You will be the Senate and I the Chamber of Deputies. Between us two we will discuss our proposals, and as soon as we are in accord we will settle upon the respective articles.

2. Gaetano Filangieri (1752-1788), Italian physiocrat.

P. Go to a thousand devils, compadre! You have started something which is going to drive me crazy. However, I make only one demand of you, and that is that these conversations shall not be printed.

S. And why?

P. Because I am now thinking that we are going to bray so loudly that we might expect to be hissed at and stoned in the street.

S. Don't fear. In Mexico they are quite circumspect and are not frightened by braying. We may be sure that after we have labored in the public interest our brilliant productions will be buried in oblivion.

P. And what if they are brilliant blunders?

S. Those are printed with more ostentation and are sold with more esteem, as experience proves. So, don't be a coward. Let's begin.

P. But what if I don't know where to start?

S. Wherever you please. Perhaps something will direct our mouths. We will begin by dividing up the land, we will establish the form of government, we will separate the powers, we will arrange the militia, and we will write the penal code. And we will speak of whatever gives us pleasure. The important thing is that we must try to speak with some air of novelty, so that we may appear to be inventors, not imitators. Because, to copy our constitution, that of Jalisco, or elsewhere—anyone does that. The thing is to say new things even though they be stupid.

P. Let's begin. Shall everyone born in any state or territory of the Mexican Federation be a citizen?

S. Do you see? Those are old chestnuts. It is a plagiarism of the Spanish constitution, of ours, and that of Jalisco. Why not make all foreigners citizens? Is not man a citizen of the world? Then why these odious distinctions? After four days of residence, does not the government give them their letter of citizenship? Then what difficulty is there in giving it to them sooner? Therefore, I make this proposal: every man who may be of any use to the republic shall be a citizen³

3. See *The Itching Parrot*, Chap. xiii, Part Two (Note of A.Y.)

P. Approved; but what benefits, what distinction or privileges shall citizens enjoy to distinguish them from non-citizens?

S. Here it is necessary to take a powder, scratch the head, and look at the ceiling, because it is necessary to take into account the character and customs of the country to which the law is given and, above all, to understand man. And since the latter, full of self love, does not refrain from doing evil except for fear of the penalty, nor do good except because of interest in the reward, it would be good for those who deserve to be citizens to understand the advantages which should be attached to so honorable a title. And those who do not should, in public contempt, get the penalty which their vices merit. Moreover, the name of citizen, without real and public privileges, is an empty title, the having or not having of which matters little, unless, in the final analysis, citizens may be recognized by their appearance; and I wish that they might be known even by their dress.

P. Alright. What distinctions and privileges shall we grant them?

S. So as not to repeat too much, granted your approval, they will be mentioned in their proper place. Please write:

POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF AN IMAGINARY REPUBLIC

Title I. Concerning Citizens, Their Rights and Privileges.
Chapter I. *Concerning Citizens.*

Art. I. All men who are useful in any manner to the republic are citizens, whatever their nation of origin.

Chapter II. *Concerning Their Rights and Privileges.*

Art. 2. The rights of a citizen are those which nature grants us; of liberty, equality, security, and property. In addition he shall enjoy the right of active and passive suffrage, to elect and to be elected to public office, in proportion to his merit, talent, and services rendered to the nation.

Chapter III. *Concerning the Privileges of Citizens.*

Art. 5. In all churches and public gatherings, those whose rights of citizenship have been suspended or cancelled will yield place to those in possession of those [rights].

Chapter IV. *Concerning the Honorific Distinctions of Citizens.*

Art. 6. The honorific devices with which citizens will be distinguished from non-citizens shall be sashes, [arm] bands, and plumes of white and celestial blue colors.

Art. 12. No one may use these distinctions without having a certificate, which the governors of the states will issue, declaring him to be a citizen in the exercise of his rights.

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Art. 15. The rights of citizenship will be lost:

First. For having been tried and convicted of infamous crimes.

Second. For not having a profession or honest means of livelihood.

Art. 16. The exercise of these rights is suspended:

First. For physical or moral incapacity.

Second. For [being a] debtor to the public treasury.

Third. For habitual drunkenness.

Fourth. For appearing in ragged dress.

Fifth. For not knowing how to read or write, although this provision shall not have effect until the year 1828.

How do you like our constitution, compadre? Does it go well?

P. I think so, surely. In a populous city the promenades and public assemblies would be most colorful with so many bands and plumes; and since men are so vain and superficial, it might happen that they would abstain from committing a thousand crimes in order not to lose the use of these bagatelles, considering it a dishonor, as they should, to appear in public without them, because everyone would point the finger at them.

Hence, this simple vanity and just fear might produce healthful effects upon society. But let us discuss the form of government.

S. Does absolute monarchy seem good to you?

P. How can you have a monarch in a republic?

S. That's right. I was forgetting. There can be no monarchs. But despots, yes, and it's all the same in the long run. What you have to fear in monarchs is not their ostentation and pomp, but their sovereign despotism. Any government afflicted with this vice is as dangerous as the most absolute monarch in the world.

P. That is an undeniable truth. It's the same to me whether a dog or a bitch bites me, so long as I am bit; and if I have to live under the injustices of a despotic government, it's all the same to me whether it is called monarchic or republican.

S. Well, then, we must establish our government in such a manner that the doors are closed to don Antonio as much as possible, and this matter is your responsibility. I have already done the chapters on citizenship.

P. How can that be? What do I understand about government when I hardly know how to govern my own house!

S. Then jump whichever direction you wish and say as many absurdities as you please; after all, we are amusing ourselves. At this very hour others are gaining credit without anyone saying anything to them. So let us start and lose no more time.

P. Well, then, you write.

S. I will: you may now dictate.

Title II. Sole Chapter. Concerning the Form of Government of the Nation.

Art. 17. The government of the republic shall be representative, popular, and federal.

Art. 18. It shall be separated into legislative, executive, and judicial.

Art. 19. These powers shall never be joined in a single person or body, nor shall one power intervene in the functions of another.

Art. 20. The legislative power shall reside in a perpetual congress, composed of delegates popularly elected by all the States, whose deputies shall be replaced every two years.

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Art. 22. No ecclesiastic may be elected deputy without having demonstrated his enlightenment (*luces*), impartiality, and patriotism, and even so, when matters of ecclesiastical reform are being discussed, they [*sic*] shall not attend the sessions so as not to compromise themselves either with their superiors or with the public.

Art. 23. Deputies shall never distract attention by talking, reading, or sleeping while some matter is being discussed, because in that way, voting without knowledge of the case, they cannot vote with sure conscience nor can the nation [be secured against] their mistakes.

Art. 27. The executive power will reside in a single person elected popularly, who shall be called president of the republic, governor in the capital of the states, and territorial judge in the villages and small towns.

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Art. 30. Whenever it is proved that a public official has violated the law, he shall lose the rights of citizenship and, consequently, his office, remaining ineligible for any other honor; and if damage results to a third party from the violation, his goods shall be confiscated to satisfy it.

S. This penalty seems a good one to drive don Antonio away from the courts; but I am thinking that we are going into a great deal of detail (*que vamos con mucho orden*) and at the rate we are talking and writing we shall not finish our laws in a year. It would be better for us to go on to those most important for maintaining order, that is, to the prevention of crimes and the penalties which reduce them.

P. That means a penal code and concerns the administration of justice. But we still need many things before that. However, since you want it that way, go ahead and dictate.

S. Then write this:

Title III. *Concerning the Administration of Criminal Justice. First Chapter. Concerning Prisons.*

Art. 31. Since prisons ought not to be places of safe-keeping for the depraved, seed beds of vice, and places to torment humanity, as ours unfortunately have been, but houses of correction from which men go out less vicious than they entered, they shall, for the future, be arranged in places which are secure but [also] capacious, healthful, and well ventilated.

Art. 32. In all of them there shall be departments of trades and mechanical arts, conducted by skilled teachers, not criminals.⁴

Art. 33. If the prisoner has some trade, such as tailor, shoemaker, etc., he shall be placed with the appropriate master, who will make him work daily, and what the prisoner earns shall be divided into two parts, one for the funds of the prison and the other for him, so that he may be able to aid his family, if he has any.

Art. 34. In case the prisoner has no trade, he may choose to learn the one he wishes. Placed with the appropriate master, he shall not leave the prison until he has qualified in his trade; and this even when the crime for which he entered may have been compurgated.

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S. What are they saying around here about our constitution, compadre? Do they like it?

P. Some yes and others no. Some proclaim it an ingenious travesty, others murmur against it as something crazy, a waste of time.

S. Now indeed we are getting on. In this respect our constitution resembles all those of the world, since all encounter the same fate.

P. As far as I am concerned, at least, it pleases me greatly.

S. Right. Who is not pleased with his children, however ugly they may be? And when you hear it called the holy charter, the divine code, and the most perfect production which has emerged from the human skull, you may expect to burst, like a toad, from sheer vanity.

4. "Vagabondage is not the cause but the effect of poverty". *El Pensador Mexicano*, tomo I, Num. 6 (Note of A.Y.)

P. I will not so burst Of the latest Mexican [constitution] it has been said that it could not be improved upon, and later I read that it left many gaps to be filled. So, what confidence can we have in our imaginary and extravagant code? But this does not keep it from having certain good qualities. For example: the project on prisons is very useful and practicable.

It is true that our prisons are nothing but seed beds of vice and places of safe keeping for the depraved. Into one of them a man enters as a drunkard and emerges a gamester, he enters as a thief and comes out a sodomite, etc. The fact is, he emerges with more vices than he had upon entering, instead of coming out corrected of them, which is what ought to happen.

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Second Chapter. Criminal Code. Concerning Malicious Assassins.

Art. 37. He who kills another with malicious intent, if he is caught *in fraganti*, within three hours, in the very place where the crime was committed, shall be passed through the arms in the common manner, if the murder shall have been of this sort; and his body shall be buried together with that of the one he killed.⁵

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P. . . . But why do you say in Article 37 that he will be passed through the arms in the common manner if such shall have been the death?

S. Continue with the writing and you will see.

Art. 39. If the murder be of an extraordinarily cruel character, the criminal shall suffer the penalty of death in the same manner [as he inflicted].

P. Caramba, compadre, what a cruel law!

S. Rather, it is very clement. We are accustomed to see things the reverse of what they really are, and hence to exchange the names.

5. See *The Itching Parrot*, Chap. xvi, Part two. (Note of A.Y.)

All publicists are agreed that punishments should fit the crimes. Accordingly, five bullets which inflict instant death are not a fitting punishment for a murder which caused slow tormenting suffering. How is one to pay with a sudden death who impales some poor woman? He who kills her with a burning iron, or who attacks her with a big rocket and makes her die with her entrails scorched and blown to pieces. Indeed such cruelties have been seen, and neither the musket nor the garrote can give a death proportionate to that which the aggressor caused. So there is no escaping it. Apply the law of the talon in these cases and I assure you that such terrible homicides will not be seen.

P. But compadre: what about religion, and the Lord of Mercy, and Christian pity, and

S. The devil take such a hypocritical devotee! Religion and piety are very poorly understood when they are applied to increase offences against God and men with enormous prejudice to society

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Third Chapter. Concerning Thieves.

Art. 41. So that our republic may not come to be so infested with thieves as others unfortunately appear to be, where one may not go out to the *garita*⁶ except with a convoy, we decree the following:

First. Anyone who robs, in country or village, in the sum of ten pesos or less, shall suffer ten years of labor in public works in the colonies which ought to be established.

Second. Anyone who robs a sum of ten pesos and up, whatever may be the excess, shall suffer the penalty of death.

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Sole Chapter. Concerning Inebriates, Gamesters, Ragged Beggars (andrajosos), and Vagabonds.

Art. 42. Anyone found thrown out in the street drunk, or uttering in such a state obscene and scandalous words, shall receive for the first time three months of public work, for the second one year, and for the third ten in the colonies.

6. A small guardhouse, usually at the outskirts of a city.

Art. 44. No ragged, dirty, or unshod person shall enter the theatres, public parks, or churches during public functions.

Art. 47. Whenever it is ascertained that there is a vagabond, they shall seize him and report to the government, which will determine whether he does not work because he lacks a place or because he has no trade. If the former, the government shall have him examined and, finding him skilled, direct that he be given something to do in the national shops which will be mentioned later. If the second, that is, if he is unemployed through not knowing a trade, he shall be permitted to choose the one he prefers and shall be placed in the corresponding shop to learn it. If he is single, he shall not leave the shop except on fiesta days, under the responsibility of the master; under bond he may be permitted to retire at night to his house.

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S. Not only must we talk of vagabond men; we also need laws against vagabond women. Among women, especially those of the lower classes, there is a scandalous vagabondage. Every day one meets in the streets a multitude of harpies who resemble bunches of celery (*manojos de apio*), drunken females by the thousand, and girls prostituted before their time; and it is impossible to find a woman servant to work. That means that they prefer miserable idleness to the chance to work. They must be strapped up (*Preciso es ponerlas en cintura*). Please write.

Art. 50. Every vagabond woman, if she is unmarried and is found cast into the street or creating a disturbance, shall be taken to prison, where she shall work at milling and cooking for the prisoners, and she shall stay there until she finds a place to work.

Art. 51. Every curate, when any couple comes to be married, shall get from the man careful information as to whether he has a trade or honest means of livelihood to support his family; and in the case of his not having it, shall refuse to marry them, considering inutility and idleness as an impediment.

P. This article seems very good to me, because one sees nothing else every day but marriages contracted to satisfy the instincts of nature, with the result that these vagabonds make

their wives and families unhappy, and it is much better for them not to marry.

It would seem to me very interesting to stamp out idleness, and this should receive the serious attention of lawmakers; because meanwhile more vagabonds and more vicious persons will proliferate, and a republic can never progress overloaded with vicious persons. But compadre, it is not enough to recognize the evil. It is necessary to apply the remedy, and this is the difficulty I find in our case.

It is more than clear that industry is very depressed in our republic; the trades are paralyzed and those who profess them find nothing to work at, especially since the arrival of the English manufactures. To try to keep them from coming in is impolitic and unjust: impolitic because it would violate the treaties of commerce and unjust because everyone is free to dress himself the best and cheapest possible with his own money. So you see how difficult I find it for the trades to progress in our land and for vagabonds and vicious persons to be got rid of.

S. On that account we must try all possible means. To achieve small successes does not take much talent: to face up to great difficulties talent and tenacity are necessary. I do not presume to have the first, but since this is nothing but a diversion, write please, and even if I dictate crazy things, the nation will know that my intention is good.

Title IV. Concerning the Sources of National Wealth and the Manner of Making them Communicable among all the Citizens. First Chapter. Agriculture.

Art. 52. The government shall found such settlements as it can in the broad territory which this new world offers, and these settlements shall be called, for the term of ten years, Free Colonies of the Mexican Federation.

Art. 53. Every voluntary married settler will be given at government cost a pair of oxen, a plow, a sheep and two ewes, a cock and three hens, two hogs (male and female), a measure of maize, and the necessary working tools, plus one hundred pesos for his travel and his house.

Art. 54. To free unmarried settlers shall be given one half less.

Art. 55. When they present themselves to the magistrate of the colony, the latter will indicate the place where they can build their house and what they will get in maize lands, in proportion to the leagues which the colony possesses.

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Art. 63. It being unjust for four hacendados to own most of a new world with notorious prejudice to the rest, for it is well known that there are rich men who own ten, twelve, or more haciendas, some of which can not be traversed in four days, at the same time that there are millions of individuals who do not have a palm of land of their own, the present agrarian law is decreed, limited to the following points:

First. No hacienda, however great it may be, shall have more than four square leagues, and the excess shall be handed over to the federal government.

Second. The government will indemnify the proprietors, paying them just prices for the value of the lands they give up.

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S. Come on, compadre, it is your turn to make the laws on the manner of encouraging industry and the [mechanical] arts.

P. Don't think that, compadre. What do I know of any trade? Perhaps if you were talking about farming I might happen to say something to the point, because I am a rancher; but about trades and industries, I am damned (*maldito*) if I understand a word.

S. No, that's a trick of yours to get out of it; but it won't do you any good.

To dictate laws favoring the trades it is not necessary to be an artisan. It is enough to be a philosopher and a patriot, and you lack neither of these things. Do you remember telling me that "better are the laws which eliminate vice than those which impose punishment upon the vicious"? Do you recall that you also said to me that the best way to wipe out thieves is to encourage industry and diminish poverty, since while the latter flourishes there will be no lack of the former.

P. Yes, I remember all that.

S. Alright. You see you have the necessary ability to make laws about industry.

P. That proves that I wish it to improve, but not that I am capable of dictating the measures for that [purpose]; and much less at the present time, when English manufactures leave nothing for the natives of the country to make.

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S. Men have always sought and achieved their welfare by whatever means they could. *Necessity* obliged them, *utility* gave them skill, and *good taste*, or if you prefer, *luxury*, perfected them. The first men, I think, covered themselves with the skins of animals; this necessity dictated to them. They noticed the inconvenience of this dress and invented the first cloth woven of hair or wool; I suppose it was very coarse, but they found it an improvement, and to this utility persuaded them. Finally, now skilled in weaving, they put their hands to silk and linen, scarlet and purple cloth, gold and silver, pearls and precious stones to adorn and decorate themselves; this luxury or good taste taught them.

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P. To avoid my being a nuisance, write my crazy ideas.
First Chapter. Concerning Encouragement of Industry and the Trades.

Art. 64. It being clear that profit (*intérés*) is the first incentive which moves the passions of men, whoever they may be, the President of the Republic is authorized by proclamation to encourage skilled foreigners to come to live on our soil, under the following conditions:

First. They shall present themselves to the commissioner of the government and state what trade they know and in what degree [of skill].

Second. If it turns out to be of the highest, that is, if they should be masters in the trade, to the satisfaction of men of intelligence, the nation shall furnish them, in its federal government and in those of the states where they wish to settle, house, tools, and money to establish their shops.

Third. These shall be called National Shops, and the works which are carried on shall be for the benefit of the State which protects them, and the profits shall be theirs.

Fourth. It shall be the duty of the foreign masters to receive as apprentices those whom the respective governments of the States send to them, and for each *good* artisan which they deliver they shall be paid two hundred pesos.

Fifth. The moment a foreign master presents himself and is admitted to establish a public shop, he shall be given his card of citizenship. Moreover, for all products made by his American apprentices the master shall receive the alcabala,⁷ for which purpose he will place his individual mark, which the government shall only make known in order to communicate it to the customs office, without declaring the name of the master.

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(The section here omitted includes El Pensador's protest against the action of the Ecclesiastical Council in refusing to replace the royal arms with those of the republic and sets forth a plan of ecclesiastical reform, including Art. 87 which would require the clergy to teach in sermons that all men are free by nature, that true liberty arises from acceptance of civil authority, i.e. freedom to do good and fear of evil, that all men are brothers, and should not quarrel over religious differences. H.E.D.)

Title IV. Sole Chapter. Concerning Freedom of the Press.

Art. 90. Every inhabitant of Mexico is free to write, print, and publish his ideas in any way he can, under the conditions set forth in the following Regulation of the Press. All men are free to express their thoughts in print or by the spoken word; but so that this liberty may not be abused with prejudice to the public order, the following articles shall be observed:

First. Classifications of subversive, seditious, and alarming in the first, second, and third degrees, shall be suppressed, and publications shall be considered only as subversive, scandalous, and injurious.

Second. Every publication which directly attacks the form of the established government shall be subversive, provided there remains no doubt of the evil intent of the author.

7. A sales tax.

Third. All writing which directly attacks religious dogma shall be scandalous, the jury taking into account that abuses are not dogmas. Likewise, all obscene publications or those which notoriously demoralize the people shall be considered scandalous.

Fourth. All writings which publish the private shortcomings of citizens shall be considered injurious; but those which accuse public officials shall not deserve such classification, provided the authors submit themselves to proof.

Fifth. The author of a subversive paper, upon judgment of the jury, shall be exiled, and if he is a clergyman his property shall be taken.

* * * * *

Eighth. There shall be two public prosecutors of [abuses of] freedom of the press who will denounce such publications as appear to them [to deserve it]; but they shall be obliged to sustain their denunciations against the author before the jury, and if the latter declares him absolved, the prosecutor shall pay a fine of two hundred pesos to the author and shall be discharged from his office with a notation of *unjust and inept*. The session was raised.

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Art. 92. So that no one may allege ignorance of the laws which they should obey, nor of the penalties which are provided for their violation, there shall be placed on every street corner of the capitals and towns of the federation some marble tablets, if possible, upon which shall stand in large letters, well written, the punishment which the law provides for the violator. For example: in Mexico, on the corner of Tacuba street, there will be a tablet or stone on which these words may be read: *Penal Code, Law such and such, He who robs in the sum of ten pesos or more shall die.*

Art. 93. In all court rooms there shall be a public epigraph in which in large letters will be read by [the magistrates] and by the criminals and the witnesses these words:

OH YOU WHO ADMINISTER JUSTICE!
IN JUDGING THIS CRIMINAL
REMEMBER THAT THE LAW MUST JUDGE YOU.

P. What attention will they pay to that? Thousands of times they have noted the same thing in public papers, and

as many more [times] we see that those who ought to set the example of their most religious observance, not only conceal crimes but violate the law [themselves]; and so they will laugh at such an inscription.

S. That might be in a republic where the laws are decreed and published but not executed; but in my republic it would not be so; because they would have to be carried out punctually and without exception as to persons. Please write.

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Art. 102. For the present and until five years after Spain recognizes our independence, the republic shall have an armed force of one hundred thousand veterans, well paid, accoutred, and disciplined.

Art. 103. Nor shall it be overlooked, but as soon as possible there shall be developed a national militia, whose members shall enjoy military privilege and wear uniforms, [since] they are no less useful than the others [merely] because they serve without pay. The encouragement of this kind of troops, when they are placed under wise and unified plans, has great importance for inspiring citizens with a martial spirit and the most determined patriotism.

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Art. 111.

First. In all the garrisons there shall be introduced, as soon as possible, the Lancastrian system, by means of which all soldiers shall learn to read, write, and count.

Art. 112. Only officers or sergeants may be teachers of the troops, and they shall be paid from the funds of the batallions, as the judgment of the colonels may dictate.

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Art. 115. In each garrison there shall be teachers and departments of all trades, in which the soldiers will be taught those which suit them, such as armorers, tailors, barbers, shoemakers, etc.

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Here we will end the constitution, since it is vain to talk much and waste time; in the final analysis, all of this is preaching in the desert.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

MARIANO MORENO (1778-1811)

ARGENTINA

Mariano Moreno, in his tragically brief but brilliant career, stands forth as one of the most representative Argentine leaders of the Revolution of May (1810), which is notable among the Spanish American independence movements of that year, not only for its unique success, but for the clarity of its economic and political ideas and objectives as well. A creole from Buenos Aires, from a good but not a wealthy family, his legal education in the Caroline Academy of the University of Chuquisaca, a notable center of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, prepared Moreno to play an important role in the revolution as a spokesman of the natural law economic principles which dominated the minds of the rising political groups in France, Britain, and the United States. His economic ideas were sharpened in frequent contacts with the older Manuel Belgrano, an official of the *Consulado*, whose enthusiastic disciple he became.

Extensive British trade, much of it contraband, had helped to create in the Plata an atmosphere favorable to Moreno's three cardinal objectives: freedom of thought, freedom of commerce, and the encouragement of agriculture. His *Memoria*, recounting the Argentine defeat of the British expeditions of 1807-1808, and even more, his *Memorial of the Hacendados* (*Representación de los hacendados*) a vigorous plea for free trade, paved the way for his prominent role in the stirring events of 1810-1811.

The aristocratic liberal elite of Buenos Aires, whose interests Moreno represented, attempted at first to govern through a triumvirate, of which Moreno was for a brief time the moving spirit. This triumvirate was soon overthrown because of opposition to its liberal political and economic reforms and to some of the extreme measures to which it had resorted. Moreno, sent to England on a political mission, died aboard ship in 1811. Yet, brief as his political career had been, it had left an imprint upon government in Buenos Aires by injecting the principles of economic and social liberalism into its activity.

Moreno's greatest influence on thought was in the realm of economics, and it was his *Memorial of the Hacendados* which

established him as a pioneer in Latin American economic thought. In it one sees a forceful application of the principles of Anglo-French political economy as seen through the eyes of landowners and merchants of the rising and ambitious colonial center of commerce on the Plata. This memorial was the first really influential argument for free trade in Latin America.

It was the last of a series of memorials and representations addressed to the Viceroy of La Plata during the period when the involvement of Spain in the Napoleonic wars had brought severe economic dislocation and disruption throughout the Spanish Empire. Just prior to the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, the British had invaded the Banda Oriental (Uruguay) in 1806-07 — with economic consequences which Moreno utilized effectively in his argument. The earlier *Representación de los labradores* (1793) had asked only for the free importation of grain; but by 1809 conditions in Buenos Aires made the time ripe for the broader proposals of the *Representación de los hacendados*. It is significant that less than a year after the appearance of Moreno's memorial the triumphant revolutionists established free trade. Customs duties were not entirely abolished, to be sure, but trade was freed of the legal impediments, of the restrictions and quotas, with which commerce between the colonies of European states and other places had been fettered in the past. In his *Representación* Moreno utilized every argument that he could muster: reason, flattery, sarcasm, philosophy, irony, and satire. Although his plea to the viceroy was chiefly directed against the injustices done to the landowners, it also aimed at rallying support from other segments of society for the cause of agriculture.

The three opening paragraphs, and occasional later paragraphs or sentences have been omitted, but the translation which follows presents most of the *Memorial*.

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MEMORIAL OF THE HACENDADOS

BY MARIANO MORENO

(From Mariano Moreno, *Escritos*. Prólogo y edición crítica de Ricardo Levene. Buenos Aires: Estrada, [1943] II, 3-89).

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When you took over the government, you found that the funds and resources of the Royal Treasury had been exhausted by huge expenditures, and that you lacked the means to provide for our security. Considering these deplorable circumstances, no other alternative appeared than granting permission to the English merchants to bring their wares to this city and to export our products in return: thereby reviving our declining commerce and bringing increased revenues to the Treasury from the duties on this two way trade. Although it is well within your authority to carry out such measures as are dictated by public necessity, your desire that whatever was done should be based on knowledge of local conditions — information such as a new administration cannot readily acquire — led you to consult with the Cabildo of this city and the royal Tribunal of Commerce.

The total neglect of the landowners and farmers, who should be the chief beneficiaries of any new policy, is incompatible, however, with the principles upon which you have been acting. These persons were overlooked in the belief that they were represented in the two corporations consulted. Because their interests presumably were being defended by these bodies, they were not offered an opportunity to assert their rights. And in truth, Sir, how could a representative of the monarch, so recently arrived, imagine that our Ayuntamiento and Tribunal of Commerce had interests or desires apart from those of our agricultural producers? Since the royal decree creating the Tribunal of Commerce stipulates that this basic institution of the Cabildo will include agricultural producers—and none are more worthy of representation thereon than those who cultivate the soil on which they were born—it was natural that you should be persuaded that agricultural interests were fairly represented on the Cabildo and needed no separate hearing.

But that, señor, is not so! Our agricultural producers do not enjoy those honors devised by a benevolent monarch to reward their useful labors. By the sweat of their brow they produce wheat, but receive no recognition from those whom it nourishes; the dignity and status of agriculture is forgotten. The men in whom distinction and usefulness are united see this important axiom denied, for they are condemned to spend their days in painful toil and utter obscurity. The traveler who has been taught that the true wealth of a province consists of the fruits of its soil, and who then looked for the prosperity of our farmers, would be astonished to find only men condemned to die in poverty. You likewise have been deceived. In spite of your having sought counsel locally, the cause of the landowners would have been decided in their absence if unusual persecution had not made them vigilant.

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Anyone able to discern the true source of the respective prosperity of each province will not fail to realize that ours is chiefly dependent upon the products of its fertile fields. On the obvious truth of this axiom the hope of my clients should rest. Long suffocated by administrative practices — though their cause was ostensibly supported by the authorities — the

agricultural producers saw in you the surest guarantee of a measure whereby the straits of the Treasury would be relieved, thereby dissolving long endured hardships that could not have been banished so easily at another period. But private interests respect only that which can satisfy them; and a small number of merchants look upon your benevolent plan with an animosity that is equalled only by their pleasure upon learning that a war has been declared when their warehouses are well stocked.

The case for replenishing the Royal Treasury is one with that of my clients; the advantages to be gained by both depend upon an intelligent application of the expedient proposed. The benevolent intentions that you have been good enough to express, and the application of these principles, might cause the landowners to modify their opposition and thus eliminate the arguments and apparent evils with which the merchants oppose the general welfare. But my commission calls for more. It is my duty to demonstrate the need, the advisability, and the justice of the proposed plan, to do away with the obstacles and apparent evils arising out of it and, lastly, to analyze those shortsighted arrangements which might counteract the effects of this important enterprise. The landowners have an equal interest in all these points, and the order of discussing them is identical with that of the Report itself — first to analyze your function, next to examine the evils that the syndic of the Tribunal of Commerce in Cádiz and the merchants of this city anticipate from the course proposed; and finally to amend by an intelligent compromise the conditions and obstacles that the Tribunal proposes and the Cabildo seems to adopt.

All laws give way to the imperative law of necessity. Since laws have no other end than the preservation and well-being of states, this will be sought through non-observance of the law when extraordinary events so dictate. This axiom, which regards the well-being of peoples as the supreme law, arms the ruler with unlimited power, whenever unforeseen circumstances arise, to revoke, correct, and suspend laws; to intervene and exercise functions that are ordinarily prohibited; and to take whatever action appears necessary to maintain the country's security and well-being.

To escape from a predicament that admits of no other remedy, you have recognized the need for free trade with the English nation. What more proof do we need of its inevitability? Political conditions in a state are not easily grasped by the people. Sometimes they think they are wealthy, while the chief of state, who is the focus of their true inter-relations, laments in secret their weaknesses and poverty. At other times they rest tranquilly in the hollow belief that they are strong, and the government spends sleepless nights in constant apprehension of imminent dangers and disasters threatening the state. Only the one in authority can calculate exactly the needs of the state. Since you have indicated the necessity of opening commerce to Great Britain, we should recognize without further study the strong reasons that make this project right, insofar as it is conducive to our preservation.

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Those who believe that to open commerce to the English under these circumstances is an evil for the nation and for the province should hang their heads in shame. Even granting that the measure in question were an evil, it should be recognized as a necessary and inevitable one, designed to serve the general good, and as an attempt to make some profit that will serve the security of the state. Ever since the English expedition of 1806 appeared on our shores, the merchants of that nation have constantly considered the Rio de la Plata in their speculations. A continuous series of expeditions have followed which have provided almost all the goods consumed in the country. These huge importations, in violation of laws and repeated bans, have had no worse effects than to deprive the Treasury of revenue duties and the country of the development that would have come about with exports on a free trade basis.

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Assuredly this is one of your first pieces of business and one in which those I represent are most interested: it is necessary to raise funds that will offer a timely consolation to our afflicted Metropolis. This is today the first cause, the first item to which attention should be given. And so important an object cannot be attained if a reviving commerce does not increase the revenues flowing into the Royal Treasury from

the duties that can be produced only by free trade. The happy result of the English expeditions that have been permitted in Montevideo should certainly serve to demonstrate the great advantages that will redound to the Treasury if the same measure is adopted in this city. It can be confidently expected that not only will the deficit in our revenues be met, but that the Treasury will be in a position to make up for the dearth of remittances that must have astonished the Metropolis in view of those provided from Montevideo — and provided by this means alone.

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Those who believe an abundance of foreign goods to be an evil for the country are surely ignorant of the first principles of the economy of states. There is no greater advantage for a province than an abundance of goods that it does not produce, for as such goods become common they drop in price. The resulting cheapness is useful to the consumer and prejudicial only to the original importer. Suppose that an over-importation of English cloth does make that commodity abundant, so that much of it remains unsold for a long time, what would result? Commerce would seek to balance trade in other branches. The cloth, being too common, could not be sold except at very low prices. The importer, brought up short, would sell at a loss and seek to correct his original mistake with new speculations, and the consumer would then buy for three pesos what is now sold him for eight. Regarding the question in the light of its inevitable results, can any one doubt that it is desirable for the inhabitants of a country to buy for three pesos a piece of cloth that formerly cost eight, or to obtain two pair of breeches with the money that a single pair cost before?

The advantage of introducing foreign goods goes hand in hand with that which will accrue to the country from the exportation of its products. Fortunately, those who produce in this province are all estimable, of proven lineage, and most of them today are in absolute need. How rapidly would our agriculture develop if the doors were open to all exportable products, if the farmer could count with certainty on selling at a profit! Those who now timidly undertake to till the fields, because of the uncertain market, will then work with

a tenacity inspired by the certainty of gain. And when products are continually held in esteem because export makes them scarce, extensive undertakings would be initiated, based on sound estimates, which would simultaneously bring wealth to those who cultivate the soil and also pour funds into the Royal Treasury.

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The multitude of ideas that the subject offers makes it impossible to develop them as fast as they come to mind; everything must be dealt with in its proper place. All I am trying to do now is to establish the idea that freedom to export the products of the country is desirable for the province. Each science has certain principles, the fruit of a long series of concepts and experiences, that, when properly applied, are recognized as being above discussion and serve as a yardstick to measure other truths. In political economy there is such a principle in the great axiom that a productive country will not be wealthy unless it is encouraged by every possible means to export its produce and that this wealth will never have a solid foundation unless surpluses are created as the result of low prices arising from the abundant importation of merchandise it does not have and does need.

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We can cite another example to prove this point even more clearly. When Montevideo was occupied by English arms, the door was opened to imports from that nation and to exports from the conquered country. The interior was suffering the apprehensions and disorders incidental to any conquest. Nevertheless, the benign influence of commerce was felt in the midst of the horrors of war. The thunder of enemy cannon presaged not so much a yoke which our people were strong enough to cast off easily, as a general abundance which, as it poured in from the fields, enabled our farmers to enjoy undreamed of comforts. The large accumulation of products amassed in that city and in the interior was entirely distributed, sales [of produce] were made at advantageous prices, [manufactured] goods were bought at the lowest of prices, and the countryman wore cloth he had never known, after having sold at a profit hides that he had always seen his grandfathers discard as worthless.

You have enjoyed traveling through a great part of that countryside, seeing the comforts that its farmers enjoy....

* * * *

You had the satisfaction of finding people there in an admirable state. Considerable aid was being sent to the Metropolis, the troops were paid to date, the responsibilities of the government were fully met, and the royal coffers had the healthy balance of three hundred and sixty thousand pesos. How different were conditions in the capital! The Treasury was empty, there were notes for amounts that it will be impossible to meet in the regular course of events, the troops had not been paid for more than five months, revenues were non-existent, and the Metropolis had not received a penny in aid. This simple comparison, which must have distressed you more than once, is enough to establish without any doubt that the country will profit by the admission of English business, which will serve equally the public interest and that of the Royal Treasury.

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The first obligation of a magistrate is to improve the public welfare by all possible means If the wealth of these provinces were to be analyzed upon the analogy of a complicated negotiation (*giro complicado*), great caution would be necessary in order not to upset the great chain by dislocating any one of its regulating factors (*muelles*). But the route of our happiness is set by Nature, which has destined us to the cultivation of her fertile fields and has denied us all wealth not acquired by this same channel. If your Excellency wishes to accomplish our welfare, the route which leads to it is very simple. Reason and the celebrated Adam Smith, who is without dispute the apostle of political economy, according to the Spanish philosopher previously cited, reveal that in their measures directed toward the general welfare governments should limit themselves to removing obstacles. This is the basic principle upon which Sr. Jovellanos¹ founded the luminous edifice of his economic discourse on the agrarian law. And the principles of these great men will never be proved false. Break

1. Gaspar Melchor Jovellanos, Spanish philosopher.

the chains of our regulations, free our commerce, and interest, which is wiser than calculation, will produce a circulation [of wealth] which will bring that flourishing of agriculture from which alone our prosperity is to be hoped for.

* * * * *

The most valuable sector of the community, which is also the most distinguished and most noble, submits its claims to you and pleads for a cause on which the stability of the government and the welfare of the land depend. This noble objective is closely bound up with national prosperity, and can be detrimental only to our merchants who see the profits they were expecting from clandestine negotiations disappear. "The net product of the European colonies established in America", says our philosopher,² "might be very considerable, and the portion that might be set apart for contributions could mean a great deal and be of great aid to the respective metropolises [governing these colonies], if the laws had been framed to promote their commerce and end their poverty. The true interests of the nation that founded these colonies, and all the hopes relating to them, are founded on the latter's prosperity and on the increase of their wealth. All the attention of the European legislatures should be directed to this sole objective in the new hemisphere. With this postulate the colonists would be free to seek from the soil all that it can yield, to acquire the goods they lack from those who offer them at the lowest price, to buy from and sell to any nation, choosing the one that suits them best, to satisfy and attend not only to the basic necessities but also to the needs of pure comfort. Who cannot see how greatly the colonies would prosper under these auspices; how their population, their strength, and their commerce would increase; how this freedom would give a new value to the land they cultivate; how agriculture would improve; how the amount, variety, and value of their products would increase? Thus they would present the very pleasant sight of a wealthy and happy country supported by agriculture, the arts, and commerce. The mere elimination of this fatal exclusiveness would, perhaps, be enough to bring prosperity to the colonies and, consequently, to the metropolis."

Let us hope, señor, for the appearance of such a time, which should bring the dawn of prosperity to this province.

2. Gaetano Filangieri, Italian physiocrat (1752-1788).

Let us hope that these powerful forces which would revive commerce and the Treasury will be unleashed and will open those doors that so far have been closed to the detriment of all, that the treasures which nature so freely and abundantly bestows upon us will be utilized, and that from the wealth of this province Spain will acquire a degree of strength which will make up for the loss in those provinces that have been so sadly devastated. My imagination is stirred by the multitude of blessings that an active trade would provide for our happiness. Tranquility will ever attend a hard-working people, they will never be the prey of the vices that are born of softness. The revivifying breath of husbandry will inspire all the reproductive seeds of nature. Innumerable vessels will swarm in our roadsteads, their constant comings and goings forming a veritable bridge that will improve our communications with the metropolis. Cultural enlightenment will be stimulated by the creations of genius imbued with new inspiration. By a thousand means there will be sown among us the seeds of population and of abundance. That is the true picture of ourselves when you grant us the right to engage in [free] commerce. "Then," says the most productive thinker of our century, "then it is that the Lord takes pleasure in contemplating his creatures, and finds no reason to repent of having created Man." Then, I add, you will be deeply moved as you contemplate your work. And as you experience the sweetness of an office whose exercise at first seemed so bitter, you will establish in the gratitude of the people an indestructible monument: the glorious title of Father of the Country.

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The first argument presented in an attempt to cause alarm, and to destroy your praiseworthy plan that will bring so many benefits, is the damage to and ruin of national commerce, especially that of Cádiz. Would that this accusation were true and that it were difficult to answer, for the disappointment of losing the great gain of which we are told would be tempered by the consolation that we were sacrificing it to the real advantage of our metropolis. But what is this advantage and what is the commerce that would be damaged by our gain? When you say national commerce to me, I understand it to mean that circulation of the objects of exchange whereby European Spain brings to America the Spanish merchandise

America does not have and, in return, carries away the silver and other products of these regions. This is the theory of legitimate commerce, and anything not included in a reciprocal trade founded on those principles is not within the real meaning of the words "national commerce."

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The satisfaction with which the assertion is made that trade with the English would destroy the manufactures of Spain is intolerable. Spanish national factories have never been able to provide everything consumed in America. They have never even sufficed for the needs of the peninsula. Although foreign manufactures were brought in and re-stamped so as to Hispanicize them, few men have been able to say that all the clothes they wore were national. In vain did the King decree that one third of every cargo should be of national manufacture; the merchants resorted to fraud to evade this order, not so much out of malice as because of the impossibility of having all their orders filled by our factories. Most of the goods consumed in America have always been foreign goods, and it is impossible to understand on what basis the commerce of the nation is so zealously defended, inasmuch as it can no longer supply even that small part it formerly provided.

So great is the confusion in which the opposition moves that they even included among the blows to "national commerce" the fact that they consider it indispensable to the agriculture of Spain! Fortunately, English agriculture cannot in any way compete with that of Spain, for the diversity of climates produces a diversity of products in each country, those of the Peninsula being preferred [here] because of their quality. How could English products compete with the wines, oil, and other products of Spain that suit us as consumers? Even the few Spanish factories will not be hurt by competition that cannot lessen the value of their output. Spanish cloth, silks, hats, and other goods coming from the Peninsula have sold because of their reputation, in spite of the low prices of clandestinely imported English goods. I would say, rather, that free trade with the English is the only recourse left whereby Spain can recoup her losses and prevent the entire ruin of her trade. For by availing herself of English vessels she will be able to maintain a trade that at present is curtailed for lack of merchant vessels.

The second injury claimed is that the free admission of English business will ruin trade in this city. This most vehemently argued claim alarms our retailers, who foresee themselves inevitably ruined. But if you desire to demolish this weighty argument, let those who put it forward make these comparisons: let them be questioned as to what they understand by the commerce of the country and you will see them confounded, unable to offer an intelligent argument or any well-reasoned proof of the injuries they bewail. The retailers who sell us goods are not commerce, which is something quite different from the individuals who take part in its circulation. The personal losses inevitable when any new course is adopted have never prevented the execution of those measures that, thanks to a happy combination of circumstances, immortalize the epoch of a beneficent government.

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.... And now that the real reasons for this complaint have been laid bare, the answer recently given to a similar complaint might bear repeating here. The only injuries to the country under free trade would be these. First, clandestine trade would wither, because no one would prefer its risks to the security of legal importation. Second, the secret importers, who are called smugglers, would lose that honorable mode of living and would have to join the army or learn to sew. Third, customs inspectors would be reduced in number, and they would receive less graft. Fourth, lesser officials and others who share in confiscated goods would suffer. Fifth, without constant battles with smugglers, the military spirit would decline. Sixth, lacking a great flood of lawbreakers, the jails would not be so full and lawyers would be deprived of these profitable cases. A governor who, in his day, was the idol of his people and whose writings will always be remembered with respect, refuted in this jesting manner the importunities of Cádiz merchants who advanced an argument much like that concocted by our merchants; and this is surely the most appropriate language for the refutation of such claims.

The third "injury" which is used to frighten the people is [the charge] that money will disappear entirely. It is claimed that trade with the English will result in a great vacuum [of currency] which will be as disastrous to the government as to the province; but careful consideration will dispel the vain

fears on which so mistaken a prophecy is based. Intelligent discussion will demonstrate that the selfsame export of currency which the merchants bewail will really benefit the country that they prophesy will be left desolate. This proposition may seem paradoxical; but I am undertaking to expound it with the formal warning that for the present I disregard those merchants who hold an opposite opinion, for the sublime principles of economic science are neither learned at a shop counter nor worthily employed there.

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If our commerce is permitted the activity and life resulting from freedom to import and export, there is no risk whatever that money will be lacking for the administration of the state and the needs of the citizens. The money necessary for the domestic commerce of a country is never consumed, because it is bound by the same reciprocity of exchange and by the immediate interest everyone has in not parting with that amount required to carry on business and meet private needs. Don Victorián de Villalba proved — by arguments based on experience and the theories of learned economists — that the domestic commerce of a trading people can be adequately maintained by an amount [of currency] much lower than that commonly believed necessary; and that once this is determined by the respective extremes of circulation there is no risk of its disappearing for any reason whatever. This is a consequence of the forces that operate the great machine called commerce. However eager a foreigner may be to export currency in the hope of making a profit, the country will be equally eager to preserve a symbol that is necessary for continued speculations.

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It is conservatively estimated that six millions' worth of English merchandise has been introduced into the Rio de la Plata since 1806. Inasmuch as the export of our products is forbidden, the greater part of this considerable amount has been exported in cash; for there was no other means of withdrawing payments. Some took the risk of violating the law and shipped products in spite of the fact that exportation was absolutely prohibited. But a clandestine shipment of such bulky goods could never amount to much, and it was only enough to give a precarious livelihood to landowners who

would have become wealthy if open exportation were permitted. The risk to which every importer has exposed part of his fortune by shipping some products, in spite of almost insuperable difficulties, is proof of the active export trade the country would have if the chains that barred such shipments were broken.

Our merchants show that their ideas move in a very small compass if they believe that free exports will destroy our currency. The genuine merchant does not want money when he can take its value in marketable goods. A peso will never be worth more than eight reales, yet its value in terms of natural or industrial products may be ten, twelve, or twenty reales, according to their combination and destination. When this Superior Government bought the English brigantine now called Fernando VII, doubts were expressed as to whether the seller could be permitted to take away the twenty thousand pesos specified in the contract. The English merchant, learning that a concern over specie was the source of the difficulty, renounced all claim to cash if he might be permitted to take away the value of the vessel sold in products of the country.

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Those are the chief wrongs that the merchants suffer from the establishment of a new order! Because of their nature a simple statement is enough to prove whether they are imagined or inevitable, and in either case they should not keep you from taking the beneficial action you contemplate as a remedy for our dire straits. The other wrongs that are claimed to be necessary results of free trade are so weak that they do not deserve a detailed reply. Therefore, I shall merely touch lightly on those that seem to be the most serious and on the real weight that should be given to these considerations.

Agriculture will be held in the lowest esteem. It was left to the syndic of the Cádiz tribunal of commerce to make this great discovery. Freedom to export the products of the soil is held to be ruinous to the agriculture that produces them. If this is so, then how can we encourage it? According to the principles held by our merchants, we should allow these products to stagnate, the buyers to be eliminated because of the difficulty of exporting them to the right markets, the farmer to be destroyed by not being paid enough to cover the cost of

growing and harvesting, and the crops to be wasted through an unprofitable abundance, their ultimate destination being to fill in the gutters and swamps of our streets. Yes, señor, to this depth has our agriculture sunk in recent years — they have filled in the swamps of this city with wheat! But this miserable condition, which moves patriots to compassion and shocks the citizenry, is the very fate of a country where, when anyone tries to improve such wretched conditions, the merchants dare to shout that *agriculture will be ruined if its fruits are properly esteemed and permitted prompt export.*

Crafts and industry will be ruined. It took the present extraordinary conditions to make the merchants say a good word for our craftsmen; but the compliment they pay them is no more sincere than the motives behind this utterance. They have encouraged agriculture and made the land wealthy. Now they would also enrich the artisans! "When the owners of land are rich," says Filangieri, "the state is rich; if they are poor, the state too is poor. All classes of society should admit that their fate is linked to that of the agricultural producers. The craftsman who clothes them, who builds their houses, who makes their furniture, who fashions the tools needed to cultivate their fields, in a word who provides for their needs and their comfort, the mercenary who serves them, the lawyer who defends them, the merchant who trades for them, the sailor and the muleteer who transports their products — all these individuals will work more and be better paid by the landowners if these sell their products at higher prices. If those who are not agricultural producers must pay them a higher price, then they, too, should be paid a higher price for their work by the land owners."

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Artisans of Buenos Aires! In the name of the Guild I represent, I urge you not to be dazzled by talk of some advantages in which you should share proportionately with other groups that make up the nation. Do not believe these seducers who are trying to hurry you and rest assured that you need no other reason for distrusting their promises than the zeal with which they defend your cause. Who will ever believe that the merchants of Buenos Aires are sincerely concerned over the welfare of the craftsmen of the country? When they tell you that the English will bring goods of all kinds, answer that any number of goods have been imported clandestinely

for a long time, and that if this is doing you great harm, they themselves are to blame for it. If they tell you that you cannot compete with foreign craftsmen, reply that this is a hazard to which you have always been exposed, since the law permits their handiwork to be imported freely. If they stress the point that finished furniture will be brought in, say you want it to serve you as models, so that by imitating it you can perfect yourselves in your craft—something you cannot do otherwise. Say that although your output may sell for less, you get more for what you make, for you will be able to buy readily all the items that you cannot afford today without sacrifice. And finally, tell them that as for competition with your wares it makes no difference to you whether they come from Spain or from a foreign kingdom. And after reminding them of the free and abundant imports of handicrafts from the metropolis, accompany them to their own homes, which you will find full of furniture that is not of your making.

The provinces in the interior will be ruined! The syndic of the tribunal makes this dreadful prophesy, which he expands to the point of believing the union that binds us with such close ties to be in danger. But when he thinks that the *tocuyos* (coarse cotton cloth) of Cochabamba are sold in Chile, it is plain that he has not the slightest knowledge of the countries he is talking about. The cloth made in our provinces will not disappear, because the English will never send any so cheap or so strong; these rough fabrics are liked and have a preferential market, for all that this trade is only recent in these regions. Our looms will not suffer from free trade. But I will discuss this point in the third part, when I show that we are not insensible to the welfare of our brothers.

How far will people go in their attempts to further a bad cause? The merchants, in despair because perfectly respectable relationships cannot be used to serve their particular interests, are obviously disconcerted when they go so far as to exclaim that the country will be flooded with goods that cannot be sold in the course of many years. If this statement were based upon fact, if such a state of affairs were actually to come about, the entire loss would fall upon the English traders, for they could not sell their surplus imports. But this is untrue, señor. The English trader is not without intelligence and does not need ours to teach him and to point out his mistakes. He will

bring here only what he can sell, and the country will buy from him only what it can consume. Consumption will be increased. Once the countryside is prosperous and some men who have never enjoyed comforts have a taste of incipient luxury, then comforts will multiply through the ease of acquisition resulting from the abundance and cheapness of good merchandise and better facilities for obtaining it.

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I shall now proceed to the third part of my Memorial, in which I shall take up in order the measures that Syndic Agüero proposes for disposing of all your troubles

The first measure proposed by the Cádiz syndic is to ask people to subscribe to a loan, secured not only by the royal revenues but also by the funds of the Tribunal of Commerce and the Cabildo of this city. He adds that, to encourage subscriptions, they should be offered at a rate of interest possibly as high as 12 per cent. Something has been said in the first part of this paper about [public] loans as a recourse. I shall only add that the sorry results of the loan solemnly issued by the Cabildo, and the meager return from the industrious activities of the merchant Benito Iglesias, are the yardstick by which you can gauge the probable results of so mistaken a course.

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The second measure is the imposition of new taxes on the free enterprise trade (*Comercio de Ensayo*) and even on that of the metropolis, on the wines of Mendoza and San Juan, and on all the other industries, as [levies] were recently imposed on meat. What a poor expedient; how sorry, how miserable! To try to tax budding or dead industries, when great advantages would accrue if they were generally encouraged — advantages that never can be hoped for from that measure! It arouses pity, señor. Cast your eyes on the wine merchants of San Juan and Mendoza. Almost all of them have been ruined by the crushing weight of contributions that have grown progressively until they have become insupportable. Our agricultural producers and craftsmen should judge the good faith with which the syndic of Cádiz is acting by the cruel request that their levies should be increased. While he apparently concerns himself with their fate, he is only interested in the success of his opposition.

Third measure: imposition of levies on all properties, and sale of secular benefices and other Crown properties. To a people that is groaning in poverty, and that repeated calamities have reduced to a state where it is impossible to remedy them, taxes are the most obvious means of hastening the ruin it is claimed would be forestalled. And what abundant resources are there in the sale of royal property, the total value of which would barely meet the expenses of a single month?

Fourth recourse: the reduction of civil servants' salaries by from one to two-thirds of the regular amount. Our ears ache, señor, with the repeated clamor against the salaries of civil servants. In vain has it been shown in a thousand different ways that their scanty wages are not susceptible of the least diminution. In vain have estimates been made of the trifling benefit the Treasury would derive from this insufficient remedy. The clearest evidence did not break the conspiracy against salaries. And the result of a generous gesture whereby the civil servants willingly gave up a part of their incomes had no other effect than to subject their families to severe privations without getting the Treasury out of its difficulties.

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Fifth recourse: to negotiate with governments of Lima and Chile that they provide funds from those revenues which should be remitted [to Spain], being assured of the good use to which you will put them. If this notion were feasible it could have been carried out long ago. But these governments — whose situation is not the best — need for their own use the revenues they collect. And when they are able to get a surplus, they will prefer to send it to assist the metropolis, taking very great care that these funds are not used for any object and purpose except those for which they are earmarked. When I saw that the Syndic of Cádiz was trying to send funds to our aid from remote provinces, I thought that the measure would be limited to offering some large amount in the name of the tribunal he represents. Inasmuch as he does not have the powers of the Viceroy of Lima or President of Chile, any offer of revenues that they control is out of the question. Nor can he properly present such a proposal, because it is not within his authority to make suggestions to this government on its relationships with other independent and equally superior governments, or as to how these should be conducted.

The sixth measure amounts to the establishment of a great lottery, like the Royal Lottery of Madrid or that of Mexico, in which sums of good fortune are set aside of from 300 to 2,000 or 3,000 pesos, sufficient to attract the poor, the rich, and widows

The needs of states have brought forth rare ideas which sometimes have saved them and other times have wrought their ruin; but this is probably the first time that consideration has been give to a lottery as a matter meriting the attention of the government and worthy of its profound deliberations [in accordance with] the economic science of states upon which their preservation depends

The final remedy proposed by the Syndic of the Tribunal of Cádiz as basic and alone capable both of alleviating present woes and of preventing difficulties in the future is strict observance of the law and double vigilance in doing away with contraband to the point of eliminating clandestine imports entirely; for in recent times smuggling has reached scandalous proportions

When the government, in straits because of its most urgent needs, stated that there was no other way to save the state than the suspension of those laws and addressed two respectable corporations of this city to be sure of doing right — although your authority is such that this step was unnecessary — how dare a private businessman, with no other title than his word that he is Syndic of the Tribunal of Cádiz, and in a tone that exceeds [the authority of] that position, say: "The Tribunal and the Cabildo have not fulfilled their respective duties properly; if you are in difficulties keep the law, for this alone will do away with the troubles that are afflicting you?"

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My clients would refrain from anticipating your decision by formulating measures that are within your province; but, limiting the subject to matters having to do with the encouragement of agriculture, they make the following requests:

1. That the introduction of free trade be granted for the period of two years, its continuation to be left to the sovereign opinion of the Supreme Junta as the results of this innovation warrant.

2. That the English transactions be carried out by Spaniards under rights of commission or reciprocal pacts that they enter into freely.

3. That any person, by the sole fact of being a native of the Kingdom, be empowered to conduct these transactions, being left free to choose any means to make the sales as well as to send to the provinces business he sees fit so to divert.

4. That when goods are so imported, the duties be paid in the same manner and amount as for the private permits that have been established.

5. That every importer be compelled to export half of the value of the goods imported in products of the country, the Spanish consignors to whose accounts the shipments are drawn being responsible for compliance with this obligation

6. That the products of the country, silver (plata), and anything else exported, pay the same duties established for goods exported in foreign vessels trading in Negroes; and that this measure be closely complied with, because of the great hindrance to exports that would otherwise result with prejudice to agriculture, the encouragement of which should be the main consideration.

7. That one of the two individuals chosen by the government to inspect and evaluate goods and to take other steps concerning the new arrangement be a landowner, the syndic of this guild being requested to send you a list of the chief landowners who might be given the appointment, which should also apply to the Plaza of Montevideo.

These are the points having the most bearing on the prosperity of agriculture, whose rights I represent on behalf of the farmers. A man of your keen discernment will know how to combine intelligently the different extremes that should be reconciled so that this great program will be based on sound principles. The hope of a prompt, happy settlement has begun to change the sad aspect that these provinces had when you took office. The country feels itself fortunate, for it knows that you are taking steps to bring about its prosperity. How could these well-founded hopes be dashed when the cause of the King is so closely linked to the welfare of the land? I congratulate my fellow citizens because the dangers that

MARIANO MORENO

threatened their security will be followed by the peaceful enjoyment of all the good things that make a people happy. I congratulate you equally, because the unstable and disheartening conditions of this Viceroyalty when you arrived have only lasted as long as it took to open the paths that respect for former customs and concerns kept closed.

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We believe that we are better Spaniards when, through mercantile relations, we take pleasure in contributing to close union with a generous and wealthy nation whose aid is absolutely necessary for the independence of Spain. We know that in the War of Succession France obtained free trade with the Spanish Americas, and we should be ashamed that gratitude denied us what was once obtained from us through dependence and fear. In our need to work for our own good we should not object to sharing with a nation to whom we owe so much and without whose aid it would be impossible to obtain the improvement that we are discussing. These are the wishes of twenty thousand landowners whom I represent; they are the only means of establishing, with the dignity that becomes you, the beginning of our happiness and the restoration of the Treasury.

(Trans. by F. W. O'R.)

JOSE CECILIO DEL VALLE (1780-1834)

HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA

José Cecilio del Valle, who played a prominent role in the independence both of Mexico and Central America, was one of the foremost intellectual spokesmen in Latin America of the new utilitarian philosophy which Jeremy Bentham was voicing in Britain. With Bernardino Rivadavia of Argentina and Francisco Santander of Colombia, he ranks among Bentham's predilect disciples in America. He accepted the liberal economic principles of free trade and free capitalism, as well as the utopian social philosophy which the union of eighteenth century rationalism and nineteenth century romanticism was beginning to produce in the western world. Yet, for all this, he was by nature conservative, and his concept of progress, while optimistic, was one of evolution rather than revolution. But like many other American liberals, he rejected the emerging concept of "scientific" deterministic history in favor of a firm belief in the free exercise of the will. As in the case of his famous mentor, these latter views led him to think of the state chiefly as a means for the achievement of justice in accordance with the principle of "the greatest possible good to the greatest possible number."

Valle was born in Choluteca, Honduras, on November 22, 1780 and died in the city of Guatemala in 1834. The son of a distinguished and prosperous creole family, he was educated first in the Tridentine College in Comayagua and later in the University of San Carlos in Guatemala, where he graduated as a lawyer. During his university days he absorbed the new scientific and philosophical thought of the Enlightenment, which was finding such rapid development in Spanish America at this time. He held many important posts, including that of deputy to the Supreme Central Junta of Spain in 1809 and professor of political economy in the University. In 1820 he began to publish the journal *El Amigo de la Patria* to express his liberal views. When the Plan of Iguala (1821) precipitated the independence of Mexico, he drafted the declaration of Central American independence. After the annexation of Central America to Mexico, he was elected a deputy to the Mexican Congress, in which he took a prominent role. He opposed Iturbide, yet finally became a minister in the latter's cabinet in order to work out the arrangements for the

emperor's abdication. Central America thereupon resumed her independence, and Valle became one of the triumvirate executive which ruled until a federal constitution was adopted and a president elected. In 1822, with the picturesque title *Soñaba el Abad de San Pedro y yo también se soñar*, he published a plan for an American congress to meet in Costa Rica or León (Nicaragua). All the provinces of America were invited to send representatives to report on political, economic, fiscal and military conditions, to prepare a plan of continental defense, to form a federation, and to adopt an economic plan.¹ Twice he was defeated for the presidency, but he continued as a deputy in Congress. His last years were spent as Director of the *Sociedad Económica*, which was devoted to advancing the study and teaching of economics.

The brief excerpt on revolutions shows the blending of rational and romantic ideas. The subsequent turbulent political history of Central America belies its confident optimism, of course. The letter to Bentham shows how closely Valle's views paralleled those of his mentor, while the essay on America embodies the anti-Spanish feeling typical of the creole independence leaders. Its concept of breaking with the ignorance of the past and rebuilding society in accordance with natural laws suggests much of the liberal utopianism of the day, but it is modified, of course, by the utilitarian principle. The phrase "force gives no right" is one of the early expressions of this particular American principle of international law. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Valle's Americanism is his Indianism — an Indianism which rejects the racism of the emerging "scientific" history.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The *Obras* of José Cecilio del Valle appeared in 1914 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and in 1929-1930 in Guatemala (Tipografía Sánchez de Guise. 2V.). More recently the late Rafael Heliodoro Valle published a *Bibliografía de don José Cecilio del Valle* (México: Ediciones de Número, 1934) and edited a volume *Valle*, published by the Secretaría de Educación Pública (Mexico, 1934) from which the following excerpts are translated. Ramón Rosa was the author of a *Biografía de don José Cecilio del Valle* (Tegucigalpa: Talleres Tipográficos,

1. José Salvador Guandique, *Proyecciones* (San Salvador: Ministerio de Cultura, 1957) p. 65.

1934). The latter work contains an excellent critical biographical introduction. *José Cecilio del Valle and the Establishment of the Central American Confederation*, by Franklin Dallas Parker, was published by the University of Honduras (in English) in 1954. See also José Salvador Guandique, "José Cecilio del Valle, precursor de la sociología centroamericana," in his *Proyecciones* (San Salvador: Ministerio de Cultura, 1957) pp. 63-70.

REVOLUTIONS

BY JOSÉ CECILIO DEL VALLE

(From Rafael Heliodoro Valle, *Valle*. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma, 1943, pp. 129-130)

In those [revolutions] of France, events transpired which history will never forget. Here is one which will always interest sensitive spirits and claim the attention of politicians.

The beautiful Roland, despite being the daughter of an artist and the wife of a renowned, wise, and philanthropic minister, possessed those qualities which most merit attention: beauty, philosophy, and virtue. However, she was condemned to death by the most shameful injustice. The day when this occurred, serene as innocence oppressed by force, she appeared dressed in white, the color of innocence; her black hair reaching to her waist increased the grace of her beauty.

She came out on the plaza of execution, in view of the statue of Liberty to which she bowed, speaking these precious words: "Oh Liberty! How many crimes are committed in thy name!"

Liberty is a right; so is the independence of Guatemala. Let us zealously defend so just a cause; but let us never give cause for hearing in this beautiful country the sad echo of those words.

The power of public opinion is not as noisy as cannons nor as violent as force. It is peaceful, measured, and tranquil. The power of opinion caused independence to be proclaimed in peace and tranquility, without bloodshed or loss of life. May the same power continue doing what is needed without hatred or persecutions. Let us direct this opinion. It will bring about progress and its power will be irresistible.

The world is in movement and will not turn back. Let us spread enlightenment so that its advance may be peaceful, and

we shall then enjoy benefits which independence promises, without suffering the ills with which it has afflicted other countries. (1822)

A M E R I C A

(From Rafael Heliodoro Valle, *Valle*, pp. 52-71)

The new continent was separated by nature from the old. Different parallels marked them off, diverse zones [of climate] divided them, and immense oceans separated them. Those who inhabited the new world were men, as were those who inhabited the old. Both had been formed by the same hand, both had the same origin. Those of one hemisphere, like those of the other, were, free, equal, and masters of the properties they possessed. The Americans knew nothing of the existence of Europe, Europeans were ignorant of that of America, and this ignorance by one and the other part of the globe ensured the liberty of both.

The all governing wisdom revealed at last what was hidden. "There must be another continent," said Columbus, and this creative discovery was the beginning of the suffering of the new and the wealth of the old. Spain sent Cortés and Alvarado, Pizarro and Almagro, Solís and Roxas, Bastidas and Heredia. Spaniards trod the soil of America, and the American began to suffer.

The color of the Indian was cooper-hued and that of the Spaniards was lighter. But the Germans were whiter still and blonder than the Spaniards; and when the house of Austria wished to dominate Spain, the Spaniards rose up against it and proclaimed that of Bourbon. Color is no title of superiority or slavery. Copper-skinned, swarthy, or white, you are a man, unhappy American, and the essence of man gives you inviolable rights. The lava of Izalco may destroy you, the waters of the Lempa may drown you; but the hand of arbitrary authority has no right to oppress you.

America did not have the degree of knowledge which Spain possessed. But neither was there in Spain the degree of wisdom which is admired in Paris. Yet when Paris wished to regenerate Spain, the Spaniards arose against France, the people repelled such an unjust aggression, and the Cortes said: "Force gives no right."

The natives showed little talent, nor did they give promise in their offspring of the divine power of self-perfection. But the works of Anahuac, the marvels of Tenochtitlán were equal to or greater than those of the Spaniard in his earliest centuries, or of the time when enlightened and rich Carthage conquered poor and ignorant Spain. The Spaniards fought against and at length broke the yoke of Carthage. The soil of America has known how to produce great talents.

[In the paragraphs here omitted Valle gives examples of great men produced by Spanish America. He points out that in spite of the superior merits of Christianity and of certain other aspects of European culture over that of America, the Spaniards did not exercise a right but only force in the conquest. The subsequent history of America has been one of resistance against the oppression and exploitation of the conquest, but, as many European authors have predicted, once Americans receive their freedom they will exceed the advances of Europeans worn out in their struggles with each other. — Translator]

The English people have never stopped fighting to improve their constitution and get back their rights usurped by the throne, the clergy, and the nobility. The Dutch of Utrecht, Zeeland, Gelderland, Friesland, Overijssel, and Groningen revolted against the yoke of Spain to defend their liberty and signed the great treaty of their union on January 23, 1583. The Portuguese arose to proclaim their independence from the Spanish government and on December 1, 1640 demonstrated the power which the united will of a people has. Sweden was impelled by the success which attends opposition to despotism and, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, adopted the constitution which astonishes philosophers, placing chains upon arbitrary authority and protecting the rights of the people.² North America began to move in the year 1774 and, declaring its independence from the English government, gave a lesson to Mexico and Guatemala, to Chile and Buenos Aires. France

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2. The Swedish constitution is incomparably wiser than the English. Nevertheless, high praise is given to the latter and only a few deign to notice the former. Man goes by routine, judges according to tradition, and when he has no right to doubt because he has not meditated upon the pro and contra, speaks in dogmatic tone, and becomes a tyrant of opinion.—Note of author.

was stirred after 1789 and, enlightening her sons and those of the whole globe, defended her liberty and taught [all] men to defend theirs. Spaniards also acted gloriously in 1808 and, hurling down with one hand the unjust conqueror of Castille, wrote with the other the constitution which says: "Sovereignty resides in the nation." The Castilians rose up again in 1820 to re-establish that fundamental law which protected their rights (*fueros*) and was to have brought about their happiness. The Portuguese also wished to recover their rights and, rising heroically, said in the face of the world: "Our justice should not be administered in Brazil, two thousand leagues away, with excessive costs and delays. It is impossible to give a regular course to the public and private affairs of a monarchy when the center of its activities is located at such a distance and when these [actions] are often impeded by the violence of passions and even by the force of the elements."³

The Neapolitans were moved by the same impulse. They knew their rights and took up arms to defend them; but superior forces suffocated the first efforts of a people wishing to be free. The power of opinion will triumph over those forces in the end and will cause a rebirth of the rule of justice.

Movement, which is communicable in the political as in the physical realm, was propagated from the old to the new continent. "I, also, am a man," the modest and intelligent American said at last. "I, also, have received from nature the rights which the European has known how to defend. Degrees of latitude make the polar region icy and the coasts of Honduras torrid, make the Georgian beautiful, the inhabitant of the Congo black, and the Indian copper-hued. But man is one in all climates. There is more cold in Madrid, in the winter, and more heat in the summer, than in suavely temperate Guatemala. But the Madrileño has no more rights than the Guatemalan. On this or the other side of the ocean, separated by mountains, or divided by lakes or rivers, we are all individuals of the same species, equal and free by nature.

If the European, the inhabitant of the old world, resisted rule by a government established in the new, if the Spaniard

3. See Number 7 of *El Amigo de la Patria*, in which, when publishing the Manifesto of the Portuguese nation, I pointed out the reasons which supported the American cause.—Note of author.

opposed moving the Madrid government to Mexico when Castile was threatened by forces which were considered invincible, if the Portuguese shouted to heaven when the king was transported from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, if they all believed it impossible to be ruled well by a government far distant from their homes, we Americans have a right to raise the same cry and voice the same opinion. Free choice is the basis of the pacts which subject one man to the power of another, and subjection to a government so far distant should never be suffered on the part of Americans. They are prudent and, being so, yielded to force when it was greater. It ceased at last to be so, and they at once reclaimed their rights which, because of prudence, were suspended for some time, but because of [their basis in] justice were never extinguished. The constitution of Spain, declaring the sovereignty of the nation, asserted that the peoples who formed the monarchy were the moral sovereign. The majority of votes is what should decide, and if fifteen million Americans declare their will to be free, nine million Spaniards ought to respect the votes of the greater number. Understand this, men of all climes. The very law of Spain itself is what has declared the independence of America; it is that [law] which, by acknowledging the sovereignty of the nation, commanded respect for the majority of that same nation.

I do not hate Spaniards, nor take pleasure in their misfortune. Spaniards endowed me with life, taught me the holy religion which I profess, and gave me the beautiful language of Castile; [Spaniards] built up the patrimony which assures my survival; they engendered her who is the object of my love and the mother of my children. Accept, beloved parents of my being, the testimony of my gratitude. I will always respect the memory of the authors of my existence; but the duties of a son are not contrary to the obligations of patriotism. In America you engendered me. America is my *patria*, and every citizen should love his own. If the Castilian does not offend his sons by supporting the cause of Castile, [neither] does the American injure his parents by defending the cause of America. I must sustain that of this dear continent, but I will never violate my American nature. Let France have sanguinary Robespierres. The character of an American is kindness — the sensibility painted on his face, expressed in his tone of voice. Let us not be unjust persecutors. Let us love all who respect order and confess the justice of our cause.

There is one voice from Cape Horn to Texas. To have opposed the freedom of America would have been to fight against the spirit of the century, to resist the force of opinion, to be unjust, and to make oneself the object of execration. Guatemala, located between the movements of the middle and the north, received her due at last. The two Americas have proclaimed their independence; this great event, more memorable than its discovery, will produce in the progressive march of time effects which will also be [memorable].

The New World will not be in the future, as in the past, an unhappy tributary of the old. The American will work to increase the productive capital of his possessions; he will work to give to the government, the protector of his rights, the taxes necessary for the preservation of order. But he will not crawl into the caverns of the earth to extract from its entrails the precious metals to be sent to the other continent; he will not remit the property of the Indian accumulated with pains; he will not send the eight or nine millions which he has been sending annually. This sum implies an immense amount of labor, and of this labor he will be freed in the future, when taxes will be only for the government of America and [will be] measured by the necessities of the same government.

The coast of America, stretching majestically from the north to the south, will be opened to all friendly or neutral nations. Flags of all colors will brighten its ports and bays, the whole world will come to sell the products of its industry. The concourse of merchants of all countries will lower prices, and America, beginning to enjoy one of its most precious rights, will do what Spain does. She will buy from whomever offers her the best and the cheapest merchandise; she will not be tied to the whims of a single market; she will not pay the tribute of millions imposed by the law which gives to a single seller the right to fix prices for his own wares and for the products of an entire continent.

The American who has had little interest in going to savage coasts, seldom or never visited, will open roads or establish routes to approach the ports which call him with their offers of the riches of all nations. Shipping costs, now greater than the value of the products, will not repel active speculators. Indigo will not be the only product capable of paying transportation. All the useful vegetable products which

can be produced by a soil embracing all the [range of] temperatures will be carried to the coast and transported to the markets of all the world.

Agriculture, which multiplies the number of ears of grain in proportion as the number of consumers increases, will expand its crops with the whole world opened to their consumption. The slopes of the Andes, the foothills of the highest mountains of the globe, will be covered with crops, and fields which [now] display their potential fertility in useless vegetation will manifest it in profitable plants, the source of wealth.

The merchant marine, which always multiplies the relations among peoples if separated by seas, will take first place in a continent which exudes iron and copper, abounds in cotton, pours out pitch, resins, and tars, and is covered with woods useful for construction.

The population, numerous or scanty in accordance with the ease or difficulty of subsistence, will reproduce itself prodigiously by virtue of the wealth wisely distributed by liberty. There will be no deserts without life nor fields without verdure. If in Spain there are 10,351,071 souls on 15,005 square leagues of less fertile lands, in America, on 408,000 square leagues of more fertile soil, even supposing the same proportion, there should be 322,845,799 souls.

Foreigners, attracted by the wealth which a free and fertile soil will promise, will also come to increase the population. They will bring their skills and their tools, as well as their hands. European industry will shine in the factories of America, and her sons, developing their genius, will imitate at first and later create.

As the Indians and ladinos (mestizos) cross with the Spaniards, Swiss, Germans, and English who come to people America, the castes, [now] so serious a division of the people, will come to an end; the population will be homogeneous society will have unity, and the elements which compose it will be unified.

The sciences, receiving knowledge from all peoples in trade with them all, will make rapid progress. Europe, which has not existed for us until now, will be a new world discovered to

our eyes; it will reveal all its riches, will present all its knowledge. America, known only in a few points, superficially, will also be another world revealed to our sight. Scientists, who did not dare to penetrate vast regions full of danger for the unwary, will come to survey the three realms (*reinos*) and shed new knowledge upon them. Existing [scientific] systems will fall and others will be raised, resting on more solid bases and more numerous observations. The American, kindly and sensitive, will give his character to the arts and sciences. Recalling his ancient slavery, he will make his fellowmen weep; singing of his freedom, he will fill the whole human species with sweet joy. His fecund imagination will create new forms of poetry and oratory, new sciences, new models of sentiment, original types of beauty. If the art of love was written in the benign climate of Italy, it will grow more beautiful, be extended and perfected in the dulcet climate of Quito.

America will not march a century behind Europe; it will march abreast at first, in front later on; finally it will be the region most illuminated by the sciences, as it is that lighted most by the sun.

The Castilian language, spoken by nations independent of Castile, will continue to change insensibly. Each American state will have its dialect; languages will multiply, and each language will be a new method of analysis. The languages retained by the Indians to express complaints which the Spaniards do not understand will disappear in the future when those unhappy ones are no [longer] oppressed — when, with the fall of the dividing wall which has separated them from the ladinos and Spaniards, the language of all will be one. [The languages] of America will become more elevated and beautiful in proportion as sentiments of tyranny are erased and those of liberty are born — in proportion as they cease to be images of unjust inequalities and commence to be an expression of social unity and of the equality of the citizens who constitute it.

The elements, principles, and methods of the sciences, possessed now by a small number of men, will in the end become popular. There will be scientists among the ladinos, philosophers among the Indians. All will have more or less

civilization, and this part of the earth will be the most enlightened of all.

Enlightened with knowledge of the sciences, restored to the enjoyment of their free rights under a protective government, equal under just and impartial laws, free of restrictions in the choice of work and of oppression in the enjoyment of their produce, enriched with the progressive development of new germs of prosperity, Americans will at last realize that they are men. They will feel all the dignity of their being; they will know that the rich and the poor, the wise and the ignorant, the man of title and he who has none, Newton and the Indian are children of one family, individuals of one species.

The soul of the American will rise to [the level of] that of the European. The Indian will not be a degraded being who displays in his very face, in the wrinkles of his brow, the marks of his humiliation. He will be what man is, a noble being who in the elevation of his glance expresses that of his essence.

Physiognomies and stature will change, also dispositions and characters. Those sad and degraded Americans who speak only sighs and laments will be changed into happy men, noble and beautiful as the sentiments which will give life to their being. They will not be humble like slaves. They will display the noble appearance of the freeman.

The Indian and the ladino, who abandoned themselves to criminal pursuits, knowing that even though they refrained from such they did not receive the reward of virtue, will in the future make the sacrifices which honor demands. They will treasure merit because its possession will give them the right to remuneration. They will educate themselves, knowing they can enter the realm of the sciences. They will render services to their peoples, knowing that public offices are given to those who do so. They will labor to possess all kinds of merit, knowing that an impartial government opens to them the doors of the priesthood, the army, letters, and wealth.

One will not see in hospitals the sad spectacle of unfortunate beings wounded by maddened men, exasperated at seeing that punishments abound for their vices but never rewards for their virtues.

There will be rich and poor, ignorant and wise, because in the system of societies it is difficult and almost impossible to distribute wealth and divide knowledge with absolute equality. [But] the poor man and the millionaire, the ignorant and the educated will be equal before the law. Wealth will give no privilege to oppress [others]; education will not busy itself with deception. Distances will be lessened, and the man of rags, knowing he is a citizen like the rich man, will be less vile and more worthy of the species of which he is an individual.

Tax [offices], hospitals, the mint, troops, and palaces of justice will not be gathered in one place, concentrating wealth, making its sons haughty, and giving one city superiority over others. A just distribution will be made so that there may be a balance. In one province there will be established the intendant of taxes, in another the courts of appeals and their magistrates, in another the troops and their chief, in another the hospitals and their administrators. The sons of one province will then have need of those of the others; those of the latter will need the former, and ties will be strengthened. The towns will not be the slaves of a capital, and society will be what it should be — a company of associates, a family of brothers.

These sentiments of just liberty, these feelings of well understood equality will give rise to the morality which can not exist between masters and slaves, between oppressors and oppressed. The few will not trample upon the rights of the rest. Man will respect himself in his fellowmen, and morality, which is the mutual respect of the rights of all, will shine at last in the lands where it has been most obscured.

Negroes will not come to the coasts of America, because the whites will interest themselves in preventing it. [Thus] the trade which most offends reason will cease; man will not be sold to his fellowman, and the liberty of America will cause that of Africa to be respected.

The word that America has declared herself independent will run around the globe. The Asiatic and the African, subjugated like the American, will begin to realize their rights. In the course of time they will finally declare their independence, and the freedom of America will at last cause the whole earth to be free.

Time, which previously strengthened the ties of America and Spain in proportion as the usages, laws, language, and customs of the latter became general in the former, will [in the future] dissolve them as the one goes on changing the institutions, language, laws, and manners it received from the other. Everything will continue to change with the march of the centuries; and the passage of each era will be an additional space in the distance between America and Castile.

America will at last be what it ought to be. Located in the most fortunate geographical position, mistress of lands vaster and more fertile than those of Europe, possessed of richer mines, filled with the most abundant means of existence, enlightened with all the discoveries of the European and those which these same discoveries will make possible for the American, full of men, knowledge, riches, and power, it will be the leading part of the earth. It will give opinions, uses, and customs to the other nations. It will come to dominate through its enlightenment and wealth. In the future it will be throughout the globe what at present the rich and intelligent Albion is in Europe.

But before reaching that summit of power it is necessary to scale craggy routes, to walk upon dangerous roads, and to cross profound abysms. Let us not conceal the risks of the position in which we stand. Let us publish the truth so that our knowledge may make us more prudent.

We are at the most dangerous point of the road; we find ourselves in the period most critical for states. We are about to form new institutions, to make new laws, to create everything anew.

A heterogeneous population, divided into so many castes, scattered over such vast territories — can it reach the point of agreeing upon the government which it should constitute? Will the privileged classes be sufficiently just to share their pleasures with the others? Will those who have suffered be sufficiently reasonable as not to go to excess in their petitions? Can opinion, which varies according to climates, latitudes, interest, and states, be sufficiently uniform in an extension of so many degrees [of latitude] and climates? Will youth, always vain and convinced it has more knowledge than it [really] has,

respect the wisdom and foresight of experience and judgment? Will public impostors forget their arts and sacrifice their private interests to those of the public?

In such great chaos, justice is the one link which can unite such contrary interests, and *justice* in politics is "the greatest possible good of the greatest possible number."

It is necessary to choose the least dangerous form of government in such critical circumstances. But it is necessary to present a plan which tends to the maximum benefit. It is necessary to form a constitution which will make all classes happy; it is necessary to make laws which, far from dividing, will unite society — laws which do not sacrifice the rights of some to increase the rights of others, laws which offer equal rewards to equal merits, laws which punish [all] crimes of one species with equal penalties, and consider as crime only the violation of the rights of man — laws which are not the vote of a single class, but the expression of the general will of the people, pronounced by their representatives.

The Spanish constitution has shed light, taught principles, and given lessons which it is not easy to forget. If a less liberal constitution is formed for America, if rights are denied to the people which that of Spain gave them, the just cause of our independence will have in its very origin the seed of its destruction. The towns which proclaimed [independence] full of flattering hopes, the towns which pronounced their independence in order to improve their future destiny, will say, sadly at first, and later with irritation, "We have made no improvement in the law which governs us." The Spanish constitution, respecting our rights, declared that sovereignty resides basically in the nation — that the towns should elect their representatives to the Cortes, their provincial deputies, their mayors, councilmen, and syndics. It reserved the legislative power to the representatives of the towns and achieved national unity by establishing that of the Cortes. It granted to the *ayuntamientos* (town councils) the internal government of the towns. It gave that of the provinces to provincial deputations and *jefes políticos*. It did not give some towns more rights than others in the great act of elections. It proclaimed the equality of all because all are composed of men, and men are equal before the law.

If in all epochs justice has demanded that the basic law respect the rights of peoples, in the present day the need is greater than in other [times]. If in all countries the constitution is a task which most merits thought, in America this duty is greater than in the others.

May Americans progress gradually, avoiding precipitate leaps from one extreme to another absolutely contrary! May those whom the will of the people selects as legislators for America formulate laws which are a true development of the great principle of society or sociability (*compañía*)! May writers worthy of their calling work to unify opinion so that there may be no serious divisions! May the patriotism of all the citizens be concerned that septentrional America should not become like that of the south, a doleful theater of intestine wars! May ambition be moderated, convinced that it is more important to be (*ser*) than to have public office and that it is impossible to exist without order and tranquility. These are the desires of reason in our present situation — my desires and those of all who love America rationally. (1821).

LETTER TO BENTHAM

(From Rafael Heliodoro Valle, *Valle*. México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1934, pp. 156-158)

Guatemala, April 18, 1826

Sir:

The past month of March was one of very great satisfaction for me. I received, forwarded by the consul of your nation, the letter and the books which you kindly sent me. Each one filled me with the sweetest sentiments. I have understood the feelings which dictated the first and recognized the good will which sent me the second.

I believe that I lack very few of your works in order to have them complete. I have those which you have sent me, plus the *Rationale of Punishments and Rewards*, *Essay on Parliamentary Practice*,⁴ *Rationale of Judicial Evidence*, and

4. The translator is not certain which of several works by Bentham the author refers to as *Táctica*, etc. He probably had a French edition of *the Essay*.

the *Treatises on Civil and Penal Legislation*, which they sent me from New York, whence I requested a shipment of outstanding books to further enrich my library.

In it your works will have the distinguished place deserved by the wise Institute of legislators of the world. Through their influence. I hope for a beneficent revolution among all the nations of the earth. You have provided the scientific basis, establishing the fecund and enlightened principle of Universal Utility, giving lessons in legislative addition and subtraction, or sum and remainder, showing how to calculate benefits and evils, to add one and the other, to deduce exact remainders and to formulate laws which produce a greater quantity of good than of evil. You will also bring about a revolution in codes of legislation by making a science of it, and peoples will at last come to have a body of law which will be not a reproach but an honor to Reason — which will bring not misery but happiness to man.

Years ago I realized that one of the first necessities of America and of this beautiful portion of America, Guatemala, was to repeal the Spanish codes and to adopt new ones worthy of the enlightenment shed upon the century by scholars who have known how to perfect jurisprudence. Before our deserved independence, proclaimed September 15, 1821, I published several discourses setting forth my desire to see a code prepared, less defective than those of Castile, and announcing (before having seen your works) the great principle of the greatest possible good to the greatest possible number, which should guide all legislators. At the time of the re-establishment of the Spanish constitution in 1820, when a deputy was chosen to the Cortes of Spain, I was the First Alcade of this ayuntamiento and drew up, by its direction, the instructions which our representative should carry. One of the points I stressed most in these [instructions] was that of drawing up a legislative code in order to stop the innumerable evils which we suffered from the old ones.

After our independence I turned my attention again to this point which had engaged it before. In January of 1822 I wrote and published a discourse in which I examined individually the Spanish codes which were in effect in America and pointed out their defects in detail. In 1824, when I was

a member of this Supreme Executive Power, I directed the attention of the National Assembly to this important point, and to make clearer the defects of the laws relating to the judiciary, I drew up a table or list of the writings or pleadings, the orders and decrees, the notifications, and the days required to terminate a trial or civil suit according to the laws which were unhappily followed. Later, in 1825, I was named by the Assembly of this State to be a member of the commission created to formulate the Civil Code. I then raised my eyes to you, Mr. Bentham, who have been the oracle for those who have held such charges in other countries. You thought it worthwhile to send me some of your works, and what you have sent me, together with those which I have received from New York, will be the directing guide of my labors.

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(Trans. by H.E.D.)

PART TWO

Romantic Liberalism and Utilitarianism

ROMANTIC LIBERALISM AND UTILITARIANISM

Since the ideas of the independence movements were transitional between eighteenth century rationalism and nineteenth century romantic liberalism, social thought of the years following independence shows no abrupt change from that of the preceding period. New influences continued to come from Europe, of course. But the trends they inspired in the New World often assumed a more American flavor than in the preceding years, because of the challenge of forming new political societies under such difficulties as a depression in mining, dislocations in international trade, and the recurring financial crises experienced by most of the new national governments of Spanish America.

Three principal streams of European influence may be noted. British political economy, the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, had a profound influence upon the Venezuelan-Chilean Andrés Bello during his long stay in London, upon José María Luis Mora of Mexico, upon Juan Bautista Alberdi of Argentina, upon José Cecilio del Valle of Central America, and upon many others. Bentham's theories were taught as early as 1821 in the university founded in Buenos Aires by Bernardino Rivadavia.¹ The romantic or utopian socialism of Saint Simon and his followers was, if anything, more influential. It found Spanish American expression in the Argentine Association of May and especially in Esteban Echeverría's *Dogma socialista*, the creed of the Association. But the *Revue encyclopédique* and *Le globe*, which diffused the ideas of Saint Simonism, were widely read throughout America, especially in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. Francisco Bilbao of Chile clearly reveals this Saint Simonian influence, while both he and Echeverría may also reflect the influence of the liberal, almost free-thinking French priest, Felicité de Lamannais. Bilbao and his circle of young liberal friends, influenced by Lamartine, called themselves *Los Girondinos*, adopting the names of the leaders of the Gironde as pen names. Victor Cousin's eclecticism, which combined ideas of utilitarianism with the emerging German idealistic concept of a scientific

1. Rafael Heliodoro Valle, *Valle, Prólogo y Selección* (México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1943) pp. xxxiii-xli.

philosophy of history, constituted a third stream of influence. Its effect in Cuba may be clearly seen in a series of lectures, *Philosophy in Havana*, delivered by José Manuel Mestre in 1861,² but it has also been noted in Brazil and elsewhere³. Latin American literature, during these years, embraced the last two trends of thought in its generally romantic trend, as well as some of the more clearly traditionalist influences of French literary romanticism.

Important American nuances are also to be noted during this period. Romantic liberalism, utilitarianism, utopian socialism, and eclecticism often expressed the social attitudes and prejudices of their creole spokesmen, who seemed to combine something of the benevolent aristocratic concept of *noblesse oblige* of the Virginian planters and the French nobility in the days of the Revolution with a growing urban class consciousness. Although this latter feeling grew more slowly in Latin American cities than in more highly urbanized Europe, it also made its influence felt.

The most distinctively American thought of this period came from Argentina and Chile. The dictatorship of Juan Manuel Rosas in Argentina resulted from the victory of the conservative hacendados of the back country of Buenos Aires over the reforming Unitarians, while the triumph of the Conservative party in Chile, under Diego Portales, was really the triumph of an oligarchy of landowners and merchants. Hence, the leaders of thought who emerged in these two countries in the middle years of the century were nurtured in the opposition to these regimes. Esteban Echeverría and his young associates in Argentina had believed at first that they could give intellectual guidance to the Rosas dictatorship. Quickly disillusioned, they seemed to lose in the travail of exile much of their unconscious loyalty to the landowning families from which they derived, developing a particularly strong spirit of nationalism in its place. In Chile the note of Chilean nationalism was equally strong, even in the socialistic Bilbao.

It would be a mistake to underestimate the influence of European thought during this period, but the rebellion of

2. *De la filosofía en la Habana*, reprinted in 1952 by the Ministry of Education of Cuba.

3. Guillermo Francovich, *Filósofos brasileños* (Buenos Aires: Lozada, 1943).

Americans, as Americans, against the authority of Europe is also clear. The anti-Spanish reaction of *desespañolización* was a striking aspect of the period, but it was not merely a political phenomenon; it also embraced cultural and philosophical trends. Andrés Bello, inaugurating the University of Chile in 1842, called for an educational program and a culture which would be American and Chilean in every aspect. Another Chilean, José Victorino Lastarria, like Channing and Emerson in the United States, called for American literary independence. Juan B. Alberdi of Argentina explained the constitutional problem of his country upon the basis of American realities. In doing so, he proposed to eliminate "all which is least contemporary and least applicable to the social needs of our countries, the means of satisfying which should furnish us with the materials of our philosophy."⁴ All of the so-called Generation of 1837 in Argentina, including Bartolomé Mitre, Domingo F. Sarmiento, and Esteban Echeverría expressed similar Americanist ideas.

Several factors in the American environment led Latin Americans to adopt European utilitarianism along with European literary romanticism. One of these elements was the success of the republican experiment in the United States, with its consequent encouragement to the Latin American constitutional experiments and to the general growth of a philosophy of freedom. A second was the abundance of undeveloped land and resources in Latin America, which called for policies to encourage the untrammelled immigration of workers and capital from Europe to develop these sources of wealth. A free trade policy was a natural corollary to that of encouraging the immigration of capital and workers. Historically, the concept of freedom in international trade was also a heritage from the American independence movements, in which it had been about as fundamental as that of the self-determination of peoples. Two other strong elements in the heritage from the independence movements also supported the various liberal trends. One was the concept of federalism, which enjoyed prestige because of its success in the United States. In Latin America it came to have a somewhat different meaning,

4. *Ideas para presidir a la confección del curso de filosofía contemporánea en el Colegio de Humanidades* (Montevideo, 1849). Quoted in Leopoldo Zea. *Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica* (México, El Colegio de México, 1949) p. 138.

however — decentralization of political and even economic authority. Another concept inherited from independence was anti-clericalism, with overtones derived from the French Revolution.

The element of European thought most commonly rejected in Latin America was the emerging scientific philosophy of history, which tended toward historical determinism. But several different and sometimes contradictory positions were taken on this question. José Luz y Caballero of Cuba, for example, although accepting much of the eclecticism of Victor Cousin, attacked the idea that history was governed by an inevitable or determined evolutionary form, because this view would make impossible the concept of a genuine revolutionary movement for Cuban independence. On the other hand, the Mexican historian and organizer of the Mexican Conservative party, Lucas Alamán, while accepting much of the Liberal thought, particularly its political economy, wrote his history of Mexican independence on the premise that independence was a mistake which had brought a weakening and decline of colonial institutions.

A Mexican scholar has pointed out the paradoxical character of the insistence of liberals upon rejecting the idea of scientific history, saying it sometimes led to a logical and formal rejection of the very historical past they were attempting to destroy. Thus the Latin American engaged in "a difficult, practically impossible task: that of tearing out or amputating a very important part of his being." Indeed, romantic liberals used the survival of the past to reinforce their demands for its destruction. They even went so far as to claim that the revolution for independence had not really been animated by liberty, but by Spanish imperialism. It had merely been the exchange of one master for another, and the social revolution still remained to be accomplished.

So the new generation of emancipators, with the courage and zeal of Spaniards, undertook to extirpate the Spanish past, including its close association with the Church, and to *make a new history*. But the past is not so easily disposed of. Political parties might take different names, new philosophies might

appear, yet still the past remained alive. The romantic liberals might deny it, but they were unable to escape it.⁵

A second element of European thought rejected by Latin American romantic liberals was the emerging class consciousness of urban workers. This spirit, so essential a part of the evolving European socialism, found little social basis in the Latin American scene. This is not to say that class lines and class consciousness remained unchanged. The aristocratic concepts so obvious in Echeverría's *Dogma socialista* became less obvious in the later writings even of the members of his group. By the revolutionary year of 1848 socialist ideas had become the possession of young men of the small but growing urban middle class — a new force to be reckoned with in the politics of Latin American countries. But one looks in vain for the degree of labor class consciousness apparent in Europe, which inspired the Communist Manifesto of that year.

The period of romantic liberalism and utilitarianism also produced a number of political leaders, such as Lucas Alamán of Mexico, Dr. Francia of Paraguay, Juan Manuel Rosas of Argentina, Diego Portales of Chile, and Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos of Brazil, with a conservative social philosophy, who are not adequately represented in this anthology. At first glance their ideas might seem to be linked to the European conservatism of the Metternich Era, with which they shared an opposition to the romantic-liberal-socialist revolutionary movements of the day. Upon closer examination, however, they also reveal close ties with American experience as Juan B. Alberdi pointed out to his generation in his *Fragmento Preliminar al estudio del derecho*.⁶

5. Leopoldo Zea, *Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica* (México: El Colegio de México, 1949) pp. 19-23.

6. (Buenos Aires: Librería Hachette, 1955). Estudio preliminar de Bernardo Canal Feijóo.

ESTEBAN ECHEVERRÍA (1805-1851)

ARGENTINA

José Esteban Antonio Echeverría, Argentine romantic poet, socialist, intellectual leader of the Argentine Generation of 1837 and founder of the Association of May, was born in Buenos Aires in 1805. He died at the age of forty six, an exile in Montevideo, a year before the overthrow of the Rosas dictatorship in Argentina to which much of his life had been dedicated. Educated in Buenos Aires and in France, he came under the influence of the romantic movement in literature there (Goethe, Schiller, Byron) and of the socialism of Saint-Simon. From Vico's *New Science* he seems to have derived something of the concept of society as a historical fact which led him to see the May Revolution as a process involving the historical development of certain principles or ideas. Another strong intellectual influence, as will be seen in the following pages, came from Mazzini's *Young Europe*. The Association of May, which he organized in 1838 in opposition to Rosas, consisted of young intellectuals of Buenos Aires dedicated to the principles of freedom expressed in the May 1810 revolution. Several of them later became important Argentine political leaders.

As might be expected because of his literary interest in the romantic movement, Echeverría's social and political liberalism also had a romantic cast. In contrast with his brilliant young colleague in the Association of May, Juan B. Alberdi, he showed little interest in economics, however, limiting himself to society and politics in their more general aspects. The chief purpose of society, he believed, was to provide the greatest individual freedom. He thought of society as an association bound together by such sentiments and feelings as love and honor. In the latter one readily recognizes an aristocratic, chivalric sense of *noblesse oblige*.

Yet in spite of his literary romanticism, Echeverría remained essentially a rationalist in many ways. He rejected the application of Saint Simon's socialism to Argentina on the grounds that the Argentines were not yet prepared for it. Although urging the equality of classes, he likewise rejected universal suffrage, arguing that it was not the people, but their reason which was sovereign. This quality of intelligence, he

believed, was to be found in those who were educated and owned property. For similar reasons he opposed unlimited freedom of the press. On the other hand, and unlike many of his anti-clerical contemporaries, he considered religion a great incentive to morality and thought of Christianity as essentially civilizing and progressive.

The *Dogma Socialista* or Socialist Creed which follows was the revolutionary creed of the Association of May. The longer subsequent passage later appeared with it in a revised and enlarged volume under the same title. It is an exposition of Echeverría's most distinctive concepts, such as equality, association, unlimited progress, liberty, fraternity, morality, and democracy.

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SOCIALIST DOGMA OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MAY

BY ESTEBAN ECHEVERRÍA

(From *Dogma socialista y otras páginas políticas*. Prólogo de Salvador M. Dana Montañó. Clásicos argentinos, Vol. XXX. Buenos Aires: Estrada, 1948, 1948, pp. 101-107).

To the Argentine Youth and to all

Worthy Sons of the Patria¹

1. Tyrants have sowed dissension and erected their throne of iniquity on the ruins of anarchy.
2. For us there is no law, no right, no patria, no liberty.
3. Proscribed, we wander like the people of Israel in search of the promised land.
4. Hence the heritage which has fallen to our lot: obscurity, humiliation, servitude, such is the patrimony which the revolution has left us, the product of the blood and of the sacrifice of our heroic fathers.
5. An accursed race, we seem destined by an unjust law to suffer the punishment of the crimes and errors of the generation which gave us being.
6. Our torture is the torture of Tantalus. We desire but find no satisfaction; we have ambitions and cannot realize them; our love of liberty is a quimera; our vows for the patria ineffective.
7. We are old enough and feel we have sufficient strength to wear the manly toga, but triumphant stupidity forbids it. We wish to speak to utter our complaints and we are muzzled.
8. As children, at the roar of the cannon we dream of a patria and, awaking as adults, we find in its place a desert sowed with cadavers and ruins, and with a bloody and fratricidal banner flaming over them.

1. First published in *El Iniciador de Montevideo* in 1838.

ESTEBAN ECHEVERRIA

9. In its shadow despotism sits in mute and perpetual adoration of itself. Around it the blind crowd scream and clamor as did the beguiled Israelities around the idol of Baal.
10. "Here is my country" [they] exclaim, "here the tutelary God of the Argentines! Come and adore him! Prostrate yourselves humbly at the foot of his excellent throne and he will crown you with blessings! Adore him or you will be cursed; vengeance and ignominy will fall upon you!"
11. Thus they speak to their brothers: "Believe or you will be exterminated." Egoism incarnate is their God and they have made an altar of their malodorous hearts.
12. Miserable ye, who, more stupid than beasts, prostrate yourselves before a monstrous idol!
13. Miserable they who hesitate when tyranny fattens itself upon the entrails of the patria!
14. Miserable those who, laughing at their clamors, go to offer themselves in holocaust to the iniquitous ambition of tyrants.
15. For them is ignominy, for them slavery, for them the hate and inexorable anathema of the generations.
16. And what! Shall we, the sons of the heroes of May and July, of the generations of giants, go to join the chorus of perjuring idolaters who have no other God than egoism, nor patria than evil (*mezquinas*) ambitions, nor idea of the dignity of man than of the dignity of brutes!
17. What would they say there in their neglected tombs, the illustrious martyrs of American independence!
18. Hear, hear their cry! Hear the cry of their immaculate blood!
19. "Our mission was to give you independence and to leave you a patria as inheritance.
20. What have you done with it?"

SYMBOLIC WORDS

BY ESTEBAN ECHEVERRÍA

(From *Dogma Socialista y otras páginas políticas*, pp. 108-184)

1. Association

Society is a fact printed on the pages of history and the necessary condition provided man by Providence for the free exercise and full development of his faculties, giving him the Universe as his patrimony. Society is the vast theater where his power unfolds itself, where his intelligence is formed, and where he produces the fruits of his indefatigable activity.

Without association there is no progress or, better still, association is the condition of all civilization and all progress.

True association cannot exist except among equals. Inequality engenders hates and passions which suffocate confraternity and weaken social ties.

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If the association is to correspond broadly to its purpose it must be organized and constituted in such a way that social interests and individual interests neither clash with nor harm each other. This means that two elements must be combined: the social and the individual element, the *patria* and the independence of the citizen. The roots of the problem of social science lie in the harmony and alliance of these two interests.

The right of the man and the right of the association are equally legitimate.

Politics should aim by association to secure liberty and individuality for each citizen.

As society should safeguard the individual independence of all its members, so all members are obliged to support with their efforts the good of the *patria*.

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The national will, the true public conscience, is sovereign to interpret and decide upon the just, the true, and the obligatory. This is the reign of positive law. Even beyond

this law, and in a higher sphere, lie the rights of man which, being the basis and the essential social conditions, are superior to and dominate all.

No majority, no political party or assembly has the right to establish a law which attacks the natural laws or the conservative principle of society, or which make the security, freedom, and lives of many subject to the caprice of one man.

2. Progress

"Humanity is like a man who lives forever and progresses constantly."² With one foot resting in the present and the other extended towards the future he marches without tiring, as though impelled by God's breath, in search for the promised Eden of his hopes.

All human associations exist through progress and for progress, and civilization itself is nothing but the indelible testimony of human progress.

All efforts of man and society are directed towards procuring the well-being which they desire. The well-being of a people is in proportion to and born of its progress.

"To live according to the law of its being is well-being. Only by means of free and harmonious exercise of all their faculties can men and peoples achieve the widest application of this law."³

3. Brotherhood

"Human brotherhood is mutual love or that generous disposition which induces man to treat others as he would like to be treated."⁴

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By the law of God and of humanity all men are brothers. Any egoistic act is an assault against human brotherhood.

Let us throw a veil of oblivion over the mistakes of our ancestors; man is fallible. Let us weigh justly their works and

2. Pascal. This and following footnotes are by Echeverría.

3. *Joven Europa* (Mazzini).

4. *Ibid.*

see what we would have done in identical circumstances. What we are and what we shall be in the future we owe to them.

Let us open the sanctuary of our hearts to those who deserve well of the patria and who sacrificed themselves for her.

The egotists and rascals will get what they deserve, the judgment of posterity awaits them. The motto of the new generation is brotherhood.

4. Equality

"By the law of God and of humanity all men are equal."⁵

To bring about equality all men must be penetrated with a sense of their mutual rights and obligations.

Equality requires that those rights and duties be equally admitted and declared by all, that no one can be exempt from the action of the law which formulates them, and that each man participate equally in their enjoyment in proportion to his intelligence and work. All privilege is an attack upon equality.

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To inform the masses concerning their true rights and obligations, to educate them so as to make them capable of exercising citizenship, and to instill in them the dignity of free men, protect and stimulate them to work and to be industrious, provide them the means to achieve well-being and independence—this is the way to elevate them to equality.

The only hierarchy which should exist in a democratic society is that which originates from nature and is as invariable and necessary as that [nature].

The problem of social equality is summed up in this principle: "From each man according to his capacity, to each man according to his work."⁶

5. Liberty

"By the law of God and humanity all men are free."

"Liberty is the right which every man has to employ his

5. *Ibid.*

6. Saint-Simon.

faculties without obstacle in the achievement of well-being and to choose the means which may help him in this purpose."⁷

The free exercise of individual faculties ought not to cause damage to nor violation of the rights of others. Do not do to another what you would not wish done to you. Human liberty has no other limits.

6. God, the Center and Periphery of Our Religious Creed

The natural religion is that imperious instinct which leads man to render homage to his Creator.

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The best of positive religions is Christianity, for it is nothing but the revelation of the moral instincts of mankind.

The Gospel is the law of God because it is the moral law of natural conscience.

Christianity brought to the world brotherhood, equality and liberty, and redeemed by restoring mankind to its rights.

Christianity is essentially civilizing and progressive.

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The Gospel is the law of love, and as St. James the Apostle says, the perfect law, which is the law of liberty. Christianity must be the religion of democracies.

Examine all and choose the good, says the Gospel. Thus it has proclaimed independence of thought and freedom of conscience, for liberty consists primarily in the right of free examination and choice.

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Religion is a tacit pact between God and the human conscience; it forms the spiritual link which unites the creature and his Maker. Consequently, man should direct his thought toward God in the way he considers most suitable. God is the only judge of the acts of his conscience, and no worldly authority should usurp this divine prerogative, because conscience is free.

7. *Joven Europa.*

The state, as a political body, cannot have a religion because, not being a person, it lacks a conscience of its own.

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7. Honor and Sacrifice, Stimulus and Norm of Our Social Conduct.

Morality rules the acts of the private individual, honor those of the public man.

Morality pertains to the jurisdiction of individual conscience and is the standard of conduct of man in relation to himself and his equals. Honor enters into the field of the conscience of social man and is the norm of his actions in relation to society.

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Sacrifice is the death decree to all egoistic passions. They have brought war, disasters, and tyranny to the soil of the patria. Only by sacrificing ourselves shall we redeem it.

8. Adoption of All Legitimate Glories of the Revolution . . . Contempt for All . . . Illegitimate Reputation.

Once the foregoing principles are established and recognized, the only legitimate glories for us will be those which have been gained by the path of honor, those which are not stained by iniquity or injustice, those achieved by virtue of heroism, constancy, and sacrifice, those which have left indelible traces of their existence, whether on battlefields or in office, in the press or in the tribune, those, in sum, which the incorruptible judgment of philosophy may sanction.

Legitimate ambition adjusts itself to the law and takes the path which the latter traces to achieve its aims. All other ambition is no more than the frenzy of the most ignoble passions covered with the mask of true merit.

Cunning is an animal instinct which those men who lack intelligence possess in high degree and which they employ without shame to accomplish their depraved purposes.

Virtue and talent walk with an open face, hypocrisy and stupidity cover themselves.

There is no legitimate individual glory without those conditions.

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The Argentine people carried the banner of political emancipation to the Equator. The initiative of social emancipation is hers. Her flag will be the symbol of two revolutions, the sun of their arms, and the regenerating star of half a world.

9. Continuation of Progressive Traditions of the Revolution of May

The American Revolution, like all great revolutions of the world, occupied exclusively in breaking down the Gothic edifice built in centuries of ignorance by tyranny and force, had neither time nor sufficient repose to rebuild a new one; but it proclaimed, nevertheless, the truths which the long and painstaking enlightenment of the human spirit had produced, that they might serve as a basis for the reorganization of modern societies.

The revolutionaries of May knew that the first need of America was *de facto* independence from the metropolis and that to establish liberty it was first necessary to emancipate the patria.

Absorbed in this thought they threw, however, a glance toward the future and sketched in passing for coming generations the plan of the great task of Argentine emancipation.

In their decrees and laws, improvised in the midst of the hazards of battle and the clash of arms, are found traced the eternal principles which enter into the code of all free nations.

They needed the people in order to disperse the enemies from the fields where the seeds of liberty were to germinate, and they declared it [the people] the unlimited sovereign.

This was not an ignorant extravagance but a necessity of the times. It was necessary to attract to the new cause the vows and arms of the masses by offering them the bait of omnipotent sovereignty. It was necessary to let the slave know that he had rights equal to those of his master, and that those who had oppressed him until then were no more than little

tyrants whom they could destroy with the first demonstration of their courage. And so instead of saying *sovereignty resides in the reason of the people*, they said *the people is sovereign*.

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This principle of omnipotence of the masses was bound to produce all the disasters it produced and to end with the sanctioning and establishing of despotism.

But this principle has also been fertile in useful results. The people, before the revolution, was something without name or influence. After the revolution, it appeared gigantic and suffocated in its arms the lion of Spain. The crowd, the populace, previously submerged in nullity, in impotence, appeared then on the surface of society, not as worthless foam but as a power destined by Providence to dictate law and superimpose itself upon any other earthly power.

Sovereignty passed from the oppressors to the oppressed, from the kings to the people, and democracy was born suddenly on the banks of the Plata; and democracy will grow; its future is great.

10. Independence from Backward Traditions Which Subordinate Us to the Old Regime

Two ideas always appear in the theater of revolution:⁸ the stationary idea which clings to the traditions of the past, desiring the status quo, and the reforming and progressive idea; the old regime and the modern spirit. Each of those two ideas has its representatives and sectarians, and out of their antipathy and struggle are born war and the disasters of a revolution.

For us the triumph of the revolution is the triumph of the new and progressive idea; it is the triumph of the holy cause of liberty of man and of peoples. But this triumph has not been complete because the two ideas still oppose each other silently, and because the new spirit has not completely annihilated the spirit of the shadows.

The American generation carries inoculated in its blood the habits and tendencies of another generation. On her

8. We do not understand by revolution the assaults or turbulences of civil war; but the complete overthrow of an old social order....

forehead one can see, if not the brand of the slave, the scars of recent slavery.

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Two dismal legacies from Spain principally check the progressive movement of the American revolution: her customs and her legislation.

A new political order requires new elements to constitute it.

Spain left us an inheritance of regimentation (*la rutina*), and regimentation in the moral order is nothing other than the abnegation of the right of examination and choice, that is, the suicide of reason, and in the physical order, to follow the common routine, not to innovate, always to make things in the same mold and adjust them to the same measures. And democracy asks for action, innovation, constant exercise of all the faculties of man, because activity is the essence of its life.

Spain imbued in us the the dogma of blind respect for the authority of certain doctrines; and modern philosophy proclaims the dogma of the independence of reason, and recognizes no other authority than that which it sanctions and no other criterion to decide upon principles and doctrines than the uniform consent of humanity.

Spain recommended to us respect and deference for the opinions of gray heads, but gray heads may indicate old age without indicating intelligence and reason.

Spain taught us to be obedient and superstitious, but democracy wants us to be submissive to law, religious, and good citizens.

Spain educated us to be vasals and dependents, but the patria demands of us an enlightenment corresponding to the dignity of free men.

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To destroy those pernicious germs and to emancipate us completely from these antiquated traditions, we need a radical reform of our customs. Such will be the task of education and law.

Our legislation should be born of the intelligence and the custom of the nation.

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A complete body of American laws, worked out with the gradual progress of democracy in view, would be a solid basis for a magnificent structure of emancipation of the American spirit.

11. Emancipation of the American Spirit

The great thought of the revolution has not been achieved. We are independent but not free. The arms of Spain do not oppress us, but her traditions overwhelm us. From the entrails of anarchy was born the counter revolution.

The stationary idea, the Spanish idea emerging from her shadowy lair (*tenebrosa guarida*) triumphantly raises again its stupid head and hurls anathemas against the reforming and progressive spirit.

But its triumph will be ephemeral. God has willed, and the history of humanity proves, that ideas and facts which once existed should now disappear from the world scene and be submerged forever in the abyss of the past, as generations disappear one after the other. God has willed that today should not resemble yesterday; that the present century should not be re-born; and that in the moral realm as in the physical, in the life of man as in that of peoples, all should move and progress, everything should be unceasing action and continuous movement.

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The revolution marches, but in chains. It is the task of the young generation to break them and achieve the glory of seizing the initiative in the great work of emancipation of the American spirit, which can be summed up in these two problems: *political emancipation and social emancipation*.

The first has been resolved but the second remains to be solved.

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Philosophy recognizes individual reason as the only judge of that which affects the individual and collective reason, or

the general *consensus*, as the sovereign arbiter of all that concerns society.

In association, philosophy will succeed in establishing a pact of alliance between individual reason and the collective reason of the citizen and the patria.

Philosophy illuminates the faith, explains religion, and also subordinates it to the law of progress.⁹

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Religion is the moral foundation (*cimiento*) upon which society rests, the divine balsam of the heart, the pure source of our future hopes, and the mystic ladder by which worldly thoughts ascend to heaven.

Science teaches man to know himself, to penetrate the mysteries of nature, to lift his thoughts to the Creator, and to find the means for individual and social improvement and perfection.

Art embraces in its divine inspiration all moral and emotional elements of humanity: the good, the just, the true, the beautiful, the sublime, the divine; individuality and society; the finite and the infinite; love, presentiments, visions of the soul, the most vague and mysterious intuitions of consciousness. It penetrates and embraces all with its prophetic spirit, it views everything through the brilliant prism of its imagination, animates it with the flame of its creative word, beautifies it with the lucid colors of its palette, and transforms it into ineffable and sublime harmonies. It sings heroism and liberty and solemnizes every great act, internal as well as external, in the life of nations.

9. Philosophy already presents and announces the birth of a rational religion of the future, broader than Christianity, which provides a basis for the development of the human spirit and the reorganization of European societies, and which satisfies fully the present needs of humanity. Who will be the revealer of this religion? Humanity itself. This idea which constitutes the fundamental principle of the doctrine of Leroux and his school, has not yet emerged from the sphere of speculation, and we limit ourselves to announcing it, without yet having had time to discuss among ourselves the questions it involves.

Industry places in the hands of man the tools to control the forces of nature, shape his welfare, and achieve the mastery of creation.

Politics, philosophy, science, religion, art, industry, all will be directed toward democracy, to offer it their support and to cooperate actively to strengthen and establish it. In the natural, harmonious, and complete development of those elements the problem of emancipation of the American spirit is outlined.

12. The Organization of the Patria Upon a Democratic Basis

Equality and liberty are the central axis, or better, the two poles of the world of democracy.

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Democracy is not a form of government, but the very essence of all republican governments, or of those established by all for the good of the community or the association.

All modern political associations tend to establish the equality of classes, and one may be certain, observing the progressive movement of European and American nations, "that the gradual development of equality of classes is a law of Providence, since it is imbued with its principal characteristics; it is universal, lasting, from day to day it limits human power, and every event and all men unconsciously conspire to extend and strengthen it."¹⁰

Democracy is government of the majority, or the uniform consent of the reason of all, working to create law and to pass sovereign judgment upon all that which interests the association.

The general and uniform consent constitutes the sovereignty of the people.

The sovereignty of the people is unlimited in all which pertains to society, politics, philosophy, religion; but the people is not sovereign in what pertains to the individual, his conscience, his property, his life, and his liberty.

10. Tocqueville.

The purpose of association is to organize and assure to each and everyone of its associated members *the freest and largest enjoyment of their natural rights, the freest and broadest exercise of their faculties.*

Consequently, neither the sovereign people nor the majority may violate those individual rights, restrict the exercise of those faculties which are at the same time the origin, the tie, the [pre-requisite] condition, and the objective of association.

From the moment they are violated the pact is broken, the association is dissolved, and each one becomes the absolute master of his will and his actions, relying upon his own strength to protect his rights (*cifrar su derecho en su fortaleza*).

Hence it results that the limit of collective reason is individual right (*derecho*) and the limit of individual rights is the *sovereignty of the popular will*.

The right of man precedes the right of the association. By the law of God and humanity the individual is the sole master of his life, of his property, of his conscience, and of his liberty. His life is a gift of God; his property of the sweat of his brow. His conscience is the eye of his soul and the intimate judge of his actions. His liberty, the necessary condition for the development of the faculties God gave him that he might live happily, is the very essence of his life, since life without liberty is death.

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When the positive law of the sovereign is adjusted to natural law, its right is legitimate and all must yield it obedience, under pain of being punished as transgressors; if it violates nature and law it is illegitimate and tyrannical, and no one is obliged to obey it.

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The sovereignty of the people is unlimited in so far as it respects the rights of man: the first principle.

The sovereignty of the people is absolute in so far as it takes reason for a norm: the second principle.

Collective reason alone is sovereign, not the collective will. The will is blind, capricious, irrational; will demands, reason examines, weighs, and decides.

Hence it results that popular sovereignty may only reside in the *reason of the people*, and only the sensible and rational part of the social community is called upon to exercise it.

The ignorant part remains under the tutelage and protection of law dictated by the uniform consent of rational people.

Democracy, therefore, is not the absolute despotism of the masses nor of the majorities. It is the rule of reason.

Sovereignty is the greatest and most solemn act of the intelligence of a free people. How can those who do not understand its importance participate in this act? Those who, ignorant as they are of that upon which they may agree, have no opinion of their own and are consequently in danger of yielding to the suggestions of those of evil intent.

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Consequently, tutelage is necessary for the ignorant, for the vagabond, and for whoever has no personal independence. Law does not *per se* forbid them sovereign rights, nor rob them of such, but imposes upon them a condition prerequisite to their possession, the condition of emancipating themselves.

But the people, the masses, do not always have the means to achieve their emancipation. Society, or the government which represents it, must put it [emancipation] within their reach.

It should foster industry, destroy fiscal laws which check its development, should not overload it with taxes, and should permit it freely and scrupulously to carry on its activity.

It should spread its light over the farthest reaches of society and extend its beneficent hand to the poor and helpless. It should endeavor to elevate the proletarian class to the level of the other classes, freeing first its body with the purpose of later freeing its reason.

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The legislature represents the reason of the people, the judiciary its justice, the executive its action and will. The

first forms the law, the second applies it, the third executes it. The first votes the appropriations and taxes and is the immediate instrument of the desires and needs of the people, the second is the organ of the social justice expressed in the laws, the last the administrator and untiring agent of the social interests.

These three powers are really independent; but far from being isolated and condemned to immobility, mutually resisting each other to maintain a certain imaginary equilibrium, they move harmoniously by different routes toward a single objective: social progress.

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13. Confraternity of Principles

One of the many obstacles which today and for a long time will oppose the reorganization of our society is the anarchy which rules all hearts and minds — the lack of common beliefs capable of forming, strengthening, and instilling irresistible power into the public spirit. No solid foundation exists upon which the judgment of the individual may rest, no norm, no doctrine, no principle of life which attracts, unites, and animates the divided members of the social body.

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To escape this *chaos* we need a light to guide us, a belief to animate us, a religion to console us, a moral basis, a common criterion of certainty to serve as a foundation for the labor of all minds and for the reorganization of the patria and of society.

That foundation stone and that rallying point — they are the rudiments.

Politics, science, religion, art, industry all exist in embryo in our society, but as in chaos, the raw materials of the creation. There are, one might say, many ideas in them but not a system of political, philosophical, artistic doctrine, nor a true science. Because science does not consist of bringing together many ideas, but in verifying them, systematizing them, and constituting them, one might say, a religious dogma for him who professes them.

14. Fusion of All Progressive Doctrines

To achieve the complete realization of the equality of classes and the emancipation of the masses it is necessary "that all social institutions be directed toward the intellectual, physical and moral improvement of the poorest and most numerous class. Society or the power which represents it owes to all its members education and is charged with the progress of the public intelligence."¹¹

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We wish a politics, a religion, a philosophy, a science, an art, an industry which will contribute simultaneously to the same moral solution; which will proclaim and propagate interconnected truths, those which are aimed to establish the harmony of hearts and minds or the close union of all members of the Argentine family.

Democracy is the central unity which we seek by the fusion of all progressive doctrines. It is the focus toward which all our tasks and thoughts converge We will look for guidance to the European intelligence, but upon certain conditions. The world of our intellectual life will be at once national and humanitarian, we shall always have one eye fixed upon the progress of nations and the other upon the internal organs (*las entrañas*) of our society.

The thought of May is ours. Our ambition is to see it completely realized, whatever may be the success of our efforts and hopes, whatever may be the fate which awaits us. In vain will tyranny, brute force, and prejudice make war upon us, and oppose invincible obstacles. Nothing will discourage us; the faith which animates us is unconquerable. God, the patria, the voice of our conscience and of our reason impose upon us the duty of consecrating our strength and, if necessary, shedding our blood for the sacred cause of democratic equality and liberty and for the complete emancipation of the land where we were born.

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15. Renunciation of Sympathies Which Might Link
Us to Either of Two Great Factions

¹¹, Convención Francesa.

The Revolution of May was divided at birth and has continued to be divided until the present day. Armed in both hands, like the French Revolution, it has carried on with one the conquest of liberty, while with the other it has cut to pieces its own breast — double struggle of anarchy and independence, of glory and disgrace, which has made the country at once happy and unfortunate, which has enlightened and vilified our revolution, our men, and our affairs.

Today's anarchy is the daughter of yesterday's anarchy. We have hatreds which are not ours, antipathies which we have inherited. It is fitting to interrupt this dismal succession which would make our anarchy eternal

The faction of Moreno, the faction of Saavedra, the faction of Rivadavia, the faction of Rosas, are meaningless words for us. We know nothing of personal parties, we do not adhere to men. We are the followers of principles. We recognize no evil man at the head of principles of progress and liberty. For us the revolution is one and indivisible. Those who have aided it are worthy of glory, those who have hindered it, of contempt. Let us overlook the faults of the few, however, and think only of the glory of the others.

* * * * *

All Argentines are one in our hearts, whatever their birth, color, condition, emblem, age, profession, or class may have been. We know only one faction, the patria, only one color, that of May, only one era, the thirty years of republican revolution. Looking from the vantage point of these supreme facts, we know nothing of *unitarians and federalists, colorados and celestes, plebeyos and decentes*, old and young, *porteños* and provincials, the year 1810, the year 1824 and the year 1830

* * * * *

We have seen the two principles at war throughout the era of the revolution and the victory is still undecided today. This has made us believe that their forces are equal and that their simultaneous presence in the Argentine organization inevitably is necessary and reciprocal. We have taken stock of the respective assets of power of both principles, unitarian and federalist, and have obtained the following results.

Unitarian Antecedents

Political unity. Civic unity. Judicial unity. Territorial unity. Financial unity. Administrative unity. Religious unity. Unity of language. Unity of origin. Unity of customs.

Revolutionary: The unity of beliefs and republican principles. The unity of representative forms. The unity of sacrifices in the war of emancipation. The unity of conduct and action in that enterprise. The several abandoned pacts of unity, congresses, presidencies, general directories, which were seen for longer or shorter periods during the revolution.

Diplomatic unity, external or international. The unity of glories. The unity of the flag. The unity of arms. The unity deriving from foreign reputation.

The tacit, instinctive unity which is revealed whenever one says without thinking of it: Argentine Republic, Argentine territory, Argentine nation, Argentine patria, Argentine people, Argentine family, and not *santiagueño*, *cordobeso*, or *porteño*.

Federalist Antecedents

The diversities, the provincial rivalries, systematically sowed by colonial tyranny and renewed by republican demagoguery.

The long interregnums of isolation and of absolute provincial independence during the revolution.

Provincial differences springing from the soil and climate, from which follow other differences in character, habits, accent, products of industry and soil.

The enormous and costly distances which separate one from the other.

The lack of highways, of canals, of means for organizing a regular system of communication and transport.

The long municipal traditions.

Previously acquired habits of legislation and provincial governments.

The actual possession of local governments in the hands of the provinces.

The partial sovereignty which the Revolution of May granted to each province and which has been kept by them until today.

The impossibility of bringing the provinces and their governments to dispossess themselves spontaneously of a deposit, liberty, which, once given, is never abandoned voluntarily.

The susceptibilities, the extraordinary strength of provincial self-love.

The eternal zeal for the advantage of the provincial capital.

Whence we have had to accept the necessity of a total sacrifice, not personal but political, of all sympathy which might link us to the exclusive tendencies of either of the two principles which now, worn out by the struggle and far from seeking combat, look for a harmonious fusion upon which the liberties of each province and the prerogative of the whole nation may rest unchanged — the inevitable and sole solution which can result from the two great elements (*términos*) of the Argentine problem, the nation and the province, and from the formula which today is called upon to direct the modern policy, which consists, as we have said elsewhere, in harmonizing the particular with the general, or in other words, *liberty* with *association*.

(Trans. by E.W. and H.E.D.)

JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI (1810-1884)

ARGENTINA

Of all the Generation of 1837, Alberdi best represents the realism in early Argentine thought. Although he was one of the original members of the Association of May, and a close associate of Echeverría, he was not carried away by the latter's romanticism nor his utopian socialism. Rather, he was influenced more than the others of this group by the concepts of British political economy, and hence the economic element often predominated in his thought. His view that legal and political institutions are largely the product of the needs and the nature of a given society may be traced to the Italian Vico and the French Volney. The other most distinctive aspect of his thought was an emphasis upon population and upon race which led him to give to Argentine thought the motto: To govern is to populate.

He was born in 1810 in Tucumán, in western Argentina, the son of one of the early proponents of Argentine independence, and was educated in Buenos Aires. His membership in the Association of May led to his exile to Montevideo during the Rosas dictatorship. Later he spent some time in Paris, but he was living in Chile, where he had gained a notable reputation in law and journalism, when news of the impending overthrow of Rosas led him to complete and publish the book which won him lasting fame: *Bases and Points of Departure for . . . the Argentine Constitution*. This book won the immediate approval of the leader of the uprising against Rosas, Justo J. Urquiza, who presented Alberdi's constitutional proposal to the convention which drew up the federal constitution of 1853, as a basis for its deliberations. Alberdi spent most of the rest of his life in Europe, part of the time as the diplomatic representative of the government of the Argentine Confederation under Urquiza's presidency. His brief return to Argentina, late in life, to serve in the Congress, brought upon him such bitter political attacks that he soon returned to Paris, sad and disillusioned. There he died a few years later (1884).

The *Bases y puntos de partida . . .* from which the following selection is translated, is Alberdi's great contribution to political thought in Argentina and America. In it the ideas of his earlier writing, and those of the Generation of 1837

in general, find classic expression. Although written hurriedly, under the pressure of rapidly moving events, it captured in a unique fashion the political thought of the newly emerging generation of leaders. In these respects it is the closest Latin American approximation to the *Federalist Papers*.

Its outstanding characteristics are a profoundly American historical interpretation of political realities, its historical concept of law, first set forth in the earlier *Fragmento preliminar al estudio del derecho*, presented by Alberdi in the literary salon of Marcos Sastre, and its generally utilitarian economics. When he asserts that "to govern is to populate," he is giving a broad meaning to the word "populate" — one which embraces immigration, education, economic development, and cultural and moral improvement. To understand this concept, as well as his economics and politics, it is necessary to notice that Alberdi always thought of society as having an essentially moral basis. To this moral basis he joins an organic concept which anticipates the later Darwinian social thought.

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BASES AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

BY JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI

(From *Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina*, 5a. ed. . . . con una advertencia por Francisco Cruz. Buenos Aires: L.J.Rosso, 1933. Chapter 17).

"Brotherhood and fusion of
all political parties."

— Justo J. de Urquiza

There is a formula as commonplace as it is profound which serves as a preamble to almost all known constitutions. Almost all begin by declaring that they are given *in the name of God, Supreme Legislator of the nations*. This great and beautiful word must be taken not in a mystical sense but in a profoundly political sense.

God, in effect, gives to each people its constitution or normal way of life, just as He does to every man.

Man does not choose whether his own constitution is to be stout or thin, nervous or sanguine; nor does a people of *its own will* select a constitution which is monarchical or republican, federal, or unitary. It receives these attributes at birth, receives them from the soil on which it dwells, from the number and condition of its settlers, from its previous institutions, and the facts which constitute its history. The people's will can do no more than guide the development of these things in the direction most advantageous to the people's providential destiny.

Our revolution took from the French Revolution this definition of Rousseau: *Law is the general will*. In contrast to the old principle that law was the will of kings, the maxim was excellent and useful to the republican cause. But it is a narrow and materialistic definition, inasmuch as it causes the human legislator to ignore the point of departure for carrying out his work of what we might call simple interpretation. It is a kind of sacrilege to define law as the general will of a people. Will is impotent before facts, which are the work of Providence. Would the will of a congress, the expression of the people, be law if, noting the shortage and the usefulness

of arms, it ordered that Argentines be born with six arms? Would the general will expressed by a constituent congress be law if it compelled every Argentine to think with his knees instead of his head? The same impotence, more or less, would attend any effort to change the action of the natural elements which combine to form the normal constitution of that nation. "Fatal is the illusion into which a legislator falls," said Rivadavia, "when he pretends that his talent and will can change the nature of things or that he can supply what nature lacks by sanctioning and decreeing creations." (Speech on 8 February 1826, on being received as president.)

Law, constitutional or civil, is the rule of existence of the collective beings which call themselves states; and its author, in the last analysis, is no other than the Author of that very existence ruled by law.

The Argentine Constituent Congress will not be called upon to make the Argentine Republic or to create the rules and laws of its normal structural organization; it can neither reduce its territory nor change its geological constitution, nor move the course of the great rivers, nor make mineral lands out of farmlands. It will study and write out the natural laws, into which all these things tend to combine and develop, in the manner most advantageous to the providential destiny of the Argentine Republic.

That is the sense of the well-known rule that institutions must be adequate for the country which receives them. All of Montesquieu's theory of the influence of climate upon the legislation of the peoples has no other meaning than this.

Hence, facts and reality, which are the work of God and exist because of the action of time and of the previous history of our country, are what must decide the constitution which the Argentine Republic receives from the hands of its constituent legislators. Those facts, those natural elements of the normal constitution which the Republic already has through the work of time and of God, must be the subject of the legislators' study and the bases and foundation of their work of merely studying and editing, let us say, and not of creating. Anything else is to legislate for a day, to waste time in inept and puerile speculations.

Applying this method, then, to the solution of the most difficult problem which the political organization of the Argentine Republic has yet presented — that of deciding whether the *unitary* or *federative* form is best suited to its general government — the Congress will find that both these bases have traditional precedents in the Argentine Republic's past life and that both have coexisted and still coexist as the two basic elements in the Republic's political existence.

The Congress can do no less than arrive at that result if, guided by a good method of observation and experimentation, it begins by taking stock of the facts and classifying them appropriately in order to deduce from them a knowledge of its own power.

History shows us that the political precedents for the form of general government of the Argentine Republic are divided into two classes, corresponding to the *federative* and the *unitary* principles.

Let us look first at the unitary precedents. The unitary precedents of the Argentine government are divided into two classes, some corresponding to the colonial period and others belonging to the revolutionary period.

The following are the unitary precedents of our former colonial life:

1. Unity of Spanish origin of the Argentine population.
2. Unity of religious creed and worship.
3. Unity of customs and language.
4. Political and governmental unity, since all the provinces formed a single state.
5. Unity of civil, commercial, and penal legislation.
6. Judiciary unity in procedure, jurisdiction, and authority, since all the provinces of the viceroyalty recognized a single court of appeals, located in the capital and called the Royal *Audiencia*.
7. Territorial unity under the Viceroyalty of the Plate.
8. Financial unity, i.e. unity of public income and expenses.
9. Administrative unity in everything else, since central

action emanated from the Viceroy, supreme chief of state, in the capital of the viceroyalty.

10. The city of Buenos Aires, established as the capital of the viceroyalty, is another unitary precedent of our old colonial life.

Let us now list the unitary precedents of the revolutionary period:

1. Unity of political beliefs and republican principles. The Nation thought as a single man in matters of democracy and republicanism.
2. Unity of sacrifices in the War of Independence. All the provinces united their blood, their sorrows, and their dangers in that undertaking.
3. Unity of conduct, of efforts, and of action in that war.
4. The different pacts of general union signed and broken during the revolution constitute another unitary precedent of the modern period of the country, which is written into its laws and its foreign relations. The first of them is the solemn act of declaration of the independence of the Argentine Republic from the domination and vassalage of the Spaniards. In this act the Argentine people appear welded into a single people. This act is and will perpetually be to their glory.
5. The congresses, presidencies, supreme and general directorates which were in evidence during the revolution.
6. Diplomatic or external unity, as expressed in treaties signed with England, Brazil, France, etc., the provisions of which are part of the external constitution of the country, whatever it may be.
7. Unity in glorious deeds and in reputation.
8. Unity in the symbolic colors of the Argentine Republic.
9. Unity of insignia or great seal.
10. The implicit, intuitive unity which is revealed every time one says without thinking, "Argentine Republic," "Argentine Territory," "Argentine People," instead of "San Juan Republic," "Buenos Aires Nation," "Santa Fe State."

11. The very word "Argentina" is a unitary precedent.

On the strength of those precedents the Argentine Republic formed a single people, a single, large, and consolidated state, a unitary colony for over 200 years under the name of the Viceroyalty of the Plate. When, during the revolution, the appeal was made to all the people of the provinces to establish an independent American sovereignty, the precedents of past monarchic centralism exercised an inexorable influence on the politics of that day, as they do even now, preventing us from thinking that the Argentine Republic could be anything but a single state, even though federative and composed of many provinces, endowed with relative and subordinate liberties and sovereignty.

Let us not, therefore, believe that unity of government was but an episode in the life of the Argentine Republic. On the contrary, it was the outstanding feature of its existence for more than two centuries.

But now, let us look at the precedents, likewise normal and powerful, which render impossible for the time being the indivisible unity of Argentine internal government. Such precedents would compel any system of central government to share and reconcile its actions with those of the provincial sovereignties which, like the general government, are in turn limited in internal administration.

The federative precedents of the Argentine Republic, both colonial and post-revolutionary, are the following:

1. The provincial rivalries and diversities systematically sown by colonial domination and renewed by republican demagoguery.
2. The long periods of isolation and provincial independence which occurred during the revolution.
3. Provincial traits derived from soil and climate, which have produced distinctive traits in character, habits, accent, industry and commerce, and [from their] situation vis-a-vis foreign countries.
4. The enormous and arduous distances which separate some provinces from others in the 200,000 square leagues of territory inhabited by our population of one million.

5. The lack of roads, of canals, of means of organizing a transportation and communication system, and the [consequent] lack of quick and easy political and administrative action.
6. The acquired habits of provincial legislatures, courts, and governments. It has been many years since Argentine laws were made in Buenos Aires, nor are the lawsuits of the inhabitants of the provinces tried there, as they once used to be.
7. The partial sovereignty which the Revolution of May recognized for each of the provinces and which no central power has disputed in modern times.
8. The many tax-exempt municipalities and the wide latitude given the provincial governments of Argentina by the old Spanish regime.
9. The fact that it would be impossible without violence and bloodshed to induce the provinces or their governing officials to relinquish spontaneously a right which when kept one day is not easily abandoned thereafter, namely the power of self-government, sovereignty, or local freedom.
10. The treaties and the partial leagues entered into by the various provinces among themselves during the period of isolation.
11. The monetary provincialism, for which Buenos Aires set the most notable example with its provincial paper money.
12. Finally, the agreement of the provincial governments of the Confederation, signed in San Nicolás on 31 May 1852, ratifying the littoral pact of 1831 which established the federative principle of government.

All the facts set forth above belong to and form a part of the normal and real life of the Argentine Republic, insofar as the basis of its general government is concerned. No constituent congress could possibly make them disappear instantaneously by issuing decrees or constitutions. They must be regarded as bases and be judiciously incorporated in the

written constitution, which must be an expression of the real, natural, and possible constitution.

The strength of the foregoing precedents, both unitary as well as federative, is leading Argentine public opinion away from adherence to any exclusive system. The two principles which vainly aspired through long years of futile struggle for exclusive government of the country are now seeking a parliamentary fusion in a joint system, embracing and reconciling the rights of each province and the prerogatives of the whole nation. This is the inevitable and only solution possible when the formula demanded by modern political life is applied to the two great terms of reference of the Argentine problem, namely the Nation and the Province. The formula attempts a harmonious combination of individualism with the general interest, of localism with the nation, in other words, of freedom with association. This is the natural law of every organic body, whether it is collective or individual, whether it calls itself state or man. Under this law, the organic being has two lives, so to speak, one local and the other general or common, as in the physiology of living things. Their lives recognize two existences, a partial one for each organ and a general one for the whole organic being.

(Trans. by R.L.N. and H.E.D.)

DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO (1811-1888)

ARGENTINA

Domingo F. Sarmiento was a man of many talents and professions: journalist, sociologist, school teacher, soldier, diplomat, state governor, and president of his country. His early difficulties in securing an education in the midst of poverty helped to make his later life a constant battle for the education of his nation, so that he has come to be known as the school teacher president. "To govern is to educate" was the slogan under which he made the fight to free men's minds the basic strategy of the larger campaign to achieve the other social objectives of liberalism — economic, social, and political freedom together with the social progress toward which they were aimed. His naturally pugnacious spirit, frustrated by having to wage his battles with a pen during long years of exile, found expression in an explosive, vitriolic style. For he believed the written and spoken word should lead to action, as appears in a letter of 1862, written shortly after his election as governor of San Juan: ". . . in three years of government I will show them the fists that God has given me. You will see if I do not do what I say."¹

Sarmiento was born in San Juan, western Argentina, February 14, 1811. His father was a soldier with General San Martín, and his mother was of the de Oro family, which played a prominent role in the religious, political and economic life of the province. He studied in the local school and with a maternal uncle, a priest, but failed because of local politics to win a coveted scholarship for study in Buenos Aires (1823) which would have given him direct acquaintance with the other young men of the emerging "generation of 1837." In 1831 his writing and teaching resulted in political persecution which drove him into a twenty-two year exile. Although he traveled in Europe and the United States, meeting the Horace Manns, he spent most of these years in Chile. There he achieved fame as a journalist and teacher, founded a national normal school, and wrote *Facundo* (1845). (Civilization and Barbarism, The Life of Juan Facundo Quiroga).

1. Sarmiento to Posse, San Juan, March 24, 1862. Quoted, from Archives of the Museo Histórico Sarmiento, by Allison W. Bunkley, *The Life of Sarmiento*, (Princeton: University Press, 1952) p.396.

Sarmiento is best known for this devastating portrayal of the caudillo and *caudillismo*. It was a sociological study describing Quiroga as a product of barbaric influences derived from the *pampa* and expressed in gaucho life. Unlike Frederick Jackson Turner in his explanation of the "frontier" in the United States, Euclides da Cunha in analyzing the backlands of Brazil, or the present day Bolivians in expressing a "mystique" of the land, Sarmiento considered this teluric element essentially malignant. He was led to this view by the historicism he shared with others of his generation, as well as by the obvious evils of the caudillo system represented in Quiroga and in Rosas, against whom the book was really written. Hence his overly simple equation of civilization with Europe and barbarism with the American pampa, from which all of Argentina's anarchy and bloodthirsty violence were presumably derived!

In some respects Sarmiento anticipates Darwinian social evolutionism and positivist racialism, but in others he is more closely akin to the demoniac Romantic rebellion against restraints on the free human spirit. One of his best biographers, Allison W. Bunkley, has dismissed this contradiction as merely a conflict between his objective of a society ruled by reason and the literary art of attack on social and political evils.² But Sarmiento's inner contradiction is more profound than this. It expresses, rather, the liberal rebel's concept of a cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil, in which his understanding of the magnitude of the historic forces which created the social realities drove him to change the course of that history, even while taking his stand upon it.

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FACUNDO BY DOMINGO F. SARMIENTO

(From the "Introduction" to *Facundo; edición crítica y documentada*. La Plata: Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1938.)

Terrible ghost of Facundo! I am going to invoke you so that, arising from the bloody dust which covers your ashes, you may come to explain to us the mysterious secret life and the internal convulsions which rend the entrails of a noble people! You have the secret. Reveal it to us! Even ten years after your tragic death the man of the city and the gaucho of the Argentine plains when following certain paths through the desert would say: "No! He is not dead! He still lives! He will come!" It is true! Facundo is not dead; he is alive in popular traditions, in Argentine politics and revolutions. In Rosas, his heir and complement, his soul has passed into another mold more finished, more perfect; and what in him was merely instinct, a beginning, a tendency, was converted in Rosas into a system, the final result. The colonial, barbarous, provincial nature was changed in this metamorphosis into an art, a system, and a fixed policy appearing before the face of the world as the mode of being of a people incarnate in a man who has aspired to assume the role of a genius dominating

objects, men, and events. Facundo, provincial, barbarous, valiant, audacious, was replaced by Rosas, a son of cultured Buenos Aires without being [cultured] himself — Rosas, the hypocritical frozen heart, the calculating spirit, who does evil without passion and organizes tyranny slowly, with all the shrewdness of Machiavelli. Tyrant without rival in the earth today! Why do your enemies think of questioning the title of great which your courtesans lavish upon you? Yes you are great, very great, to the glory and shame of your country, because while thousands of degraded beings have been found ready to hitch themselves to your carriage drawn over dead bodies, other thousands of generous souls are also to be found who in fifteen years of bloody strife have never despaired of conquering the monstrosity which the enigma of the political organization of the republic discloses to us. The time will come, at last, in which they resolve it, and the Argentine Sphinx, half woman for its cowardice, half tiger for its blood-thirstiness, will die in its tracks, giving to the Thebes of the Plata the high rank it deserves among the nations of the New World.

However, to untie this knot which the sword has been unable to cut, it is necessary to study extensively the turns and twists of the threads which form it and to search in national antecedents, in the physiognomy of the soil, in popular customs and traditions, for the points to which they are attached.

The Argentine Republic is today the section of Hispanic America which has pre-eminently claimed the attention of those European nations which not infrequently have seen themselves involved in her disorders, drawn as if into a whirlpool in whose center the most contrary elements whirl about. France was at the point of yielding to this attraction, and only by great efforts with oar and sail, and after losing the rudder, was she able to pull away and keep her distance. Her most skilled politicians have not learned to understand anything of what their eyes have seen upon casting a hasty glance over the American power which defied that great nation. Upon seeing the burning streams of lava boiling up, dashing against each other, roaring in this great center of intestine strife, those who are considered best informed have said: "It is a minor volcano, a nameless one of the many which appear in America; it will

soon be extinct." With that they have turned to look elsewhere, satisfied that they have given a facile and accurate explanation of social phenomena which they have only seen in the aggregate and superficially. To South America in general, and to the Argentine Republic in particular, great damage was done by one Tocqueville who, armed with knowledge of social theories, a scientific traveler with barometers, octants, and compasses, came in order to penetrate into our inner political life as into a vast and still unexplored field, not described by science, and to reveal to Europe and France, so avid for any new aspect of the life of different parts of humanity, this new manner of being which so clearly marked our known antecedents.

If only he had explained the mystery of the desperate struggle which mutilated that republic. If only he had classified carefully the opposing, unconquerable elements which fought against each other. He might have assigned a role to the geography of the land and the customs which it engenders, a role to Spanish traditions and the intimate, plebeian national consciousness which the Inquisition and Spanish absolutism left behind, a role to the opposing ideas which have torn the political world asunder, a role to native barbarism, a role to European civilization, and a role, finally, to the democracy consecrated in the Revolution of 1810, to equality, belief in which has penetrated [even] the lower levels of society.

Such a study, which we are not yet prepared to make because of our lack of philosophical and historical background, if made by competent observers, would have revealed to astonished European eyes a new world of politics, an open, frank, and elemental struggle between the latest progress of the human spirit and the rudiments of savagery, between the populous cities and the dark jungles. Then it might have been able to clarify somewhat the problem of Spain, that straggler of Europe which, thrown between the Mediterranean and the ocean, between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century, tied to civilized Europe by a broad isthmus and separated from barbarous Africa by a narrow strait, stands balanced between two opposing forces, now rising upon the balance of free peoples, now falling upon that of the despot-ridden — now irreligious, now zealous, sometimes avowedly constitutionalist, sometimes shamelessly despotic, at times cursing her broken chains, at times crossing her arms and crying out for the yoke which

seems to be its [accustomed] condition and manner of living. What? The problem of Spain could not be explained by carefully examining American Spain, as the ideas and morality of parents may be traced in the education and habits of their children?

What? Is there no significance for history and philosophy in this eternal struggle of the Hispanic American peoples, that supine lack of political and industrial ability which keeps them restless, turning about unoriented, with no clear objective, not understanding why they cannot achieve a single day of repose nor what hostile hand casts them into the fatal whirlwind which draws them in, despite their wish and without any chance of escaping its malign influence? Is it not worthwhile knowing why in Paraguay, a land subdued (*desmontada*) by the shrewd hand of Jesuitism, a wise man educated in the halls of the old University of Cordoba could open a new page in the history of the aberrations of the human spirit, imprison a people within the bounds of primeval forests and, erasing the paths leading to that hidden China, hide and conceal his prisoner for thirty years in the depths of the American continent without permitting a single outcry to escape until his death came from age and the quiet fatigue of standing immobile — treading a submissive people under foot until the latter is at last [merely] able to say, in a weak and barely intelligible voice, to those who pass by: "I still live, but how greatly have I suffered!" *Quantum mutatus ab illo!* What a transformation Paraguay has undergone! What scars and ulcers the yoke has left upon her unresisting neck!

Is it not worthwhile to study the spectacle of the Argentine Republic which, after twenty years of internal convulsion, of all kinds of efforts at organization, at last produces out of the depths of its entrails, out of its inner heart, the very Dr. Francia in the person of Rosas, only greater, more developed, more hostile if that is possible to the ideas, customs, and civilization of the European peoples? Is there not revealed in his very rancor against the foreign element, his very idea of the authority of government, his very insolence in defying the reprobation of the world, even more in his savage originality, his coldly ferocious character, his will unbending even [to the extent of] sacrificing the patria as [happened to] Sagunto and Numantia, even to abjuring the future and the rank of a

civilized nation, as did the Spain of Philipp II and Torquemada? Is this a chance caprice, a momentary deviation caused by the appearance on the scene of a powerful genius, much as planets leave their accustomed paths when attracted by the approach of another, but without escaping completely from the attraction of their center of rotation, which later resumes its preponderance, causing them to return to their regular courses?

M. Guizot has said from the French tribune: "There are two parties in America, the European party and the American party; the latter is the stronger." And when they told him that Frenchmen had taken up arms in Montevideo and had associated their future, their lives, and their welfare with the triumph of the European party, he contented himself with adding: "The Frenchmen are meddling and they compromise their nation with the other governments." Blessed by God! M. Guizot, the historian of *European Civilization*, he who has outlined the new elements which modified Roman civilization and penetrated the puzzling labyrinth of the Middle Ages to demonstrate how France has been the crucible in which the modern spirit has been mixed, fused, and shaped — M. Guizot, minister of the King of France, gives as the complete explanation of this manifestation of deep sympathy between Frenchmen and the enemies of Rosas: "They are very meddlesome, the French!" The other peoples of America, unmoved and indifferent, who witness this struggle and these alliances of an Argentine party with any European element which may come to their aid, in their turn exclaim with indignation. "These Argentines are great friends of the Europeans!" And the tyrant of Argentina officiously takes it upon himself to complete the phrase, adding: "Traitors to the American cause!" True, they all say. Traitors, that is the word. True, we say, traitors to the American cause, the Spanish, the absolutist, that of barbarism! Have you not heard the word *savage* which goes flying around over our heads?

CONCEPT OF LIBERTY

BY DOMINGO F. SARMIENTO

(From *Comentarios sobre la Constitución 1853, Obras de D.F. Sarmiento*. Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Paris: various publishers, 1889-1903. Vol. VIII, pp. 111-113.)

"To assure the benefits of liberty to ourselves,
our posterity, and to all men in the world
who wish to dwell in the Argentine land."³

* * * * *

Modern liberty arises from the circumstances of simple perfection of institutions, from the mere satisfaction of the sentiment of human dignity. It is economic, industrial — the indispensable basis of the wealth of individuals and of national development. Peoples who lack part of the public liberties vegetate, those who lack all of them wither away in obscurity and decrepitude. England, which displays the greatest liberty, shines in the world scene; the prodigies of expansion and riches of the United States astonish and overwhelm [us], thanks to her public liberties. Those who wish to separate liberty from the prosperity of states forget that Holland, Tyre, Sidon, Carthage, free peoples of earlier epochs, were free and at the same time rich, enterprising, and industrious — [great] merchants and sailors.

Modern liberty, thus, is a [form of] capital. To bequeath liberty to their children is the best and most productive inheritance that one generation can leave to another; and when establishing a state, it is a worthy and serious concern of its legislators to give effect to this blessing which is the source of all others In the midst of the ignorance of undisciplined masses, amidst the hazards of civil war and increase in de facto powers, the very ones who might be expected to temporize with the difficulties raise up a monument to the progress of universal reason in a desolated country, establishing a perfect code which concedes none of the conquests which human freedom has made in the most fortunate regions. If that constitution is not realizable, at least no other could equal its high objective in respect to what is fundamental. It would be a noble program and a goal toward which to direct the efforts of the future.

3. Preamble, the Argentine Constitution of 1853.

Its mere promulgation is in itself a valuable precedent and a fertile seed. Tyranny has ruled twenty years openly and unopposed. This is the code of the liberties which it trampled under foot (*holló*); this is the criterion for judging any new attempt to revive it.

Everywhere efforts have been made to break down the fundamental principles which the human conscience recognizes as the basis of all right and justice, the capacity of the people for whom constitutions which abridge, violate, or prostitute them are intended. Experience, however, has shown the vanity and fallacy of such attempts.

None of these bastard or mutilated constitutions endures, and this is their best refutation. Statesmen who believed it necessary to suppress liberties to protect order have not even had time to die before seeing the power overthrown which they wished to protect or the tyrannies re-established which they believed they were fending off. Anarchy and despotism are the two dangers of all political apprenticeship. The excesses of despotism teach the love of liberty, the ills and disturbances of anarchy demand order, and it is useless for constitutions to pretend to escape these lessons by reducing those very liberties which they propose to guarantee. Those who speak of a people as capable of abusing these [liberties] forget that those who wield power, being a part of that same imperfect people, are even more exposed to the abuses which resistance provokes. In order to be good, constitutions should have as their basis the principles of law recognized by the universal conscience, as their sphere of action not only the momentary needs of the time and its preoccupations, but the more extensive [sphere] which relates to the future, and the territorial scope to permit (*dar lugar*) the growth of the population and its wealth.

Constitutions contrived for the present moment are only an iron barrier erected against future developments. The Argentine Confederation, with scanty population and an immense terrain, should measure its capacity in proportion to the elements which must develop more or less immediately.

Thus, a general government and the constitution which assures it should be concerned with assuring the blessings of liberty, not only to ourselves, but to our posterity and to all men in the world who wish to inhabit our soil.

CONCERNING NATIONAL POWER

BY DOMINGO F. SARMIENTO

(From *Argirópolis*, con una introducción biográfica por Ernesto Quesada. Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficas Argentinas, 1916, pp. 189-193).

There are special circumstances, not understood until the present, which [explain] why the backwardness of some countries is maintained by their zeal for legislating upon the basis of what exists, imitating in this respect the old governments of Europe, or why everything is destroyed by the spirit of antipathy to things European, by Americanism. The first leads to inaction, the second to barbarism. South America, in 1810, found itself in circumstances unique in the history of civilized or Christian peoples.

[She has] an immense continent but sparse population, navigable rivers but neither ships nor experience in navigation, a fertile soil but not the science to cultivate it, cities in the interior lacking easy communication with the ports, a population accustomed to the uses and necessities of civilized life but without the industry to satisfy them. Given these antecedents, the truth of which no one doubts, time alone can produce an improvement in the observable situation, because there is no progress except where there are the elements of development, such as science, industry, etc. The achievement of independence was not a benefit except in the sense of giving us liberty, which the colonial regime had denied, to correct our defects; independence, by perpetuating existing evil, could bring as a consequence of lassitude and the unleashing of passions, the destruction [even] of what existed.

These are simple principles but very general in their application. We shall limit ourselves here to a few cases [drawn] from practical experience. The Argentine Republic, for example, is a country uninhabited from the Straits of Magellan to beyond the Chaco. In the interior is a population small in numbers and negligible in respect to industrial capacity, because they have inherited from their fathers neither the mechanical crafts, nor the machines which aid them, nor knowledge of the sciences which direct and change them. Hence, the American governments born of independence ought to have occupied themselves exclusively with making this immense

extension of country into a state, the rivers into means of communication and export, and this scanty population into a nation.

But if a government had to wait for time to bring these results, so that the present population reproducing itself could come to make up a nation of millions of men, two results would follow: first, five hundred years would be required to obtain it and, second, the same men would be reproduced, with their present scanty knowledge, lack of industrial ideas, *et cetera*. This is what occurred until very recently in European Spain and still continues in Morocco, in Africa, and in other countries. Population has increased for centuries, but the civilization of the inhabitants is no more advanced today than it was five hundred years ago. By what miracle, then, can a government accelerate the work of time and improve at once the intellectual, industrial, and productive capacity of the present population?

European immigration answers all these questions. Make of the Argentine Republic the fatherland of all men who may come from Europe; let them freely work and unite with our population, taking part in our tasks, enjoying our advantages. This is what is happening today in North America, which had three million inhabitants when it became independent and today numbers twenty-five [million], which consisted [then] of only thirteen states and now consists of twenty-eight, among them many peopled almost exclusively by immigrants. In ten years half a million men have emigrated from England, and annually an equal number of souls emigrates from Europe as a whole, of whom half direct themselves throughout the new countries of the world,⁴ carrying everywhere their industries, new means of acquiring [wealth], and often fortunes already made.

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Where this mass of population is gathered, uncultivated fields disappear, cities arise, rivers are peopled with ships, and markets are filled with products, because the European brings with him some of the knowledge, the industry, and the tools of production of the civilized nations. Hence it results that the more Europeans hasten to a country the more that country

4. Sarmiento doubtless means the countries of the *new world*.— Trans.

will come to resemble Europe, until a day comes in which it surpasses [the latter] in wealth, in population, and in industry — a thing which is already happening today in the United States.

Have our governments labored with this end in view? Our tragic history provides the answer. For twenty years we have occupied ourselves with finding out whether we should be federalists or unitarists. But what organization is it possible to give to an unpopulated country, to a million men scattered over a limitless extension [of territory]? And why was it necessary, in order to make unitarists or federalists, for the one [group] to kill the other, pursue them, and exile them? Instead of doubling, the country has declined in population; instead of advancing in knowledge it has taken pains to persecute the best educated.

It was necessary to attract population from other countries in order to increase our numbers and wealth and to introduce the knowledge of crafts and sciences which we lack, but for twenty years we have done nothing but shout against foreigners, frightening those in Europe who might be disposed to come with their families and their industry to establish themselves among us. And since these antipathies led to war and blockades, and since to resist them money and armies were needed, this at a time when we were defending ourselves in the Rio de la Plata, savage Indians depopulated the interior by their depredations, reducing even more than before the part occupied by Christians.

Thus each day we go from bad to worse, and the evil will continue until we organize a national government planned with the sole object of [furthering] endeavors to people the country and to create wealth. This purpose, pursued with zeal for a number of years, would accelerate our development in a prodigious manner; but to carry it out requires giving to the country a different organization and a different spirit from that which has counseled and directed the policy of the nation.

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One of the most beautiful institutions of former times still exists in Buenos Aires, although today it does not make itself felt through any work of consequence. The Topographical Department, if made into a national [agency], could become

the point of origin and return for all projects of reconnaissance, survey, and other [similar activities]. Our principal source of wealth is the public domain, today unproductive, which can be worth millions the moment we begin to distribute it to settlers at a fixed price. Once the frontiers [of settlement] are assured by the system we have indicated, the interior of the Republic should be the object of development on a large scale. In the United States, the government at Washington places on sale every year part of the federal lands, previously surveyed and marked out by the engineers. In this way two hundred thousand pesos per year come into the treasury, and foundations are laid for new settlements and states. It would be the duty of the National Topographical Department to proceed to survey and sell arable public lands in different parts of the Republic so that immigrants arriving from Europe would know where to go and would not accumulate on the coast just because of uncertainty and fear of venturing blindly into an unknown country.

The interior should be made livable for immigrants, and a chain of post houses from Buenos Aires to Mendoza and Tucumán would assure the passage of those traveling on foot. In Bolivia, a country which we consider more backward than ours, the traveler walks through the deserts, sleeping at night in decent buildings constructed by the government. Who, having traveled from Buenos Aires to San Luis, will not recall with horror those hog sties called post houses which reveal backwardness, unexampled on the plains of Asia, where from time immemorial caravanseries have existed for the comfort and protection of merchants?

* * * * *

These are the objects for the first attention of a national government: to attract quickly the European immigration which [now] goes to settle in the most remote countries because of the fear we inspire in them; to solicit it, urge it, animate it until a natural and spontaneous movement is built up, until from the ports of Europe to the banks of the Plata an uninterrupted line of embarkations may be seen. This is neither impossible nor far distant.

Let us not despair of the future, however. Peace will be established on solid bases, the provisional authority of the confederation will return to its legitimate center, the congress, and with the re-establishment of peace and confidence capital will abound. Three quarters of the canals and railroads of the United States have been built with English capital. In Europe money earns only three percent, even two. Capital calculates the risk, and there is no enterprise, however distant or problematical, to which a good rate of interest will not attract capital. When we are seen to be at work, when these arbitrary governments and persistent wars disappear, European industry, capital, and workers will come voluntarily to seek lucrative employment under the protection of our laws.

* * * * *

Still another difficulty — What kind of constitution should be given to the new federation or to the present one if the desired aim is not achieved? But this question is easier to resolve than the others. The nature of the country and the position of the provinces in respect to each other indicate what their relationship should be. The national will, [political] violence, and events have given the federal form to the state. Constitutions are no more than a declaration of the rights and duties of man in society. In this respect all the constitutions of the world can be boiled down to a single one. In matters of guarantees, security, liberty, and equality it suffices to declare in effect all the provisions of our old constitutions, that of the year 1812, that of 1818, and that of 1826.

As for the federal structure, there is no other basis to adopt now than that of the United States. Do we want to be federalists? Let us be so, as a minimum, in the manner of the only peoples who have this form of government. Would we want, perchance, to invent a new federal form, unknown in the world until today? [Then] let us enter upon any regime whatsoever, provided it is not arbitrary, provisional, or chaotic. Time, tranquility, and experience will reveal the difficulties and point out the remedy. All peoples follow this road. The source of order in a country is not the pressure or coercion of government. It is the interests embraced. Depopulation and lack of industries engender revolts. Populate and create interests. Let commerce penetrate everywhere, let a thousand enterprises be initiated, let millions of capital await its products,

and you will create a million supporters of order. Order thus established is not so ridiculous that men of substance will wish in secret to see it disappear. Change the course of ideas, opening up for them, instead of partisan ambitions, a new theatre of action, instilling new hopes. Popular preoccupations can be changed and directed. The Romans imbibed with their mothers' milk the idea that they were destined to rule the world, and they achieved it. For a century the French have believed themselves called to dominate modern civilization, and the efforts of their lips seem to justify these pretensions. Implant in the people of the Rio de la Plata [the idea] that they are destined to be a great nation, that every man who arrives on their shores is Argentine, that their patria is that of all the men of the world, that the near future will change their present condition and, thanks to these ideas, these peoples will march happily along their appointed road. Two hundred thousand immigrants brought into the country and a few preparatory works will provide the basis for such pleasant hopes. Call yourselves the United States of South America, and the sense of human dignity and noble emulation will together prevent making a mockery (*baldón*) of the name with which great ideas are associated.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

JOSE MARIA LUIS MORA (1794(?)-1850)

MÉXICO

José María Luis Mora gives us a clear expression of Mexican economic and political liberalism during the troubled quarter century which followed independence in that country. He was the spokesman of the creoles of Mexican society, outnumbered at least ten to one by the Indian masses among whom they lived. Or at least he was the spokesman of that part of the creoles who were willing to break with the authority of Church and Crown in trying to apply the liberal principles of freedom in politics, religion, and economics.

Mora's thought, always moderate, shows much of the aristocratic temper, reflecting in its moderation something of the historicism of Frederic Charles de Savigny and the Comte de Volney, as well as the liberalism of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. With the optimism fashionable in the 1830's he believed in progress. When forced to choose between liberty and order he chose order. He also reveals the growing race-consciousness of European social thought. Mora recognized the Indian as Mexico's greatest social problem, but like Domingo Sarmiento in Argentina, and Antonio Saco in Cuba, he believed that Mexico must emphasize its European character. "The name of Mexico is so intimately linked with the memory of Cortes," he wrote, "that while the latter exists the former will not perish."¹

He was the theoretician of Mexican political liberalism, playing an active part in developing the federalist constitution of 1825 and in restoring federalism after its abrogation by Santa Anna. The anonymous *Catecismo político de la Federación Mexicana* (1831) is generally attributed to him.² Federalism, to Mora, was a logical application of liberal political principles. Its object was to lessen the danger of arbitrary political power by decentralization. In a spirit somewhat similar to that of the conservative authors of the United States federal constitution, he also saw federalism as a means of preventing the demagogic forces represented in the local caudillos

1. Quoted by Arturo Arnáiz y Freg, in *José María Luis Mora* (México: Universidad Nacional, 1941) p. xvi-xvii.

2. Samuel Ramos, *Historia de la filosofía en México* (México: Imprenta Universitaria, 1943) p. 109.

from capturing control of the state. Federalism also appealed to him as a hierarchical structure of the state through which the creoles might govern with law and order, holding in restraint the threat of social revolution ever present in the Indian. He advocated a suffrage limited to property owners, and his principal reform objectives were to destroy the privileges of the two most powerful institutions in Mexican society, the Army and the Church.

Consequently, while there is much of the Liberal, there is little of the romantic in Mora, even in his historicism. Supremely confident in the power of reason, he rejected Bolívar's dream of a united Spanish America as "the greatest of deliriums." Perhaps it was because his family had been ruined financially by the destruction attending the Hidalgo uprising that he feared the repetition of such a violent mass movement. But others of his class shared this fear, whether or not they had suffered personally. As the following selection shows, however, he also believed that in order to avoid such revolutions the governing class must rule democratically, extending the realm of freedom by progressive measures.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The complete works of Mora have never been published. The two essays from which the following passages come are found conveniently in *Ensayos, Ideas y retratos*, edited with a prologue by Arturo Arnáiz y Freg (Mexico: Universidad Nacional, 1941). Mora's *México y sus revoluciones* appeared in Paris in 1836, and two volumes of *Obras Sueltas* were published there in 1837 (Paris: Rosa, 1837). Biographies and critical studies include *El Doctor José María Luis Mora*, Homenaje de la universidad nacional de México (1934) and Salvador Joscano, *Vida del Dr. Mora* (México: Biografías Populares, no. 1, 1936). William Rex Crawford gives a brief sketch in English (*A Century of Latin American Thought*, pp. 247-250).

MEANS OF PREVENTING REVOLUTIONS

BY JOSÉ MARÍA LUIS MORA

(The two following sections are from *José María Luis Mora. Ensayos, ideas y retratos*. Prólogo y selecciones de Arturo Arnáiz y Freg. México: Universidad Nacional, 1941. Pp. 31-49).

One of the worst errors generated by revolutions is that of imagining that their prevention requires reducing men to slavery. Excesses produced by [applying] the doctrine of rights may impel people to actions which give rise to theories of oppression. But this is new proof that progress in civilization must grow out of peaceful processes and that efforts to substitute a revolution of men for that of time are fraught with [the seeds of] disaster.

In the opinion of some persons, the only effective way to prevent political disturbances is to give the maximum of power to authority and to reduce men to a state of ignorance which keeps them poor, weak, and as a consequence, little to be feared.

Those who refuse to authority the strength necessary to peaceful existence understand the general interest poorly and strangely deceive themselves as to the art of establishing a state. Every government uneasy about its existence is apprehensive; the most legitimate exercise of liberty frightens it; it employs cunning, resorts to fraud, and seeks arbitrary [power] as the only means of protecting itself. For the state to be happy and free, it is necessary for a government to be strong. But force is granted to governments only in the common interest; it is given them so that they may set an example in the discharging of duty and not so that they may put into practice doctrines of oppression. Now, this latter [state] results from a combination of great concentration of power and popular ignorance. It is not difficult to encounter this combination in most of the countries of Europe and to maintain for a more or less considerable period of time the fatal state of affairs that results from it. It must be confessed, though it be with shame, that we do not know the depth of debasement to which man may be lowered. Twice France has seemed about to decline in civilization, that is, in the period when political fanaticism caused streams of blood to flow in the public squares, and

again when her sons were snatched up to be sent to perish in laying waste to Europe. She has suffered two kinds of tyranny and a third might follow. These terrible scourges were experienced even though the number of evil doers was small. For even in the most frightening times, only a small number of perverse beings appear, while cowards are to be seen in infinite numbers. Few men commit transgressions, but many allow them to be committed. As long as the ideal of duty fails to penetrate men's souls, tyranny will easily find agents and will easily rid itself of those who oppose it.

Neither concentration of power nor the ignorance of the people brings tranquillity or prosperity to empires. States in which a combination of these two conditions is well established, as in the Asiatic governments, are precisely those which are most apprehensive of revolutions. Unhappy those governments in which rebellion is the only way of redemption in which the arbitrary is matched by the arbitrary and the power of the noose is limited by the power of the sword! To see the fury that takes possession of slaves when they find the opportunity to escape their yoke is to know man possesses an [inner] resource of liberty. While he may not be prudent and constantly alert all the time of his life, he springs to action in the space of a few hours and causes frightful havoc.

But let us suppose that to brutalize and enslave men is a means to make them live in peace. What people of honor would not seek other means? Those who, exercising power in an elevated position, consider popular ignorance to be a means of ensuring leadership, disregard or violate their first duty.

When intelligence is throttled, industry is destroyed or decays. The masses (*la clase numerosa*) are destined, by means of their work, to provide for themselves adequate sustenance, comfortable clothing, and healthful housing. A government which deprives them of these benefits, either by denying adequate instruction, or by withholding the necessary liberty, opposes the purposes of Providence and deprives men of the innocent satisfaction that they would enjoy under just laws.

Misery not only signifies the deprivation of enjoyment but it also generates diseases, making more frequent and terrible the spread of epidemics. A harmful and scanty diet shortens the life of an infinite number of individuals.

To aspire to establish the peace of states upon the brutality of people is to employ a wicked means, reprehensible in the sight of God and man. Such measures can produce nothing less than calamity. Let us suppose that it might be possible to postpone revolutions under certain circumstances; far from preventing them forever, it must make them more terrible some later day; it is like those remedies which stave off illnesses only to cause others more acute later on. Let us seek more secure means to guarantee the peace of nations; let us seek [them] in some doctrine other than oppression.

The ideal of duty inspires dread of revolutions and the desire for progressive improvements. In order to diffuse this ideal it is important that the chiefs of states put it into practice. Fear of revolutions comes naturally to them, and no less necessarily the desire for progressive improvements.

Heads of nations need enlightenment and firmness — enlightenment to pursue the revolutions of time, firmness to oppose those of men.

The situation to which we are reduced, when we have no other way to avoid a revolution than to effect a great political change ourselves, is always a dangerous one. We find ourselves placed in this situation by our own neglect. Either refusing to recognize, or forgetting our obligations to society, we have incited the people to rebellion; or, having failed through weakness to uproot some dangerous factions, we have taught the rebels the art of mocking authority.

The wisest and surest method of preventing the revolutions of men is to understand well that of time, and to grant what it demands, granting it, not as a sovereign who yields, but as a sovereign who rules. The skill of those who direct a state consists principally in understanding needs born of the level of the civilization to which men have come! It may be conjectured that, in some more or less remote epoch people will reach political liberty. Heads of nations, far from being frightened by such a thought, should seek to make their subjects worthy of obtaining this liberty as soon as possible. Without doubt they will lose in this [way] some of that false and prejudicial power that is called arbitrary, but they will gain in effective power. It is well known that representative assemblies often obtain in critical times the enlistment of men and contributions which the most audacious minister, possessing absolute power, would not dare request. Kings, imbued with the sanctity of their

office, who hold a high concept of the tremendous reckoning they will have to give on the other side of the grave, should aspire to see their nations worthy of political liberty, since anyone wishes to diminish the weight of a responsibility that is frightening to conscience. When people have representatives it is less difficult for princes to inform themselves of the truth, and the free discussion of political plans provides them with the best assurance of having what is incumbent upon them in governing for the benefit of the common interest.

Furthermore, in order to observe and to pursue the path of civilization it is important not only to restrain the factious, but also to cleanse their spirits of chimerical projects and extravagant fallacies by means of wise doctrines, to cast out of their souls the turbulent desires which cause them to scorn the good in order to pursue with ardor some imaginary improvement. We have many juvenile spirits that do not know the dangers of their effervescence, to whom it is necessary to repeat incessantly: *Good can only take root and grow slowly.* This is a law of nature. He who scorns moderation, disregards justice. But we find it hard to believe that haste may cause the failure of the most useful plans. Perhaps we are ashamed to vacillate or to reflect and prefer to risk our most cherished interests rather than appear afraid in the face of danger. Ah! Perhaps we would experience some shame if we but knew with what eyes a judicious man regards such impatience and unreasonableness.

Let us banish, particularly, the erroneous belief that a certain form of government is a talisman to which the prosperity of empires is bound. Let us substitute for this false idea the truth that the lot of men is improved by encouraging morality and industry.

DISCOURSE UPON THE NATURAL COURSE OF REVOLUTIONS

Nothing is more important than to inform men and nations of the great risks they incur when they are drawn by circumstances into the difficult and always dangerous course of political change. Inexperience and lack of understanding concerning the natural course and outcome of revolutions is in general the source of their errors and of the dangerous steps which frequently lead them to the brink of the precipice. We believe, then, that we do an important service to our republic when we set forth an idea as to the natural course

of revolutions, establishing the general character and principles common to them all, and indicating their good and adverse results, so that the Mexican people, keeping them in sight, may know how to obtain for themselves the good they can bring and how, assuming certain principles, to prevent the evils which are inevitable in them

Movements that agitate peoples may take two forms. Some are produced by a direct cause from which an immediate effect results. Some circumstance occurs that makes an entire nation, or some portion of it, desire a determined goal; the purpose is achieved or defeated, and in either case a state of tranquility returns. The decemvirs were oppressing Rome with their tyranny; some particular event rendered this insupportable and in an instant it [the tyranny] fell. The English Parliament despaired of seeing the nation happy under the domination of the Stuarts, and so the dynasty is changed. The English colonies in America find themselves oppressed by the fiscal policy of the mother country, and the Spanish [colonies] by a system of prohibitions and calculated oppression. Both make the effort, declare themselves independent, and throw off the yoke under which they were bowed. These are the happy revolutions. The desired goal is known, all direct themselves toward a known objective and, whatever is achieved, everything again returns to order.

But there are other revolutions which depend upon some general movement in the spirit of nations. Because of some turn which public opinion takes, men become tired of being what they are, the existing order vexes them in all its aspects, and their spirits seem possessed with an extraordinary ardor and activity. Everyone feels disgusted with the position in which he finds himself, everyone wants a change of situation, but no one knows exactly what he wants. Everything is reduced to a state of discontent and restlessness.

Such are the symptoms of those long crises to which it is not possible to assign a precise or direct cause, of those crises that appear to be the result of a thousand simultaneous circumstances without deriving from any one in particular — [crises] which produce a general flare-up because everything seems ready to be set afire, [crises] which in themselves do not contain any salutary principle that can contain or direct their progress and which result in an endless chain of misfortunes, of revolutions, and of crimes unless chance or, more likely, weariness brings them to an end. Such was the

convulsion that led Rome from a republican government to the rule of emperors, by means of proscriptions and civil wars. Such were the long agitations which Europe suffered at the time of Luther's reform, a bloody period that marked the transition from old customs and constitutions to a completely new order. These are the critical epochs of the human spirit that arise from its having lost its usual stability, and from which it never emerges without having changed entirely in character and features.

The French Revolution, especially, had a character of this kind and, like all others, was produced by universal and inevitable causes. All the circumstances from which it appears to have resulted were entwined one with the other and from this union and combination alone derived their strength. But who would believe that when the effects are [so] prodigious the cause can or should be considered small? When one sees that the removal of one small stone brings the whole edifice crashing to earth, can anyone doubt that all is not in ruins? No elaborate explanation is necessary [for one] to perceive this idea clearly. Tell me, if this is not so, what could cause these disturbances to which all nations have been subject when they have found themselves in such a situation?

An impatience, all the more violent in its attacks as its desires are vague, is what produces the first outbreak. All submit freely to this emotion without reserve or remorse. It is imagined that civilization, always foreseeing such a situation, will mitigate all the passions, softening their character. It is believed that the moral becomes easy in practice, that the equilibrium of the social order is so stable that nothing can destroy it. It is forgotten that the interests and opinions of the multitude can never be stirred up with impunity. Peace and habits of obedience, strengthened by [the passing of] time, suppress in the human heart that active egoism and that immoderate zeal which fly up at the point where each one sees himself obliged to defend his own interests — a necessary result when disorder in society endangers them, ceasing to protect them or to support them by established laws. For when the latter are destroyed man appears in his natural savagery. Then social amenity gives way to vice and crime, and man, previously moral because of his submission to the established order, regains all the violence of his primitive character upon taking the first step on the road to disorder.

Another of the elements which feed anarchy is the rashness with which all kinds of opinions are adopted concerning frequent and successive changes in government, including the certainty with which they are advanced. Since the eras preceding such catastrophes have been peaceful, ideas being uniformly accepted, the systems have developed freely without the possibility of anything opposing them or rendering them suspect. Hence the lack of experience gives unlimited confidence to the holders of these abstract theories. The result is that upon the arrival of the tempest each one sees constant proof of the weakness and feebleness of his arguments, his failure to reckon with new and unforeseen events having led him to err regarding men and things. Daily, in sudden revelations, he experiences bitter and fatal disillusionments. At this point boldness of opinion begins to weaken, fear of self-deception increases, and the confidence with which all was previously risked upon the fragile security of human reason ceases.

But before this salutary disillusionment comes it is necessary to pass through a long chain of calamities which idealism brings with it, because neither prudence nor moderation can be expected, even of the most honorable and wisest of men. The idea of a complete renovation, far from frightening, flatters them. The proposal looks easy, the outcome happy and certain. They rush into it without apprehension or caution. Not content with modifying the existing order they aspire to create one entirely new. Shortly this makes the destruction complete, and nothing escapes the zeal of demolition. To no one does it occur that to upset the laws and habits of a people, to break down the springs of their being (*descomponer todos sus muelles*) and to reduce them to their primary state, decomposing even their most fundamental traits, is to deprive them of all means of resistance against oppression. In order to be able to combat [oppression] it is necessary to find certain points of support, certain banners under which to rally, and certain centers for union. If they are deprived of all this, they are reduced to dust and are handed over defenseless to all the revolutionary tyrannies.

Such are the drawbacks of any revolution begun without a determined and set purpose, and started only to satisfy some vague sentiment. When men clamor excessively for liberty

without associating any clear idea with that word they do nothing but prepare the way for despotism, overthrowing whatever might restrain it.

The first authors of this destruction are found to be inspired, on the whole, by pure and beneficent desires. So it is that even though they wander from illusion to illusion, they certainly offer a title of glory to their country, a gathering of men of this sort in all parts of the territory presenting a great and sublime spectacle of enlightenment and virtue. They work in concert to advance the most precious interests of the country and humanity. They are all filled with a noble zeal, they pledge to their enterprise all the strength of their souls, and almost all stand ready to sacrifice for their country their personal interests with the sole exception of fame. Since the results, usually, are not happy, their labors seem vain and sometimes stupid. That zeal to establish principles, without regard to their application and practice, is often puerile, and those who have learned the lessons of experience after a revolution frequently are tempted to hold in contempt their immediate predecessors, as the latter had done with those who preceded them. This propensity is unjust, however, since no one should fail to understand that it is very easy to judge after the event.

Imagine ourselves transported to that epoch which we suppose has begun to disappear, an age in which vigorous and energetic spirits needed occupation and movement, in which their zeal scarcely found a wide enough field in the space around them, and in which their faculties sought to exercise in all its plenitude the force with which they found themselves animated. If one reflects upon all this he can do no less than recognize that such dispositions are greatly exposed to error, nor [fail] to confess that one ought not on this account to underestimate the intellectual strength and vigor of those who found themselves [living] in such times. The first sparks of a political revolution and the initial steps of social regeneration always reveal great talents rendered notable by brilliance and force of eloquence as well as by firmness of character. Turn your eyes to France, to Spain, and to the new republics of America. In all of them you will find the defects of the literature and philosophy of the eighteenth century. You will note a declamatory tone, you will miss a certain

simplicity, you will even notice ungrounded subtleties. But you will never cease to see or to recognize the valor of the eloquence in the tribune, the profundity of the philosophy, or the resolute decision displayed in attack and defense.

Thus far [we have] the first stage of a revolution; certain evils have begun to be felt but still not all are perceived. The scene changes imperceptibly. The movement is communicated from one to another and all now wish to take part in public affairs. Soon men of a new type appear on the scene, educated for the most part in an inferior class, and not accustomed to living in that kind of society that tempers the character and lessens the natural violence of vanity, constantly civilizing and moderating it. This class of envious men, relentlessly opposed to all types of distinction which grant superiority and to what they call *aristocracy*, push forward (*apechugan*) the most exaggerated doctrines and theories, taking literally and without social modifications whatever certain books say upon *liberty* and *equality*. With these honored names they cover up personal designs which they themselves, perhaps, do not understand too clearly. Some, full of Rousseau whom they understand poorly, drink in his works the hate of whatever is superior to themselves. Others acquire in Mably the admiration of ancient republics and aspire to reproduce their forms among us despite the immense distance of time and the differences of place, habits, and customs. Some, snatching from Raynal the torch he enkindled to reduce all institutions to embers, apply it heedlessly to their country and produce a universal conflagration. Others, worthy disciples of the fanatic Diderot, bellow with fury at the mere mention of the name of priest, religion, or cult. Still others, finally, undertake coolly and tranquilly to test their ill-founded theories and, in their frenzied arrogance, let nothing, not even the most disastrous revolution, prevent their putting them into practice, no matter what the cost.

Such is the second class of men, those who play a very active part in the second stage of a revolution. Their perversity is not wholly fixed or settled. Their errors are even in some respects excusable, because they are somewhat blind, which prevents them from gathering fruit from the evil they cause and for which they pay very soon. Many of those who belong to this revolutionary period are often endowed with great talents which soon shine brilliantly, especially when in order to defend themselves they have recourse to eloquence, after

this gift has served as an instrument to attack and destroy everything. In these circumstances, their language has great dignity, sufficient truth and tenderness.

When this party, in which men of honor and good faith are not lacking, is annihilated, then the revolutions of peoples cease to be the subject of the history of human opinion and belong solely to that of personal passions and interests. The mask behind which those empowered by society hide themselves is so gross and obvious that it deceives no one, and most of those who employ it cannot quite disguise their intentions. Their base and vile actions find defense neither in the excuse of enthusiasm nor in that of mental intoxication.

In the midst of crimes and of public calamities, morality can have only too precarious an influence. It is worthwhile to note one circumstance, however, which appears to be peculiar to civilized times. That is that no faction, no matter how barbarous it might be thought, ignores the necessity of covering its decrees with a varnish of reason and of arguments. The strongest always insist on proving that force is not its only reason. All who dominate in this period of calamity call upon sophism and declamation to serve their ends. Their mental faculties are always thus engaged, and nothing is left undefended or unextolled. Complacent philosophies are found to defend the killings, and friends of liberty to eulogize arbitrary power. Poetry does not disdain to lend its accents to celebrate the cruelest excesses and the saddest misfortunes and, with feigned enthusiasm, knows how to sing while shedding tears of blood. No literature yet exists, nor arts sufficient to soften the barbarity of so terrible an era. Language has neither persuasive power nor fertility of ideas in such times. Art does not know how to give lasting effect to hypocritical eloquence, and even when an unhappily blind imagination succeeds in achieving a certain degree of ardor and true passion, it appears to the eyes of the wise and the moderate as merely intoxicated exaltation, the object of both compassion and repugnance.

When matters have reached this point and men have grown tired of suffering, they take advantage of some favorable circumstance to make a change, gradually turning back by the same stages in inverse order. That people is fortunate which does not return to the very point from whence they set out, because then, as happened in Spain at the fall of the last Cortes,

all the horrors of a revolution have been experienced without improving anything. But this is not the usual occurrence. [The more usual thing is] to stop in the middle like a pendulum at the end of more or less violent oscillations. Then the revolution is ended, its fruits are assessed, and its excesses become a practical lesson for their avoidance in the future.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

FRANCISCO BILBAO (1823-1865)

CHILE

Francisco Bilbao was born in Santiago, Chile, on January 9, 1823, into a family devoted on the paternal side to the tradition of the Encyclopedia and the French Revolution. When he was eleven, his father was exiled to Peru because of political activities. There Francisco is said to have learned carpentry, to recite the Gospel according to St. John, and to "chant" a chapter of Rousseau's *Social Contract*.¹ After the family returned to Chile a few years later, he entered the Instituto Nacional, the famous school which has produced so many of Chile's leaders. There he came to know the revolutionary ideas of Felicité de Lamennais. By 1841 we see him participating in a Literary Society directed by José V. Lastarria. The *Sociabilidad chilena* grew out of his activity in this society. Published in 1844, it brought him a fine for blasphemy and caused his departure for Europe. There he established friendships with Lamennais,² Michelet, and Quinet, absorbing the revolutionary ideas of the year 1848.

Returning to Chile in 1850, he helped to organize the Society for Equality, whose activities brought him another exile, in Peru, France, and Argentina. His works of this, his most productive period, include *The Law of History* from which part of the following translation is drawn, *America in Danger*, and the *American Gospel*. He died in Argentina in 1865.

In the *Sociabilidad chilena*, part of which is also translated here, reason, inspired by fraternity, seeks a new faith based on a new philosophical, political, and historical synthesis. After an exposition and criticism of the "old synthesis" represented by feudalism and Catholicism, Bilbao turns to the "new synthesis" of beliefs which has been developing since the Middle

1. Manuel Blanco Cuartín, "Francisco Bilbao, su vida y sus doctrinas," Biblioteca de escritores de Chile, Vol. XI, pp. 677-688, at pp. 678-9.

2. Writing between 1854 and 1856 he recalls borrowing a book of Lamennais from which he "received . . . the scientific confirmation or revelation of eternal Republicanism." *Obras completas*, I, 123. The statement apparently refers to Lamennais, *Le livre du peuple* (1838) but does not exclude the possibility that Bilbao became acquainted with the same author's *Words of a Believer* (1834) and *On Modern Slavery* (1840), as claimed by Diego Barros Arana in his *Un decenio de la historia de Chile*, I, 494.

Ages, and which culminates in the "equality of liberty." The development of Chile is evaluated employing the latter criterion, and the principles of the "new synthesis" in various spheres are summarized. Allusions to historical determinism or fatalism should be noted, for this topic is the theme of the second selection.

The *Law of History*, written in 1858, merges Bilbao's concern for political reform and constitutional problems with the contemporary interest in philosophy of history. In 1836 Andrés Bello had expressed the Chilean concern for an approach to constitutional problems through history, warning against disregard of the voice of experience in establishing democratic institutions in a society whose habits and outlook were colonial.³

Lastarria reports numerous discussions with Bello from 1840 onward as to whether history should be narrative or interpretative and, if the latter, whether it is ruled by providential laws which imprison man in a fatalistic system. Lastarria rebelled against the latter interpretation, while Bello thought it poor educational policy to replace the study of history with philosophy of history.⁴ By 1844 Bello was of the opinion that Lastarria who, in his *Investigaciones* had criticised the views of Vico and especially those of Herder, had opposed "general principles which were for many centuries the faith of the world."⁵ This statement would suggest that Bello leaned somewhat toward providentialism in history.

After defining history and its conditions, Bilbao finds the law of history to be a normative, rather than a descriptive principle. His view, like those he rejects, is metaphysical. Like Lamennais, he interprets the imperative of nature, destiny, and providence so that it does not prevent man from exercising his freedom and gives him no excuse for resigning what is properly his own responsibility to some impassive, inevitable, automatic cosmic process. He rejects philosophies of history which seem to justify passivity, resignation, and indifference in

3. Andrés Bello, *Antología*, ed. por Pedro Crases (Caracas, 1949). Speech at inauguration of the University of Chile, 1843.

4. José V. Lastarria, *Obras completas*, X, p. 253.

5. *Ibid.* p. 275. For Lastarria's discussion of the whole chain of events see *Ibid.* chs. 25-28. Cf. his discussion of Herder in *Investigaciones*, etc. in Vol. VII of the *Obras completas*, pp. 17-23.

the face of evil and blind force. Man finds the true law of history, the command of the Creator, the norm of his action and judgment, in his awareness of duty. Duty, in turn, requires that man possess rights and law, that is liberty. The complete development of each individual in harmony with the development of all is social perfection, the ideal or principle which enables man to judge history, learn from his mistakes, and be stimulated to further effort. The concept of "sovereignty of the people" is elaborated to mean sovereignty of reason, law and freedom, republicanism, and incessant struggle for perfection.

It is not hard to see that Bilbao's thinking moves in the ambient of the metaphysical social thought of his European contemporaries. He sees, moreover, that no metaphysical system can be constructed which will guarantee the ultimate success of democracy in the abstract, aside from human effort. In order to direct man's effort toward democratic ideals, he calls for a fundamental change of outlook in Latin America, so that the sovereignty of the people may become the sovereignty of reason. This is conformity to divine law as he conceives it — a theme further developed in his *American Gospel*. From this point of view, "history is reason judging memory and projecting the duty of the future."

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O.A.K.

CHILEAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

BY FRANCISCO BILBAO

(From *Sociabilidad chilena*, Vol. X of *Obras completas*, Buenos Aires: Manuel Bilbao, 1866, pp. 3-41).⁶

"Descend from on high,
 august truth!"

— Voltaire

INTRODUCTION

During transitional periods of civilization many minds are downcast. Both inspiration, which needs an object, and will, which requires support for its activity, languish because they lack the lifegiving breath of faith. Their power of expansion is inhibited by the presence of external indifference or by the weakness of the faith they seek. They analyze the universe and find it covered with wintry snow. In such cases their power concentrates upon and devours the very activity which feeds it. Thus we see men, born in material tranquility, despair when they examine the subterranean hell of societies. But in the midst of all this, in the midst of our slow development, in the midst of that desert without guide, the society of the present, in the midst of social elements which occasionally rebel, certain facts, inspirations, or incidents are apt to appear which determine our uncertain path, which startle and challenge us, making us take account of what we see and conjecture. Then the individual, however isolated, extends his hand to follow the chariot of society and changes from egotist to one who hears a brother's groan. The anarchy of his intellectual life subsides, and he casts out the hideous thought of social suicide, of satanic despair, and impotent clamor. His intelligence unfolds, illumined by a spark from the universal pyre, fraternity. His will which lay prostrate has heard the divine trumpet and rises titanic. He would ask those who doubt this result and have experienced the pangs of their century, "Have you felt in your moral sufferings, in your ignorance about the absolute, in your failure of nerve before your anxieties, before the fearful picture of human suffering

6. The word *sociabilidad* in the Spanish title is translated "social structure" because this phrase seems to convey the author's meaning in English. A statement by Lastarria, prefacing his speech before the Literary Society of which Bilbao was a member, includes this sentence: "The superficial notions of theoretical legislation we have just acquired at the Instituto Nacional have acquainted us with the great needs of our country and its position in the scale of *sociabilidad*" José V. Lastarria, *Obras*, X, p. 117.

— have you felt those spontaneous movements when hearing the groan of a sufferer, the sound of the chain of a prisoner? Have you heard the sublime chants which take people to battle? In the presence of the beauties of nature, or the songs of poets, or when the inner man is externalized by art, have you felt those ravishing mysteries, those volcanic disturbances, those divine calls toward something we know not what, invisible, infinite?" "Yes," you say! You have felt those impressions, but in a fugitive way; you have felt them, but the reality is at hand; you have sighted the profound mystery of the heavens, but the cloud passed and your glance returned to earth. You have wept, but the laughter of indifference brought you back to the life of the world.

All this will pass. This is life!

Incomprehensible mixture of the sublime and ridiculous, of fatality and freedom! Life, we perceive you and come to ask an accounting as to what you have made of us and what you promise. It is in the name of those spontaneous promptings that reason persists in forming a new synthesis, that we stop to examine our conscience, take our stand in the press to say: We are men of Chile. Where does the tricolor stand in the ranks of humanity?

OUR PAST

"In Rama was there a voice
heard, lamentation, and
weeping, and great mourning."
— Matthew.

Our past is Spain. Spain is the Middle Ages. In soul and body the Middle Ages consist of Catholicism and feudalism. Let us examine them separately. That society thus named, composed of the results of Roman civilization, idealized by the Catholic religion, rejuvenated by the original customs of the barbarians, forms the nucleus, the bond which unites the ancient with the modern world. Rome contributes its legislation, industry, and mythology. Catholicism contributes Scholasticism and oriental myths with the tint of revelation, but with remarkable perfection. The barbarians contribute the spontaneity of their beliefs and the exaltation of individuality. Reflection, faith, spontaneity; Rome, the Orient, the barbarians; these are the elements. They clash, blood flows, but the barbarian turned Catholic triumphs. Time marches on, a

system develops, Catholicism rules, the barbarian does not completely lose his original character, and the Middle Ages rise from the ruins of the invasion, from the blood of so many years of struggle.

Behold that society, that civilization maintained in its castles and cloisters to resist the bulging torrent of the world. A true society because it was one, because it had a belief which nourished and provided that originality so unique; a society of soul and body from this point of view. That is to say, Catholicism and feudalism, spirit and territory, religion and politics. Let us analyze its two separate aspects.

[In the passage which follows, secular and religious institutions are sketched as the body and soul of the Middle Ages in bold and colorful strokes. Feudal vassalage receives religious sanction. Catholicism is treated as a human institution of "men." The Apostolic Creed is quoted as the world outlook of the Middle Ages and interpreted, by the use of scriptural passages, predominantly from St. Paul, as broadly implying the subjection of women and children to the father, of the individual to prevailing powers, of thought to prevailing beliefs, and of government to divine right. — Trans.]

If we examine the basic structure of civil society, namely property, we shall discover Chilean feudalism.

The lack of communications and new needs, the lack of small holdings (*capitales divididos*), the lack of education and artistic needs, the lack of commerce because of the oppressive and exclusive economic system and the system of coercing and "tithing" the labor of the poor, prevent the rise of a middle class like the bourgeoisie of Europe which might introduce freedom.

* * * * *

REVOLUTION

"What lives? The nation.
What people? The citizen."

[After introductory remarks celebrating the existence of God and the dignity of man, "the greatest of His creations," Bilbao turns to what the *Introduction* calls the "new synthesis" which developed in opposition to the medieval spirit. — Trans.]

Thought develops. Abelard, Luther, Descartes, and finally Voltaire, Rousseau, etc. are transferred to the Holy Ark. They consecrate their lives in the temple of their intellects until the prophets of the new law take on the robe of the tribune, take up the trumpet of the press, and the cult becomes popular. Doubt becomes flesh. The system of old beliefs falls. Human dignity rises. The individual insists upon examination before he believes.

Examination⁷ is denial of faith, submission to the empire of individual reason. To submit to reason is to trust one's self, to have confidence in one's powers. It is the exaltation of the human self, voluntary and intelligent, subjective and objective, that is, individual and social, particular and general, human and divine, containing in its psychological essence the basis of universal harmony. Once the individual system is revealed, the individual puts off the ancient system, the foundation of belief and ancient synthesis. He does not, however, isolate himself in a misanthropic egoism. He tries, rather, to place the social bond on another basis, under a system of relations admitting facts which the Catholic synthesis failed to recognize. The new spirit came from the ancient temple to erect a larger and higher edifice, more worthy of God and man — who recognized absolute freedom of thought as the only legitimate means of communicating with Him. The bases of the edifice are still under discussion. All thinkers hasten to contribute their bricks. Since the ancient synthesis, that is, the unitary whole of beliefs about man, his origin, his essence, his end, his relations and duties, was attacked in the principles of its faith and tradition, it is clear that all the ramifications of the system are affected by the trembling of their foundations.

CHILE

Our revolution is. . . the destruction of the past synthesis and the erection of the modern synthesis. It was not a partial fact, merely analytic, but complete and synthetic. Yet nevertheless it was vaguely perceptive of the appearance of future problems. But the work of establishing the new system of beliefs, the spiritual bread necessary for the people after

7. According to Michelet, Luther "at least courageously signed his name to the great revolution which legalized in Europe the right of free examination." *The Life of Luther*, trans. by Hazlitt (London: George Bell & Son, 1904). P. xii. - Trans.

the destruction of the old, could not be elaborated in a satisfactory way. This is the reason.

The men who headed the reflective revolution, unable to organize beliefs logically related to political freedom, reacted for the people in religion and politics. Among many peoples we thus find constitutional despotism Nearly all American governments were like this at the outset and those military powers fell because of their inability to organize society logically. In this way, [both] Bolívar in Colombia and O'Higgins in Chile fell. They effected their organization when the heat of republican war was still felt. However, those same governments fell when, during post-revolutionary peace, they proposed isolated reforms rather than the logical unity of revolutionary reform. What was the culminating objective of the eighteenth century revolution and the American Revolution? The freedom of man, the equality of the citizen. The individual vindicated in all his rights and in the complete application of those rights. Since the equality of man's origin, right, and end were recognized, the conditions necessary for their enjoyment were logically due him. Since the individual, as man, in general seeks freedom of thought, freedom of religion must be granted. The individual as "free spirit," exposed to good and evil, needs "education" to recognize the good. The individual, the "human self," body and soul, needs "property" to achieve his end on earth. He needs property to develop his intellectual life, his physical life, and that of his children. Therefore, the conditions necessary to acquire them, and acquire them completely, are his due. Hence follows the destruction of privilege, of feudal property, and a rise in wages proportional to the rise in human dignity.

These were the culminating points of the revolution. If governments had understood that the development of equality was the sacred legacy of the revolution, that equality is historic fatality (*fatalidad*) in its development, they would not have fallen. Maintaining their ground and raising the glorious faces of heroes, the people likewise would have supported them.

[At this point Chilean governments from O'Higgins through Bulnes are evaluated from the standpoint of the "equality of liberty."]

CONCLUSION

* * * * *

Now we ask ourselves whether the work of the social thinker (*socialista*), of the lawgiver, or of the ruler, is to despair,

to remain indifferent, or to stand by ancient solutions of human problems.

No. Despair is weakness The present spectacle is deplorable. Note the intellectual anarchy. But anarchy is transitory Social metaphysics sometimes takes the steps of a giant, but we always witness the struggle of the soul and the brain. The one raises hope, the other tears it down. All in all, our duty. . . is the investigation of law and its obligatory character as law. Given this Stoic step of science, we can await the rest, holding with one hand to individual belief and invoking immortality with the other.

Our job in the political and religious sphere is consequently to accept and proclaim the indestructible facts which we recognize.

Just as doubt recedes before consciousness of the existence of the "self," so also political and religious doubt ceases when contemplating the great and inevitable spectacle of freedom conquered philosophically.

The freedom of the individual as body and as thing which thinks: behold one fact. The equality of my fellowman in so far as he is another temple in which God has placed freedom: behold another fact. Freedom and social equality, that is, equality of all, "sovereignty of the people": behold another fact. Freedom in the conception of the divine, that is, religious democracy: behold another fact. Freedom and political equality, that is, democracy properly speaking: behold another fact. Consciousness of free right, which implies the right of defending and promoting it in order to make free individuals of those who are not free, that is, the right of civilizing and increasing the number of children of the Divinity: behold another fact.

These facts provide the basis of the future system of beliefs. They are few but irrefutable. They are indisputable. If so, they must serve as the basis of future religion.

Meanwhile, we poor devils of good intentions will do what we can and draw the following conclusions about Order, Religion, Politics.

As to the first we should confine ourselves to the universal morality which we recognize: *Do not kill — Do not steal — Do not commit adultery — Do not lie or give false testimony.*

The concept of theft remains vague as long as property is not delined in relation to the right of all to develop themselves morally and physically.

The conception of adultery remains vague as long as duties of wives toward their husbands are not defined in relation to freedom achieved by women.

Individual dignity produces the feeling of honor, but honor requires fixed principles to which it may appeal in practical situations. It is defined in its relations. Question of insult and duel.

"Love the Creator." It remains to define His essence popularly and scientifically and to determine whether He is thought or extension or a personal being. Sublime insights which occur to us say that He is a personal being. For me, creation of freedom is proof of divine freedom. Divine freedom is the individualization of the Creator.

"Love your fellowman." Fraternity is a principle and a sentiment, a great refuge from vital suffering and terrifying indifference. How can one fail to love his "neighbor," his brother, if one recognizes in himself the omnipotence of freedom. My fellowman is another self, a depository of the same spirituality as that by which I am; hence, the bond, the love between the community and identity of this great essence is necessary. Behold the impregnable foundation of democracy.

Governments, then, can divulge what science presents clearly without symbol. Enough of falsehoods. This is the logic of the times and of the revolution. To cultivate past beliefs and forms is to retrograde.

In "politics" we accept the principles expounded in the same way and we accept the new forms which bring freedom of religion. This is a step necessary for the better development of the new synthesis and new religion.

The definitive point to which we hold is the elevation to sovereignty of all individuals, that is to the fraternity of freedom. If so, let the right of the rustic peon and the last plebian be represented. Right (*derecho*) is one. Hence, there should be nothing but representation based on their natural rights, that is, one Chamber.

If the right (*derecho*) is thus represented, the proletariat would have representation of its right to knowledge, to education, and to have "property." Education would be established at the cost of wealthy proprietors who would have to pay higher wages in order that the poor might educate themselves.

The Chamber of Senators represents conservative interests or an aristocracy of property. In the first case, it tries to maintain the status quo, and in the second, the same. Thus, in both cases it tries to preserve inequality. This is the sentence for its abolition.

Responsibility is relative. Punishment is corrective.

Therefore, the death penalty which does not increase responsibility and provides no correction is unjust.

* * * * *

These are unquestionable facts. As long as we do not have scientific solutions for human problems, let us apply those eternal principles of development which appear clear and logical in the light of the revolutionary criterion. If the old symbol has fallen, let us replace it with the spirit, even though without the form, of philosophy. Truth has advanced far beyond the stage we have reached. Let us not try to increase the distance by speaking the old word for lack of the new.

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THE LAW OF HISTORY

(From *Obras completas*. Buenos Aires: Manuel Bilbao, 1866. Vol. I. *Ley de historia*, pp. 137-168).⁸

Gentlemen: History in its more natural meaning is the exposition of the life of humanity, while in its more philosophical meaning it is the manifestation of human effort in the realization of an ideal.

The *subject* of history is humanity regarded as an immortal and solidary individual, extending through time and space. The *object* of history is the resurrection of the past. Its *means* are all the manifestations of life: beliefs, institutions, codes,

8. Address at opening session of Liceo Argentino, Buenos Aires, November, 1858.

traditions, poetry, monuments of art and industry, customs. Its *end* is to point out development or decay, approach to, or recession from, the ideal. Its law is the demand for perfection.

As science, it is narration and doctrine. Doctrine is the logic of a premise moving facts. As narration, it is memory. We then tie up our definition by saying: HISTORY IS REASON JUDGING MEMORY AND PROJECTING THE DUTY OF THE FUTURE.

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Has the life of humanity a law? Is history narration of fact or demonstration of the development of that law? In order to solve this problem, we shall try to establish its conditions clearly.

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Man... could not be self-conscious without memory. Consciousness of personal identity could not exist without memory. From this it rigorously follows that history is the element necessary for consciousness of human identity through time and space. It is the factor prior to progress because, without consciousness of the past, we would not have consciousness of the hour in which we live — that everything created, everything finite, solely in virtue of its existence is subject to the law of succession and development.

Creation may be divided into two categories: beings without consciousness and beings with it. Between matter and mind appear intermediate beings who live on the borders of organization and freedom.

Material creation develops. Eternal genesis has not ceased.

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Creation can never cease. A law of destruction, conservation, and development propels it toward an ideal which it does not know.

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And is it credible that humanity, thrown out by a flash of divine light in order to serve as the consciousness of the lower world, should lack a providential end? No, gentlemen.

Such a supposition would turn over the highest in a series of known organisms to anarchy.

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If humanity has an end, history has a law. (End of introduction)

It must be clearly understood what is meant by law of history. Shall we understand by law of history the chronicle of events raised to the category of cause and effect, that is, that *what has happened is what ought to have happened?* Then the law is nothing but justification of facts. Shall we understand by law of history a theory which humanity ought to realize in its onward march? This is another problem.

Either this theory is an effect of the spectacle produced by the facts, in which case the value of what happened is what it ought to be, or it is a preconceived idea, an ideal in accordance with which facts are to be judged.

All theories known to me are the result of facts elevated to the category of law.

[Bilbao gives characteristics of the theories of Herder, Bossuet, Vico, Hegel, Cousin, and others to illustrate the point. — Trans.]

But the law of history must be the law of humanity throughout the centuries of its life. The law of humanity must be the law of individual man. The law must be the imperative of his actions. The actions of man and of humanity have an end. Therefore, the law of history is identified with the moral law and turns out to be the principle which determines their destiny. The moral law and destiny constitute what is called *happiness*. Consequently, law of history, law of humanity, rule of action, destiny of the individual and of the species, are terms which cover a single principle. That principle is nature, providence, destiny or, in a word, the law of man.

* * * * *

Humanity is an element of creation, but an emanation of spirit as well. As physiological organism it has its roots in

the earth and its antecedents in the animal kingdom, uniting in a higher unity the elements of lower kingdoms.⁹

As spirit it receives directly from the Infinite Word the spark, the vision of being, the harmony of its law and its destiny. From this union results a new element, which is the domination of spirit — a necessary order in everything existent. As organism it is fatal; as spirit, free. In humanity are celebrated the solemn nuptials of fatality and freedom.

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How does this union take place? Must humanity always live in perpetual oscillation between those forces, destroyed by the power of those agents? Are harmony and resolution possible?

Yes, Gentlemen. Fatality is the law of bodies. Freedom is the law of minds. The solution of the problem consists in bringing it about that fatality be free and dominated by the free element, and that freedom be directed toward the supreme goal. And as those two manifestations of substance are found temporally united in man, the law of history ought to take account of the fatality of the organism and the freedom of consciousness.

But if there is fatality, there is a destiny to fulfill. If there is freedom, that freedom ought to satisfy an end. In both cases there is a *supreme imperative* which must be obeyed. Here we return to the formulation of the problem of history: What is the law of human movement?

The explanations which have been given are various.

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9. Man is union of nature and history for Herder. R. M. Agoglia, "El problema del mal en Herder, etc." in *Vico y Herder* (Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1948) p. 260. With reference to "fatality" it should be added that the first paragraph of Michelet's *Introduction to General History* reads, "With the origin of the world a struggle has begun which will not cease until its end: a struggle of man against nature, of spirit against matter, of freedom against fatality. History is nothing but the narrative of this incessant struggle." It is obscurely indicated that "fatality" means anything inhibiting freedom. (*Op. cit.*, note 2). The earliest Chilean reference to Michelet known to me is late 1844, when the Argentine Pinero uses Michelet to refute Lastarria. Lastarria, *Obras Completas*, X, pp. 276-277. "Fatality is here used instead of "fatalism" as a translation of *fatalidad* to preserve the parallelism to Michelet's "*fatalité*." — Trans.

All systems known to me, from St. Augustine to Hegel, from Bossuet to Herder, are different aspects of absolute fatality incarnate in the movement of peoples. Philosophy of history has been for all those writers a manifestation of fatality. But in the conception of fatality there has been a great variety of exposition.

[Bilbao indicates that history may be conceived as an epic over which leaders of world religions have presided. He then classifies philosophies of history into three groups: pantheistic (Hegel and Donoso Cortes), Catholic (Bossuet and Vico), and naturalistic (Herder). Cousin reconciles their ideas in an eclectic system unable to foresee or to survive the Revolution of 1830 in France. — Trans.]

If we notice the moral results of those philosophical systems which have dominated and still dominate our century, we can see the justification of success in all its aspects, the adoration of force, the veneration of all the wicked who have obtained mastery over peoples provided they have practised their wickedness on a large scale. Unfortunately, such doctrines still prevail and enervate men's minds. Eclecticism, doctrinairism, sanction of the existent, form the mind and sanctify facts as law and transgressions as decrees of Providence. Partial histories of modern peoples are nothing but partial corroborations of this great doctrine of *philosophy of history*. The whole Middle Ages wins out: the Inquisition, Jesuitism, St. Bartholemew, all past and present horrors have been *coups d'état* of the Divinity, measures foreseen from eternity in Its infinite wisdom. And even America has been invaded by that plagiarism of European fatality. The American conquest, the extinction of races, servitude of natives, slavery of Negroes, anarchy, and even the despotism of American monsters have been regarded as providential necessities.

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It remains now to expound our own ideas on philosophy of history. We repeat the question. Is there a law of history? Yes. We believe there is.

Humanity is one. Humanity has a beginning, a life, an object, an end. Men, peoples, races, nations, have a common ground, an identity of law and destiny in spite of their variety. Humanity has not been launched by chance. It bears on its

brow the design engraved by its author. If we can discover that design, that intention of Providence, we shall have found its law; we shall know the unity of its life, the identity of its being, the magnificence of its end.

How can we know that law?

* * * *

If this law exists, it ought to exist in consciousness. To clarify our point of departure, we shall establish that the law ought to be the divine imperative. Conceptions of the imperative may vary, and this is the reason for the error of the philosophers we have rejected. Conceptions are the work of thought.

* * * *

We say: human conceptions are not reality.... The idea of an object is not the object. If there is a law, the law as divine idea ought to be independent of human conception.

One might rightly say to us: you seek the criterion of truth as a condition of knowledge of the law. Yes.... It is here that history should be subject to philosophy.

* * * *

That undeniable truth (and permit me here to spare you the logical development of the conception of truth¹⁰ since it is too abstract) that truth is a personal and creative Infinite Being, and [that it is] a finite being, free and perfectible. Those are the two truths which like two columns support the arch of beliefs of mankind and which will maintain them through the centuries.

If man is free, he has a law. If he is perfectible, he has an end. The problem whose solution we seek may then be formulated thus: the law and end of man are the end of humanity. Then, in order to know the law of history we ought to know the law of humanity and its destiny.

10. Bilbao accepts Lamennais' criterion of truth, the general consent of the universal reason of mankind, but does not believe that the doctrines of Catholicism satisfy this test. See Bilbao's essay on Lamennais, *Obras Completas*, I, pp. 103-113. — Trans.

That law of humanity is prior, pre-existent to humanity itself, and will subsist in the Divine mind when humanity no longer exists, just as mathematical principles which live incarnate in bodies are prior to and subsist even without the necessity of bodies.

* * * * *

From this point of view it is obvious how false was the point of departure of all those who sought the law and destiny of humanity in the very facts of its life, just as the point of departure and method of German philosophy in general is also false when it pretends to assimilate creation to the conceptions which reason makes of it, and assimilates the laws of reason to the accidental manifestations of mental speculation, *in this way trying to reproduce in its conceptions the very order of things* (Schelling). In short, this is the doctrine of fatality which in spite of its high pretension to absoluteness in theory is nothing but the doctrine of empiricism or experience converted into a system.

If the law is higher than the fact, if duty is superior to man, if the end is higher and dominates experience, we need not know the tradition in order to know the law which ought to dominate that tradition. The contrary would be to say that we need to know the series of iniquities in order to know justice.

* * * * *

Where, then, shall we find the law of humanity? In the knowledge of duty. Then, the problem of philosophy of history is reduced to knowing the duty of humanity and the nature of that being who ought to realize that law and approach the end appointed by God himself.

What is the duty of humanity? The duty of humanity is the complete possessions of right (*derecho*) and the development of all its faculties in harmony with itself, with society, and with peoples. The idea of right (*derecho*) corresponds to the idea of liberty, and the idea of development to the pursuit of an end, to the realization of an ideal.

The ideal is the perfection of the human being. The perfection of the human being is the absolute dominion of

universal spirit in order to make universal freedom live in each. We may take another step and say: the law of history is the conquest of freedom in consciousness (*conciencia*), in facts, and in the universality of men.

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We have then the criterion of history. Humanity is free and perfectible. Therefore, the law of history is liberty and perfection. Being free, it has fallen; being perfectible, it can redeem itself. The good and evil of history now depend, gentlemen, not on the passive flow of time, but on the efforts of man. When peoples are persuaded that everything comes about by an inexorable law independent of the will, they become enervated, and bring about the abdication of that sovereign who not only ought to rule at the bar but also in the movements of the day.

[The theory of automatic progress is rejected as a form of fatalism. Materials for the construction of history are found to be (1) nature, external influences; (2) organization, races, their mixture, and migrations; (3) reason, beliefs, institutions, customs. Knowledge of these make critical history possible. — Trans.]

Knowledge of the *law* applied to history would acquaint us with the vicissitudes of truth and virtue on earth, delineating the progressive development resulting from the elaboration of ideas for the sake of the growing perfection of humanity. Such is the philosophy of history conceived and executed by Michelet and Edgar Quinet, whom I do not hesitate to place at the head of the regenerative movement of the modern world.

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Turning to American history, tell me, who is the historian who has explained the *why* of our miseries, the cause of our misfortunes and the impotence of freedom!

* * * * *

The two nations, the English United States and the Spanish Disunited States, present an incompatible and contradictory spectacle. In the United States we see all elements of its history directed and combined for the development of freedom.

In the Disunited States, the impotent efforts of freedom, falling, rising, always menaced, never secure, assume all the vicissitudes of a terrifying duality between despotism and attempts at freedom. Why such different results? Shall we attribute the difference to climate, race, politics, religion?

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No other cause remains, then, to explain the difference between the two Americas except that of religion.

I do not refer to religion under prevailing circumstances, to the Catholic and Protestant sects which divide Christianity. All sects and religions live in the United States. There is no state or national religion. But if there is a common principle which forms, so to speak, the soul of the nation, that principle is for all purposes, whether religious or political, the sovereignty of reason in every man. Such a principle is the very root of liberty. Where that principle does not exist, freedom does not exist. Even more, I say, it cannot exist.

In effect, we in South America believe that political liberty is one thing, and religious dogma another. We abandon conscience to the priest and the Church, believing that sovereignty in political matters applies to the things of this earth. Once this division in the sovereignty of man is made, that is, the division of what ought to be obeyed in blind faith from what ought to be done by independent reason, we have believed that freedom and religion are reconciled and we are satisfied. Politics to the citizen and to the state; dogma, conscience, absolute judgment to the priest. Such is the dualism of the American world, a dualism which all republics have stamped into the portico of their constitutions to reveal the antagonism of two ideas, two dogmas, two destinies. It is thus that we understand the contradiction in all our political codes: First principle: *Sovereignty resides in the people.* Second principle: *The religion of the Republic is Roman Catholic.*¹¹

[The antithesis between loyalty to church and loyalty to state is developed and in it are found many obstacles to Latin-American constitutional organization. Consideration of sovereignty of the people leads to the principle of sovereignty of the law, which is the popular will limited by the imperative of the Creator.]

11. It was this dualism which Bilbao found incarnate in the life and experience of Lamennais. See *Obras Completas*, I, p. 111. — Trans.

The path of history is not a straight line. Humanity travels by falling and rising. Magnificent revelations disappear in dark eclipses. The philosophy of history of the old world embraces fatality. Philosophy of history of the new world ought to embrace freedom and inquire of the Eternal Being: what good did you have in mind when you launched into space that immortal being which accumulates a life of centuries which, incessantly acquiring the inheritance of the past, nevertheless receives the vitalizing breath of hope?

(Trans. by O. A. K.)

FELIX VARELA Y MORALES (1787-1853)

CUBA

Father Félix Varela is notable for having introduced modern or rational philosophy into Cuba, through his classes in the University at Habana. He taught an eclectic philosophy, influenced by the ideas of the French *ideologues*, as represented in Destutt de Tracy. Basically this was the rationalism and sensationalism of Descartes, Locke, and Condillac, with the addition of the social and economic ideas of utilitarianism, together with something of the dawning historicism.

Father Varela's ideas and activities led him into trouble with the Spanish authorities, so that he spent the latter half of his life in exile in the United States. For a while he edited the review *El Habanero*. Later, with Antonio Saco, he published *El Mensajero Semanal*.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Varela's *Lecciones de filosofía* has been published in several editions, the latest (without date) around 1940. José Manuel Mestre, a contemporary, gives the best picture of Varela's influence in *De la filosofía en la Habana*, republished by the Ministry of Education (La Habana, 1952) under editorship of Humberto Piñera Llera. William Rex Crawford makes a brief reference in his *Century of Latin American Thought* (p. 218). See also Francisco González del Valle y Ramírez, *El Padre Varela y la independencia de la América hispana* (La Habana: no publisher, 1936) and Antonio Travieso Hernández, *Varela y la reforma filosófica en Cuba* (La Habana: J. Montero, 1942.)

PHYSICS AND LOGIC

BY FÉLIX VARELA

(From José Manuel Mestre, *De la filosofía en la Habana*, edited by Humberto Piñera Llera, Habana, 1952. Pp. 111-126, Appendix 2. First published 1862. Part of a letter from Father Félix Varela to one of his disciples on the philosophic controversy of Don José de la Luz and Don Francisco Ruiz with Don Manuel González del Valle.)

New York, October 22, 1840

Dear A:

My silence on the philosophic controversies that for some time have claimed the attention of the public on the island is merely a measure of prudence. Any intervention by me might be taken for a claim to my former status as a mentor; if I was unable to assert it when nearly all parties to the controversy were my pupils, I could ill pretend to do so now when they are the leaders in the field of education which I have left. Still your pleas have been so strong and so repeated that I shall finally reveal to you my thoughts.

The points in controversy are three: First, whether the teaching of Philosophy should begin with Physics or with Logic; second, whether utility should be admitted as a principle and standard of action; third, whether the Cousin system should be admitted.

On the first point, reflect that the sciences may be considered either for themselves or for the method by which they may be taught; although the method must be based on the relationships of the sciences, it varies in its application. Since Logic is the science that directs the mind in acquiring the other sciences, clearly it must precede or, at least, accompany them. To do otherwise would be like giving medicine after the patient has recovered, or bringing a torch to light the road after the traveller has reached his destination. Consequently, those who argue for beginning with Logic have considered the nature of the sciences as such, and their argument is irrefutable. However, the relationship of Logic to the other sciences may also be applied to a specific object, or be taught in a practical way. This amounts to teaching Logic simultaneously with another science, while the student does not perceive the

artfulness with which he is guided. Thus, the medicine is given gradually, as the illness requires, and the torch accompanies the traveller, lighting his way unnoticed.

Those who argue that Physics must be the starting point, do not intend that it be taught before Logic but, rather, with its help, as a simple exercise in logic wherein the intellect is guided unconsciously and acquires a habit that will later facilitate the understanding of the precepts of Logic, or of the logical sciences as systematized by man. Certainly, in addition to that natural Logic always referred to, which consists in the ability to perceive errors in the light of reason, there is another Logic which we may call that of social and scientific education. It is the outcome of a continuous chain of one's own experience, together with suggestions of others, and leads in the end to knowledge (*acertar*). This is also true of grammar. One can learn to speak perfectly without ever studying its rules if he has someone to correct his mistakes. Still, one will never speak perfectly without obeying the rules, even though he himself is not conscious of this adherence. Properly speaking, we would not say that he learned without rules, but that he learned the rules without knowing he was learning them, because he had not perceived them systematically. The question should not be posed, therefore, by asking whether Physics should be taught before Logic; the question should be whether logic should be taught simultaneously with Physics, in a practical and merely preparatory way, with the physical objects serving as tools for exercises in logic.

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(Trans. by L.P.)

PART THREE
Positivist and Evolutionary Thought

POSITIVISM AND ITS CRITICS

Romantic liberalism reached its apogee in the revolutionary year 1848. By that time one can see, on the one hand, that much of the aristocratic overtone of the earlier decades had given way to an outlook more characteristic of the rising urban middle class. Many young men of this class had absorbed European socialist ideas, but in their minds these ideas differed from the more class conscious Marxism which poured forth in Europe in that revolutionary year. Marxism found its way to the New World, of course, but the main stream of thought in Latin America followed a different, even though in some respects related development. Evolutionary and deterministic ideas gained ground as August Comte's concept of a "science" of society achieved dominion over social thought, substituting evolutionary and secular concepts for the revolutionary and romantic philosophies of the post-independence period.

In the main this change reflected the contemporary movement in European thought. But, as during the earlier period, several elements in Latin American experience gave to the trend there special characteristics which it lacked elsewhere in the western world. One of the most important of these indigenous factors was the general Latin American sense of failure to develop the institutions of constitutional democratic government, as hoped for, in the image of their British, French, and North American models. Failure to achieve the economic prosperity promised by independence leaders was another indigenous factor, and like the former a source of disillusionment in respect to the earlier romantic liberalism. For economic depression had been common, especially in Spanish America, during the decades immediately following independence. New elements of social dynamics resulting from the emancipation of Negro slaves, a process completed by the middle of the century in most of Latin America except Cuba and Brazil, and from the speeding up of the ethnic assimilation of the Indian peoples, also affected American trends. These social changes also undermined seriously the confidence of the governing class, putting them on the defensive against the pressure of the new social elements which were gaining political power, especially through the army. In the long run it was possible to see that this increasing social mobility was lessening the danger of race warfare, never far below the level of consciousness in the colonial mind. But the social and political

anarchy of the nineteenth century made it difficult to take such a long range view, with the result that fear of race conflict lurked constantly in the back of men's minds.

A frustrating conflict between the Church and the state was another element which was giving a distinctive character to the intellectual development of Latin America, especially to the Spanish nations. Spanish policy had made the Church the central instrument of the Conquest and of the American colonial system, while the Catholic Counter Reformation, as previously noted, had given special strength to Catholic theology and philosophy. Many leaders of the eighteenth century revolt against scholastic philosophy had been churchmen, however, and one of the most interesting aspects of the independence movement in Spanish America had been the firm conviction of many liberal churchmen among its leaders that the church was the really solid basis upon which the empire maintained its control of the New World. Early nineteenth century liberalism dissipated much of its strength in a largely ineffective struggle to deprive the Church of this eminent position in Spanish American society and culture. By mid-century this battle had exacted great toll from the Church in material wealth and doubtless had caused it to lose something in spiritual qualities as well. But one of its chief effects had been to force this fundamental institution of Latin American society into unyielding and often blind opposition to the liberal movements and philosophy of the age.

These various factors combined to make the Latin American mind of the nineteenth century extraordinarily receptive to the scientific sociology of August Comte and his successors. Mid-century economic prosperity, the triumph of liberalism, and the achievement of greater political stability came about as the evolutionary and secular thought of Comte and Herbert Spencer came to dominate men's minds. Nowhere else did positivism achieve a stronger hold upon the directing class of society than in Latin America. But the very elements in the Latin American background which made for this receptivity to Comtian thought also gave it an American flavor. When one turns to consider the content of the sociology studied in the universities in the late nineteenth century this becomes apparent at once, for it was an American sociology, or an Argentine or Brazilian sociology, which was taught.

POSITIVISM AND ITS CRITICS

Comte wished to systematize the romantic and utopian "socialism" of his day, thus creating a "science of society" or scientific sociology. He found the basis of this science in empirical knowledge, assuming that social beliefs were the product of experience rather than of *a priori* logic. Positive liberalism accordingly developed a concept of positive, as distinguished from theoretical freedom — of freedom derived from beliefs based upon experience and finding expression in social structure. This was a pragmatic concept of freedom which proved to be one well suited to the temper of liberals in an increasingly "scientific" age.

Comte divided the study of society into the two main realms of statics and dynamics, and the vital relationship between the two was expressed in the phrase, "order and progress," which became the motto of his followers. It expressed the importance which the Comtians attached to social order as the necessary basis of social progress. Moreover, Comtian thought was evolutionary and hence based on a concept of inevitable progress. It thus assumed that improvement in society must come gradually, that it was gradual but inevitable. An understanding of this inevitable process of evolution was considered essential to the scientific study of society, and hence to social advance. Upon this basis Comte evolved a hierarchy of the sciences, beginning with mathematics; sociology stood at the head of the system, and politics was an important branch of sociology.

Comte had held that progress, whether economic, political, social, intellectual, or spiritual passed through three stages: (1) animistic — theological — military, (2) speculative — critical — metaphysical, and (3) rational — scientific — industrial. It was a basic law that each stage in this inevitable social evolution was assumed to have different institutions. These three stages, reminiscent of St. Augustine's division of history into three ages — before the law, the law, and Grace — led to the concept of the historical method as the highest form of empirical science.

Positivism provided the basic structure of Latin American thought during the last half of the nineteenth century, coming to the zenith of its popularity between 1880 and 1900. In Brazil, indeed, positivism became nearly an official philosophy of the Republic. The *Sociedade Positivista* was founded in 1871 under the influence of Benjamín Constant Botelho de

Magalhães. In 1881 Miguel Lemos and Antônio Teixeira Méndez founded the positivist church, *Templo da Humanidade*, still in existence. This Brazilian center of Comtian religious influence and ideas was probably the greatest outside France, and its membership furnished an important part of the leadership of the republican revolution in 1889. The Brazilian flag, with its motto, *Ordem e progresso*, still proclaims to the world this Brazilian identification with the Comtian formula of order as the necessary condition of progress, and progress as the inevitable objective of order.

To say that positivism was popular in Latin America means largely that Latin America was preoccupied with the social basis of its moral, political, educational, and economic problems, as visualized in Comtian terms and modified by the ideas of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin, and to a lesser degree by the evolving psychology of the day. In this sense Positivism seemed to provide a scientific approach to the pressing problems of the organization of national life which occupied the attention of most of the Hispanic nations during the nineteenth century. In its later Darwinian evolutionist phase, it characteristically explained political and social instability as a form of illness in society.

Originally, of course, positivist thought was an instrument of socialist and liberal forces intent upon building a strong lay society and state, and it sought to bend the forces of traditionalism and colonialism to its purposes. Education was prominent in the positivist concept of social action, and education was considered one of the major responsibilities of the state. Education must be secular, since it was the essential means by which a people might rid itself of superstition and rise to the level of a free secular life. To this end, Benito Juárez supported Gabino Barreda in his reorganization of the educational program of Mexico after the triumph of the liberal revolution in that country.¹

Since so many national leaders came to believe that positivism could solve these great national problems, the

1. See: W.H. Calcott, *Liberalism in Mexico 1857-1929* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931); Leopoldo Zea, *El Positivismo en México* (México: El Colegio de México, 1943) pp. 45 ff.; Justo Sierra, *Evolución política del pueblo mexicano* (México: La Casa de España en México, 1940; published originally by J. Balleca with other works under the title *México, su evolución social*).

"scientific" outlook came to have special political value. It suited well the growing spirit of nationalism and at the same time provided the dominant class, naturally inclined toward moderation, with a well oriented philosophy of prestige and "scientific" character with which to meet the impatience of groups with more radical reforming tendencies. The leading chairs of philosophy in the universities were, accordingly, held by positivists. The Díaz regime in Mexico furnishes a good example of this identification of positivism with a regime emphasizing "scientific progress" and gradual evolution in order to prevent "revolution." José Vasconcelos could speak of Justo Sierra as the high priest of positivism in the University, and later in the Ministry of Education, as "the popularizer of the positivist theory in art and life."² When the process is viewed historically, it appears that political stability was in fact achieved on the basis of the positivist ideology. This was also the basis of much of the political liberalism of the late nineteenth century, a fact not unrelated to the achievement of stability. The significance of positivism may be seen, for example, in the evolution of the party structure which brought political stability in Uruguay, particularly in the Colorado party — later to play a progressive role under José Batlle.³

By the end of the nineteenth century, however, national political stability was well achieved in most of the Latin American states, economic and demographic changes were presenting new national and international problems, and new movements of social protest found their ideological bases in conflict with the dominant positivism. The great development of historical scholarship in Latin America during the last half of the nineteenth century reflects this achievement of national political stability and the national soul-searching which accompanied it. In Mexico it was the work of such scholars as Vicente Riva Palacio and Joaquín García Icazbalceta; in Peru, Manuel de Mendiburu and Pedro Paz Soldán; in Chile,

2. See: José Vasconcelos, *Ulises Criollo*, p. 197. Vasconcelos writes that his studies varied from rigid Comtian thought to Spencerian evolutionism. The sociology of Le Bon, Worms, and Gumplowitz was just beginning to enter the universities of his student days (ca. 1900). He remained, he says, "*sumiso a Comte que prohíbe las aventuras de la mente y las excluye del período científico que profesamos.*" (p. 174).

3. Juan Antonio Oddone, *El principismo de Setenta*. Advertencia de Edmundo M. Narancio. (Montevideo: Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay, 1956) pp. 9-10.

Diego Barros Arana, Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, Miguel Luis Amunátegui and José Toribio Medina; in Argentina, V.F. López, Bartolomé Mitre, Antonio Zinny, and Vicente G. Quesada; and in Brazil, Manoel de Oliveira Lima. This history was nationalistic, but it was also reminiscent, stock-taking. In many respects it represents a continuation of the social and political philosophy of the movement for independence rather than thought of positivist tendency.⁴

About the turn of the century, however, the Venezuelan, Rufino Blanco Fombona, studied the conflict of classes in his *Evolución política y social de Hispano-América*. The *científico* (positivist) Francisco Bulnes of Mexico painted a pessimistic future for Latin America in its relations with the United States in his *El porvenir de las naciones hispano-americanas*. At the end of the century Octavio Bunge of Argentina gave a similarly pessimistic psychological-social analysis of the mixed racial basis of Latin America in his *Nuestra América*, which suggests a positivist interpretation.

But while there was great variety within the patterns of historical thought, there was usually a common denominator as well. Very little historical writing accepted the Comtian concept of inevitable historical development. Justo Sierra's positivist history of Mexico, *Evolución política del pueblo mexicano*, was an important exception, and Francisco Calderón interpreted the political development of Hispanic America as an evolution through various stages of dictatorship to a freer and more prosperous society, in a manner reminiscent of the Positivist evolutionism. But most Latin American historians, following von Ranke, refused, as during the earlier years of the century, to accept historical determinism. They continued to interpret national development in terms of the revolutionary and rational natural law and idealism of the independence movements, as modified by the romantic liberalism of the early nineteenth century. The influence of this earlier rational-idealism may also be seen in the writings of such non-historians as the Ecuadoran Juan Montalvo and the Peruvian Manuel González Prada.

The empirical character of positivist thought helps to account for some of the most important variations — those which insisted upon American elements in thought. Euclides da

4. See L.L. Bernard in *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, I, pp. 308-9.

Cunha, José Ingenieros, Agustín Enrique Álvarez Suárez, and José Martí may be mentioned particularly in this connection because of their search for American social principles and American values in American experiences. Racism, so prominent in the thought of Alberdi and Sarmiento, attained an even more prominent place in the later positivist thought of the nineteenth century. But as it became Darwinian in da Cunha, Martí, and González Prada, it also became tolerant and evolutionary in character.

In some writers, notably Martí, Rodó, and to a degree in Justo Sierra, one may, however, discern something of the new idealism which appeared in French and German thought in the late nineteenth century. Even Hostos in the prescriptive nature of his ideas, and José Ingenieros in his appeal to youthful idealism, represent this trend in some respects. These authors are forerunners of the anti-positivism which was to become so prominent in the twentieth century in connection with the *ateneos de juventud*, the student movement, and university reform.

It is an overstatement to say as has John H. Randall, Jr., that Comte "preached an enlightened despotism of the old order."⁵ But it was certainly true that in Latin America scientific positivism seemed to provide a rationalization of things as they were. It was convenient for the uncertain, shifting, faction-ridden ruling class to buttress its tenuous position and authority with the concept of institutions appropriate to the stages of development and the doctrine of the inevitable evolution of institutions. Non-revolutionary in general, positivism concerned itself with concrete national problems. One is not surprised, therefore, to find that revolutionaries like Martí and Hostos revolted against "inevitability." Rodó's case, as will appear, is somewhat different, for his stoical idealism tended to defend the older aristocratic-democratic values of his intellectual and social class against the "vulgarizing" trends of democracy, but at the same time he appealed to the idealistic sense of *noblesse oblige* of the youth of Uruguay to lead a moral and spiritual revolution.

Positivism continued the earlier trend toward religious free thinking and the secularization of society. This was a necessary

5. *The Making of the Modern Mind* (Boston - New York: Houghton - Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 579.

corollary of its basic concept of a rational society achieved by the growth of knowledge. The "scientists" viewed traditional religion as superstition, urging in its place a religion of positive social values — a religion of humanity. When esthetic naturalism was added to this rational religion, as in Rodó, the result was what may be called a non-theistic religion.

Where revolutionary ideas persisted, as in Martí, Montalvo, and González Prada, they may be attributed in part to the older Liberal tradition, in part to Marxism, and in part to the newly dawning idealism. Early nineteenth century enthusiasm for Spanish or Latin American union has waned, but is being replaced by a spirit of general internationalism, as in Joaquim Nabuco.

At the end of the century, while Latin American thought is still generally positivist, several divergent trends and influences are to be noted. Alvarez Suárez speaks with a new accent on naturalistic realism, while Hostos and Rodó are moralists, the former rather prescriptively so. Both make of their appeal for education a kind of moral crusade. Marxism is gaining adherents in the small syndicalist labor movement and among intellectuals sympathetic to it. Sociologists tend to give more emphasis to psychology. The neo-idealism of Nietzsche, Bergson, and Renan, and the more existentialist concepts of Troeltsch, William James, and others, are beginning to exert their influence. The literary modernism of the poets reveals close links with the awakening intellect in Spain — the Generation of 1898. Perhaps most important of all, however, is the vague religious movement of Krausism, linked to Spiritism in Brazil, and having roots in a revival of Kantian idealism, both in the New World and in the Old.

MANUEL GONZALEZ PRADA (1848-1918)

PERÚ

For years González Prada was the Peruvian conscience, denouncing the social and political errors of Peru which had produced the weakness and anarchy responsible for defeat by Chile in 1789, while leading a liberal intellectual and literary revival. Although in the general form of his thought he is a social evolutionist, similar to other writers of his day, contacts with socialist thought seem to have made him a revolutionist in spite of Comte, Darwin, and Spencer.

Born in Lima in 1848, he was the third son in a wealthy, conservative, and religious landowning family which had taken an active part in Peruvian affairs since long before independence. His education at the Colegio de San Carlos and in the law school of the National University exposed him to the scientific rationalism (positivism) of the day, and he came to be an admirer of the free-thinking director of the National Library, Francisco Vivil, to the great distress of his pious mother and conservative father. Later contact with Renan in France helped to make his anti-clerical pen one of the sharpest in all Spanish America. At first his activity centered in literary circles, but in 1891 he participated in organizing the *Unión Nacional*, a political party committed to Indian reforms, social legislation, and parliamentary government. After his return from France in 1898 his political writing and speaking increased, and his appointment as director of the National Library in 1912 was the occasion of political as well as religious controversy.

While his social thought is basically that of scientific rationalism, he has combined with it a strong moral idealism having roots in the Liberal thought and utopian socialism of an earlier day, as well as in the contemporary idealistic and generally socialistic reaction against the materialistic determinism of Darwinian and Spencerian thought. "To one who says *the school*, reply the school and bread." The old Liberal anti-clericalism has been reinforced in González Prada by scientific free-thinking, and he retains the positivist's strong opposition to religious superstition.

González Prada wrote with the pen of a journalist, with sharp cutting sarcasm and subtle satire which is difficult or

even impossible to translate adequately. The essay on the Indian which follows is particularly interesting as one of the early statements of the present day Indianism of Peru. But it also reveals other aspects of the author's thought which have been mentioned, especially his revolutionary moral idealism. Written in 1904, it was a product of the years of political activity following his return from France. Never completed by the author, it was included only in the second edition of *Horas de lucha*, prepared by Adriana de González Prada.¹

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

A complete edition of the works of González Prada has not been published, but numerous editions of individual works have appeared, particularly the *Horas de lucha*. The most recent edition of *Horas de lucha* was published in Buenos Aires, by Americalee, in 1946. Of several anthologies, the most useful for social thought is *González Prada: Prólogo de Andrés Henestrosa* (México: Sec. de Educación Pública, 1943). Luis Alberto Sánchez has written an excellent critical study, *Don Manuel* (2d. ed. Santiago: Ercilla, 1937). Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez, *La literatura política de González Prada, Mariátegui y Haya de la Torre* (México: Studium, 1957) develops the inter-relationships of the ideas of the three authors. It contains an extensive bibliography on González Prada. In English, see the brief sketches in William Rex Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought* and in H.E.Davis, *Makers of Democracy in Latin America*. See also Isaac Goldberg, *Studies in Spanish American Literature* (New York: Brentano, 1920) and Pedro Henríquez Ureña, *Literary Currents in Hispanic America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945).

OUR INDIANS

BY MANUEL GONZÁLEZ PRADA

(From *Horas de lucha*, second edition. (Callao: Tip. Lux, 1924, pp. 311-338).

I

The most eminent sociologists consider sociology a science in formation and call for the advent of its Newton, its Lavoisier, or its Lyell. Yet no other works pullulate such dogmatic and

1. Callao: Tip. Lux, 1924. Cf. Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez. *La literatura política de González Prada, Mariátegui y Haya de la Torre* (México: Studium, 1957) p. 112n.

arbitrary assertions as those produced by the heirs and disciples of Comte. One might call sociology not only the art of giving new names to old things but also the science of contradictory assertions. If one great sociologist announces a proposition, we may be certain that another no less great sociologist will advocate the diametric opposite. Just as some pedagogues remind us of the teachers of [Eugene] Scribe, so many sociologists make us think of the physicians of Molière — Le Bon and Tarde are not far from Diafoirus and Purgon.

We might mention the question of race as one upon which the authors differ most. While some see in it the principal factor of social dynamics, others reduce ethnic influences to so small a scope that they say with Durkheim: "*We know no social phenomenon which falls unquestionably under dependence upon race.*" Novicow, in spite of considering the opinion of Durkheim exaggerated, does not hesitate to assert that race, like species, is to a certain point a subjective category of our spirit, without external reality; and in a generous burst of humanity he exclaims: "All those pretended incapacities of the yellow [race] and the Negroes are chimeras of sick spirits." Whoever dares say to a race, "Thus far you may come and no farther," is blind and stupid.

How convenient an invention ethnology is in the hands of some men! If one grants the division of humanity into superior and inferior races and recognizes the superiority of the whites and their consequent right to govern the planet, nothing is more natural than the suppression of the Negro in Africa, the redskin in the United States, the Tagalog in the Philippines, or the Indian in Peru. Since the supreme law of life is fulfilled in the selection or elimination of the weak and unadaptable, the violent eliminators and suppressors are merely accelerating the slow and indolent labor of Nature. They abandon the [slow] pace of the tortoise for the gallop of the horse. Many, like Pearson, do not write it but allow it to be read between the lines, as when he refers to the "solidarity among civilized man of the European race against Nature and human barbarism." Where you read "human barbarism" it is to be translated "man without white skin."

But not only is the suppression of the Negroes and the yellow [race] decreed. Within the white race itself classifications are made of peoples destined to live and prosper and peoples

condemned to decline and die. Since Demouliens published his book *A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons*, the fashion has revived of glorifying the Anglo Saxons and depreciating the Latins. (Although few Latins can [really] be called so — for example [can] Atahualpa [be called] Galician, or Montezuma, Provençal?) In Europe and America we see many Casandras flourishing who live by prophesying the conflagration and destruction of the New Troy. Some pessimists, believing themselves the Deucalions of the next deluge or even the Supermen of Nietzsche, decree the disappearance of their own race as if dealing with prehistoric beings or inhabitants of the Moon. It has not been formulated, but an axiom follows [from this]. Crimes and vices of the English and the North Americans are things inherent in the human species and do not forecast the decline of a people. On the other hand, crimes and vices of the French or Italians are anomalies and indicate racial degeneration. Fortunately Oscar Wilde and General MacDonald were not born in Paris and the round table of the Emperor William was not held in Rome.

It seems unnecessary to say that we do not take seriously dilettanti like Paul Bourget nor mystifiers like Maurice Barrès when they thunder against cosmopolitanism and weep over the decadence of the noble French race because the daughter of a syphilitic count and a tuberculous marquise allows herself to be seduced by a healthy and vigorous youth without a noble pedigree. In respect to Monsieur Gustave Le Bon, we should admire him for his very vast knowledge and his great moral elevation, even though he represents an exaggeration of Spencer, much as Max Nordau does of Lombroso and Haeckel of Darwin. He deserves to be called the Bossuet of Sociology, but that is not to say the Torquemada or the Herod. If he had not made himself worthy of consideration by his observations upon occult matters (*sobre la luz negra*) we might say that he is to sociology what doctor Sangrado [the ignorant physician of *Gil Blas*] is to medicine.

Le Bon warns us not in any way to take the term race in an anthropological sense, because pure races have long since almost disappeared, except among savage peoples. And to give us a secure road to march on, he decides: "Among civilized people there are only historical events." According to the Le Bon dogma, Hispanic American nations constitute one of these races, but a race so exceptional that it has passed dizzily from

childhood to decrepitude, covering in less than a century the course run by other peoples in three, four, five, and even six thousand years. "The twenty-two Latin republics of America," he says in his *Psychologie du socialisme*, "although all situated in the richest regions of the Globe, are incapable of developing their immense resources.... The final destiny of that half of America is to return to primitive barbarism unless the United States do it the great service of conquering it.... To debase the richest regions of the Globe to the level of the Negro republics of Santo Domingo and Haiti, this is what the Latin race has accomplished in less than a century with half of America."

It might be argued with Le Bon that he mistakes the skin eruption of a child for the senile gangrene of a nonogenarian, the hebephrenia of a youth for the homicidal mania of an old man. Since when do revolutions indicate decrepitude and death? None of the Hispanic American nations today displays the political and social misery which reigned in the Europe of feudalism. But the feudal epoch is considered a stage in evolution, whereas the era of Hispanic American revolutions is looked upon as an incurable, final state. We might also answer by confronting Le Bon the pessimist with Le Bon the optimist, [pitting] as one might say St. Augustine the Bishop against St. Augustine the pagan. "It is possible," affirms Le Bon, "that after a series of profound calamities, convulsions almost never seen in history," the Latin peoples, taught by experience, "may attempt the arduous task of acquiring the qualities they lack in order henceforth to achieve success in life.... Apostles can accomplish much because they succeed in changing public opinion, and public opinion is queen today.... History is so full of the unforeseen, the world is undergoing such profound changes, that it is impossible today to foresee the destiny of empires." If it is impossible to foresee the fate of nations, how then announce the death of the Hispanic American republics? What the Latin empires can achieve in Europe, may not the nations of similar origin attempt in the New World? Or are there two sociological laws, one for the Latins of America and another for the Latins of Europe? Perhaps. But, happily, the assertions of Le Bon resemble nails which drive out each other.

It appears, then, that while August Comte intended to make of sociology an eminently positive science, his heirs have converted it into a heap of ramblings without any scientific basis.

II

In his *Der Rassenkampf* (Race Conflict) Ludwig Gumplowicz says that every important and powerful ethnic element seeks to make serve its ends any weak element found in its radius or which penetrates into it. First the Conquerors and then their descendants in the countries of America constituted an ethnic element sufficiently powerful to subjugate and exploit the indigenes. Although the statements of Las Casas are marred by exaggeration, it cannot be denied that in some American countries, thanks to the avaricious cruelty of the exploiters, the weak element was almost extinguished. The ants which domesticate grubs in order to milk them do not imitate the lack of foresight of the whites—they do not destroy the productive animal.

To the theory of Gumplowicz should be added a law which has great influence in our way of life—when an individual rises above the level of his social class he usually becomes its worst enemy. During the time of Negro slavery there were no crueller overseers than the Negroes themselves. At the present time there are probably no harsher oppressors of the Indian than those very Indians who are Hispanicized and invested with some authority.

The real tyrant of the masses, who uses certain Indians to exploit and oppress the others, is the half-caste, including in this term not only the cholo or mestizo of the sierra but also the mulatto and zamba of the coast. In Peru we see an ethnic stratification. Excluding Europeans and the small number of national or creole whites, the population is divided into two parts, very unequal in quantity, the dominating half-castes and the dominated indigenes. One to two hundred thousand persons have been placed over three millions.

There is an offensive and defensive alliance based on exchange of services between the dominant group of the capital and those of the province. The political bosses (*gamonal*) of the sierra act as political agents for the ruling caste (*señorón*) in Lima and the rulers of Lima defend the political bosses of the sierra when they barbarously abuse the Indian. Few social groups have committed such iniquities or have such a black record as the Spaniards and half-castes of Peru. Revolutions, squandering, and bankruptcy seem like nothing compared with the glacial cupidity of the half-castes to squeeze the blood out

of human flesh. The suffering and death of their fellow creatures matters very little to them when that suffering and death yields them a gain of a few *soles*. They decimate the Indian with their assessments and forced labor (*mitas*); they import the Negro to make him groan under the lash of the overseer; they swallow up the Chinese, giving him a handful of rice for ten and even fifteen hours of work; they bring the East Indian from his islands to let him die of nostalgia in the slave quarters of the haciendas; today they are trying to bring in Japanese The Negro seems to decline [in numbers], the Chinese is disappearing, the East Indian has left no trace, and the Japanese gives no sign of lending himself to slavery. But the Indian remains, since three hundred to four hundred years of cruelty have not succeeded in exterminating him. The vile creature obstinately insists on living!

The viceroys of Peru never failed to condemn the violations nor spared any effort to achieve the protection, good treatment, and relief of the Indians. The Kings of Spain, yielding to the compassion of their noble and Catholic souls, conceived humanitarian measures and backed those initiated by the viceroys. There were more than enough fine proposals in royal cédulas. We do not know whether the Laws of the Indies formed a pyramid as tall as Chimborazo, but we know the evil continued unchanged, even though some were punished as examples. And it could not be otherwise. The exploitation of the conquered was officially ordered, but humanity and justice were asked of the executors of the exploitation. It was pretended to commit iniquities humanely and to carry out injustice with equity. To stamp out the abuses it would have been necessary to stamp out the *repartimientos* and *mitas*, in a word, to change the whole colonial regime. Without the forced labor (*faenas*) of the American Indian the coffers of the Spanish treasury would have been empty. The wealth sent by the colonies to the Metropolis was merely blood and tears converted into gold.

The Republic continues the tradition of the viceroyalty. In their messages the presidents urge the redemption of the oppressed and they are called protectors of the native race. Congresses elaborate laws which go beyond the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the ministers of government issue decrees, send notes to the prefects, and appoint investigating commissions, all with the noble purpose of assuring guaranties

to the disinherited class. But messages, laws, decrees, notes, and commissions are nothing more than hypocritical jeremiads, fruitless words, overworked measures. The authorities who send threatening orders from Lima to the departments know they will not be obeyed. The prefects who receive the warnings from the Capital know that nothing will happen to them for not carrying them out. What the Marquis of Mancera said in his *Memoria* in 1648 could be repeated today, reading governors and hacienda owners for *corregidores* and *caciques*. "These poor Indians have as their enemies the greediness of their *corregidores*, of their priests, and of their *caciques*, all trying to grow rich on their sweat; it would take the zeal and authority of a viceroy for each of them. Relying upon the distance [from authority] they falsely pretend obedience and there is not enough strength or perseverance to register a second complaint."² The phrase falsely pretending obedience has great significance in the mouth of a viceroy. But even more significant is the statement which escaped from the defenders of the Indians of Chucuito.³

There are many friends of the Indian who in their individual and collective capacities behave like the government in its official action. The groups formed to free the unredeemed race have been no better than political contrabandists, hiding behind a philanthropic banner. Defending the Indian, they have exploited [the public] pity as [others] have traded on patriotism by invoking Tacna and Arica. For the redeemers to act in good faith they would have to experience an overnight transformation, repenting the terrible measure of their sins, formulating a steady purpose of obeying [the dictates of] justice, becoming men instead of tigers. Is this conceivable?

Meanwhile, as a general rule, the dominant [group] approach the Indian only to deceive him, oppress him, or corrupt him. And we should remember that not only the national half-caste acts with inhumanity and bad faith. When Europeans become wool traders, mine owners, or hacienda proprietors, they show themselves fine exactors, extortionists, rivaling the old *encomenderos* and the present day *hacendados*.

2. *Memorias de los virreyes del Perú, Marqués de Mancera y Conde de Salvatierra*, publicadas por José Toribio Polo. Lima, 1889.

3. *La raza indígena del Perú en los albores del siglo XX*, página vi, segundo folleto. Lima, 1903.

The white skinned animal, wherever he is born, is afflicted with the disease of gold. In the final analysis he yields to the instinct of rapacity.

III

Does the Indian suffer less under the republic than under Spanish rule? While neither *corregimientos* nor *encomiendas* exist, forced labor and its recruitment remain. What we make him suffer is enough to call down upon us the execration of humanity. We hold him in ignorance and servitude, we debase him in the garrisons, we brutalize him with alcohol, we set him to destroying himself in civil war, and from time to time we organize hunting parties and massacres like those of Amantani, Ilave, and Huanta.

It is an unwritten axiom that the Indian has no rights, only obligations. In his case a personal complaint is considered insubordination, a collective claim a plot of rebellion. The Spanish royalists killed the Indian when he tried to escape the yoke of his conquerors; we republicans exterminate him when he protests against onerous taxes or tires of enduring in silence the iniquities of some satrap.

Our form of government is in essence a great lie, because a state in which two or three million individuals live outside the law does not deserve to be called a democratic republic. While in the coastal region one sees a shadow of protection under a feigned republic, in the interior the violation of all rights under a feudal regime is open. Here neither laws nor courts of justice rule, because hacienda owners and political bosses (*gamonales*) settle everything, arrogating to themselves the role of judge as well as executor. The political authorities, far from protecting the weak and the poor, almost always help the strong and the rich. There are regions where justices of the peace and [provincial] governors are servitors of the hacienda. What governor, what sub-prefect, what prefect, even, would dare oppose a hacienda owner.

A hacienda consists of small farms taken by force from their rightful owners. A landlord exercises the authority of a Norman baron over his peons. He not only influences the selection of governors, alcaldes, and justices of the peace, but also arranges marriages, designates heirs, divides up inheritances, and imposes what is frequently a life-long servitude upon

children to pay the debts of their parents. He imposes heavy punishments such as shackles, flogging, the *cepo de campaña*,⁴ death; or humiliating ones (*visibles*), such as shaving the head and cold water enemas. It would be a miracle for one who respects neither life nor property to respect the honor of women. Any Indian woman, married or single, may be the object of the señor's vicious desires. Violation and rape mean little when one realizes that it is necessary to take the Indian women by main force. And despite all this the Indian never speaks to the landlord without kneeling and kissing his hand. It can not be said that the lords of the land act in this way through ignorance or lack of culture. The sons of some hacienda owners go to Europe in childhood to be educated in France or England, returning to Peru with all the outward aspects of civilized people. But once ensconced in their haciendas, they lose the European varnish and proceed with more inhumanity than their fathers. When [the son] dons his sombrero, poncho, and spurs, the beast reappears. To sum up: the haciendas are kingdoms in the heart of the republic; the hacienda owners rule as autocrats in the midst of democracy.

IV

To justify governmental negligence and the inhumanity of the despoilers some pessimists of the Le Bon stamp brand a degrading stigma on the forehead of the Indian; they accuse him of being refractory to civilization. Could anyone imagine that splendid schools could be built in all our towns, with competent well paid teachers buzzing around in them, that the rooms would be empty because the children, obeying the orders of their parents, would not hasten to receive education? Could one imagine, moreover, that the natives would fail to follow the fine moral example of the ruling class and crucify without a scruple all who preach elevated and generous ideas. The Indian received what they gave him — fanaticism and liquor.

Now let us see what is understood by civilization. Over industry and art, over science and learning, morality gleams like a shining light on the apex of a great pyramid. Not theological morality based on punishment after death, but humane morality which seeks no sanction far removed from

4. The *cepo de campaña*, or *cepo colombiano*, is a cruel form of military punishment in which a man is strapped, in a sitting posture, to a rifle passed under his knees. Trans.

the world. The essence of morality, for individuals as well as for societies, consists in transforming the struggle of man against man into a mutual accord for living. Where there is no justice, pity, or benevolence, there is no civilization; where the struggle for life is made the law of society, barbarism reigns. What does it avail to acquire the wisdom of an Aristotle if one's heart is that of a tiger? What is there worthwhile in having the talent of a Michelangelo if one has the soul of a pig? It is better to go through the world distilling the honey of goodness than shedding the light of art or science. Those societies deserve to be called highly civilized in which the practice of the good has become an habitual obligation and the beneficent act instinctive. Have the rulers of Peru reached this level of morality? Have they any right to consider the Indian incapable of civilization?

The political and social organization of the ancient Inca empire astonishes revolutionary reformers today. True, Atahualpa did not know his Pater Noster, nor had Calcuchima pondered the mystery of the Trinity. But the cult of the Sun was perhaps less absurd than the Catholic religion, and the high priest of Pachacamac scarcely exceeded Padre Valverde in ferocity. If the subject of Huayna Capac accepted civilization we see no reason why the Indian of the republic should reject it, unless the whole race has suffered irreparable physiological decay. Morally speaking, the native of the republic is inferior to the native encountered by the conquerors; but moral depression because of political servitude is not the same as an absolute incapacity by organic constitution to achieve civilization. In any case, upon whom should the blame fall?

The facts give the lie to the pessimists. Wherever the Indian is educated in schools or simply by contact with civilized persons, he takes on the same level of morality and culture as the descendant of the Spaniard. We constantly meet mongoloids (*amarillos*)⁵ who dress, eat, live, and think like the suave gentlemen of Lima. We see Indians in legislatures, municipal governments, magistracies, universities, and scientific bodies who seem no more venal nor more ignorant than those of other races. It is impossible, in our national politics, to trace the lines of responsibility *in totum revolutis* [sic] so as to say what evil is caused by mestizos, mulattoes, and whites. There is

5. González Prada seems to use *amarillo* here as a rough equivalent of Mongoloid, including the American Indian. — Trans.

such promiscuity of blood and color, each individual represents so many licit or illicit mixtures, that most Peruvians would be puzzled to figure out the dose of Negro and Mongol (*amarillo*) they carry in their veins. No one deserves the qualification of pure white, even though he may have blue eyes and blond hair. We need only recall that our president who had the broadest viewpoint belonged to the native race and was called Santa Cruz. There were a hundred more, valiant to the stage of heroism like Cahuide or loyal even to martyrdom like Olaya.

Novicow is right in saying that the supposed inferiority of Mongoloids and Negroes is a chimera of diseased minds. Actually, there is no cultural activity which can not be performed by some Negro or some Mongoloid, just as the most infamous act may be committed by some white. During the invasion of China in 1900 the yellow men of Japan gave lessons in humanity to the whites of Russia and Germany. We do not recall whether the Negroes of Africa ever gave such lessons to the Boers of the Transvaal and the English of the Cape; but we do know that the Anglo-Saxon Kitchener showed himself as ferocious in the Sudan as Behanzin in Dahomey. If, instead of comparing white-skinned masses with dark-skinned masses, we compare one individual with another, we see that savages and redskins at heart abound in the midst of white civilization. Suppose we name as flowers of the race, or representative men, the King of England and the Emperor of Germany. Do Edward VII and William II deserve to be compared with the Indian Benito Juárez and the Negro Booker Washington? Those who lived in taverns, barracks, and brothels before occupying a throne, or from the summit of power ordered the pitiless massacre of children, women, and old people may be white in skin but hide blackness (*lo negro*) in their souls.

Does the lowliness of the native race result merely from ignorance? Certainly national ignorance is fabulous when it is recalled that in many towns of the interior not a single man is found able to read or write, that during the War of the Pacific the Indians believed the conflict of the two nations was a civil war between General Chile and General Peru, and that not long ago representatives of Chucuito went to Tacna imagining that there they would encounter the president of the republic.

Some pedagogs (rivalling the sellers of panaceas) imagine that if a man knows the tributaries of the Amazon and the median temperature in Berlin, half of the road to the solution of all social problems has been traversed. If, by some superhuman phenomenon, our national illiterates should arise some dawn not only knowing how to read and write but with university diplomas, the problem of the Indian would not be solved. A proletariat of bachelors and doctors would merely replace that of the ignorant. [Even] in the most civilized nations physicians without patients, lawyers without clients, engineers with nothing to build, writers without a reading public, artists without buyers, and teachers without students abound, making up a numberless army of shining intelligences without bread for their stomachs. Where the coastal haciendas run to four or five thousand fanegas⁶ and the estancias of the sierra measure thirty or even fifty [square] leagues, the nation must be divided into lords and serfs.

Education does indeed usually change an impulsive brute into a reasonable and magnanimous being, teaching him and lighting for him the path he should follow in order not to get lost at the crossroads of life. But to see a path is not the same as to follow it to the end; firmness of will and toughness of feet are also necessary. A proud rebellious spirit is also needed, not the submission and deference of the soldier and monk. Education may keep man in [a state of] meanness and servitude — the eunuchs and grammarians of Byzantium were educated. It is the right of every rational being to occupy on the earth the decent place due him instead of accepting that which is assigned, to ask for and get his daily bread, to demand a roof and piece of land.

Nothing changes the psychology of man more quickly or more fundamentally than property. Upon escaping belly servitude he grows a hundred palms. By merely becoming the owner of something the individual rises several steps on the social ladder, because classes are essentially groups based upon the amount of wealth. Quite the opposite of a balloon — the more he weighs the more he rises. To one who says *the school reply the school and bread*.

6. The Spanish American fanega varies from 1.59 to 8.81 acres. — Trans.

The problem of the Indian is economic and social more than educational. How is it to be resolved? Not long ago a German conceived the idea of restoring the Inca empire. He learned Quechua, made himself known among the Indians of Cuzco, began to gain supporters and might, perhaps, have attempted an uprising if death had not surprised him when returning from a voyage to Europe. But is there any place for such a restoration today? If it were attempted and carried out the result would be a petty imitation of past greatness.

The situation of the native can improve in two ways. Either the heart of the oppressors relents to the extent of recognizing the rights of the oppressed, or the spirit of the oppressed acquires sufficient vigor to chasten their oppressors. If the Indian were to spend for rifles and bullets what he wastes on alcohol and fiestas, or if he were to conceal a weapon in the corner of his hut or in the hollow of a rock, he might change his situation, making his property and life respected. To violence he might then reply with violence, punishing the patron who steals his wool, the soldier who levies in the name of the government, and the bandit who robs his cattle and beasts of burden.

To the Indian one should not preach humility and resignation but pride and rebellion. What has he gained by three or four hundred years of conformity and patience? The less he is subject to authority the more injury he escapes. It is a revealing fact that there is more well being in the regions most remote from the big haciendas and that the towns least often visited by the authorities enjoy greater peace and order.

To sum up, the Indian will be redeemed by his own efforts, not by the humanizing of his oppressors. Every white, more or less, is a Pizarro, a Valverde, or an Areche.⁷

7. José de Areche, the Spanish *Visitador* to Peru in 1780, whose harshness provoked the Indian rebellion of Tupac Amará. — Trans.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

EUCLYDES DA CUNHA (1866-1909)

BRAZIL

Euclydes da Cunha was born on January 20, 1866, in Santa Rita de Rio Negro in the province of Rio de Janeiro, the child of Donna Eudoxia Moreira da Cunha and Manuel Rodriguez Pimenta da Cunha. His father was a native of Bahía, the province which includes the Canudos of which Euclydes was to write. A poet of the romantic school, the father imparted to his son his own liking for poetry, besides providing him with a good general education.

When Euclydes was ten years old, his father took him to Rio de Janeiro, where at the Colegio Aquino he came under the influence of Benjamín Constant Botelho de Magalhães. Entering the Escola Militar da Praia Vermelha at the age of 20, he acquired the scientific training that later contributed much to his work. There, under the influence of Benjamín Constant, he absorbed the ideas of August Comte, Herbert Spencer, Victor Hugo, the abolitionist-poet Castro Alves, James Bryce, Hippolyte Taine, Ernest Renan, Henry Buckle, and Joseph Arthur Gobineau. Gobineau's racialism is especially discernible in da Cunha's writing. He was also influenced by three North Americans: the geographer Orville Adelbert Derby, the geologist John Casper Brenner, and the archaeologist Charles Frederic Hartt.

In 1896 da Cunha left the army to take up civil engineering, and he was engaged in public works for the state of São Paulo when the Canudos revolt, led by the strange, half mad Antonio Maciel, the Counsellor, took place in 1896. The newspaper *Estado de São Paulo* sent da Cunha to report on the army expedition against the *sertanejos*, and his reports were the first to recognize the significance of the rebellion of Canudos and its heroic resistance. He sensed intuitively that this isolated backlands area, with its harsh extremes of climate and topography, was giving birth to something distinctively Brazilian. In the appearance of Maciel, the back country Messiah, da Cunha saw a more universal cultural phenomenon. The Counsellor and his *sertanejos* represented a new race emerging from the mixture of the Indian, the Negro, and the European, under the influence of the backlands. Their behavior reflected the still unformed aspirations of the three races and gave dynamic expression to their latent religious feelings. In them

daCunha saw "the very case of Brazilian nationality, the bedrock of the Brazilian race," and attributed their shortcomings to the more civilized people of the coastal areas, who had failed to provide education for these men of the backlands. Thus the rebellion at Canudos inspired a narrative which has been acclaimed as one of the great books of Brazil and of America, because it expressed so truly the aspirations and emotions of a people. In its wake followed a veritable school of interpreters of the Brazilian backlands and its cultural significance.

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Os Sertões has gone through many editions in Brazil. The excellent English translation by Samuel Putnam was published by the University of Chicago in 1943. Other works of da Cunha have been published in various volumes of the *Coleção Documentos Brasileiros* (Livraria José Olympio: Rio de Janeiro). Aside from *Os Sertões*, the most important is *Canudos: Diário de uma expedição*, edited by Gilberto Freyre (Vol. 16 in the *Coleção*). Among the books treating da Cunha are: Gilberto Freyre: *Atualidade de Euclides da Cunha* (Rio de Janeiro: Caso do Estudante do Brasil, 1941), Eloy Pontes, *A vida dramática de Euclides da Cunha* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1940), Nelson Wernecke Sodré, *História da literatura brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1940) pp. 209-212, and Cruz Costa, *Esbozo de una historia de las ideas en el Brasil* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1957) pp. 112-114. In English, see William Rex Crawford, *Op. cit.* pp. 193-198, Harold E. Davis, *Latin American Leaders*, pp. 128-133, and Isaac Goldberg, *Brazilian Literature* (New York: Knopf, 1922) pp. 210-221.

REBELLION IN THE BACKLANDS

BY EUCLYDES DA CUNHA

(From the English translation of *Os Sertões*, by Samuel Putnam, the University of Chicago Press, 1943. Pp. 55-56, 60-61, 82-84, 84-88, 89-91, 92-94. With permission of the publisher).

EFFECTS OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

The disposition of the mountains in Brazil, great upheaved masses which follow the coast in a line perpendicular to the southeast, determines the primary distinctions over large tracts of territory which lie to the east, creating a significant climatological anomaly. The fact of the matter is, the climate

here, entirely subordinated to geography, violates the general laws that ordinarily govern it. Starting from the tropics, on the side of Ecuador, its astronomical determination by latitudes yields to disturbing secondary causes, and it is, abnormally, defined by longitude.

This is a well-known fact. In the extensive strip of coast which runs from Baía to Paraíba more marked changes may be observed accompanying the parallel to the east than along the meridian northward. Those differences in climate and in natural features which in the latter direction are imperceptible stand out clearly in the former. All the way to the far northern regions, Nature exhibits the same unvarying exuberance in the great forests that border the coast; so that a stranger at a rapid glance would believe this to be a most fertile tract, of wide extent. On the other hand, beginning with the thirteenth parallel, the forests conceal a vast strip of sterile land, a barren tract, displaying all the inclemencies of a region in which the thermometric and hygrometric readings, marked by exaggerated extremes, vary in inverse ratio.

This is revealed by a brief journey to the west, starting from any point along the coast. The charm is broken, the beautiful illusion gone. Nature is here impoverished: no more great forests and mountain tops, but deserts and depressions, as the region is transformed into the parched and barbarous backlands with their intermittent streams and endless stretch of barren plains, forming a huge dais for the woebegone landscapes of the drought.

The contrast is most striking. A little more than a hundred miles distant are regions the exact opposite of this, with conditions of life that are equally different. It is as if one had found one's self suddenly in a desert.

And, certainly those waves of humanity which, during the first two centuries of settlement, swept over the northern tracts on their way west to the interior must have encountered obstacles more serious than the rolls of seas and mountains, when they came to cross the meager, barestripped caatingas. The failure of the Baians to penetrate to the interior of the country — and they, by the way, preceded the Paulistas — is an eloquent case in point. (Pp. 55-56).

Whence the mistake made by those who, in studying our national physiology, fall into generalizations with regard to the particular effect of a tropical climate. It is undoubtedly true that such a climate tends to create a *sui generis* pathology throughout the whole of the northern coastal strip and a good part of the corresponding states, as far as Mato Grosso. The moisture laden heat of the Amazon region, for example, is depressing and exhausting in effect. It forms stunted organisms, in which all activity is subject to a permanent lack of balance between the impulsive energies of the strongly excited peripheral functions and the apathy of the central functions: marasmic intelligences, stupefied by the explosive force of the passions; feeble innervations, in contrast to the acuity of the senses, and ill compensated or repaired by a blood stream which has been impoverished by incomplete hematosis.

From this flow all the idiosyncracies of an exceptional physiology; lungs that are reduced in size, and which, in the obligatory elimination of carbon dioxide, are replaced by the liver, upon which falls life's heavy surcharge: organisms wasted by the persistent alternation of an impulsive exaltation and an enervating apathy, without the vibratility or energetic muscular tone of robust and full-blooded temperaments. Natural selection in such an environment is effected at the cost of grave compromises with the central functions of the brain, in a most prejudicial inverse progression between intellectual and physical development, assuring inevitably the victory of the expansive instincts and looking to the ideal of an adaptation which shall have as its sole consequences a maximum of organic energy and a minimum of moral fortitude. Acclimatization in such a case means a regressive evolution. The type wastes away in a constant decline, the effects of which are transmitted by heredity to the point of total extinction. Like the Englishman in Barbados, in Tasmania, or in Australia, the Portuguese in the Amazon region may flee miscegenation, but after a few generations his physical and moral characteristics will be profoundly altered, from his complexion, turned copper colored by the tropic suns and the incomplete elimination of carbon dioxide, to his temperament, which is weakened by having been deprived of its original qualities. The inferior race, the crude savage, dominates him; in league with the environment, he conquers him, crushes him, annihilates him, in formidable competition with malaria, hepatitis, debilitating fevers, the intense heat of summer, and the ague-breeding swamps. (Pp. 60-61).

BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

There were very powerful causes which led to the isolation and conservation of the autochthonous stock. First of all, there were the great land grants, representing the most perduring aspect of our shameful feudalism. The possessors of the soil, the classic model being the heirs of Antonio Guedes de Britto, were jealous of their far-flung latifundia, which, with no boundary lines to demarcate them, made their owners the lords of the countryside, barely if at all tolerating the intervention of the metropolis itself. The erection of chapels or the establishment of parishes on their lands was always accompanied by controversies with the padres; and, although the latter won out in the end, they nevertheless, to a degree, came under the sway of these potentates, who made it difficult for new settlers or competitors to come in by turning their cattle ranches, which lay scattered around in the neighborhood of the newly formed church domains, into powerful centers of attraction for the mestizo race that inhabited the parishes.

The race accordingly developed without the influence of external elements. Devoting themselves to the herdsman's life, to which they were by nature well adapted, the curibocas or swarthy cafusos, immediate forebears of the present-day vaqueiros, being entirely cut off from the inhabitants of the south and the intensive colonization activities of the seaboard, proceeded to follow their own path of evolution, acquiring thereby a highly original physiognomy, like that of residents of another country. The royal charter of February 7, 1701, was a measure designed to increase this isolation. It prohibited, with severe penalties for infraction, any communication whatsoever between this part of the backlands and the south, the São Paulo mines. Not even commercial relations were tolerated, the simplest exchanges of products were forbidden.

In addition to these factors there is, in view of the origin of the backwoodsman of the north, another that is to be taken into consideration: namely the physical environment of the backlands, to be found throughout the whole vast expanse of territory which extends from the bed of the Vasa-Barris to that of the Parnaíba in the west.

We have seen something of the unusual physiognomy of this region: the aggressive flora; the merciless climate; the periodical droughts; the rugged, sterile soil of the barren mountain ranges, lying isolated amid the splendors of the majestic *araxa* of the central plateaus; and the great forests that follow the curving border of the slopes. This unprepossessing region, for which the Tupi had a suggestive appellation, *pora-pora-eyma* (a sterile, unpopulated place) — a name that remains attached to one of the mountains (the Borborema) which wall it in on the east — was the asylum of the Tapuia. Beaten by the Portuguese, by the Negro, and by the Tupi combined, falling back in the face of superior numbers, the indomitable *Carirys* found their only protection on this rough neck of land, rent by tempests, indurated by the rigid structure of the rocks, parched by the suns, and breaking out in briar patches and caatingas. Here too it was, in these vast open wastes, with no sign of the longed-for mines in sight, that the impulse of the bandeiras finally spent itself. As for the mysterious *Tapuy-retama* region (region of the Tapuias), it appealed to the stoicism of the missionary, and its long and devious trails saw the slow, grievous, agonizing onward march of these apostles of the Church. The bandeiras, on the other hand, when they reached this district, speedily decamped, fleeing it for other parts: it may have been fashioned for the battles of the Faith, but to them it was overwhelming and depressing; and so they left it, and nothing could prevail upon them to return; they left it, and left the heathen in peace.

Hence the happy circumstance, as is revealed by observation, of the predominance of Tapuia terms in the geographic names of these places — terms that have resisted absorption by the Portuguese and Tupi languages, which have prevailed in other localities. Without going too far afield, let us take a glance at the lands round about Canudos by way of illustrating this matter of language which so well reflects the historic vicissitudes of a people.

“Starting out from the São Francisco in a southerly direction, we find ourselves once more in an unfriendly region, beneath an inclement sky; and from here we go on to cross the elevated basin of the Vas-Barris, before reaching those scattered and more depressed sections of the Baian plains which from the Paulo Affonso Falls, from Canudos and from Monte Santo,

bring us to Itiuba, to Tombador, and to Assuruá. Here on this, the most ungrateful tract of our native territory, where once the persecuted remnants of the Orizes, the Procas, and the Carirys sought refuge, we find today, appearing once more as place names, barbarous words from the Tapuia tongue which neither Portuguese nor Tupi have been able to supplant; we discover on the map of the region, occurring with the frequency of topographical land-marks, names such as Pambú, Patamoté, Uáuá, Bendegó, Cumbe, Massacará, Cocorobó, Geremoabo, Tragagó, Canché, Chorrochió, Quincunca, Conchó, Centocé, Assuruá, Chique-Chique, Jequié, Sincorá, Caculé or Catolé, Orobó, Mocugé, and others equally strange and barbarous-sounding.”¹

It is natural that the great backlands populations, like the one which grew up in the middle basin of the São Francisco, should have been formed with a preponderant admixture of Tapuia blood. And there they remained in banishment, evolving in a closed circle for three centuries, down to our era — completely abandoned, wholly alien to our destinies, and preserving intact the traditions of the past. Accordingly, whoever today traverses these regions will observe a notable uniformity among the inhabitants: an appearance and stature that vary but slightly from a given model, conveying the impression of an unvarying anthropologic type, one which at first glance is seen to be distinct from the proteiform mestizo of the seaboard; for, where the latter shows all varieties of coloring and remains ill defined in type, depending upon the varying predominance of the formative factors, the man of the backlands appears to have been run through one common mold, with the individuals exhibiting almost identical physical characteristics: the same complexion, ranging from the bronze hue of the mameluco to the swarthy color of the cafuso; hair straight and sleek or slightly wavy; the same athletic build; and the same moral characteristics, the same superstitions, the same vices, and the same virtues.

This uniformity, in its various aspects, is most impressive. There is no doubt about it, the backwoodsman of the north represents an ethnic subcategory that has already been formed. (Pp. 82-84).

1. Theodoro Sampaio, *Da Expansão da língua tupi e do seu predomínio na língua nacional*.

THEORY OF EVOLUTION

An intermingling of races highly diverse is, in the majority of cases, prejudicial. According to the conclusions of the evolutionist, even when the influence of a superior race has reacted upon the offspring, the latter shows vivid traces of the inferior one. Miscegenation carried to an extreme means retrogression. The Indo-European, the Negro, and the Brazilian-Guarany or the Tapuia represent evolutionary stages in confrontations; and miscegenation, in addition to obliterating the pre-eminent qualities of the higher race, serves to stimulate the revival of the primitive attributes of the lower; so that the mestizo — a hyphen between the races, a brief individual existence into which are compressed age-old forces — is almost always an unbalanced type. Fovel compares them in a general way to hysterics, but the nervous disequilibrium in such a case is incurable; there is no therapeutic for this clash of antagonistic tendencies on the part of races of a sudden brought together and fused in an isolated organism. It is not to be understood how, after they have diverged so extremely for long ages — ages compared to which history is but a moment — two or three peoples can suddenly come together and combine their diverse mental constitutions, thus annulling within a short space of time those distinctions which have resulted from a long, slow, laborious process of selection. As in algebraic sums, the qualities of the juxtaposed elements are not increased, subtracted from, or destroyed by the positive and negative signs that are present. The mestizo — mulatto, mameluco, or cafuso — rather than an intermediary type, is a degenerate one, lacking the physical energy of his savage ancestors and without the intellectual elevation of his ancestors on the other side. In contrast to the fecundity which he happens to possess, he shows extraordinary cases of moral hybridism: a brilliant mind at times, but unstable, restless, inconstant, flaring one moment and the next moment extinguished, victim of the fatality of biologic laws, weighted down to the lower plane of the less favored race. Impotent when it comes to forming any bonds of solidarity between the opposed forebears from whom he sprang, he can reflect only their various dominant attributes in a permanent play of antitheses. And when, as not infrequently happens, he shows himself capable of broad generalizations and

of grasping the most complex abstract relationships, all this mental vigor (saving those exceptional cases which merely go to prove the rule) will be found to rest upon a rudimentary morality in which is present the impulsive automatism of the lower races.

The fact is that in the marvelous competition of peoples, all of them evolving in a struggle that knows no truce, with selection capitalizing those attributes which heredity preserves, the mestizo is an intruder. He does not struggle; he does not represent an integration of forces; he is something that is dispersive and dissolvent, suddenly springing up without characteristics of his own and wavering between the opposing influences of a discordant ancestry. The tendency toward a regression to the primitive race is a mark of his instability. It is an instinctive tendency toward a situation of equilibrium. The very play of natural laws would appear to extinguish little by little the anomalous product which violates those laws, by sending it back to its own generative sources. The mulatto, then, has an irresistible contempt for the Negro and seeks with a most anxious tenacity such intermarriages as may extinguish in his progeny the stigma of the dark brow; the mameluco becomes the inexorable bandeirante and hurls himself fiercely on the conquered native villages.

This tendency is significant. In a manner of speaking, it picks up the thread of evolution which miscegenation has severed. The superior race becomes the remote objective toward which the depressed mestizos tend; and the latter, in seeking this objective, are merely obeying their own instinct of self-preservation and defense. The laws of the evolution of species are inviolable ones; yet, if all the subtlety of the missionaries was impotent when it came to winning the mind of the savage to the simplest conceptions of a superior mental state; if there is no force capable of causing the African, under the tutoring of the best masters, to approximate at least the intellectual average of the Indo-European — for every man is, above everything else, integration of racial forces, and his brain is a heritage — if all this is true, how then account for the normality of an anthropologic type which suddenly makes its appearance, combining tendencies that are so opposed?

A STRONG RACE

Meanwhile, painstaking observation of the man of the north shows a distinct attenuation of this interplay of antagonistic tendencies and almost a fixation with regard to the physiological characteristics of the emergent type. This fact, which would appear to contradict what has just been said above, affords on the contrary the most striking counterproof of those assertions.

It is undeniably true that the abnormal aspect of mestizos who come from races that are very diverse is due in good part to the fact that the more elevated ethnic element brings with it a more elevated way of life, which renders the process of accommodation a difficult and painful one; and when there falls upon them the intellectual and moral surcharge of a civilization, it is inevitable that they should be thrown off balance. The incoherent, uneven, and turbulent character of the mestizo may be looked upon as denoting an inner and intensive effort to eliminate those attributes that impede his way of life in an environment that is more advanced and complex. It reflects, within a small circle, that silent, formidable combat which is the very life-struggle of races, a deeply moving and everlasting struggle, one that has been described in Gumplowicz' brilliant axiom as the motive force of history. The great professor of Gratz does not consider it under the aspect with which we are dealing here. The truth is, however, that if the strong ethnic element "tends to subordinate to its destiny the weaker element with which it comes in contact," then it finds in miscegenation a disturbing factor. The irresistible expansion of its syngenetic circle, though eluded in this manner, nevertheless is merely retarded; it is not extinguished. The struggle is transformed and becomes one with much graver implications, ranging from the vulgar case of the frank extermination of the inferior race through war to its slow elimination, absorption, dilution in the form of intermarriage. And during the course of this process of reduction the mestizos that emerge—variable, of all shades of color and all the shadings of form and character, without a well-defined appearance, without vigor, and in most cases not viable—are nothing more, in the last analysis, than the inevitable casualties in an unseen conflict that endures down the ages. In this latter case the strong race does not destroy the weak by force of arms; it crushes it with civilization.

It was in this manner that our rude fellow-countrymen of the north were formed. The abandonment in which they were left by the rest of the country had a beneficent effect. It freed them from a highly painful adaptation to a superior social state and at the same time prevented their slipping backward through the aberrations and vices of a more advanced milieu. The fusion that took place occurred under circumstances more compatible with the inferior elements. The pre-eminent ethnic factor, while transmitting to them civilized tendencies, did not impose civilization upon them.

This is the basic and distinguishing fact with regard to miscegenation in the back-lying regions of the littoral. These are distinct formations, if not with respect to their ethnic elements, with respect to the conditions of environment. The contrast may be reduced to the simplest of parallels. The inhabitant of the backlands has in large degree taken from the savage the latter's intimacy with his physical surroundings, and this, instead of acting as a depressing influence, has enriched his potent organism. As a consequence, he reflects in character and costume only those attributes taken from other formative races which are adaptable to this incipient phase of social life.

He is a retrograde, not a degenerate, type. The vicissitudes of history, by freeing him, in the most delicate period of his formation, from the disproportionate exigencies of a borrowed culture, have fitted him for the conquest of that culture some day. His psychic evolution, however backward it may be, has therefore the guaranty of a strong, well-constituted physique. This crossed race, then, makes its appearance as an autonomous and, in a way, an original one, transfiguring within itself all the inherited attributes; so that, unfettered at last of a savage existence, it may attain to civilized life as a result of the very causes which prevent it from doing so at once. Such is the logical conclusion.

The situation here is the reverse of that to be observed in the cities of the seaboard, where an extravagant inversion prevails, highly complex functions being there imposed on feeble organisms, with the effect of compressing and atrophying them before they have attained their full development. In the backlands, on the other hand, the robust organic integrity of the mestizo remains unimpaired, inasmuch as, being immune to foreign admixtures, he is capable of evolving and

differentiating himself in accommodation to new and loftier destinies; for the solid physical basis is there for the moral development that is to come. (Pp. 84-88)

THE SERTANEJO

The sertanejo, or man of the backlands, is above all else a strong individual. He does not exhibit the debilitating rachitic tendencies of the neurasthenic mestizos of the seaboard.

His appearance, it is true, at first glance, would lead one to think that this was not the case. He does not have the flawless features, the graceful bearing, the correct build of the athlete. He is ugly, awkward, stooped. Hercules-Quasimodo reflects in his bearing the typical unprepossessing attributes of the weak. His unsteady, slightly swaying, sinuous gait conveys the impression of loose-jointedness. His normally downtrodden mien is aggravated by a dour look which gives him an air of depressing humility. On foot, when not walking, he is invariably to be found leaning against the first doorpost or wall that he encounters; while on horseback, if he reins in his mount to exchange a couple of words with an acquaintance, he braces himself on one tsirrup and rests his weight against the saddle. When walking, even at a rapid pace, he does not go forward steadily in a straight line but reels swiftly, as if he were following the geometric outlines of the meandering backland trails. And if in the course of his walk he pauses for the most commonplace of reasons, to roll a *cigarro*, strike a light, or chat with a friend, he falls—"falls" is the word—into a squatting position and will remain for a long time in this unstable state of equilibrium, with the entire weight of his body suspended on his great toes, as he sits there on his heels with a simplicity that is at once ridiculous and delightful.

He is the man who is always tired. He displays this invincible sluggishness, this muscular atony, in everything that he does: in his slowness of speech, his forced gestures, his unsteady gait, the languorous cadence of his ditties—in brief, in his constant tendency to immobility and rest.

Yet all this apparent weariness is an illusion. Nothing is more surprising than to see the sertanejo's listlessness disappear all of a sudden. In this weakened organism complete transformations are effected in a few seconds. All that is needed is some incident that demands the release of slumbering energies.

The fellow is transfigured. He straightens up, becomes a new man, with new lines in his posture and bearing; his head held high now, above his massive shoulders; his gaze straightforward and unflinching. Through an instantaneous discharge of nervous energy, he at once corrects all the faults that come from the habitual relaxation of his organs; and the awkward rustic unexpectedly assumes the dominating aspect of a powerful, copper-hued Titan, an amazingly different being, capable of extraordinary feats of strength and agility.

This contrast becomes evident upon the most superficial examination. It is one that is revealed at every moment, in all the smallest details of back-country life—marked always by an impressive alternation between the extremes of impulse and prolonged periods of apathy.

It is impossible to imagine a more inelegant, ungainly horseman: no carriage, legs glued to the belly of his mount, hunched forward and swaying to the gait of the unshod, mistreated backland ponies, which are sturdy animals and remarkably swift. In this gloomy, indolent posture the lazy cowboy will ride along, over the plains, behind his slow-paced herd, almost transforming his "nag" into the lulling hammock in which he spends two-thirds of his existence. But let some giddy steer up ahead stray into the tangled scrub of the caatinga, or let one of the herd at a distance become entrapped in the foliage, and he is at once a different being and, digging his broad-roweled spurs into the flanks of his mount, he is off like a dart and plunges at top speed into the labyrinth of jurema thickets.

Let us watch him at this barbarous steeple chase.

Nothing can stop him in his onward rush. Gullies, stone heaps, brush piles, thorny thickets, or riverbanks—nothing can halt his pursuit of the straying steer, for *wherever the cow goes, there, the cowboy and his horse go too*. Glued to his horse's back, with his knees dug into its flanks until the horse and rider appear to be one, he gives the bizarre impression of a crude sort of centaur: emerging unexpectedly into a clearing, plunging into the tall weeds, leaping ditches and swamps, taking the small hills in his stride, crashing swiftly through the prickly briar patches, and galloping at full speed over the expanse of tablelands.

His robust constitution shows itself at such a moment to best advantage. It is as if the sturdy rider were lending vigor to the frail pony, sustaining it by his improvised reins of caroa fiber, suspending it by his spurs, hurling it onward—springing quickly into the stirrups, legs drawn up, knees well forward and close to the horse's side—"hot on the trail" of the wayward steer; now bending agilely to avoid a bough that threatens to brush him from the saddle; now leaping off quickly like an acrobat, clinging to his horse's mane, to avert collision with a stump sighted at the last moment; then back in the saddle again at a bound—and all the time galloping, galloping, through all obstacles, balancing in his right hand, without ever losing it once, never once dropping it in the liana thickets, the long, iron-pointed, leather-headed goad which in itself, in any other hands, would constitute a serious obstacle to progress.

But once the fracas is over and the unruly steer restored to the herd, the cowboy once more lolls back in the saddle, once more an inert and unprepossessing individual, swaying to his pony's slow gait, with all the disheartening appearance of a languishing invalid. (Pp. 89-91)

MAN'S CLOSE RELATION WITH NATURE

The vaqueiro... grew up... amid a seldom varying alternation of good times and bad, of abundance and want; and over his head hung the year round threat of the sun, bringing with it in the course of the seasons repeated periods of devastation and misfortune. It was amid such a succession of catastrophes that his youth was spent. He grew to manhood almost without ever having been a child; what should have been the merry hours of childhood were embittered by the specter of the backland droughts, and soon enough he had to face the tormented existence that awaited him. He was one damned to life. He understood well enough that he was engaged in a conflict that knew no truce, one that imperiously demanded of him the utilization of every last drop of his energies. And so he became strong, expert, resigned, and practical. He was fitting himself for the struggle.

His appearance at first sight makes one think, vaguely, of some ancient warrior weary of the fray. His clothes are a suit of armor. Clad in his tanned leather doublet, made of goatskin or cowhide, in a leather vest, and in skintight leggings of the

same material that come up to his crotch and which are fitted with knee pads, and with his hands and feet protected by calfskin gloves and shinguards, he presents the crude aspect of some medieval knight who has strayed into modern times.

This armor of his, however, reddish-gray in hue, as if it were made of flexible bronze, does not give off any scintillations; it does not gleam when the sun's rays strike it. It is dead and dusty-looking, as befits a warrior who brings back no victories from the fight.

His homemade saddle is an imitation of the one used in the Rio Grande region but is shorter and hollowed out, without the luxurious trappings of the other. Its accessories consist of a weatherproof goatskin blanket covering the animal's haunches, of a breast covering, or pectorals, and of pads attached to the mount's knees. This equipment of man and beast is adapted to the environment. Without it, they would not be able to gallop through the caatingas and over the beds of jagged rock in safety.

Nothing, to tell the truth, is more monotonous and ugly than this highly original garb of one color only, the russet-gray of tanned leather, without the slightest variation, without so much as a strip or band of any other hue. Only at rare intervals, when a "shindig" is held to the strains of the guitar, and the backwoodsman relaxes from his long hours of toil, does he add a touch of novelty to his appearance in the form of a striking vest made of jungle cat or puma skin with the spots turned out—or else he may stick a bright red bromelia in his leather cap. This, however, is no more than a passing incident and occurs but rarely.

Once the hours of merrymaking are over the sertanejo loses his bold and frolicsome air. Not long before he had been letting himself go in the dance, the *sapatado*, as the sharp clack of sandals on the ground mingled with the jingling spurs and the tinkling of tamourine bells, to the vibrant rhythms, the "rip-snortings" of the guitars; but now once more he falls back into his old habitual posture, loutish, awkward, gawky, exhibiting at the same time a strange lack of nervous energy and an extraordinary degree of fatigue.

Now, nothing is more easily to be explained than this permanent state of contrast between extreme manifestations of

strength and agility and prolonged intervals of apathy. A perfect reflection of the physical forces at work about him, the man of the northern backlands has served an arduous apprenticeship in the school of adversity, and he has quickly learned to face his troubles squarely and to react to them promptly. He goes through life ambushed on all sides by sudden, incomprehensible surprises on the part of Nature, and he never knows a moment's respite. He is a combatant who all the year round is weakened and exhausted, and all the year round is strong and daring, preparing himself always for an encounter in which he will not be the victor, but in which he will not let himself be vanquished; passing from a maximum of repose to a maximum of movement, from his comfortable, slothful hammock to the hard saddle, to dart, like a streak of lightning, along the narrow trails in search of his herds. His contradictory appearance, accordingly, is a reflection of Nature herself in this region—passive before the play of the elements and passing without perceptible transition from one season to another, from a major exuberance to the penury of the parched desert, beneath the refracted glow of blazing suns. He is as inconstant as Nature. And it is natural that he should be. To live is to adapt one's self. And she has fashioned him in her own likeness: barbarous, impetuous, abrupt. (Pp. 92-94)

RUI BARBOSA (1849-1923)

BRAZIL

Rui Barbosa was one of Brazil's most renowned jurists and statesmen. A good example of the moderate liberalism of the founders of the Brazilian Republic, he devoted his life to such causes as the abolition of slavery, the extension of popular education, freedom of conscience and religious liberty, federal constitutional government, civilian predominance over the military in government, improvement of the integrity of public officials, the equality of all citizens before the law, and the supremacy of law in both national and international spheres.

He was born in Bahia on November 5, 1849. His father, a physician, was a leader of the Liberal party in Bahia, taking an active part in the political life of his state. His father's admiration for Anglo-American traditions of freedom and justice and strict adherence to principles in politics left a lasting impression upon the son as he grew up. During his student days in Bahia and São Paulo he became intimate with a group of young abolitionists, including the poet Castro Alves. Thus the freedom of the Negro slaves became the first of the numerous liberal causes to which his life was to be dedicated.

To understand Barbosa one must realize that although his mind was formed within the scientific sociological pattern of his age, he held firmly to a spiritual view of man and the universe. His ideas are basically naturalistic, but a note of moral idealism, resembling that of his contemporary, Woodrow Wilson, is constantly introduced. Since he does not write of abstract ideas, it is difficult to define the nature and source of this idealistic inquietude. Perhaps it was connected with Kantian influence in Brazil. Perhaps it was the survival of something in an earlier liberalism for he came out of an earlier generation than da Cunha. In any case, after passing through a phase of youthful anti-clericalism, which gained him an undeserved reputation for atheism which was hard to lose, Barbosa turned to an emphasis on the Christian values of love of God and of man. Yet because he insisted upon man's individual relationship to his Creator, something of his earlier reputation for atheism clung to him.

As author of the first Constitution (1891) of the Brazilian Republic, and as Minister of Justice in the provisional

government, he instituted many of the reforms he had been championing. Church and state were separated; freedom of worship was established; marriage, public education, and cemeteries were taken out of the hands of the Church. Despite his admiration for British institutions, he favored a federal republic for Brazil and was outspoken in proclaiming the debt of the Brazilian constitution to that of the United States.

The *Oração aos Moços*, here presented, was written near the end of his life and delivered by proxy at the Law School of São Paulo in 1821. Yet it well sums up his life-long views on man's relation to God, on intelligent citizenship, and on the responsibilities of those in positions of public trust. It shows, particularly, his insistence upon natural inequality among men and his disagreement with the socialist principle "to each according to his need." This view, he held, based values upon human appetites, rather than on man's spiritual nature.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Other important works of Barbosa, aside from the *Oração aos Moços* which appears below, include *Os actos inconstitucioaes do Congresso e do Executivo*, *Cartas de Inglaterra*, *O Papa e o Concilio*, and *O Habeas Corpus*. Extensive excerpts may be found in the volume *Barbosa*, edited by Renato de Mendonça, and published by the Secretaría de Educación, México, in 1944. Mario de Lima Barbosa has published *Ruy Barbosa no politica e na historia* (Rio de Janeiro: F. Briguier, 1916). In English, see Charles W. Turner, *Ruy Barbosa, Brazilian Crusader for the Essential Freedoms* (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945) and briefer sketches in W. Rex Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, pp. 190-193, Pedro Henriquez Ureña, *Literary Currents in Hispanic America*, pp. 137-160, and Harold E. Davis, *Latin American Leaders*, pp. 100-108.

PLEA TO YOUTH

BY RUI BARBOSA

(From *Oração aos Moços*. Rio de Janeiro: Casa Rui Barbosa, 1949)

No one, my dear sirs, who undertakes an extraordinary journey, sets out without first taking account of his forces to see whether they will carry him through. But on the great voyage from this world to the other there is no can or can not,

will or will not. Life has but two doors: one to enter, through birth; the other to leave through death. No one, when his time comes, can avoid entering. No one, once he has entered, can avoid leaving when his turn comes. And from one end to the other runs the road — long or short, no one knows. Within its fated bounds man strives, sorry that he entered, dreading the hour when he may leave, a captive of these two mysteries which bound his earthly passage.

There is nothing more tragic than the inexorable fatality of this destiny, whose swiftness further accentuates its severity.

In such a brief span each one has to finish his task. With what elements? With what he inherits and what he creates. The former he gets from nature, the latter from work.

The contribution of nature varies infinitely. No two things in the universe are equal. Many may appear so, but all differ among themselves — the branches of a single tree, the leaves of the same plant, the fingerprints of a human hand, the drops of the same fluid, the grains of the same powder, the rays of the spectrum of a single beam of sunlight or starlight. Thus it is with everything, from the stars in the sky to the microbes in the blood, from the nebulae in space to the beads of dew on the grass of the meadows. The law of equality means nothing more than sharing among unequals in accordance with their inequality. In this social inequality, proportionate to natural inequality, lies the true law of equality. Anything else is a delirium of envy, pride, or madness. To treat equals with inequality or unequals with equality would be flagrant inequality and not real equality. Human appetites have motivated the notion of inverting the universal rule of creation, intending not to give to each according to his worth but to grant the same to all, as if all were equal.

This blasphemy against reason and faith, against civilization and humanity, is the philosophy of misery, proclaimed in the name of the rights of labor; were it carried out, it would inaugurate, instead of the supremacy of labor, nothing but the rearrangement of misery.

But if society can not make equal those whom nature has created unequal, each one within the limits of his moral energy can rise above his native inequalities through education, activity, and perseverance. Such is the mission of work.

The wonders of which this force is capable, no one may reckon. Its victories in the reconstitution of the poorly gifted creature are comparable only to those of prayer.

Prayer and work are the most powerful resources in the moral creation of man. Prayer is the intimate uplifting of the soul through contact with God. Work is the making whole, the unfolding, the purification of the energies of body and spirit through the continuous action of each one upon himself and upon the world wherein we toil.

The individual who works draws continually closer to the Author of all things, taking part in His work, from which his own also derives. The Creator begins and the creature finishes the creation of himself.

Whoever works, therefore, is praying to God. Prayer through acts is coupled with prayer through worship. Nor can one truly exist without the other. The work of an evil person is not worthy of such a name as work, because the malice of the worker contaminates it. Nor is the prayer of the idle acceptable, because idleness profanes it. But when work is joined to prayer and prayer to work, the second creation of man, the creation of man by man, sometimes resembles in its marvels the creation of man by the divine Creator.

Let no one be disheartened, then, that the cradle was not generous with him; let no one believe himself damned by being born without wealth and social standing. In all of this there is no surprise too great to be expected from tenacity and sanctity in work. (Pp. 30-36).

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Awaking to work must precede the awaking of the day.
(P. 40)

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But, gentleman, those who arise early to read should also arise early to think. Reading is commonplace, reflection rare. Knowledge consists not so much in the learning of others which one absorbs, but rather of ideas themselves which arise from the understandings absorbed and the transmutation through which they pass in the mind which assimilates them. A learned man is not a closet of stored wisdom but a reflective transformer of digested acquisitions. (Pp. 48-49)

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Those who consider it mandatory to rise above the level of ordinary education are regarded as useless. Why? Because they "know too much." This is to assert that competence lies precisely in incompetence. It is carried even to the incredible point of inculcating a "fear of the educated," of regarding them as dangerous citizens and of considering as dogma that a man whose studies are more than the common amount may not occupy any higher post in the government of a country of illiterates. If the people are illiterate, only ignoramuses will be qualified to govern them. A nation of illiterates, a government of illiterates—so they are saying, often openly and boldly. (Pp. 51-52)

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Once in a conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles, recorded by Xenophon, the subject of debate happened to be law, what it is and when it does or does not exist.

"What becomes law?" inquired Alcibiades.

"The expression of the will of the people," responded Pericles.

"But what do the people decide upon, the good or the evil?" his nephew asked him.

"The good, of course, young man."

"But if an oligarchy rules, that is, a small number of men, will the 'laws' still be respectable?"

"Without a doubt."

"But if the order comes from a tyrant? If there should be violence or illegality? If the powerful coerce the weak? Will it nevertheless be one's duty to obey?"

"I believe so."

"But then." Alcibiades insisted, "the tyrant who compels the citizens to respect his whimsies, will not he himself then be the enemy of the 'laws'?"

"Yes. I see now that I was wrong in calling 'laws' the orders of a tyrant, accustomed to commanding without persuading."

"But if a small number of citizens impose their will on the multitude, do we or do we not call that violence?"

"It seems to me," Pericles conceded, vacillating more and more, "that in such case it is a matter of violence and not of 'law'."

Pericles had nothing to reply, nor would reason itself have anything.

Law is not "law" except when it rests on the consent of the majority, for if consent were required of everyone — an unrealizable *desideratum* — there would never be a way to arrive at a law.

Now, gentleman of the graduating class, consider well that you are going to consecrate yourselves to "law" in a country where the law absolutely does not express the consent "of the majority," where it is minorities, the most fearful, most unpopular, and least respectable oligarchies, who propose and dispose, who command and countermand in everything; in other words, in a country where truly "there is no law," morally, politically, or juridically speaking.

Consider, then, the difficulties in which those who profess the mission of upholders and helpers "of the law," its masters and executors, are going to become entangled.

It is true that enforcement often corrects or alleviates poor legislation. But in Brazil the "law" is deprived of legitimacy, is nullified, and becomes "non-existent" not only because of the bastardy of its origin but also because of the horrors of its application.

Now St. Paul said that the law is good when it is used lawfully. "*Bona est lex, si quis ea legitime utatur.*" (I Timothy 1:8)

That would mean that the law is good when it is executed with righteousness. That is, it will be good if there is in the executor the virtue which was lacking in the legislator, because only moderation, uprightness, and equity in the application of bad laws can to a certain extent rid them of the impurity, harshness, and malice which they contain. Or more simply and clearly, if I understand him well, the apostle of the gentiles means that bad law, when "unexecuted" or "badly executed" (for the good), is worth more than good law which is purposely misinterpreted and not observed (against him).

How extraordinary, how immeasurable, how, so to say, stupendous and superhuman the role of justice can be in such circumstances! Greater than that of legislation itself. Because if the judges are worthy of the supreme role they play in the execution of laws, just laws will maintain their justice and unjust laws can be moderated, injustices perhaps even being corrected.

Laws are to no avail, it is well known, if there is no one to protect them from abuses; and the protection essential above all is that of a judiciary as high in its power as in its mission.

"There we have the laws", said the Florentine. "But who is to lay hand on them? No one."

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Among us it would not be licit to answer so absolutely the poet's query. In the Brazilian Constitution the hand which he did not see in his republic and in his time, the sustaining hand of the laws, we in this day have created, and so great that nothing equals its majesty, nothing rivals its power.

.... Between the laws, that is, between ordinary laws and the law of laws [constitution], justice decides, the former exploding when they collide with the latter.

Only in federations of the North American mold does so great a sovereignty fall to the judicial power, subordinated to other powers in other forms of government, but in this one superior to all.

Of such democracies, then, the axis is justice, an axis that is not abstract, not suppositious, not merely moral, but of a profound reality and so seriously implanted in the mechanism of the regime, so practically permeated through all its parts, that if it betray its office, the whole system will fall into paralysis, disorder, and subversion. The constitutional powers will enter into insoluble conflicts, the constitutional rights will crumble to earth, and of the constitutional organization, of its character, of its functions, of its guaranties only the ruins will remain.

This is what Brazilian justice must preserve us from, if the other constitutional branches of the republic allow it to survive, even though attacked, vacillating, and insecure, left in the midst of the ruins, in which faint outlines of its truth are scarcely preserved.

Gentlemen, this eminently necessary, vital, and saving power has two arms, two institutions, in which the law is upheld: the bench and the bar, as old as human society but elevated a hundredfold in the constitutional life of Brazil by the stupendous importance which the new regime has given to justice.

My friends, it is to collaborate in giving life to these two institutions that you are today leaving here trained. You will be magistrates or lawyers. These are two almost sacred careers, inseparable one from the other, and both tremendous in their difficulties, responsibilities, and uses.

If each one of you lays his hand well on his conscience, it is certain that he will tremble at the prospect. It is proper for those to tremble who face great callings and are prepared to carry them out. To tremble, but not to lose heart. To tremble, but not to give up. To tremble, but to dare. To tremble, but to be enterprising. To tremble, but to have confidence. Have confidence, gentlemen. Dare. Respond. And you are bound to succeed. God, country, and work. Take to yourselves these three faiths, these three loves, these three holy symbols. And go on with pure hearts. Do not be afraid that luck will mock you. Constancy, courage, and virtue avail more than your misfortunes.

Idealism? No, it is the experience of life. (Pp. 53-63)

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I have seen much in fifty years, but experience consists less in seeing than in knowing how to observe. Observe with clarity, with disinterest, with selectivity. Observe — deducing, inducing, and generalizing, with deliberation, with sound criteria, with skepticism. Observe — testing, contrasting, and retaining. (P. 64)

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Future magistrates. . . never deny the Treasury, the Administration, the Union their rights. They are as inviolable as any others. But the right of the most wretched of men, the right of the beggar, of the slave, of the criminal, is no less sacred before justice than that of the highest of authorities. Rather, it is with the most wretched that justice must be most attentive and doubly scrupulous, because the most poorly defended are

those who arouse the least interest, those against whose rights inferiority of station conspires with lack of resources. (Pp. 72-73)

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Another major point in the education of the magistrate: blush less at having been wrong than at not making amends. It is best for the sentence not to be wrong. But should one make a mistake, it is worse for it not to be corrected. And if the one who made the mistake remedies it, so much the better, for in confession the magistrate's reputation for fairness grows all the more, and the redress given the offended is all the more solemnized. (Pp. 77-78)

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In closing, my beloved friends... the last, the best lesson of my experience. Of all that I have seen in the world the essence is contained in these words:

There is no justice where God is not.

Would you like me to show you? But it would be a waste of time, if you have not already found the demonstration in the present spectacle of the earth, in the catastrophe of humanity. Mankind has lost itself in the material, and today on the violent ocean of the Material float the remnants of civilization half destroyed. This fatal calamity is crying out for God. When He turns to us, the nations will abandon war, and peace will then dawn among them, the peace of laws and justice which the world still does not have, because it still does not believe.

In this regeneration an essential role falls to human justice. May it know how to honor it! Work for that, you who are to embrace that career, with the influence of the high dignity you will receive from your profession. (Pp. 81-83)

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A kind of magistracy is also exercised in the mission of the lawyer. The two are interlaced, diverse in their functions but identical in their objective and result: justice. In the lawyer, justice is militant. In the magistrate, justice reigns.

Legality and liberty are the Tables of the lawyer's calling. On them is inscribed for him the synthesis of all the commandments. Neither desert justice nor woo it. Neither

lack in fidelity toward it nor withhold counsel from it. Do not forsake legality for violence nor exchange order for anarchy. Do not place the powerful ahead of the destitute nor refuse to defend the latter against the former. Do not serve justice without independence nor do violence to truth before authority. Do not collaborate in persecutions or assaults nor plead for iniquity or immorality. Do not withdraw from the defense of unpopular causes or of dangerous ones when they are just. Wherever even a grain of true right is ascertainable, do not begrudge the consolation of judicial protection to the one in distress. Do not proceed with your consultations except with the real impartiality of the judge in his sentences. Do not make a shop counter of the high bench or a trade of learning. Do not be lowly with the great or arrogant with the lowly. Serve the opulent with pride and the indigent with charity. Love your country, love your neighbor, keep faith in God, in truth, and in good. (Pp. 84-85)

(Trans. by R.L.N. and H.E.D.)

EUGENIO MARIA DE HOSTOS (1839-1903)

PUERTO RICO

Eugenio María de Hostos was the greatest social philosopher of Puerto Rico, and his influence upon Puerto Rican thought has continued into the twentieth century. He was born in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, on November 11, 1839, and educated there and in Spain. Much of his later life was spent as an exile in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Brazil and the United States. Originally a monarchist, favoring a confederation of the West Indies, he later became the outstanding intellectual leader of the movement for political autonomy in Puerto Rico. But his greatest contribution was made in education, and this was by no means limited to Puerto Rico. He organized normal schools in the Dominican Republic and in Chile. In the Liceo de Chillán, in Chile, he was able to introduce his ideas of a curriculum devised to achieve his concepts of moral, integral education.

Hostos was largely a product of the scientific or "positivist" thought of his day. Following in the path of Comte and Spencer, and beginning with the principle that both the individual and society may be analyzed in utilitarian terms of the satisfaction of necessities, he looked for rational and essentially moral principles or laws. His concept of history, which he considered the basis and origin of the study of society and which he derived apparently from Vico, was also "scientific." But while he adopted the utilitarian analysis, Hostos was not what one would call a materialist. For him, human necessities were not confined to the material. The subject of history, he believed, was the *ser humano*, and history, therefore, *created* human ideals. This psychological concept of history, which he distinguished sharply from biological activity, led him to emphasize the role of free will in society. His idealism reflects that of continental Europe in the late nineteenth century and is an important source of contemporary Latin American philosophical idealism.

The following selections from his *Sociology* do not do justice to Hostos as a writer, for they are the notes of his university lectures as taken down by students and were never revised by the author. But his distinctive ideas seem to stand out more clearly than in some of his more carefully written works. The reader can not fail to notice the prominence of

the historical element, the organic concept, and the insistence upon the moral basis of society, coupled with a highly prescriptive tone.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The *Obras completas* of Hostos were published in twenty volumes (Edición conmemorativa del Gobierno de Puerto Rico. La Habana: Cultural S. A. [1939]). Among the works most interesting to the student of Hostos' ideas are the *Tratado de sociología*, from which the following excerpt is translated, *Hombres e ideas*, and *Tratado de moral*. Juan Bosch has written *Hostos, el sembrador* (La Habana, 1939). For a brief treatment in English see William Rex Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, pp. 236-246.

THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY

BY EUGENIO MARÍA DE HOSTOS

(From *Tratado de Sociología. Obras completas*. Edición conmemorativa del Gobierno de Puerto Rico. La Habana: Cultural, S. A. [1939]. Vol. XVII, pp. 19-51.)

CHAPTER I. INTUITIVE SOCIOLOGY

1. LIFE IN SOCIETY. SOCIAL FACTS. Varying with the place in which we live, we all have within sight the spectacle of a life distinct from that of each one of us, which is nevertheless linked so intimately with our life that we feel certain that if that life failed us we could not go on living our own. We are as sure of this as we are that if the sun should stop the earth would cease to revolve.

2. That dependence of the individual upon society represented in each of us, and represented by all of us as a group, is a fact of which we are all aware from firsthand evidence and by virtue of our traditional knowledge that in all nations the same thing has always occurred.

3. Certain facts follow of which we know — the existence of the individual and society, the co-existence of the individual and society, the mutual dependence of the individual and society, and the constant repetition of these facts everywhere as a natural and normal thing.

4. These four facts multiply indefinitely as we undertake to examine the normal repetition of facts. . .

5. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL FACTS. If we take the necessities of life as an indication, we soon see that in the individual as in society, and in society as in the individual, life is not limited to necessities of an exclusively material character.

6. On the contrary, just as we feel and observe non-physical needs in the individual, so in all societies and social groups we see a portion of facts distinct from those which produce physical life.

7. Thus, the efforts to establish order, based upon the promulgation and observance of law, make of the latter an agency of moral character which grows daily in strength to the extent that customs founded upon justice are rooted in society.

8. Likewise, customs which result from our understanding and respect for domestic, political, and social obligations are also the work of a moral agent which acts as powerfully upon our wills as does the need of satisfying our hunger upon our stomachs.

9. In the same way, without at first noting the force which we obey, all our ambition as individuals in society is to learn trades and sciences, rules and principles, which enable us to compete (*nos pongan en expectativa*) with our associates; the whole ambition of society consists in providing itself with aids and protectors of its acquired knowledge who transmit the latter by means of education.

10. Although it may be an act of individual sensibility which begins to take root in the understanding of religious ideas, it is not long until piety becomes a social fact, with its different characteristics so tempered to social conditions that the relation between religion and contemporary sociability is obvious.

11. From the moment we cast our eyes upon a society of the kind which has the varnish of civilization we find that the only obstacle to the unthinking use of our will is not the written law but a coactive force which obliges us to obey the law. This coercion, in the form of fine, prison, penitentiary,

vagabonds asylum, insane asylum, rural police, urban police, we also see turned against neighboring or distant states by means of organized forces on land and sea, whenever any right or interest of our state is threatened.

12. HOW SOCIAL FACTS APPEAR IN HISTORY. This, which is really a series of facts, may be supplemented by other series, merely by consulting the daily activity of any social group. But since the most complete study of the life of man belongs to history and since, in fact, it was from the very study of history that the idea of a social science arose in the minds of philosophers, let us complete this examination of facts, intended to illustrate the reality of the life of societies, with an examination of the movement of history in the general evolution of human knowledge. In this way, while we are seeing proved in history the unquestionable existence of the single and diverse being we call society, we shall also see the changes in historical method which have helped to suggest the reality of social science.

13. Human life, individual as well as collective, appears to us first in narrative history. This history, which is satisfied to narrate what is told without further verification of the exactness and authenticity of facts, is plagued with errors, inaccuracies, lies, prejudices or *a priori* judgments, legends, adages, and superstitions that confuse the mind and make it unable to decide upon the truth or falsity of the narratives which boast of being historical. Nevertheless, it is impossible not to recognize the living reality which appears in this confused variety of incongruent facts, causeless actions, events without effect — so that although this history may seem basically to come from infantile lips and pens, one always gets finally a vision, however obscure, of a really living being of whom the facts are as told.

14. When the philosophers set themselves to think about the incongruence of the facts related in purely narrative history, they conceive and carry out the proposition of revising it, placing the events which it narrates in a more logical relation and increasing the number of man's achievements from the events which narrative history at times relates. At this point a subject appears in history — the human being.

And since the human being lives in conformity with the normal necessities of his life, *ipso facto* the critic finds in the facts of history the basis of judgments and the criterion which he applies in ordering and verifying the facts of narrative history. The criterion which history then applies is human nature itself which, ruled by the constant relations of cause and effect, means and ends, needs and their satisfaction, continues to guide the historical critic, causing him to discover the falsity of some facts, the half-truth of others, the logical inconsistency of the latter, the traditional and local causes of the former. Then as the primary and contributory causes of human events are gradually clarified by virtue of this criterion of human events, derived from the human nature of the actor, that very historical criticism which sought to cast down the edifice of traditional history finds itself stopped by the fact that many of the greatest falsehoods which impelled it to revise history are, in effect, truths.

This fact of the rehabilitation of many historical lies is in itself so important a proof of social reality that it is necessary to stop and meditate upon it before following history in its last development.

15. * * * * *

Among the peoples of our whole continent, marks of the somewhat anthropomorphic idolatry [derived from pre-Conquest Indians] survive even among those inhabitants partly habituated to civil life. Those idols played so positive and effective a role in the private and public life of the aborigines that without the destruction of the idols of Cuzco by the Pizarros it would have been almost impossible for the Spanish conquerors to carry out their enterprises. It is clear that those roughly or smoothly (*tosca o pulidamente*) carved stones were no more able to achieve feats for the benefit of the natives than their models, the violent saints (*santos de palo*). But, nevertheless, it is entirely true that the destruction of the idols destroyed the confidence of the aboriginal peoples of America.

16. Therefore, when narrative history relates as fact the direct personal intervention of the gods or their agents in individual conflicts and in the general life of peoples, it merely asserts in reference to the religious activity of peoples what it might say about any other activity.

17. In some respects, therefore, one of the most difficult tasks of critical history has been to restore as a fact in the life of peoples actions, cults, habits, and customs which at first sight appear physical impossibilities, but which upon a second examination appear as real forces in the social medium. Thus, for example, all those things in the book of Herodotus which passed for falsehoods have little by little revealed themselves to historical critics as truths in fact. Thus, the astonishing and absurd tales told to the southern peoples of Europe by Marco Polo in the fourteenth century gradually appear as natural events in the bosom (*seno*) of the barbarous, semi-barbarous, and semi-civilized societies to which he referred.

18. This work of restoration, which every day shows us some custom, event, or man of history in a different light from that in which we thought of him, has and will continue to reveal two parallel facts in the history of all social existence: first, the biological activity of the group of which it treats and, second, the psychological activity of this same group.

19. This is how the New Science arose, based upon this latter truth in contrast with the former, and seeing that both of these realities appear in all times and places — that the same human nature acts among all men on the planet and that the same historical phenomena are repeated. This is how Vico, the founder of the Philosophy of History, conceived of and named this last development of history itself. And this is how the New Science, based upon the reality of its object, proves conclusively the reality of the being (*ser*) whose existence it has to begin by demonstrating, since there is no science in which the reality of the subject and object of the science is not revealed.

20. CONCEPT OR INTUITIVE VIEW OF SOCIETY. This, also, is how, by the conjunction of all these intuitions, we come to the immediate conception and to the spontaneous formulation of the intuitive idea or opinion (*juicio*) that society is a living reality, a living organism (*ser*).

CHAPTER II. INDUCTIVE SOCIOLOGY

1. OBJECT OF THIS CHAPTER. It falls to this part of our study to establish demonstrably the existence of a natural order of society. Naturally, in order to demonstrate that this normal order exists we must take our stand upon the truth

of social facts, because the work of our understanding in this inquiry must be chiefly a work of induction for which we must take as raw material the intuitions which we form and especially the intuitive judgments at which we arrive.

2. STATEMENT OF THE INTUITIVE JUDGMENT UPON SOCIETY. The intuitive judgment which we make of society may be formulated in any manner so long as it affirms the existence of social reality. Any statement of it is, then, of indifferent value and any one is good. Let it be this: society is a living and acting reality.

3. ANALYSIS OF THIS JUDGMENT: SOCIETY IS A LIVING REALITY. This is to say, we affirm a living reality. Hence we affirm a biological reality. Hence we affirm an organic reality. Hence we affirm an existence organized according to the necessary and infallible relation of the part to the whole and the whole to the part.

4. SOCIETY IS AN ACTING REALITY. In this we affirm that the social organism (*ser*) lives, like all beings in the zoological scale, by virtue of the functions of its life and for the ends and purposes of life.

5. FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL LIFE. The functions of the life of a society correspond to the needs to be satisfied. Hence, in cities and towns, in municipal, national, and international groups, we may see every day a quantity of facts, alike in themselves, which are repeated as regularly as the acts of individuals in satisfying their needs.

6. Thus, in the city, from the dawn of day until their final retirement to their homes at night during the hours of repose, all the inhabitants, simultaneously, carry out certain purposes of the collective life which are likewise purposes of the individual life and reveal in themselves the natural character of the functions which correspond to these actions. While some open their shops, others begin their work in the fields, the women start their household tasks, the pastors of religious flocks intone their psalms, the schools assemble their academic population, the tribunals of justice begin their work, the offices of government [hear] the requests of petitioners, the Congress renews its legislative action, journalism, whether vigilant for the good or for encouraging evil, prepares its defensive or offensive arms for social morality, the busy and the idle,

slanderers and defamers, run through the streets and plazas, and in bookstores and libraries a part of society moves in search of the latest scientific news, the latest truths of contemporary knowledge. [Thus] urban society, at once alike and different, one and multiple, individual and generic, part and whole, consumes the labor of each day.

7. A day of labor or a day of fiesta in one city is the same as a day of fiesta or labor in any other city and, what is more, in any other place in the earth — what is still more, in any other time in history. This is because, except for differences of time, place, and environment — this is because, except for those differences, every day in every place is an expression of individual and group life which necessarily manifests the same organic activity of a living organism (*ser*).

8. THE SOCIAL ORDER. The social organism, like the individual being, neither more nor less, lives by its labor. It lives to establish a collective order which will give peace and security to goods, to persons, and to the general community. It lives endeavoring to perfect itself in the management of all the physical, intellectual, and moral instruments which the human being has at his disposal to improve himself and to progress. It lives upon its zeal for a moral order and for the purpose consecrating the doctrine in which it sums up its beliefs with ceremonies, rites, and organized cults. It lives, finally, from its need of assuring material respect and aiding the forces which defend all the institutions of the civil order and the great national institution itself.

9. All these actions of the sempiternal life of human association, in conjunction, produce a sum which is called civilization, because men's universal and continuous experience has proved to them that the fulfillment of individual and group life conforms more closely to the necessities of its nature when it is carried out in the city (*civitas*) than when it is attempted in the solitude of the countryside.

10. CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONS AND JUSTIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION. [The author indicates five groups: (1) labor, (2) governmental, (3) intellectual, (4) religious, and (5) military or defense functions.]

11. We began with the facts of labor and, in the final analysis, there is not one of the hundred thousand acts of an individual and collective character, or of a biotic and historical character, such as man carries on in association with man, which would not be an act of work.

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12. Society in the large, beginning with the individual, continuing through groups, and ending with the species, gives us obvious proof at each step of the necessity of a government of men to establish security, liberty, and order. Starting with the individual, who submits to a norm of conduct—which is for him much like a norm of government—in human life everything is an effort toward order, which it is sought to establish by means of governments, whether personal or doctrinal, that may serve as instruments for this purpose.

Hundreds of thousands are the acts [found] in the records of notable events, in the annals, in the chronicles, and in the general history of man carried out by the individual and the species in order to achieve this end.

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13. The preceding groups of facts show palpably that each of them corresponds to a generic fact, or what is the same thing, to an inborn activity of the human being.

We will now see the same thing in the very abundant series of daily events which together make up the functional activity of man in the search for satisfaction of his intellectual needs. The whole series of facts resulting from that function of the human soul—the individual as well as the social soul—is what constitutes the zeal for education.

At all social stages, from savagery to the most flourishing civilization, man desires to transmit to man—father to son, mother to daughter, the shepherd to his flock, the curate to his charges, the master to his disciples, the instructor to his students, the boatswain to his sailors, cultural institutions to

society in general—the ideas of the 'good, the beautiful, and the true which constitute human wisdom. This need for education is so exigent in the really rational man that those societies in which it becomes the cause of social, religious, and political conflict are the societies most active, progressive, and capable of civilization, those which are most quickly civilized.

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14. The multitudinous events which constitute the religious activity of peoples begin, among all of them, early in the morning of each day, and some days do not end until well into the night. The activity is one of individuals, groups, voluntary societies, *ad hoc* institutions, churches, fraternities (*cofradías*), brotherhoods, monasteries, and convents, which find their adherents in the deepest forests of equatorial Africa and in the brightest avenues of the most beautiful cities of the American world.

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15. The various military organizations which compose that force, insofar as it concerns one state in its relations with others, and all the police establishments which guard public order and security in cities, suburbs, and countryside, may be summed up in two generic institutions which embrace all aspects of the public forces in nations which have reached the fifth social stage, almost all those which have reached the fourth, and many which have reached the third. These two institutions are the army and the police . . .

16. The conduct of civilized society consists of the sum total of all activities and efforts displayed by human society in the development of its life. The phenomenon which the human species displays to the student of society is very clear in nature although it has seemed and still seems confusing to many persons. If it is so considered, that is to say as a phenomenon or conjunction of facts coordinated by natural relations, all the activity of our species is the natural result of the biotic conditions to which it is subject by birth and of the necessary ends of its life which its origin requires it to realize.

17. This correlation of facts constituting the phenomenology of human life must be studied carefully so that one may come to understand that order is a destiny of human societies—that is to say, that it results of necessity from the very character of the life of the social organism.

19. We have already seen that the primary manifestation of social life corresponds exactly to that which is primary in the life of the individual. The labor of society is neither more nor less than the labor of the individual. That of the individual, like that of society, is for the immediate ends of existence, because neither society nor the individual lives without means of subsistence.

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20. In the second manifestation of the social life, the relation between individual and collective activity is so close that the possibility of achieving the object of government—the universal practice of liberty—is inconceivable unless all groups of society are disciplined in terms of individual conduct in the exercise of rights and in the fulfillment of constitutional and legal duties.

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22. The relation between organized public force and the increasing control acquired by the individual over the environment in which he moves when he has confidence that his rights are protected by law and safeguarded by force—this is a relationship so obvious that it may be seen by the naked eye (*con los ojos de la cara*). In effect, it suffices to notice the bearing of persons in the cities or fields of countries which have an established force representative of the social will in order to realize that there each man is under the protection of armed law. It suffices, on the other hand, to descend from one social stage to another to see others as well as oneself weaker and less protected, as you descend [the scale]. Just as in the stages of civilization and semi-civilization, organized force makes it unnecessary for the individual to arm and protect himself against unorganized brute force, so in the other social stages an environment dominated by brute force obliges each individual to arm and protect himself against it.

23. **INDUCTIVE CONCLUSION CONCERNING SOCIETY.** At this point we may sum up all the work of this second part of the study in an inductive conclusion, stating a demonstrable principle. The principle discovered by induction is this—that there is a social order founded upon the conjunction of the relations established by the partial order which appears

in each human activity. Of course, in the discovery of this social order we have the basis for a general induction which gives us this inductive conclusion: There are natural laws of society because there is a necessary social order.

CHAPTER III. DEDUCTIVE SOCIOLOGY

1. FORMULA OF THE INDUCTIVE CONCLUSION CONCERNING SOCIETY. The inductive conclusion to which inductive sociology led us in the investigation of a social order, necessary, antecedent to society, and superior to the disorders of society itself, has this formula, which is the same as that with which we concluded the work of Chapter II: there are natural laws of society because there is an essential order.

2. NATURAL LAWS OF SOCIETY. As appears in the formula or proposition of the inductive conclusion, the natural order which we perceive in society is the result of natural laws of society. We cannot doubt—no matter how extraordinary it may seem to the common mind—that there are laws which govern the order that we observe and which we have discovered in all our previous study. And the reason for the existence of such laws is conclusive to our mind, because if it is clear that the order which we have induced from the general phenomena of social life exists, it must also be clear that there are laws upon which that order is based.

Let us see what they are.

3. HOW MANY NATURAL LAWS OF SOCIETY ARE THERE? There are as many, there must be as many, as there are functions. There are five functions; the laws that control them must be, and are, five.

4. WHAT ARE THE LAWS? They are the Law of Labor, the Law of Liberty, the Law of Progress, the Law of the Ideal, and the Law of Preservation.

5. CLASSIFICATION OF THESE LAWS. These laws are jointly and severally subject to one still more general, much as constitutional laws (*leyes constitutivas*) are to the organic laws of a national state.

There is also a natural law in human societies, of such constant application that the common sense of the more or less literate masses takes it into account. This law is to the general

life of societies what a procedural law is in the process (*juego o mecanismo*) of national legislation.

6. The first of these two laws is the Law of Sociability, the second is the Law of Environments (Medios).

7. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW OF SOCIABILITY. Let us now take up the natural laws of society. The first of all is the Law of Sociability. This law is as obvious as the phenomenon which it governs and normalizes. It is obvious that there exist societies spontaneously formed, and it is obvious that the phenomenon of the life of these societies is as natural as the societies themselves. The association of the natural strengths and the natural weaknesses of the human individual is so natural an aspect of his existence that without association there is no individual existence. Notice, in the first place, that every human being springs from the carnal association of two other human beings. In the second place, he is so constituted that he cannot subsist by himself. He is born, grows, and up to a certain moment lives, related and associated with all the strength of nature, now to his mother, now to his nurse, now to some tutor. And in the third place, he alone can do nothing in infancy, in adolescence, in youth, in manhood, in old age, or in senility. As a boy, he lives from and with other boys, and if he does not, he withers and weakens. An adolescent, he needs for his own physical development the company, the activity of other adolescents. As a youth, likewise, he needs the company of other youths to such a degree that this spontaneous association is given the name Youth in all times and places of history. An adult, the individual cannot take a step outside of Society, because a single one leads him into a vacuum or throws him into the abyss of impotence. As an old man, the individual cannot withdraw from the home, or at least from the life of that second home which is the city. In senility the individual returns to a state of infancy, in which he definitely needs the help of someone.

8. This natural force, which links each man with all the men about him, is as active and imperative a force in the life of groups as in that of individuals.

The first social group that results from the association of individual needs and weaknesses is the family. Hence it is that even in the inorganic form in which the family appears

in the primitive social state the family is a group. It become even truer when, because of improvement in social conditions, the structure of the family is also seen to improve. As the ties of association tighten they also strengthen, and as they become stronger they make the family group more united, more solid, more compact, more resistant, and more vital.

9. In the preceding group, association is so natural a law that scarcely has the family been formed in a regular and legal manner in the third stage of sociability, when the third social group appears—the community (*municipalidad*). Whatever name it bears, whether *demos*, *clan*, commune, or community, it is always a similar expression of the Law of Sociability which, in its third stage of organization, constitutes in the simplest and most natural way the third group of society. In fact, there have been times in history in which this group has had such strength of association that it has been the only form of the national state. Not only in Rome, where the municipality attained its strongest structure, nor in Athens and Sparta, where municipal life, universally represented in the city state, carried out alone all the purposes of national life, may we fruitfully study the effectiveness of the Law of Sociability as the natural creator of the third group of association. For in the history of the towns of the oriental civilizations and in that of our English and Spanish towns in America, we can also see the municipality as the true type of the third group of sociability.

10. As for the fourth group, it suffices to mention it in order to explain it as the natural result of a law which is not dependent on man for its promulgation, sanction, modification, or amendment. In effect, the region, which is usually called a province, or a district, or a county, is such a spontaneous manifestation of the Law of Sociability that it is not surprising to see it adapt itself, from the earliest times, to the particular form of certain societies. Here, reversing the historic process and starting at the end instead of the beginning, we can study in our own continent the historical adaptation of the Law of Sociability to the formation of regions.

With the exception—as far as we know—of the two national empires, everything in our continent was regional. From East to West and from the Atlantic to the Pacific, all our social life, wherever it had advanced from the first stage, all our life was regional. It was the region which made society, which

constituted the nucleus of sociability, which determined the strength of association. Let us take two examples, the *Yucayo* nation in the Antilles and the *Araucanian* nation in the western extremity of the continent. In the Antilles, especially in Haiti-Quisqueya, the association of groups was strictly adapted to the orographic or geographic regions of that territory, so that in it existed five independent chieftainships, linked by bonds of origin and proximity but completely separated as to territorial power and social authority. In *Araucania*, the *ulmenados* or governments of *ulmenes* were, like the Antillian chieftainships, regional states in which partial groups of the same national society functioned independently.

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11. Moreover, as appears from our recent analysis of social stages, even before the family really existed, the tribe lived in a completely natural manner. Very well: the tribe is no more than the formless nation, without organization, without institutions, without structure, without juridic personality. But even though inorganic, the tribe appears from the earliest time in human societies and is the rudimentary nation, embryonic, in its first stages of existence.

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Without insisting further upon the fact of the earliness or even priority of the tribe over every other social form, enough has been said to demonstrate definitively the proposition that sociability is a natural law which all thinking beings obey.

12. In reality, the Law of Sociability does not relate exclusively to rational beings, since animal and vegetable life also obey it. And because it is the natural tendency of induction to look for its bases in first facts, primitive and anterior to everything else, the Law of Sociability may be, in fact is, found to be related to facts of a cosmologic character. Thus, cohesion acts upon small masses, affinity upon the smallest masses, and attraction upon the largest.

13. EXPOSITION OF THE LAW OF SOCIABILITY. Just as a law rules all the facts of attraction (gravity) in direct proportion to the mass and inversely to the square of the distance, so the Law of Sociability must have a similar statement.

The idea of stating a social law is so new in science that it seems a daring attempt. In fact, it does some violence to the inductive — deductive character of the social sciences to attempt to change them into experimental sciences, sciences in which the enumeration of cosmologic laws is the indispensable result of the observation and experience of social facts, because no will outside themselves acts upon them in a way capable of changing, even for an instant, the infallible relation of cause and effect.

Since, on the contrary, in the action of rational and conscious beings there is indeed a principle of change in the fundamental relations of the social order, the mere existence of a natural factor of change is, in itself, a reason which makes almost impossible the [exact] exposition of a social law.

Because, if a law is properly formulated, it must of necessity be a precise description of an unalterable relation. And if it is agreed that there is a natural factor of change in all relations of a social nature, it is evident that the statement of a social law cannot be precise. But even if it cannot be precise, because it is subject to the different points of view from which one looks at the relation that constitutes the law, it can, nevertheless, be accurate enough. For this purpose, it suffices to refer to the most general phenomenon among those falling within the relationship with which the law deals. So that we may understand clearly, before stating the Law of Sociability, let us see what is the most general phenomenon among those within that relationship from which we induce the existence of a Law of Sociability. We have already seen that because of the need for association social groups joined together for work, for the establishment of a social order, for the organization of religious, scientific, and artistic schools, etc., and we have also seen that all of these activities are phenomena of sociability. But none of these phenomena appeared to be a sufficient explanation of the universality of the phenomenon of sociability itself, and we had to resort — in order to explain it — to the general principle of the creation of the physical world in which we found in the law of attraction the prototype, first type, or first idea, of the Law of Sociability.

Now then, since the law of universal attraction establishes a relationship so fixed that it constitutes the cause, the explanation, and the reality of cosmic conservation, it is clear

that the most extensive phenomenon, the first, the most primitive, the one antecedent to all others, is the phenomenon of universal preservation (*conservación universal*).²

Now then, if in formulating the Law of Sociability we must adopt the point of view of the most general phenomenon of association, we will conclude that this phenomenon is also the preservation of society, since the fact of the self-preservation of societies is the continuous result of the pre-existence of the Law of Association. Therefore, we now have one of the precise terms of the law, that is social conservation. But as we are dealing with moving and changing beings who may and do contribute to the alteration of the order of societies, we shall search their very nature for some constant trait which shows the necessity and inevitability (*fatalidad*) of individual and collective preservation, and we shall find the instinct of self-preservation. In this manner, we shall establish the positive aspect of the Law of Sociability and will need only to look for the negative aspect. If, positively, the instinct of self-preservation helps the social order, negatively, the lesser development of that instinct, which is common to all social beings, will be an obstacle to social order.

14. The Law of Sociability may then be stated as follows: *Sociability is in direct proportion to the strength of the instinct of self-preservation and in inverse proportion to the collective needs.*

15. STUDY AND EXPOSITION OF THE UNIVERSAL LAW OF LABOR. The exposition of this law, as of the previous one and of all the others, requires searching for and discovering, if possible, the two extreme terms of the relationship which establishes the order. Once these are found, the exposition cannot be vague or uncertain, even though it still may be debatable, for, as we have seen, the element of change is always present in man, free in his acts as an individual and free in his acts as a group.

The extreme terms of the relation which constitutes the natural order of society in its economic activity are production

2. As used by Hostos the term *conservación* seems to include something of the sense of self-preservation or survival. Hence the term preservation has been adopted, rather than conservation. — Trans.

and consumption — production because it is the immediate result of labor, of all labor, of any labor; consumption because it is the very purpose of all work!

Given these two extreme terms, the proposition must embrace them descriptively, that is, describing the way in which they are related. Therefore, we may state the proposition of the Universal Law of Labor as follows: *Consumption is directly proportional to production.*

But this would be no more than part of the law, which relates the two extreme terms by describing the consumption of wealth as a proportionate result of its production. It would be necessary, also, for the proposition to state the negative relationship between production and consumption. The negative relationship lies in the efficiency or inefficiency of the three coefficients of labor, which are land, the worker, and capital. When these factors are efficient, the relation, that is, the economic order, remains intact; when they are inefficient it is changed. The proposition might express it thus: *Production is in direct proportion to the efficiency or inefficiency of the factors of labor.* Then the Universal Law of Labor might be given as follows:

Consumption is proportional to production and production is proportional to the efficiency or inefficiency of the coefficients of labor.

16. UNIVERSAL LAW OF LIBERTY. A STUDY AND EXPOSITION. The exposition of this law, as of all the others, attempts to embrace both the affirmative and negative expressions of the normal relation which establishes it. That is why, in its first part, the exposition refers to the affirmative aspect of the relation. That is also why, it says: *The relation of liberty with right and duty is one of harmony.*

The negative part is expressed in terms of negation.... *The relation with force and power is one of contrast.* When the extremes of this proposition are joined they may be expressed thus: *The relation of liberty with right and duty is one of harmony and that with force and power is one of contrast.*

17. A STUDY OF THE UNIVERSAL LAW OF PROGRESS. Of all the principles which may be considered universal laws of society, none has been more generally so considered, for

more than two centuries, than the phenomenon of individual and collective development which is called progress. Because it is common knowledge that progress is a natural law of society, it is important to state it in the most precise terms possible. And as we know that for this purpose it is necessary to begin with the extreme terms of the relation established by the particular order that is being examined, we must remember that in our inductive study we recognized that the two extremes of the relation of progress are *education and self-improvement (perfeccionamiento)*. Now, since education is a voluntary term, precise and positive, the proposition expresses the positive aspect of the relation of progress. Thus it states that *progress is in a positive relation to education*. And as self-improvement is the end which it is necessary to achieve, and is contingent, uncertain, or at least variable, we express in it the negative side or phase of the relation. Thus we say: *... and in negative relation to the lesser degree of self-improvement*.

It must be understood that this portion of the proposition means precisely that when self-improvement is not very active it is because education is very passive.

The complete proposition of the Law of Progress is: *Progress has a positive relation to education and a negative relation to the lesser degree of self-improvement*.

18. STUDY AND EXPOSITION OF THE LAW OF THE IDEAL. *The ideal is in direct proportion to the development of morality and in inverse proportion to the collective incapacity to learn the religious or moral objectives*.

Of the two parts of this proposition, the positive part explains the role of morality in the production of good, whereas the second part of the proposition shows how the growth of social well-being tends to be arrested by the incapacity of the masses for understanding that the religious or moral ends are objectives of social well-being and that they are, therefore, dependent, strictly dependent, on morality and on the moral objectives of human life.

19. LAW OF PRESERVATION. ITS STUDY AND EXPOSITION. The Law of Preservation may be stated thus: *Preservation corresponds to the vital force, and the vital force to the energy with which functional means are adapted to all and each of the objectives of a function*.

It is obvious that the two extremes of the relation upon which the proposition is based are strength, as the sign of life, and adaptation, as the measure (*exponente*) of the force of preservation; because it is clear that the more vigorously a means is applied towards an end, so much more energetic is the achievement of that end.

Since, of all the propositions, that of the Law of Preservation is the one most calculated to cause astonishment and perplexity, and because the accumulation of popular misconceptions leads to the belief that force destroys itself, it is important to explain the proposition briefly, in order clearly to deduce from it that force is really the basis of individual and social preservation.

Force, in society as in nature, is simply an agent which is constantly called upon to produce the result that its own application demands. Thus, for example, when heat, a cosmic force, is applied, the result which is desired is expansion. It is evident that if we feel certain of producing expansion when we apply heat, we employ this force with complete assurance, because we are so certain that its tendency (*objeto*) is to preserve the perpetual relation between it, as the cause, and expansion, as the effect. Very well. In human societies the use of force is also the exercise of a conviction that there is a necessary relation between it, as cause, and the order or preservation of society, as effect.

20. LAW OF THE MEDIA.³ EXAMINATION AND EXPOSITION. The proposition of the Law of the Media boils down to this: *All social force, upon passing from one environment to another is refracted.*

This breaking or refraction of social force tends either toward growth or decline. It tends toward growth when the passing or transfer of the force takes place under such circumstances that the force moves with the very elements or social groups which determine it, in which case the influence of the force develops as it would not have done in the environment from which it sprang. Liberty developed in this way because the English in the American colonies, the Australians, and the Dutch carried it with them.

3. *Media* is used by Hostos with a meaning similar to, yet also different from the environment, referring more to the people or cultural elements than to external factors.

Conversely, the force develops in an opposite direction when the social environment has already attained part of its vital activity, in which case it tenaciously resists any influence by a force which does not conform strictly with the interests already established, whether strongly rooted, or already weakened by abuse, or through the fault of public administration, or by the ease with which evil elements prevent the introduction of vital, organic, and effective social forces in societies which are not well organized or which are in a disorganized state.

All the peoples of Spanish origin in America give a perennially tragic example of this refracting of vital force in the sense of decline.

Because of the poor development of all of these societies, when their independence gave them the opportunity of adapting to their social environment the natural forces of civilization, they did it so poorly that there is not one such force which acts normally in any one of these societies.

(Trans. by H.E.D. with assistance of J.M.Y.)

JOSE MARTI (1853-1895)

CUBA

Poet-journalist-revolutionist, José Martí devoted his life, most of it spent in exile, to achieving the independence of Cuba. As he said in Caracas in 1878, Cuban independence would be ... "the last strophe" of the incomplete "poem of 1810." But he also saw in it the beginning of a new and broader revolutionary movement, in the support of which he aspired "to arouse the world." America, he said, must go her own way, but she must march with Bolívar on one side and Herbert Spencer on the other.¹ Later, during his fourteen year stay in the United States, he was influenced by the writings of Henry George and other North Americans sympathetic to the ideas of socialism. Some Cubans have tried to stamp him with the mark of materialist-socialist doctrine.² Others have emphasized his individualism and devotion to democratic-liberal ideas.³ But Martí defies categorization. Even the Cuban communist, Juan Marinello, has called him "the poet [who], expressing reality in an unaccustomed manner, transforms it within himself, makes it a part of his internal tumult, of his spiritual state, of his dominating emotion."⁴ Hence, Martí is best understood as expressing the frequently contradictory emotions and anxieties of Cuba and Latin America at the end of the nineteenth century, rather than as the exponent of any particular ideology. In this sense he may be considered a precursor of the inquietude of Latin America which finds expression in its twentieth century revolutionary movements.

José Martí grew up during the Ten Years War (1868-78) for Cuban independence. Entering the Colegio de San Pablo two years before the war began, he studied under the revolutionary poet and journalist, Rafael Mendive, until the latter was imprisoned for his revolutionary activities. A visit to his

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1. Jorge Mañach, *Martí, el apóstol* (2d. ed. Buenos Aires and México: Espasa-Calpe, 1944) p. 208.
 2. See A. Martínez Bello, *Ideas sociales y económicas de José Martí* La Habana: La Verónica, 1941.
 3. See Emeterio Santovenia y Echaide, *Genio y acción, Sarmiento y Martí* La Habana: Trópico, 1938 and *Lincoln en Martí* (La Habana: Trópico, 1948).
 4. "Carta de Juan Marinello," in Martínez Bello, *Op.cit.*, p. 216.

JOSE MARTI

imprisoned teacher left an impression on the mind of the thirteen year old boy which was never erased. Later he published his first, revolutionary, poem, "Abdala," in *La Patria Libre*, edited by Mendive and Cristobal Madán. At the age of sixteen he was condemned to six years imprisonment at hard labor because of a letter he and a fellow student had written to another student of Mendive, then in the Spanish service, urging him to return to the Cuban cause. Released after two months because of ill health and a wound on his ankle from the iron grill he wore as a prisoner — a wound which required several surgical operations for its cure — he was permitted to go to the Isle of Pines and later to Spain to continue his studies.

In Spain, then undergoing a series of kaleidoscopic political changes following the overthrow of Queen Isabella in 1868, Martí was as much political agitator as student. He published a scathing denunciation of Spanish treatment of political prisoners in Cuba, and his poetic ode to the student demonstrators shot on the streets of Havana on November 27, 1871 had an electric effect on Spanish public opinion. During the historic siege in Zaragoza, he stirred the republican sympathies of the city with his fiery oratory. After the establishment of the Republic (1873) he pleaded the Cuban cause in a pamphlet, *The Spanish Republic Confronting the Cuban Revolution*.

Years of exile followed the overthrow of the Republic — first in Mexico, where he began in his writing to urge the development of an American, rather than European education, literature, thought, and institutions, and later in Guatemala, where he lectured in the Normal School and published the *Revista Guatemalteca*. Returning to Cuba, briefly, after the Ten Years War, he was soon imprisoned and deported to Spain (1878). Escaping from prison, he made his way to Paris, New York, and finally Caracas, where he vowed to "arouse the world" to the Cuban cause. Because of differences with the dictator-president, he soon left Caracas for New York, around which the last fourteen years of his life centered. Recognized as the moral and intellectual leader of Cuban independence, he devoted his energies to arousing support for that cause, while earning his living as a journalist. It was a severe blow when United States officials stopped the departure of two vessels equipped at great expense to initiate an invasion of Cuba. But Martí and his followers, undaunted, made their way to Cuba to begin hostilities in February 1895. On May 19, at Dos Rios, he was killed in the first charge of the rebel forces.

Martí's martyrdom made him an idol of the next generation of Latin American youth, while his poetic and vigorous expression of a new revolutionary philosophy, decrying the notion of Latin American political incapacity derived from the prevalent evolutionary positivist concepts, anticipated some of the new trends in twentieth century social thought in the Hispanic countries. Absorbed in the daily tasks of the journalist and in revolutionary planning, his life cut short at forty-two, he never wrote the volumes he planned on such subjects as education and the Negro race. His thought must therefore be culled from speeches, newspaper and magazine articles, letters, and the preliminary notes for books never written.

Crawford has called him a practical mystic, utopian yet at the same time realist.⁵ While obviously influenced by Marxism, much of his writing, like that of Rodó, is an eloquent plea for a spiritual revolution, with an ethics based upon love. His great admiration for Cecilio Acosta of Venezuela embraced the latter's appreciation of the ethical basis of Anglo-American democracy, and his frequent denunciations of the materialism he found in the United States should be interpreted in that light. He spoke out clearly against racism, defending the cause of the recently emancipated Negroes of Cuba. He urged education for the Indians and Negroes of all of America, an education which would be practical rather than literary, agrarian reform which would include division of the land, and an independence for Cuba which would be not only political, but economic and cultural as well. Thus his concept of the social revolution required in America makes him a predecessor of José Mariátegui and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, while his appeal to the idealism of youth links him with José Rodó, José Ingenieros, and José Vasconcelos.

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5. W.R. Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, p. 233.

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THE MORAL BASIS OF REVOLUTION

BY JOSÉ MARTÍ

(From an address to Cuban emigres in Steck Hall, New York, January 24, 1880,⁶ in Félix Lizaso, *José Martí, Ideario separatista*. La Habana: Ministerio de Educación, 1947. Pp. 42-43, 48-52).

We know and believe that human nature, evil by chance but in essence noble, once committed to the exercise of its most honorable prerogatives, only exchanges or declines them for advantages so pleasing that they may worthily compensate for the ineffable pleasure produced by rational self-control. . . . Only virtues produce in peoples a continuous and serious well being. (Pp. 42-43)

* * * *

This is not merely the revolution of anger. It is the revolution of reflection. It is the prudent conversion to a useful and honorable objective of inextinguishable elements, restless and active, which if they are neglected, would certainly lead us to serious permanent unrest and to solutions achieved under threats. It is the only way in which we can attend in time to interests which are at the point of death, which constitute our sole element of economic prosperity, and which have nothing to hope for from interests absolutely opposed. At this moment in which, from one and another side of the continent, the ocean threatens to leave its bounds to carry the artistic riches of the white peoples to the yellow peoples — at this point

6. Originally published in New York (1880) as a pamphlet "Asuntos Cubanos."

in human history in which, by amazing exertion, it seems that the world is initiating an era of greater understanding and happiness, we Cubans stand in the gravest danger of losing forever the easiest, simplest, and most advantageous means of raising our abused *patria* to an unanticipated height of strength and wealth. Because this epoch, looked upon by some as one of transition and trying disturbances for Cuba, is rather a decisive one, never to recur, in which, if we do not effect change energetically, we shall lose, together with the sole diminishing and threatened wealth which remains to us, the natural and probable possession of one of the most abundant veins of fortune which the commerce of this age offers. And these problems through which, dulled by the sight of the gallows and the yoke, we usually pass without casting an eye upon them, as in the case of all real and pressing problems, add up to a little more than the narrow proposals, imperfect aspirations, and timid suggestions with which, as individuals and aimlessly, the corrupt and uncertain Cuban delegation fights in the Spanish Cortes. And because they are so dispirited, behold them frustrated and conquered, looked upon as strangers and not abused as the illustrious men of other times were; because with a single meritorious exception they have had neither the daring spirit, nor the vital speech, nor the sure judgment the latter had.

One must do in each moment what is necessary in each moment. Time should not be wasted in attempting what there is good reason for believing is not to be achieved. To postpone is never to decide, above all since now neither palpitating memories, nor painful resentments, nor serious impending catastrophes permit another opportunity. To foresee is a duty of those who undertake to lead. To go ahead of others requires seeing more than they do. Peoples know not how to live in the compromising uncertainty of those protected by the advantages which prudence yields, who do not feel within their cloistered homes the tempests of the countryside, nor in their torpid hearts the real cry of a country stoned and betrayed.

Despots do not know that the people, the suffering mass, is the true head of revolution; and they caress that other brilliant mass which, because it seems intelligent, appears to influence and direct [affairs]. And it does in fact direct, with

a leadership necessary and useful in so far as it obeys — to the extent that it is inspired in — the energetic desires of those who entrust to them their destiny with blind faith and generous confidence. But when they in their own weakness neglect the trust of the people and give up their task in fright, when those who had been considered and chosen as good by their smallness belittle everything and by their vacillation defeat it, the proud country casts off the burden of these men and goes on its way, leaving behind those who had insufficient valor to go on. The opportunistic policy, as it is now called, pretending to make a special school of what is merely the predominance of good sense in the conduct of public affairs — the opportunistic policy, which does not consist in hoping blindly despite everything but in being impatient when there is a right to hope, cannot be the mad effort to feign them [hopes] when there is no cause whatever to nourish or justify them. The price of liberty is very high, and one must either resign himself to live without it or decide to buy it at its price.

From the vibrant and varied elements which palpitate in Cuba; from the impotence for good and the incapacity for government of Spanish policy; from the habits contracted during the long campaign, not lessened by later benefits, but strengthened by new offenses; from the custom of fighting which agitates some and from the custom of being free which disquiets others; from the shame of having contributed to a general decline; from the complete absence of the hoped for resources (*caudales recelosos*) in the largest and neediest part of the island; from the unthinking and traitorous abundance of promises, which thereupon caused the deception to be felt more keenly; from the hopeless misery which afflicted all; from the patriotic ardor which burned in all, fed by such varied causes — [from all of these] the revolution had to surge, in spite of those who did not feel so keenly these deeply wounding evils (*punzantes males*). It had to surge up disorderly and fierce, as an explosion of wrath and a tempestuous rebirth of varied and angry hopes which needed no previous agreement to throw themselves into the battle. . . . When an evil is necessary, the evil occurs. And since nothing now avails to avoid it, the wise thing is to study it and guide it so that it will not exhaust and overwhelm us with its excesses. Thus, the revolution having occurred when valor, decorum, and the sentiment of honor, primary laws of life, were lacking — and they alone had

sufficient force to produce — a popular motive of convenience and a narrow logical reasoning invigorated, set the tone, and gave form to a movement which it was not now possible to prevent. Therefore, since the same reasons, strengthened by new events and by the hoped for agreements militate now, now is the only opportunity to aid with energy a revolution which is taking form by itself, as well as through the cruelty and stupidity of its enemies. Hence, disdainfully heedless of sympathies which are not needed, and with the approval of reason and honor, those who support the present revolution with all their energy and aid it with all their ability may be proud of their work. (Pp. 48-52)

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AMERICA

(From a speech before the Hispanic American Literary Society of New York, December 19, 1889, honoring the delegates to the First Interamerican Conference. *José Martí: Prosas. Selección, prólogo y notas de Andrés Brouard*. Washington: Pan American Union, 1950. Pp. 65, 68-70).

And why not recall, for the glory of those who have known how to conquer in spite of them, the confused origins, stained with blood, of our America, even though one, for whom the light of our glory, the glory of our independence, molests in his function of compromising and cheapening it, may attach the fault of inopportune old age to the faithful record, more than ever necessary today? North America was born of the plough, Spanish [America] of the bloodhound (*perro de presa*). A fanatical war cast out of their ethereal palaces the moors debilitated by wealth, and the excess soldiery, brought up on crude wine and hate for heretics, cast themselves with cuirass and arquebus upon the Indian with his breastplate of cotton. The ships arrived full of armed cavaliers, of disinherited second sons, rebel junior officers, and hungry lawyers and clergy. They bring culverins, shields, lances, thigh-armor, casques, backpieces, helmets, and dogs. They carry the war (*ponen el espada*) to the four winds, declare the King's ownership of the land, and sack the temples of gold. Cortes entices Moctezuma to the palace which he owes to the latter's generosity or prudence, and makes him prisoner in his own palace. The naively trusting Anacaona invites Ovando to a fiesta to see the garden of his country, its

joyful dances, and its maidens; the soldiers of Ovando draw out the swords concealed under their garments, and the land of Anacaona is theirs. The conquistador advances in America between the divisions and jealousies of the Indian peoples; between the Aztecs and the Tlaxcaltecas Cortes reaches the canoe of Cuauhtemoc; between the Quiches and the Zutujiles Alvarado conquers in Guatemala; between the Tunjas and the Bogotaes Quesada in Colombia; between those of Atahualpa and those of Huascar Pizarro passes in Peru; on the breast of the last valorous Indian they plant the red standard of the Holy Office. They steal the women.

* * * * *

And all this poison we have changed into a vital element (*trocado en savia*)! Never was a people more precocious, generous and firm born out of such difficulty and suffering. We were the sewer (*sentina*) and we are coming to be the crucible. We have built upon the hydras. We have cast out the javelins of Alvarado with our railroads. In the plazas where heretics were burned, we have built libraries. We now have as many schools as we previously had familiars of the Holy Office. If we have left anything undone, it is because we have lacked time to do it, busy as we have been with extirpating from our blood the impurities bequeathed us by our fathers. Of the religious and immoral missions, only the bare walls remain, where the owl peers and the lizard sadly crawls. Among the divided races, the ruins of the convents, and the horses of the barbarians, the new American has opened a path, inviting the youth of the world to pitch their tents in his camp. This handful of apostles has triumphed.

* * * * *

Our America, capable and tireless, conquers all, raising its banner higher each day.

* * * * *

From that angry and agitated America, which burst forth with thorns on her brow and [with] words flowing like lava . . . once the evil gag was broken, we have come by main force (*a pujo de brazo*) to [be] the present day America, heroic and hard working, frank and vigilant, with Bolívar on one hand and Herbert Spencer on the other; an America without childish

suspicious (*suspicias*), nor naive trusts, which welcomes all races to the prosperity of its home, because it knows that the America of the defense of Buenos Aires and the resistance of Callao is also the America of the Cerro de las Campanas and of the New Troy.

MY RACE

(From *La Cuestión racial*. Biblioteca Popular Martiana No. 4. La Habana: Lex, 1959. Pp. 25-29. Originally published in *La Patria*, New York, April 16, 1893).

The term racist is coming to be confused, and it is necessary to clarify it. Man has no special right because he belongs to one race or another: speak of man and you have spoken of all his rights. The Negro, as Negro, is neither inferior nor superior to any other man. It is a sin of redundancy for the white to say "my race"; it is a sin of redundancy for the Negro to say "my race." Everything which divides men, everything which specifics, separates, or groups them is a sin against humanity. To what intelligent white does it occur to be proud of being white? And what do Negroes think of the white who is proud of being so and also believes he has special rights because of it? What are whites to think of the Negro who is vain concerning his color? To insist upon the divisions of race, upon the racial differences of a people naturally divided, is to make more difficult both public and private welfare, which lie in bringing closely together the factors which have to live in common. When one says that there is no original sin in the Negro, nor any virus which inhibits him from developing completely his human soul, one speaks only the truth; and it must be said and demonstrated, because the injustice of this world is great, as is the ignorance of those who pass for learned. Some, in good faith, even believe the Negro incapable of the intelligence and spirit (*corazón*) of the white. If this defense of nature is called racism, it does not matter if it is so called, because it is nothing more than natural decorum and a voice which cries out from man's breast for the peace and life of the country. If it is claimed that the condition of slavery does not prove inferiority in the enslaved race, since the white Gauls, with blue eyes and golden hair, were sold as servants, with yokes on their necks, in the Roman markets, that is good racism, because it is pure justice and helps to eliminate prejudice from

the ignorant white. But here justifiable racism ends, with the right of the Negro to maintain and prove that his color does not deprive him of any of the abilities and rights of the human species.

What right has the white racist, who believes his race has superior privileges, to complain of the Negro racist who also sees some special [right] in his race? The Negro racist who sees in race a special character, what right has he to complain of the white racist? The white man who believes himself superior to the black man because of race admits the idea of race, authorizing and provoking the Negro racist. The black man who proclaims his race, when perchance what he [really] proclaims in this erroneous form is the spiritual identity of all the races, authorizes and provokes the white racist. Peace demands the common natural rights; differentiating rights, contrary to nature, are the enemies of peace. The white who isolates himself [also] isolates the black. The Negro who isolates himself provokes the white to do the same.

In Cuba there is no fear whatever of a war of the races. A Cuban is more than white, more than mulatto, more than Negro. On the battlefields, dying for Cuba, the souls of whites and blacks have risen together through the air. In the daily life of defense, of loyalty, of brotherhood, and of shrewd planning a black always stood beside each white. Like the whites, Negroes divided themselves according to their characters, [whether] timid or brave, self-denying or egotistical, into the several parties in which men are grouped. Political parties are aggregates of preoccupations, aspirations, interests, and characters. [Within them] essential similarity is searched out and established above the differences of detail, and the fundamental element of the analagous characters is fused in the parties, even though they differ in the incidental or in what is irrelevant to the common aspiration. . . . The affinity of character is more powerful among men than the affinity of color. The Negroes, distributed among the diverse or hostile specialties of the human spirit, can never write, nor will they wish to write against the whites, scattered among the same specializations. Negroes are too tired of slavery to enter voluntarily into the slavery of color. . . . Both racists would be equally blameworthy: the white racist and the black racist. Many whites, as well as many blacks, have already forgotten

their color. Whites and Negroes work together for intellectual achievement, the propagation of morality, the triumph of creative work, and sublime charity.

Cuba will never have race warfare. The Republic cannot turn back. . . . The civil rights, whether those granted astutely by the Spanish government or those originating in custom prior to the independence of the Island, cannot now be denied, neither by the Spaniard who will maintain them while he remains in Cuba in order to continue dividing the Cuban Negro from the white Cuban, nor by independence, which could not deny under freedom the rights which the Spaniard recognized under servitude.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

AGUSTIN ENRIQUE ALVAREZ SUAREZ
(1857-1914)

ARGENTINA

Agustín Alvarez is a late nineteenth century representative of the vigorously realistic and practical idealism which characterized Argentine thought of an earlier generation. Rex Crawford has compared his "secular idealism" with that of Emerson,¹ but this is true chiefly in respect to their religious free thinking. In other respects Alvarez is more typical of positivist and Darwinian thought which emphasized the role of science and advocated policies of moderation.

Born in Mendoza on July 15, 1857, he was educated in that provincial capital and in the law school of Buenos Aires. In many respects he was a self-made man, an orphan who rose to prominence through military service and politics. He was the founding vice-president of the University of La Plata and one of its most popular professors. His views on Argentine political life and problems, expressed with great vigor, independence, and practical realism, found expression in numerous volumes on social ethics, politics, and education. Although the title of his book, *La transformación de las razas en América* (1906) might suggest a racialist outlook, he definitely parts company with earlier Argentines like Sarmiento and Alberdi who attributed national backwardness to racial factors. To Alvarez this racialism is merely a popular illusion. The real explanation of Argentina's problems is to be found in customs and institutions.

The following passages from *South America, Natural History of Reason* show the generally Darwinian-Spencerian- evolutionist character of Alvarez' thought. His "positivist" outlook embraces tolerance based upon preference of reason to any fanaticism, a concept of reason which is empirical and practical rather than "pure," skepticism of verbal formulas in politics, and a view of laws and constitutions which finds their essential basis in customs. His most significant departure from the older positivist sociology consists of his emphasis upon psychological explanations of social phenomena. Qualities of Americanism and *Argentinidad* are clearly evident, as is the spirit of

1. *A Century of Latin American Thought*, p. 95.

moderation and the acceptance of "gradualness" so well expressed in the concluding paragraph.

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SOUTH AMERICA: NATURAL HISTORY OF REASON

BY AGUSTÍN ENRIQUE ALVAREZ SUÁREZ

(From *South America: Natural History of Reason*. Translated by Gustavo E. Archilla. W. R. Dittman, Ph.D. Project Supervisor. W.P.A. Project 465-97-3-81. Columbia University, 1938. Pp. 17-20, 94-104, 144-147.)

CHAPTER V. SELF-ASSERTIVE REASON

Proceeding with our investigation of the organ of reason we declare that judgment is arrived at through the data, elements or ideas — good or bad, right or wrong — which exist in the mind at the moment when judgment is to be passed. This is the time, however, to state that there is, at least, one element which is always present in the mind of every man, whether he be asleep or awake, and which can subsist alone when other elements are absent or feeble. We refer, of course, to the instinct of self-preservation.

This element is, as it were, the landlord and only member of the household when there are no visitors. The less the mind is held in bondage by exterior interests and motives — interests of other people, religious, humanitarian, experimental and scientific motives — the more personal interest will influence and dominate the mind. These interests and motives, if they were understood and appreciated, might hold the domestic tyrant in check.

Consequently, the closer man's mind is to the animal, the more self-interests alone will solve and judge problems put to reason. This is more than theory as men in the most primitive state, the anthropophagi, eat their unwary prisoners alive or roasted.

"What did you do during the Terror?" someone asked Siéyès. "I lived through it," he answered. This was indeed a great accomplishment in an epoch when Reason was let loose unmuzzled.

Reason is the fundamental charter of every rational being; hence, the foundation upon which he builds progress or the trap in which he remains caught for life. It presents many analogies to a political constitution. If what is lodged in the organism could be translated into words, we should find in every mind a preamble of the following tenor: "I, John Doe, in order to build up a strong being, to ensure justice and peace for my household, to provide for my defense, to promote my well-being and secure the benefits of liberty for myself and my children, resolve to govern myself in accordance with my *reason*."

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The Constitution of the United States makes no provision for other nations, nor does self-assertive individual reason contain any clause for the benefit of another.

Christian virtues aside — for that is another matter — the relations between different parties, individuals, and nations fall within the Roman classification: *do ut des, facio ut facies, presto ut prestes*. But this is precisely reason *a posteriori*, which takes into consideration later events. Spontaneous reason is direct; you have a talisman, I seize it. The rioting people of ancient Rome in their frenzy demanded bread and circuses — *panem et circenses*. Indians, petty thieves, and hirelings, true to their native trend, leave nothing in exchange for that which they carry away. One of the first lessons which a child learns is that “tears speak.” Thus, “lewd hirelings roar a most outrageous dreadful yelling cry” in order to swell their purse, and as a child is given a toy horse to make it stop crying,

To Cerberus they give a sop
His triple barking mouth to stop.

With superlative reason the King of Prussia said in a speech from the throne in 1847: “I will never allow to come between Almighty God and this country a blotted parchment” — a constitution is meant — “to rule us with paragraphs and to replace the ancient and sacred bond of loyalty.”

Of course, Reason was a great help to the English admiral who bombarded the ports of China in 1840 because the Chinese refused to allow the importation of opium after discovering that they were being poisoned piecemeal.

Among savage peoples, where reason reigns supreme and almost without counterbalance, robbery, pillage and slavery are social institutions. By this kind of reason the American *conquistadores* seized the land, and by virtue of identical reason the Indians of our pampas have razed our frontiers. “Among all young and warlike peoples, robbing the enemy has always been considered a legitimate means of acquisition; even today, among the nomad tribes of Africa, the word ‘thief’ is a title of honor” (Roschner). “In the opinion of the Greeks and the ancient peoples of the north, piracy was a dignified occupation, while commerce, being associated with cowardice and deceit, was despised” (Jhering).

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CHAPTER XXVI. THE PERNICIOUS SENSE OF HONOR

The essence of Federal as well as of Unitary government is not the written guaranty of the law but the effective balance

of powers through division into three branches. Such a division did not exist at the time of the struggle between the Unitarians and the Federalists, because then only the form and not the substance of things was discerned. Systems of government ruled by pure reason are not workable. Discarding middle-of-the-road standards, pure reason groups man as either good or bad, perceives in things only the best or the worst and, ultimately, arrives in all matters at over-simplified, categorical, and uncompromising conclusions.

Some regarded the unitary system, others a federation as the best form of government. Logically, Unitarians and Federalists arrived at extreme formulas: "Accept Unity or die" — "Accept Federation or die." Such systems are like those of the ancient Greek and Roman Republics where the defeated party was ostracized, excluded from public life and declared a public enemy.

Counterbalance and control are not synonymous with suppression and proscription, at least among civilized peoples who have coined such terms. It is clear that among backward peoples where the substance of things does not exist, the law stating that substance is not understood either, for it deals preeminently with the suppression or the prevention of excess in what is considered partly good and partly bad, acceptance of this point of view is imperative if acts shall be tolerated in part or rejected in part; for if we consider acts wholly unacceptable, we cannot accept them in part, particularly if we consider them wretchedly bad, disgracefully humiliating, or despicably unworthy. For example, when one is convinced that a certain system of government is best, patriotism will counsel that it be made to prevail at any cost and against any opposition; consequently, the opposite system is the worst and should be attacked ruthlessly. After concluding that the partisans of the unitary system are "outlaws, savages and traitors," we cannot tolerate them logically, and we finally club them to death as mad dogs. To compromise under such circumstances is, of course, impossible, shamefully cowardly, even immoral. Blows are the direct result of our mode of thinking, of our way of judging people. Formulas here reflect "a mental state." Changing words, however, does not affect the matter. Let us suppose that the Federalists had called themselves Unitarians; Argentine history would have been the

same except for a switch of adjectives. The barbarians would have remained the same.

Such, in fact, were the convictions that led both the Federalists and the Unitarians to exclude and persecute each other without truce or respite; cruel experiences, however, as well as the natural progress of an enlightened population, began to produce a less radical and more expedient attitude which enabled the illustrious Federalist Urquiza to march against Rosas in alliance with the Unitarians. Without "compromise and barter," without the aid of the renowned Federalists such as Urquiza, Virasoro, Garzón, L. Torres, Galán, Crespo and many others, Caseros and the national government would not have been the creatures of their time and their form.

Since disasters usually come in pairs, it happens that where the political mind of the people is immature or, rather, intransigent and intolerant, their rulers also, partners in the same business, are heedless. Constitutional legislation is not balanced, or it functions badly, because if the opposition is in the majority, it indicts the ruler; if in the minority, it obstructs him.

What we have said applies to rationality. In addition, there are imponderables which complicate matters further, such as the ambition, selfishness, vanity, and the fierce rancor of little countries.

Natural evolution and not artificial development by sudden spurts will reveal the "spirit" of our constitutions. Thus we shall approach the degree of culture that those institutions imply. During this process, attempts to whip up the spirit of the laws by vehemence in the South American manner is as uncondusive to success now as it was at the time of Lavalle, Dorrego, and Rosas, and would justify the bitter phrase of Mérimée, "*a quoi diable sert l'histoire, puisque personne n'en profite?*"

The essence of government by checks and balances "of all and for all" is not the material division of powers, but rather the moral divisibility of evils. This little point, apparently so insignificant, embraces the whole question. If evils are indivisible, the division of powers is a mere phrase without force and utility. One might say that the disease dwells in

the heart or in the brain and that it is necessary to extirpate the affected organ in its entirety. The removal of the organ would mean the destruction of the whole organism.

Even supposing that ill be in the substance of the matter, the classification, which determines the treatment, is made by the mind. This classification is a product of fantasy or pure conventionality. The physician cannot treat the ailment from which the patient suffers abstractly and apart from his professional opinion, but must treat the disease according to the diagnosis of the case. The mind creates the indivisible and the divisible, the curable and the incurable. The mind may envisage the outside from the point of view of practical utility or from the point of view of pure vanity. The first is the basis of good sense which cannot put even the ignorant on the road of reasonableness; the second is the basis of extreme romanticism, capable of guiding even the wise to excessive violence.

There is, in fact, a very simple way of turning a small evil into a very great one, necessitating heroic remedies; this is done by making such a small infraction "an offense against honor."

In all matters there are two main aspects: form and depth, body and soul, substance and sound, matter and color, well-being and fame. Anyone may like one more than the other or both equally. In that sense he who prefers substance, soul, depth, matter, well-being, is called "a practical soul," he who prefers form, beauty of body, sound, honor, fame, pride, is called "a noble soul"; the nobles of the Middle Ages disemboweled themselves because of a word or sacrificed everything to gain the favor of beautiful ladies who may have belonged to other men.

The practical man subordinates his own judgment to that of the rest of the world; the proud man sacrifices the rest of the world to his own ideas.

But, strangely, no people are more easily handled by outside forces than the vain. They are like mechanical dolls which jump when the button is pressed. These persons, however, have a most noteworthy peculiarity: they can be handled in only one way, namely, through their vanity.

The vain are like badly trained horses which prefer to obey one rein and unconsciously travel twisted toward the stable; the slightest pull makes them turn about into the street of pride. Even though sense be pealed to them by the Kremlin bell, they hear it not. "*On tombe toujours du côté ou l'on penche.*" Thus it is easy "to sow the seed of self-interest in the susceptibility of others." They do not color their teeth black, as the Siamiese do in order not to look like dogs, because it is not fashionable. But they go further; to avoid being humiliated, they humiliate; to avoid being harassed, they harass; to avoid being dishonored, they dishonor; to avoid being imposed upon, they do the imposing; to avoid being insulted, they commit abuses; to avoid being under orders and serving as underlings, they assail power with arrogance; to avoid remaining in the rear ranks, they seize the chief officers; to avoid being led, they command, and to avoid being ignorant, they have themselves called wise and perfect.

Tangible interests are divisible, and because they admit of parts and degrees, they are at times compatible with good sense and at other times at least reconcilable with it. Conversely, honor, decorum, pride, and dignity are, like virginity, essentially indivisible because of mental construction; they can neither be lost nor regained in parts. The slightest injury is like the greatest one, since it destroys them in their entirety.

The practical consequence of this statement is immense. Thus, for example, the political rights of a man are his property just as are his health and his fortune. Whoever loses all or a part of these things suffers a misfortune, a decrease of his powers. But who can say that he who is healthy is honorable and that he who is ill is debased, just as we say that he who loses half of his fortune still has the other half and he who loses the hundredth part of his honor is left with none and is "totally vile." A bankrupt merchant can return to his work; a dishonored merchant cannot work and ought to shoot himself if he is an honorable man. A ruined nation should regain its honor by cleansing itself with human blood as the only remedy.

The ailment is the same for the patient in both cases, but the remedies to be applied depend upon the diagnosis. Every disease demands a different treatment. Sickness, misfortune, poverty, are things that can be cured by degrees. One can be

half-sick, half-overcome by misfortune, half-poor and from any of these states become gradually well, happy, rich. But since it is impossible to be half-noble and half-vile, half-honest and half-thief, half-patriot and half-traitor, there is nothing left except to be either wholly noble or vile, to be an honest man or a thief, a patriot or a traitor.

Consequently, if we apply the usual concept of personal conduct to nations; if we say that a government is disgraceful, that an injustice is an affront, that an abuse or a foolish act is a violation of national honor; that the dignity of our country has been trampled upon by a drunken public official, that our own pride has been hurt in the person of any son of a fellow-citizen, that an election — such as those held in all South and Central America — has smeared with mud the glorious Argentine name, we can admit of neither parts nor degrees nor manners nor bargainings, for we do not bargain concerning honor and pride. Therefore it follows that we cannot seek improvement by degrees; rather must we find the solution to our problems at once, in South American fashion. Consequently, if the triumph of our adversaries were a disgrace or dishonor to our country, sane and pure patriotism should imperatively urge us to prevent it by all possible means.

If we search the political documents from the year 1820 on, we shall find in almost all of them that deplorable attitude which looks at all questions from the standpoint of vanity and ends in intolerance. A man's chief concern is the true determinant of his line of conduct. When, for example, his desire is personal well-being, he finds little or no difficulty in acquiring it in sundry competition. Glory and honor, however, can neither be attained in installments nor enjoyed in common. O'Higgins and Carrera could not agree because there is never glory enough to divide among partners.

As we have said before, there is no government bad or good or honorable or infamous, except in the eyes of those who consider it such. Thus opinions on all questions are divided. Some consider as good and honorable the very things that others look upon as bad or dishonorable. Each one feels that his own opinion is true and, therefore, the opposing opinion, held by an adulterated people hostile to the genuine people, must be false. Accordingly, it makes no difference what kind of government we have, since its nature is entirely

determined by our judgment of it. But our conduct in regard to it remains logically and fatally subordinated to the classification to which we have assigned it, because if we have assigned it to the category of evils which in themselves are not subject to partial adjustment and which, by their very nature, call for a complete cure, we cannot apply to them curative remedies but must resort to radical amputation.

For instance, if we believe that the government is bad, it is possible to enter into a mutually profitable agreement through which the government may forego its evil tendencies, wholly or partially, in exchange for our assistance in respect to the remainder of its conduct. This action, however, is absolutely impossible if we believe that the government is disgraceful and dishonorable, because the very fact that we deal with it at all brings upon ourselves opprobrium and dishonor, thus adding to the world-wide disgrace of our country.

The government, in turn, may believe it dishonorable, humiliating and vexatious to yield to popular clamor; it may believe that those in the opposition are "unclean and savage Unitarians"; that they are "traitors to the country," that they dishonor it with their unpatriotic propaganda. As time goes on, it may believe that the opposition to our country is made up of ambitious ruffians and foreigners with neither voice nor vote in our affairs." With such knowledge of the situation it is clear that it would be extremely infamous and humiliating for men of honor to condescend to deal with such despicable rabble.

Now it is plain that both factions must necessarily be of the same class, mold, and element. They all lived in the same epoch, breathed the same air, had the same South American attitude of mind, had been ruled by the same pure reasoning, professed the same religion of honor, and had been dominated by the same whims of intellectual superiority, even though their fanaticisms, natural in a backward people, had different names and forms.

We may believe that the government of Don Luis Saenz Peña is a disgraceful one, even worse than that of Nero and Caligula. In fact, we may believe so with better reason since these rulers have not done us any harm and their actions do not concern us. It matters little whether a thing actually

exists or not. As long as we believe that it does, we are logical if we act accordingly.

South Americans have copied the North American institutions and thereafter have looked upon both bad and good governments as degrading, dishonorable, and humiliating. They have bungled all their borrowed constitutions by negating checks and balances of powers and parties, by causing the total annihilation of the opposition, and by making woefully necessary the reconstruction of the entire constitutional structure.

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CHAPTER XXX. WHEN LAWS CONFLICT WITH CUSTOM

We have seen that the mental attitude of the Argentine people is diametrically opposite to the mental attitude of their constitutional godfathers; the latter regulate reality, while we convert rationalized perfection, pure theory, into positive law in order later to adjust real and living facts of life to classical folds of fantasy. Our grandfathers made the garment to fit the body, the shoe to fit the foot; we, with our super-perfect laws, adopt the Chinese fashion of making first a small shoe and then forcing the human foot into it.

"The Constitutions," says Sarmiento in a letter addressed to General Urquiza in October, 1852, "are not written just for the sake of writing them, but they are written 'for future generations'; not because of the exceptional circumstances of the moment in which they are framed, but 'in contemplation of the future.' On this account it is important to endow them with all the prestige of scientific knowledge in order that they may be obeyed and respected. Your Excellency has noted that 'lawful' resistance against mischievous but "constitutional" acts has not ceased. . . ."

Here we have a confused, if not definitely absurd, thought. Do future constitutions rule in the present? Constitutions written for the future and for the present also — unless they have in view a particular emergency — are not adaptable to the future. Constitutions framed for the future, can they be adapted to the present? If constitutions are not written for the future, what, then, is the meaning of the phrases: "lawful" resistance, mischievous but "constitutional" acts? How can the common people of today "understand," obey and respect

constitutions written for the future by a few learned men? Are present "lawful" impediments of a constitution and contemporary crafty procedures against future "legalities" possible? Note how correctly Taine evaluated actual facts: "The only type of government or liberty a people can have is one capable of being adjusted to the social and political environment created by the circumstances of the moment, by their own aptitudes and by the 'logical' elements which seek their true level of culture." Lycurgus, to paraphrase Macaulay, founded his whole system on a mistaken principle. He never considered that governments were made for men, and not men for governments. Instead of adapting the constitution to the people, he distorted the minds of the people to suit the constitution.

In England, there is no danger of rats chewing to bits the Magna Charta or carrying away the national treasury. Should this happen, however, the English would not have to rewrite their constitution "once and forever," because their institutions are not ornaments, but integral parts of the body politic. The constitution, without having the disadvantage of being reduced to writing, is an energizing force in the vitals of the national organism; it pulsates in the blood because it rests on convention and impregnates customs because it is secreted by customs. On the other hand, we South Americans, who use our institutions like manufactured goods, would have to order their immediate replacement if we should ever lose those now in existence.

Although we see that the North American constitution — amended and increased to unwieldy size — does not fit our social body, no matter how perfect, on paper, the balance of the governmental powers may be or how well power checks power, we shall not ask that the long skirts now entangling our infant legs of Reason be cut off; nor shall we shout because men "do not practice" what the constitution "says," because we know that they will not obey the constitution. We realize that clamoring will not North-Americanize the understanding of our fellow citizens, and truth cannot be injected by means of the garrote or bombs of dynamite. Nor shall we try to perfect our times by means of bullets; we shall, however, contribute our small share to the gradual uplifting of public conscience and reason to the level of the fundamental

AGUSTIN ENRIQUE ALVAREZ SUAREZ

law, so that the spirit of the written law and the judge who applies it may draw near to each other, get acquainted, esteem and serve each other.

JOSE INGENIEROS (1877 - 1925)

ARGENTINA

In some respects, the *Mediocre Man* is a book expressing the literary trends of the turn of the century better than the character of the author's own social thought. But it interests us as his most widely read book and also because it is a work which influenced the thought of a whole generation. Ingenieros was already well known as a physician and scholar when his failure to receive a deserved university appointment caused him to leave Argentina for a period of self-imposed exile in Switzerland. *Mediocre Man* was a product of this period. First published in 1920, it went through numerous editions.¹

Basically, Ingenieros expresses the evolutionary social thought of Herbert Spencer, but with considerable influence from the psychologism of Tarde.² His work has a strongly moralistic basis, with occasional tones of a kind of stoical idealism, like that of Rodó. Although differing from Rodó's *Ariel* in its premises and development, the *Mediocre Man* achieved an idealistic appeal to university youth of the day comparable to that made by the Uruguayan classic. It made Ingenieros one of the outstanding intellectual forces shaping the mentality of the rising student generation. Haya de la Torre, for example, ranks him with José Vasconcelos as one of the two greatest influences in the student movement for university reform,³ of which Haya was himself an outstanding early leader.

His omnivorous reading led Ingenieros to delve into most of the new philosophical and sociological trends of his day. For years he edited a philosophical journal which enjoyed wide circulation. Hence it is not surprising to find him, in the following selection, accepting something like the new concept of being or existence emanating from German thought. Occasionally the influence of Anglo-American empiricism may also be seen. Most notable, however, is the influence of his psychological and psychiatric training, which modified his social evolutionism

1. The most recent edition is in Vol. X of the twenty volume *Obras completas* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Elmer, 1956).
2. Francisco Larroyo, *La filosofía americana*, pp. 117-119.
3. *¿A dónde va Indoamérica?* The statement was made ten years before this book was published in 1936.

by the introduction of concepts of imitation, simulation, and pretense, as when he explained race conflicts as fictions invented to cover up real conflicts of interests. His *Simulation in the Struggle for Existence* expresses many of these ideas, and they also run through his *Argentine Sociology*.

Ingenieros imbibed Marxist socialism from his father, Salvador Ingenieros, an Italian immigrant labor leader and journalist. But after a brief youthful phase of political agitation he ceased to be an orthodox Marxist, and his thought became more broadly scientific and positivist.

He was born in Buenos Aires on April 24, 1877, and was educated in the Colegio Nacional and in the University of Buenos Aires, studying first law and, later, medicine. It was the positivist physician, Dr. José María Ramos Mejía, who turned Ingenieros toward medicine, becoming in other ways, as well, a major influence in his intellectual orientation. Although he died in 1925, at the early age of forty-seven, his voluminous writing had already produced 515 items in his bibliography.

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THE MEDIOCRE MAN

BY JOSÉ INGENIEROS

(From *El hombre mediocre*, 3rd. ed. Vol. X of *Obras completas*. Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso, 1917, pp. 7-14, 44-54, 198-218).

EMOTION OF THE IDEA

When you turn an imaginary prow toward a star and take wing toward such unattainable heights, anxious for perfection and rebelling against mediocrity, you carry within yourself the mysterious resource of an ideal. It is a sacred flame capable of tempering you for important actions. Guard it! If you let it go out it will never be rekindled. And if it dies within you it remains cold, inert human refuse. You live only through this particle of a dream that raises you above reality. It is the lily on your escutcheon, the helmet crest of your temperament. Innumerable signs reveal it — when your throat constricts at the memory of the hemlock forced upon Socrates, the cross raised for Christ, or the blaze kindled for Bruno; when you become absorbed in the infinite while reading one of Plato's dialogues, an essay of Montaigne, or one of Helvetius' discourses; when your heart shudders at the unhappy outcome of those passions in which you were first the Romeo of some Juliet and then the Werther of some Carlotta; when your temples freeze with the emotion of reciting a stanza by Musset that strikes a cord in your feelings; and when, in sum, you admire the deservedly respected minds of wise men, the sublime virtue of saints, the superb acts of heroes, bowing with equal veneration before the creators of Truth and Beauty.

Not everyone delights as you do in the half light of dusk, or dreams dreams in the sunrise, or bows before a storm. Not everyone likes to walk with Dante, to laugh with Moliere, to tremble with Shakespeare, to resound with Wagner, or to stand in silent awe before a David, a Last Supper, or a Parthenon. Only to a few comes this restlessness of avidly pursuing some chimera, venerating philosophers, artists, and thinkers who base their visions of being and eternity on supreme syntheses, flying beyond reality. Beings of your stock, whose imagination is peopled with ideals and whose feeling orients their entire personality toward these ideals, form a race apart within humanity. They are the idealists. In defining his own emotion,

he who feels himself a poet might say the Ideal is a gesture of the spirit toward some perfection.

IDEALISM BASED UPON EXPERIENCE

The philosophers of the future, in order to achieve increasingly exact expression, will leave to the poets the beautiful privilege of figurative language. Future systems, shaking off ancient mystic and dialectical residues, will posit experience as the basis of all legitimate hypothesis.

It is not venturesome to think that in the future ethics a moral idealism will flourish independent of religious dogma and of metaphysical apriorisms. Ideals of perfection, founded on social experience, and like it evolutionary, will constitute the inner nexus of a doctrine of infinite perfectibility, propitious to all the possibilities of human improvement.

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Human evolution is a continuous effort of man to adapt himself to nature, which in turn evolves. For this, man must recognize the reality about him and anticipate the tenor of the appropriate adaptations, the roads to this perfection. Its stages are reflected in the human mind as ideals. A man, a group, or a race are idealists because advantageous circumstances lead their imaginations to conceive of attainable perfections.

Ideals are natural formations. They appear when the thought process achieves such development that the imagination can anticipate experience. They are not entities mysteriously instilled in man, nor are they born by chance. They are formed like all phenomena accessible to our observation. They are the effects of causes, accidents in the universal evolution investigated by the sciences and systematized in philosophies. And once understood, the process is easy to explain. Our solar system is a point in the cosmos; in that point the planet we inhabit is a simple detail; within that detail life is a transitory chemical equilibrium on its surface; the human species dates from a very brief period in the complications of that pulsing equilibrium. The process of thought is developed in man as an achievement in adaption to environment. One of its forms is imagination, which permits generalizing the data of experience, anticipating its possible results, and abstracting from it ideals of perfection.

Thus, the philosophy of the future, rather than denying such ideals, will permit affirming their reality as a legitimate aspect of the thought process and will restore them in the natural conception of the universe. An ideal is a point and a moment among the infinite possibilities which people space and time.

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To evolve is to vary. In human evolution thought varies constantly. All variation is acquired by a predisposed temperament; useful variations tend to be retained. Experience determines the natural formation of generic concepts, each time more synthetic. Imagination draws from these concepts certain common characteristics, building general ideas which may be hypotheses concerning the continuous becoming (*devenir*). Thus are formed ideals, which for man are norms of conduct in harmony with his hypotheses. These are not *a priori* [in nature] but derived from broad experience in order to foresee the course which humanity will take. All ideals represent a new state of equilibrium between the past and the future.

Ideals are not necessarily truths, they are beliefs. Their force rests in their affective elements and they exercise influence over our acts in proportion as we believe them. Hence abstract representation of future variations acquires a moral value; those most beneficial to the species are conceived of as improvements. The future is identified with perfection, and ideals, being anticipated views of the future, influence conduct and are the natural instrument of all human progress.

While teaching is limited to presenting ideas which present experience considers most correct, education consists in suggesting the ideals considered most likely to result in perfection.

The concept of the best is a natural result of evolution itself. Life tends naturally toward perfecting itself. Aristotle taught that activity is a movement of the being toward its own entelechy, its state of perfection. All that exists pursues this entelechy and the tendency is reflected in all the other functions of the spirit. The formation of ideals is subject to a determinism, which though complex is no less absolute. They are not the

product of a freedom that escapes universal laws, nor are they the product of a pure reason which no one understands. They are approximate beliefs concerning future perfection. The future is the best of the present, since it survives through natural selection. Ideals are an élan for the best, rather than simple anticipation of change.

To the extent that human experience expands, observing reality, ideals are modified by the imagination, which is creative and never rests. Experience and imagination follow parallel routes, though the former lags far behind the latter. Hypothesis flies, fact trudges; at times the wing may falter, while the foot always remains on firm ground. But flight may be corrected while the plodding step can never soar.

Imagination is the mother of all originality; deforming reality toward its perfection, imagination creates ideals, giving them impulse with the illusory sentiment of liberty. Free will is an error useful for the gestation of ideals. Hence it has, in practice, the value of reality. To demonstrate that it is a simple illusion resulting from ignorance of innumerable causative factors does not imply denial of its effectiveness. Illusions have as much value in directing conduct as the most precise truths. They may have more if they are thought or felt intensely. The desire to be free is born of the meeting of two irreducible forces —the tendency of the being (*ser*) to persist, implied in heredity, and the tendency toward growth in the being, implied in variation. One is a principle of stability, the other of progress.

In every ideal, whatever the order toward whose perfectioning it tends, there is a principle of synthesis and continuity — “it is a fixed idea or a fixed emotion.” As propellants of human activity these balance and interact reciprocally, although in the former reason predominates and in the latter passion. “This principle of unity, is the center of attraction and the fulcrum of all labor of the creative imagination, that is to say, of a subjective synthesis which tends to be objectified in its ideal,” said Ribot. Imagination strips reality of all evil and adorns it with all good purifying experience, fitting it into the patterns of perfection it considers most pure. Ideals, as a consequence, are imaginative preconstructions of the reality to come.

They are always individual. A collective ideal is the coincidence of numerous individuals in a similar quest for

perfection. It is not that an "idea" unites them, but that an analogous way of feeling and thinking converges toward an "ideal" common to all of them. Each era, century, or generation can have its ideal; it is wont to be the patrimony of a select minority, whose strength continues to impose it upon succeeding generations. Each ideal may be engendered in a single genius. While he defines or forms it, it is understood only by the small nucleus of spirits sensible to the rhythm of the new belief.

The abstract concept of a possible perfection takes its strength from the truth which men attribute to it. All ideals are a faith in the very possibility of perfection. In its involuntary protest against evil, an indestructable hope of improvement is always revealed; in its aggression against the past, it ferments a healthy leavening of the future.

It is not an end but a road. Like all beliefs, it is always relative. The intensity with which it tends to be achieved depends not on its effective validity but on that attributed to it. Even though the coming improvement is erroneously interpreted, it is an ideal for anyone who sincerely believes in its truth or its loftiness.

To reduce idealism to a dogma of metaphysics is equivalent to castrating it. To call idealism the fantasies of sick or ignorant minds, seeking to sublimate their incapacity to live and to succeed, is one of those superficialities proffered by those who play with words. The more common philosophical dictionaries suggest that this confusion may be deliberate: "Idealism: an extremely vague word that should not be used without explaining it."

There are as many idealisms as ideals, as many ideals as idealists, and as many idealists as men able to conceive of perfection and capable of living their dreams. The monopoly in ideals should be refused to those who claim it in the name of philosophical schools, moral systems, religious creeds, sectarian fanaticisms, or esthetic dogmas.

"Idealism" is not the private preserve of the spiritualist doctrines which would oppose it to "materialism," as they contemptuously classify all other doctrines. That error, so exploited by the enemies of science—rightly feared as the source of truth and freedom—is repeated in the suggestion that the

material is the antithesis of the idea, after confusing ideal with idea and the latter with the spirit, as a transcendent thing and outside the real world. Obviously this is a play on words, repeated endlessly by their adherents, transferring to philosophical doctrines the meanings which the terms idealism and materialism have in the moral order. Zeal for perfection in the knowledge of the truth can motivate equally the monist and the dualist philosopher, the theologian and the atheist, the stoic and the pragmatist. The particular ideal of each one contributes to the over-all rhythm of possible perfection, rather than hindering the similar efforts of others.

Still narrower is the tendency to confuse idealism, which refers to ideals, with metaphysical tendencies which are so named because they consider "ideas" more real than reality itself, or presuppose that they are the only reality, forged by our mind, as in the Hegelian system. Those who believe in the reality of ideas (*ideólogos*) cannot be equated with "idealists," although bad usage leads one to think so.

Nor could we confine it [idealism] to the pretended idealism of certain esthetic schools, because all types of naturalism and realism may constitute an artistic ideal when their prophets are Michelangelo, Titian, Flaubert, or Wagner. The imaginative power of those who pursue an ideal harmony of rhythm, of colors, of lines, or of sounds is the same, provided that their work shows a standard of beauty or an original personality.

Nor should we confuse it, finally, with a certain ethical idealism which tends to claim a monopoly of perfection for one of the predominant religious fanaticisms in each epoch. Since there is no single and invariable ideal Good, it would be hard to express it in catechisms for dull minds. The individual striving for virtue can be as magnificently conceived and carried out by the peripatetic as by the Cyrenaic, by the Christian as by the anarchist, by the philanthropist as by the epicurean; for all philosophical theories are equally compatible with the individual aspiration for human perfection. They all can be idealists if they know how to enlighten themselves in their doctrine, just as all doctrines may embrace worthwhile men and quacks, virtuous persons and shameless ones. The desire for and the possibility of perfection are not the property of any single creed. Remember the water of that fountain mentioned by Plato, that no vessel could hold.

Experience and it alone decides the legitimacy of ideals in each time and place. In the give and take of social life they are selected naturally; the fittest survive, those which best foresee the course of evolution, that is, those in accord with effective improvement. So long as experience has not rendered judgment, every ideal is worthy, no matter how absurd it seems. And it is useful for its strength of contrast. If it is wrong it will die of itself, harmless. Every ideal, being a belief, may contain a portion of error or be entirely wrong. It is a far off vision and hence likely to be inexact. The only evil is to lack ideals and to be enslaved to the contingencies of practical, day-to-day life, renouncing the possibility of moral perfection.

MEN WITHOUT PERSONALITY

From the standpoint of the individual, mediocrity may be defined as an absence of the personal characteristics which permit an individual to be distinguished from his society. This lack tends to give everyone the same bundle of habits, prejudices, and domesticities. It suffices to gather a hundred men together for them to resolve themselves into something impersonal. "Gather a thousand personalities in a council and you will have the soul of a mediocre man." Those words point out that when that quality in every man which does not pertain to him alone is multiplied many times, the result is the low level of collective opinions.

Individual personality begins at that point where each person differs from others. In many men this point is simply imaginary. For that reason, in classifying human personalities, it is necessary to separate those who lack characteristic traits, who are chance products of environment, of circumstances, of the education given them, of the persons who have taught them, of the things which surround them. Ribot⁴ has termed "indifferents" those who live without their existence being noticed. Society thinks for them and is fond of them. They have no voice, not even an echo. Their very shadow, scarcely a penumbra, shows no definite lines.

They move stealthily through the world, like smugglers of life, fearful that someone may reproach them for daring to live uselessly, like contrabandists of life. And they are just that.

4. Theodule Armand Ribot (1839-1916) stressed physiological aspects of psychology. — Trans.

Although as men we lack a transcendental mission on this earth, on whose surface we live as naturally as the rose and the worm, our life is not worthy of being lived except when some ideal ennobles it. The highest pleasures arise from proposing perfection for oneself and then striving to attain it. Vegetative existences have no biography. Only he who leaves his mark in things, or on spirits, lives in the history of his society. Life has value because of the use we make of it, because of the works we achieve. That man has not lived more who merely counts more years, but he who has better sensed an ideal. Grey hair bespeaks old age, but does not tell how much youth preceded it. The social measure of a man lies in the durability of his works. Immortality is the privilege of those whose works, outlive the centuries, and is in turn measured by them.

Power wielded, favors granted, fortune amassed, and honors acquired have an ephemeral value which may satisfy the appetite of one who does not have within himself, in his inherent virtues, the moral strength which embellishes and gives quality to life—the affirmation of the real personality and the degree of manliness required in the dignifying of our ego. To live is to learn, in order to be ignorant of fewer things. To live is to love, in order to bind oneself to a larger part of humanity. To live is to admire, in order to share the excellences of nature and of man. It is an effort to better oneself, a never-ending zeal for progress toward defined ideals.

Many are born; few live. Men without personality are innumerable. They vegetate, molded by environment, stamped like wax by the social die. Their catechismal morality and their rectangular intelligence constrain them to disciplined regularity of thought and conduct. As social entities their existence is negative.

The man of strong character is capable of sublime rage, like that of the ocean. In the domesticated temperaments everything has a quiet surface, as in the marshes. Lack of a personality makes such men incapable of initiative and of resistance. They parade unnoticed, learning nothing and teaching nothing, dissipating in tedium their insipidity, vegetating in a society which ignores their existence, zeros on the left which qualify nothing and have no value. Their lack of moral robustness makes them yield to the lightest pressure, succumb to all influences high or low, great or small. They

are transitorily blown to the heights by the gentlest zephyr or bowled over by the tiny wave of a little brook. Ships of ample sail but rudderless, they do not know how to plot their own course. They do not know whether they will be grounded on a sandy beach or dashed to pieces against a reef.

They are everywhere, although we may search in vain for one who is recognizable. If we were to find such a one, he would be original simply for being enveloped in mediocrity. Who does not attribute to himself some virtue, a certain talent, or a firm character? Dull intelligences often boast of their stubbornness, confusing paralysis with that firmness which is the gift of a chosen few. Scoundrels brag of their dissimulation and impudence, confusing these qualities with genius. The servile and the cowardly pride themselves on their honesty, as if the incapacity for evil could ever be confused with virtue.

If the high opinion all men have of themselves were taken into account, it would be impossible even to discuss those who are characterized by lack of personality. Everyone believes he has one, one very much his own. No one notices that society has subjected him to that arithmetical operation which consists of reducing many quantities to a common denominator: mediocrity.

Let us study, therefore, these enemies of all perfection, who can not see the stars. A vast bibliography exists on these inferior and inadequate [beings], from the criminal and the raving to the retarded and the idiot. There is also a rich literature devoted to the study of genius and talent, over and above the convergence of history and art upon maintaining their cult. All of these, however, are exceptions. The average is neither genius nor idiocy, it is neither talent nor imbecility. The man who surrounds us by the thousands, the one who prospers and reproduces in silence and in darkness, is the mediocre.

CONCERNING THE MEDIOCRE MAN

It has sometimes been attempted, under different names and from diverse points of view, to define the man without a personality. Philosophy, statistics, anthropology, psychology, esthetics, and ethics have helped to establish more or less exact types. The essentially social aspect of mediocrity, however, has not been taken into account. Mediocre Man, like the human

personality in general, can only be defined in relation to the society in which he lives, and by his social function.

If we could measure individual values they would fall into a continuous scale graduated from the lowest to the highest. Between the extreme and rare types, we would observe an abundant mass of subjects, more or less alike, clustered in the central grades of the scale. It would be a vain illusion for anyone to search there for the hypothetical archetype of humanity, the Normal Man, whom Aristotle sought. Centuries later, this same strange manifestation reappeared in the somewhat disorganized spirit of Pascal.⁵ The mean, we know, is not synonymous with normality. The Normal Man does not exist, he cannot exist. Humanity, with all of its living species, evolves constantly. Its changes take place unequally in the numerous social groups, differing one from the other. The Normal Man in one society is not that of another. The Normal Man of a thousand years ago would not be such today, nor in the future.

Morel⁶ erred in forgetting this fact, when he conceived normal man as an example of the "first edition" of humanity, launched into circulation by the Supreme Maker. Upon this premise he defined procreation, in all its forms, as a pathological divergence from the perfect original example. From this position to the cult of primitive man was but a step. Contemporary anthropologists, happily, have departed from such a prejudice. Man — we now say — is an animal evolved in the more recent geological ages of the earth. He was not perfect in origin, nor does his perfection lie in returning to his ancestral forms, arising from similar animalism. If we did not believe thus, we should revive the amusing legends of the fallen angel, the tree of good and evil, the tempting serpent, the apple accepted by Adam, and paradise lost.

Quetelet⁷ tried to formulate an anthropological social doctrine concerning the average man. His essay is a statistical inquiry complicated by naive applications of the abused maxim, *in medio stat virtus*. Let us not commit the error of assuming that mediocre man can be recognized by physical or moral

5. Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). — Trans.

6. Federic Morel (1558-1630). — Trans.

7. Lambert Quetelet (1796-1874), Belgian astronomer, meteorologist and statistician. — Trans.

attributes which represent a middle point among those observed in the human species. In this sense, he would be an abstraction, not corresponding to any actually existing individual.

The concept of human normality must be relative to a given social environment. Are those normal who best "toe the line," who align themselves most exactly in the ranks of social conventionalism? In this sense, *normal man* would not be a synonym of the well balanced man but of the *domesticated man*. Passivity is not an equilibrium, it is not the complicated resultant of energies, but of their absence. How can great balanced personalities such as Leonardo and Goethe ever be confused with amorphous ones? The balance between two loaded plates of a scale is not to be compared with the tranquility of an empty scale. The man without personality is not a model but a shadow. If there are dangers in the worship of heroes and representative men, in the manner of Carlyle or Emerson, there are more dangers in repeating those fables which let us consider as an aberration all excellence of character, of virtue, and of intellect. Bovio⁸ has pointed out this great error, picturing the average man as having precise psychological traits: "He is docile, readily adjustable to all small opportunities, adaptable to all of the temperatures of a variable day, shrewd in business, resistant to the combining of businesses; but, taken out of his mediocre sphere and immersed in a happy combination of intrigues, he always plunges downward precisely because he is a balancer and does not have within himself the power of equilibrium. 'Balancer' does not mean 'balanced'. This is the most grave prejudice concerning the equilibrated mediocre man and the unequilibrated genius."

This feigned equilibrium is placed, by its most indulgent commentators, among those qualities little deserving of admiration, provoking more pity than envy. Lombroso once received a characteristically North American telegram. As it turned out, it was from a large newspaper, accompanied by the suggestive recommendation of a cheque, and requested a long telegraphed reply to the question "What is a Normal Man?" His answer no doubt disturbed the paper's readers. Far from extolling the virtues of the normal man, he drew a picture of negative and sterile character: "good appetite, orderly, egotistical,

8. Giovanni Bovio (1841-1903), Italian philosopher. — Trans.

headstrong in his habits, misogynist, patient, respectful of all authority, a domesticated animal."

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This definition recalls, with few variants, that of the Philistine: "A product of custom, devoid of imagination, embellished with all the virtues of mediocrity, living an honest life thanks to the modesty of his needs, lazy intellectually, carrying with moving patience the whole bundle of prejudices inherited from his ancestors." In these lines are reflected the now classic invectives of Heine against the mentality which he believed common among his fellow citizens. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, in his *Aphorisms*, defined the perfect Philistine as one who allows himself to be deceived by appearances and takes social dogmas seriously, and is constantly occupied with adjusting himself to the human comedy.

To these definitions of the average man, others of an intellectual or esthetic character may be added — not lacking in interest, although one-sided. For some, mediocrity would consist of the inability to exercise the highest qualities of genius; for others, it would be the inclination to think on the ground level. The mediocre would be the bourgeois, in contrast to the artist. Flaubert defined him as "A man who thinks basely." Judged by this criterion the average man seemed to him detestable.

Such a view appears in the magnificent sketch of Hello,⁹ the trail blazing Christian author, whom Rubén Darío taught us to admire. He distinguishes the mediocre man from the imbecile. The latter stands at one extreme of the world and genius stands at the other. The mediocre man is in the middle. Is he then what in philosophy, or in politics, or in literature is called an eclectic or the golden mean (*justo-medio*)? Neither he answers. He who is the golden mean knows it; he is such by design. The mediocre man is at the exact mean without knowing it. He is that way by nature, not by his own design; by character, not by accident. During every minute of his life, and in whatever state of spirit, he will always be mediocre. His characteristic action, absolutely unmistakable, is his preference for the opinion of others. He never asserts, he always repeats. He judges men as he hears them judged. He would revere his most cruel adversary, if the latter were honored. He will heap

9. Ernesto Heller (1828-1885) French religious mystic. — Trans.

disdain upon his best friend if no one praises him. His discernment lacks initiative. His ambitions are prudent. His enthusiasms are official. That descriptive definition similar to those which Barbey D'Aurevilly might give, possesses a very suggestive eloquence, although it begins with esthetic premises and ends with moral conclusions.

The "normal man" of Bovio and Lombroso corresponds to the "Philistine" of Heine and Schopenhauer, both resembling the anti-artistic "bourgeois" of Flaubert and Barbey D'Aurevilly. But it is necessary to recognize that such definitions lack certainty from the point of view of social psychology. We must search for one more exact and less equivocal that attacks the problem along other lines.

SOCIAL CONCEPT OF MEDIOCRITY

No man is exceptional in all of his aptitudes, but it may be affirmed that those who excel in none are, to the very letter, mediocre. They parade before us like simple examples of natural history, with as much right as the geniuses and the imbeciles. They exist; we must study them. The moralist would say, later, whether mediocrity is good or bad. The psychologist, for the time being, is indifferent. He observes the characters in the social medium in which they live, he describes them, he compares them and classifies them just as other naturalists observe fossils in the bed of a river or butterflies in the corolla of a flower.

Despite their infinite individual differences, groups of men exist who can be classified within common types. Such classifications, simply approximations, constitute the science of human characteristics, ethnology, which recognizes Theophrastus as its father. The ancients based it on temperaments. The moderns look for its basis in the preponderance of certain psychological functions. Those classifications, though admissible from a special point of view, are insufficient for us.

If we observe any human society, the value of its components is always relative to the whole: man is a social value.

Every individual is the product of two factors: heredity and education. The first tends to provide him with the organs and

mental functions which were transmitted to him by previous generations; the second is the result of the multiple influences of the social medium in which he must live. This educational action is, as a consequence, an adaptation of the hereditary tendencies to the collective mentality: a continuous acclimatization of the individual to Society.

The child develops as an animal of the human species, until he begins to distinguish the inert qualities of human beings and to recognize among them his fellow creatures. The beginnings of his education are, then, directed by the persons who surround him, the influence of the environment becoming constantly more decisive. Since environment predominates, he evolves as a member of his society, and his habits are established by imitation. Later, variations acquired in the course of his individual experience may cause the man to be characterized as a person differentiated within the society in which he lives.

Imitation fulfills a very extensive, almost exclusive role, in the formation of the social personality. Invention, on the other hand, produces individual variations. The former is conservative and acts to form habits. The latter is evolutionary and is developed through the imagination. The different adaptation of each individual to his environment depends upon the balance between what he imitates and what he invents. All cannot invent or imitate in the same manner, since these aptitudes are exercised on the basis of a certain innate capability, initially unequal, received through psychological inheritance.

The predominance of variation determines originality. To vary is to be somebody. To differ is to have a character of one's own, a panache, large or small: an emblem, in a word, that one does not live as a simple reflection of others. The prime function of the mediocre man is imitative patience; that of the superior man is creative imagination. The mediocre aspires to lose himself among those who surround him; the original tends to separate himself from them. While one strives to think with the head of society, the other strives to think with his own. This is the basis of the distrust which usually surrounds original characters. Nothing appears to be so dangerous as a man who aspires to think for himself.

ARCHTYPES OF MEDIOCRITY

The archtypes of mediocrity pass through history with the superficial pomp of fugitive Chinese shadow shows. No insult or praise reaches their ears, they are never called "heroes" or "tyrants"; in the popular imagination they awaken a uniform echo, repeated everywhere, "the peacock!" — in a synthesis sharper than a stone inscription. Their psychological trinomial is simple: vanity, impotence, and favoritism.

They live on emotional demonstrations, which touch only the forms of things. Austere sobriety of gesture is an attribute of men; sumptuousity of appearance is the boast of shadows. After hatching their anxieties, trembling in humility before their associates, they conceal themselves in vapors and shield themselves in fatuities. They forget that to boast of rank is to admit inferiority to it. They build up pompous contrivances to fool domestic imaginations; they surround themselves with lackeys, they adopt pleonastic nomenclatures, they centuplicate expedients, they strut about in showy clothes, they sail elaborate bucentaurs, they dream of receptions beyond the oceans. They expose both flanks to the laughing irony of the scoffers, showing in everything a certain second-hand fatuity which recalls the comic opera courts and lords. Their melodramatic emphasis would befit the characters of Hugo and would tickle the Voltarian egotism of Stendhal.

In their placating Adonis cult (*adonismo contemplativo*) there is no room for ambition, which is an energetic effort to increase one's own merits through works. The ambitious person wants to rise as far as his own wings will lift him; the vain man believes that he is already on the high summit coveted by others. Among all the passions, ambition stands out for its beauty if vanity does not disgrace it. Hence, it is respectable in geniuses and ridiculous in fools.

They prink themselves constantly with pompous platitudes. Suspecting that ideals exist, they fancy themselves their sustainers. They always adopt those most consonant with the morality of their mediocrity. They get intimations of the truth, at times, because it enters everywhere, more subtle than adulation. But they maim, attenuate, and corrupt it, with accommodations, with crutches, and with alterations which disfigure it. In certain cases, truth is stronger than they. It

springs into view despite them and is their punishment. They parade good intentions when they have the least strength to convert them into acts. Their innate childishness is translated into puritanical prattle. Their ineptitude becomes comical in its disguise of idealism. The vague principles which they opportunistically apply are fragile. Time discovers the right principle to those who stand for it, pointing it out, although they may never cut from its cloth a costume to clothe their mediocrity.

They are tributaries of the seventh cardinal sin. In their impotence there is laziness. They renounce authority and conserve pomp; the former could cause merit to shine, the latter adorns vanity. They enjoy rest, they avoid doing the little they could do, they avoid all hard labor, they separate themselves from all combat, declaring themselves spectators. They may do evil through inertia and good by mistake. "The lazy," said Voltaire, "are never anything but mediocre people, no matter what their type."¹⁰ However detestable governors may be, they are never worse than when they fail to govern. The evil which tyrants do is a visible enemy; the inertia of poltroons, on the other hand, implies a mysterious abandonment of the function by the organ — the headlessness, the death of authority by a physical degeneration incurable by medicine. It is conscienceless for a man to govern peoples when illness or old age has deprived him of the ability to govern himself.

The lack of intrinsic inspiration makes them easy prey to the pressure of conspirators, to the intrigue of their domestics, to the adulation of courtiers, to the pressures of intriguers, to the threats of journalists, to the influence of the sacristy. Their conduct reveals transparently their weakness toward whoever accosts them; not even their pompous wars against windmills can hide it. When they attain power they renounce it, in fact, convinced of their inability to use it. They resign themselves to the current of the river, like novices in swimming. Riding colts whose gyrations they do not understand, they close their eyes and let go of the reins. This inability to grasp the reins with their inexpert hands they call submission to democracy.

Favoritism is their bondage, at the head of a hundred interests which importune them. They ignore the sentiment of

10. "*Les paresseux ne sont jamais que des gens médiocres, en quelque genre que ce soit.*"

justice and respect for merit. The truly just resists the temptation of not being so when he will benefit personally; the mediocre always yields. He professes an abstract equity in those cases which do not harm the interests of his accomplices, but becomes an accomplice in fact in all their chicanery (*zirigañas*). Never, absolutely, can there be justice in preferring the lackey to the worthy, the crooked to the upright, the ignorant to the studious, the intriguer to the gentleman, the coward to the brave. This is the moral corruptness of societies governed by mediocrities: placing favoritism ahead of merit. In a regime of favoritism, as [in walking] upon quivering morasses, those who step firmly are bogged down, while those who creep meekly advance. When merit reproaches the archtypes for their faults, the latter argue humbly that they are not infallible. But their vileness consists in underlining their excuses with tempting offers, accustomed as they are to commercializing honor. He who confuses a diamond with things of no value (*bazofia*) cannot be a judge. When the responsibility of governing is accepted, "to make a mistake is a fault," as Epictetus said. Societies ruled by mediocrities do not know that dignity never comes on bended knee to the halls of justice of those who govern.

[Their conduct] frequently repeats the legendary tale of Midas. Pan dared to pit his flute of seven reeds against Appollo's lyre, proposing to the god of harmony a contest, with the ancient Phrygian king as judge. The rustic melodies of Pan resounded, and Appollo compassed the range of his divine harmony. All decided that the flute was not equal to the lyre. But although the agreement [of the concourse] was unanimous, the king claimed the victory for the flute. At once two (donkey) ears started to grow on his head — Appollo was avenged and Pan took refuge in the shadows. The confused judge tried to hide the ears under his crown, but a bedchamber groom discovered them. Fleeing to a distant valley, the king dug a well, into which he told his secret. But the truth can not be buried. The rose bushes which sprang up, swaying in the breeze, repeat eternally that Midas has the ears of an ass.

History punishes as severely as in this legend. A page of history lives longer than a rose bush. No one asks whether those who crucified Christ, burned Bruno, or scoffed at Columbus were knaves or tender hearted. Their condemnation

is alike ineradicable. Justice is respect for merit. A Marcus Aurelius knows that each generation has ten or twenty privileged persons, and his genius consists in encouraging them all. A [Sancho] Panza excludes them from his island, using only those who are domesticated, that is to say, the worst in character and morality. Those who listen to the servile instead of interrogating the worthy are always unjust. Those who deserve justice never ask favors. Nor do they accept them. It is natural for the depraved to prefer their equals. It is correct that "the dullness of the bourgeois, mortified by the natural pride of superiority, seeks to elevate an equal who has easy access to him and in whose mentality he finds understanding and the basis for satisfaction." But the hour arrives when the crimes of those who govern are irremissibly repaid with exorbitant compounded interest. [For injustices] against one damage all worthy persons. To leave them unpunished is to become an accomplice. Sooner or later their mistakes must be liquidated, and although their errors never end, the archtypes of mediocrity learn [at last] through the suffering of their own flesh that for lack of a nail a horse-shoe is lost.

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Societies of mediocrities deny to their archtypes the right to choose their opportunities. They harness them in government when the organism vacillates and the brain is exhausted. They prefer the useless and the obtuse. Men who are repudiated as youths are raised up in their old age—at that age when good intentions grow out of the weariness from bad habits. They elect those who are slaves to their stomachs, eat until surfeited and drink until stupefied, ruin their health in nights of revelry, lower their dignity in the bankruptcy of the green gambling tables, and become incapable of any continuous or productive effort, bringing on that decrepitude in which the kidneys become fossilized and the liver becomes sugar syrup (*se almibara*). This [decrepitude] is the best protection for the docile flock, whose hatred of originality impels it toward those men who begin to mummify while living.

While old age continues to erase the last personal traits of the archtypes, their accomplices conspire to conceal their progressive degeneration, exempting them from all tasks and strengthening them by ingenuous fictions. Little by little the decrepit old man (*carcamal*) escapes from his natural habitat

and isolates himself. He avoids occasions when he must exhibit himself in full light, displaying himself in small windows, where the peacock can make shining, though distant display, of the hundred eyes of Argos on his tail. Uncertain now in thinking, they need, more than ever, the incense from the censers. Flattery finally covers them with [holy] oil. Praises redouble as they gradually disappear, their brains ruined by shameful diseases contracted in the brothel behaviour of courtesans.

The dawn comes implacably, like a slow fire, little by little as if destiny wished to strip bare its vacuity bit by bit, proving it to the most stubborn, to those who might still think that these were to die suddenly, without this slow fading out.

It suffices for one free man to denounce them for posterity to place on them the shroud of the dead. His single word more than suffices if he is virtuous, stoic, incorruptible, and resolved to sacrifice himself without a backward glance, provided only he is loyal to his dignity — a single word more than suffices to erase the adulations of the courtiers, purified in vain in the funeral hour.

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It is natural for each one's following to die with him. Many are changed in each era of the penumbra. Mediocrity tosses them away like old cards whose faces are already known by the gamblers, dealing out new cards, neither better nor worse. The worthy, remote from the game whose tricks they do not know, hold themselves aloof from all of the cabals which thrive in the shadow of the fatherland. They cultivate their ideals and they ignite a flame from them as best they can, while hoping for or preparing a better moral climate. And they do not soil their lips by mentioning the archtypes, [lest] this might, perhaps, immortalize them.

THE ARISTOCRACY OF MERIT

Has the progressive advancement of democracy, permitting the equality of the most, made more difficult the rise of the best? It makes no difference whether one speaks of monarchies or republics; the nineteenth century began to unify the essence of political regimes, leveling all systems, making them bourgeois.

An eminent thinker commented on this truth: Mediocrity does not tolerate illustrious exceptions. If genius is a magnifi-

cent soliloquy, a voice of nature in which a whole nation or race speaks, it is asked, is it not an exorbitant privilege for one person to raise his voice in the name of all? Democracy rejects such sovereigns who achieve position without being elected and who do not adduce proof of divine right. What was once the Word (*Verbo*) in genius now becomes merely a word (*palabra*) and is shared by all, who believe that together they reason better than one alone. Civilization seems to acquiesce in this slow and progressive banishment of the extraordinary man, enlarging and illuminating the mediocre. When the majority did not know how to think, it was right that one should do it for all: a faculty liable to dangerous excesses. But the providential man is becoming unnecessary to the degree that the masses learn to think and desire for themselves. "In such diffusion of sovereignty, what need is there for great epics to be meditated, carried out, or written?" This seems to be, temporarily, the formula of leveling, and could be translated thus: to the degree that the democratic system is extended, the function of the superior man is restricted.

This would be an incontestable, definitive truth if the equalitarian tendency were a natural orientation of history and if, in such a case, it came about with a continuous rhythm, without any mishaps. But it is not so. It has never been so, nor apparently, will it ever be so. Nature opposes all leveling, seeing death in equality. Human societies have more need of the genius than of the imbecile, and more need of talent than of mediocrity, for their moral and structural progress. History does not confirm the premise of equalitarianism, it does not surpress Leonardo [da Vinci] to deify [Sancho] Panza, nor does it crush a Bertoldo to adore a Goethe. Each has his reason for being; nor does one prosper in the climate of the other. The genius, in his opportunity, is as irreplaceable as the mediocre in his. One thousand, nay a hundred thousand, would not do then what one genius could do. The idealists who precede or follow them co-operate in their work. Not so the conservatives, who are their natural enemies; nor the docile masses, who may be their instrument, but never their guide.

It is ironic to repeat that states never need a ruler of genius. The cult of the despised but honest governor is peculiar to shop keepers who, fearing evil, are unable to conceive of anything better. Why should history reject the genius, the

saint, or the hero? During times of crisis the nation expects everything from great men. In decadent epochs the commonplace suffice. There is a certain climate which excludes genius and brings out the fatuous. In this crepuscular barrenness, the academies are filled with the myopics and bureaucrats, while charlatans and cunning young turkeys (*pollipavos*) govern the state. But there is another climate in which the latter do not serve; then the horizon is filled with stars. In the storm a [Domingo] Sarmiento takes the wheel to pilot a nation toward its ideal; in the dawn a [Florentino] Ameghino looks far ahead and discovers fragments of some Truth in formation. Everything changes under their rule, and around them, like a halo around the stars, a special atmosphere develops in which their word resounds and their spark flames into fire. This is the climate of genius. One alone thinks and acts, leaving an eternal mark.

To him who says "equality or death," Nature answers, "equality is death." The dilemma is absurd. If constant equality were possible, if all differentiated individuals, men of originality, were to succumb, humanity would no longer exist. It could not exist as the culmination of the biological series. Our species emerged from those preceding it as a result of natural selection. Evolution occurs only when variations among individuals can be selected. To make all men equal would be to deny the progress of the human species — to deny civilization itself.

The present situation remains to be considered. Has the progressive advancement of the democratic regime in republics and monarchies encouraged their public decline during the past century?

Practically, democracy has been a fiction until now. It is a falsehood of the few who pretend to represent everybody. Although Lamartine, Heine, and Hugo may have believed in it at times, no one is more disloyal than the idealistic poets to literal universal equality; most of them are openly hostile. The nature of the problem is something else. It is simple.

Until now no effective democracy has existed. Regimes which adopted the name were fictitious. The pretended democracies of all times have been confabulations of professionals to take advantage of the masses and to exclude eminent men. They have always been regimes of mediocrities. The premise of their myth was the existence of a "people" capable

of assuming the sovereignty of the state. There is no such "people". Up to the present time, the masses of the poor and ignorant have not had the ability to govern themselves. They have merely changed shepherds.

The greatest theorists of the democratic ideal have actually been individualists and partisans of natural selection. They sought an aristocracy of merit as against class privileges. Equality is a mistake or a paradox, depending upon the case. Democracy has been a mirage, like all the abstractions which people the fantasy of the deluded or form the stock in trade of the mendacious. The people have been lacking in it.

The aristocratic classes are no better. In them, also, there is a crisis of mediocrity and a tendency to turn into mediocrities. Democrats pursue justice for all, but mistakenly look for it in equality. Aristocrats seek privilege for the superior, but end up by reserving it for the most inept. The former erase merit in equality; the latter make it laughable by assigning it to a class. Both are, in fact, enemies of natural selection.

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A regime in which individual merit would be esteemed above all else would be perfect. It would exclude all numerical and oligarchical influence. There would be no vested interests. The anonymous vote would have as little value as accidental glory. Men would constantly strive to be more dissimilar among themselves, preferring any creative originality whatever to rutinary tradition.

Natural selection would be possible and the merits of each one would benefit society as a whole. The gratitude of the less skilled would stimulate those favored by nature. The shadows would respect the true men. Privilege would be measured by the effectiveness of abilities and would be lost with them.

The political creed suggested by idealism based on experience is thus clear.

It is opposed to quantitative democracy which seeks justice in equality, affirming privilege based on merit.

It is also opposed to oligarchical aristocracy which bases privileges on vested interests, affirming merit as the natural basis of privilege.

The aristocracy of merit is the ideal system, opposed to the two systems of mediocrity which cast their shadow over history. It has its absolute formula: "justice in inequality."

(Trans. by H.E.D. and J.J.C.)

JOSE ENRIQUE RODO (1871-1917)

URUGUAY

Rodó was one of the least American and the most universal of modern Latin Americans. Keenly sensitive to the problems and conflicts involved in the rapid development of American life and culture, he did not deny the American scene and its amorphous democracy, as exemplified in his own Uruguay. Yet neither did he find the basis of his thought in the American soil or American experiences, but in Hellenic and Christian sources.

Born and educated in Montevideo, he inevitably reflected in his thought something of the sensitiveness of the Uruguayan upper classes to the social challenge presented by the overwhelming wave of European immigration and the changes it was bringing. A journalist, he never left Uruguay until the first World War brought a journalistic excursion which resulted in illness and death in Italy at the early age of forty-six. He was twice a member of the national congress and briefly a professor of literature, but was ill-adapted for success in either calling. Wearing thick glasses to correct his nearsightedness, he was coldly shy and ill at ease in social gatherings. The detached Olympian tone of his writing compensated psychologically for this timidity. At all events, his pen spoke with the assurance and optimism for which Latin American youth yearned in order to rise above the failures of their democracy and to face the problems presented by the rapid tempo of social and economic change.

The basis of his thought was an idealistic revolt against the growing materialism of his times. In this he reflects influences from such sources as Renan (the most important), Taine, De Tocqueville, Carlyle, Emerson, Flaubert, Ibsen, Nietzsche, Sarmiento, Martí, and Montalvo. In some respects he presaged the later popularity of the ideas of Dilthey and Bergson in Latin America. He speaks with approval of German idealism, and his views sometimes suggest Ortega. From Christianity he derived one of the two basic historical impulses which give civilization its essential characteristics: the sentiment of equality. But Christian equality was vitiated by the ascetic tendency to depreciate spiritual and cultural selection. Classical civilization provided a second and counterbalancing impulse — a sense of order and hierarchy, coupled with religious respect

for genius. This impulse, too, had its weak side, that of "aristocratic disdain" for the humble and the weak. Nietzsche's idea of the elite he thought was "monstrous." For democracy to succeed it must combine these two elements, synthesizing Judaic Christianity with Hellenism, both of which were essential elements of freedom.

Rodó chose *Ariel*, the blithe spirit of freedom from Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, to symbolize this synthesis. In his volume by that name he speaks in a quiet, serene voice, expressing a stoical spiritual purpose and enunciating the values to be achieved within a democratic American setting. The scene is the study of the revered master, bidding farewell to his students gathered around a bronze statue of *Ariel*. In aphoristic, oracular language the master speaks of the most serious problems of the spirit.

With Renan, Rodó believed that democracy tended toward mediocrity. But he refused to follow Renan in condemning democratic equality of rights. "The spirit of democracy is . . . for our civilization, a principle of life against which it is useless to rebel." Yet, democracy must be balanced by a spiritual elite. While both philosophy and science testify to the need for a "sense of the select," art provides its most natural medium. It is in art that "with deep resonance, the notes which acknowledge the sentiment . . . of the spirit vibrate." He warns against a "delicate and sickly Parnassianism," however, calling upon youth to avoid "aristocratic disdain for the present" and to renew their ideals and hopes by dedication to the spirit of *Ariel*.

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DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL ARISTOCRACY

BY JOSÉ ENRIQUE RODO

(From *Ariel*, Trans. by F. J. Stimson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922 pp. 60-94. With permission.)

Often you will have heard attributed to two main causes that torrent of the spirit of utility which gives its note to the moral physiognomy of the present century, with its neglect of the aesthetic and disinterested view of life. The revelations of natural science, whose interpreters, favourable or the reverse, agree in destroying all ideality for its base, are one; the other is the universal diffusion and triumph of democratic ideas. I propose to speak to you exclusively of this latter cause; because I trust that your first initiation in the revelations of Science has been so directed as to preserve you from the danger of a vulgar interpretation. Upon democracy weighs the accusation of guiding humanity, by making it mediocre, to a Holy Empire of Utilitarianism. This accusation is reflected with vibrant intensity in the pages — for me always full of suggestive charm — of the most amiable among the masters of the Modern Spirit: the seductive pages of Renan, to whose authority you have often heard me refer and of whom I may often speak again. Read Renan, those of you who have not done so already, and you will have to love him as I do. No one as he, among the moderns, appears to me such a master “of that art of teaching with Grace” which Anatole France considers divine. No one so well as he has succeeded in combining irony with pity; even in the rigour of the analysis he can put the unction of the priest. And even when he teaches us to doubt, his exquisite gentleness sheds a balsam over the doubt itself. His thoughts ring in our minds with echoes ineffable, so vague as to remind one of sacred music. His infinite comprehension

makes critics class him among those dilettantes of a light scepticism who wear the gown of the philosopher like the domino of a mask; but, once you penetrate his spirit, you will see that the vulgar tolerance of the mere sceptic differs from his as the hospitality of a worldly salon from the real spirit of charity.

This master holds, then, that high preoccupation with the ideal interests of our race is irreconcilable with the spirit of democracy. He believes that the conception of life in a society where that spirit dominates will gradually come to seek only material welfare, as the good most attainable for the greatest number. According to him, democracy is the enthronement of Caliban. Ariel can but be vanquished by its triumph. Many others who most care for aesthetic culture and select spirit are of a like mind. Thus Bourget thinks that universal triumph of democratic institutions will make civilization lose in profundity what it gains in extension. He sees its necessary end in the empire of individual mediocrity. "Who says democracy voices the evolution of individual tendencies and the devolution of culture."

These judgments have a lively interest for us Americans who love the cause and consequence of that Revolution which in our America is entwined with the glory of its origin, and believe instinctively in the possibility of a noble and rare individual life which need never sacrifice its dignity to the caprices of the rabble. To confront the problem one must first recognize that if democracy does not uplift its spirit by a strong ideal interest which it shares with its preoccupation by material interests, it does lead, and fatally, to the favouring of mediocrity, and lacks, more than any other social system, barriers within which it may safely seek the higher culture. Abandoned to itself, without the constant rectification of some active moral sanction which shall purify and guide its motives to the dignifying of life — democracy will, gradually, extinguish the idea of any superiority which may not be turned into a more efficient training for the war of interests. It is then the most ignoble form of the brutalities of power. Spiritual preference, exaltation of life by unselfish motive, good taste and art and manners, and the admiration of all that is worthy and of good repute, will then alike vanish unprotected when social equality has destroyed all grades of excellence without

replacing them with others that shall also rule by moral influence and the light of reason.

Any equality of conditions in the order of society, like homogeneity in nature, is but an unstable equilibrium. From that moment when democracy shall have worked its perfect work of negation by the levelling of unjust superiorities, the equality so won should be but a starting-point. Its affirmation remains; and the affirmation of democracy and its glory consist in arousing in itself by fit incentives the revelation and the mastery of the true superiorities of men.

With relation to the conditions of the life of America, that duty of attaining the true conception of our social state is doubly needful. Our democracies grow rapidly by the continual addition of a vast cosmopolitan multitude, by a stream of immigration which is merged with a nucleus already too weak to make active effort at assimilation and so contain the human flood by those dikes which an ancient solidity of social structure can alone provide, a secured political order, and the elements of a culture that has become deeply rooted. This rapid growth exposes our future to the dangers of a democratic degeneration which smothers under the blind force of the mass all idea of quality, deprives the social consciousness of all just notion of order, and, yielding its class organization to the rough hands of chance, causes the triumph of only the most ignoble, unjustifiable supremacies.

It is, of course, true that our selfish advantage — not the virtue of it alone — bids us be hospitable. Long since the need of peopling the emptiness of the desert made a famous publicist coin the phrase, "To govern is to populate." But this famous aphorism contains a truth that must not be closely interpreted; it must not ascribe civilizing virtues to mere number. To govern is to populate by assimilation, first of all, and then by education and selection. If the appearance and growth in a society of the highest human activities require a dense population, it is precisely because great numbers make possible the most complete division of labour, and the birth of elements of strong leadership which bring about the predominance of quality over quantity. The multitude, the anonymous mass, is nothing by itself. It will be an instrument of barbarity or of civilization according as it has or lacks the coefficient of high moral leadership. There is deep truth in

Emerson's paradox that every country on earth should be judged by its minorities and not its majorities. The civilization of a country acquires its grandeur, not by its manifestations of material prosperity and predominance, but by the higher order of thinking or of feeling made thereby possible. So Comte: it is senseless to pretend that excellence can ever be replaced by number, that by an accumulation of vulgar minds one may hit upon a brain of genius, or by the addition of many mediocre virtues get the equivalent of a deed of heroism. So our democracy, proclaiming the universality and equality of rights, will sanction the ignoble predominance of mere number unless it be careful highly to maintain the idea of human superiorities that are legitimate; and to make authority, bound to a popular vote, not the exponent of an absolute equality, but (as I remember some young Frenchman said) "the consecration of a hierarchy based on Liberty."

The clash between the democratic rule and the higher life becomes a fatal reality when that rule imparts the disregard of even legitimate superiorities and the substitution of mechanical government for a faith in heroism (in Carlyle's sense). All in civilization that is more than material excellence, economic prosperity, is a height that will be levelled when moral authority is given to the average mind. Though there be no longer external invading hordes to hurl themselves upon the beacon lights of civilization with a might now devastating and now regenerating, the high culture of today should guard itself against the soft and gradual dissolvent work of those other crowds, pacific, even educated — the unescapable multitudes of the vulgar, whose Attila might well be personified in "Mr. Homais," whose heroism is shrewdness, ordered by an instinctive repugnance for what is great; whose device is the leveller. Immovable indifference and quantitative superiority are its attributes, the usual result of its labours; yet is it not entirely incapable of rising to epic heights, usually of anger, giving free reins to its antipathies. Charles Morice called it "those phalanxes of ferocious Prudhommes who have for their device Mediocrity, and march together in their hatred of all that is extraordinary."

Elevated to power, these Prudhommes will make of their triumphant will an organized hunting-party against all that shows aptitude or daring wing to fly high. Its social formula

will be a democracy which leads to the consecration of Pope Anyone, the coronation of King Average. They will hate merit as a rebellion. In their dominion all noble superiority will be like a marble statue placed in a miry road to be spattered by the mud of any passing wagon. They will call the dogmatism of common sense, wisdom; mean avidness of heart, gravity; adaptation to the mediocre, sound judgment; and bad taste, manly indifference to trifles. Their notion of justice will lead them either to substitute in history the immorality of great men by the common forgetfulness of all, or to preserve it with the equal memory of a Mithridates who knew the names of all his soldiers. Its manner of republicanism will resemble that of Fox, who used to submit his projects to the criterion of that member who seemed to him the most perfect type of the country gentleman, judging by the limitation of his faculties and the rudeness of his gestures. Then we shall be in that Zoocracy that Baudelaire imagined, and Shakespeare's Titania, kissing an ass's head, will be the emblem of that liberty which calls but for the middling. Never could a tyrant's conquest compass a more sinister end!

And if you make a prophet of your neighbour who preaches the belittling lesson of the mediocre, if you make him your hero and seek your salvation in his bureaucratic content — you will encounter that rancorous, implacable hostility against all that is beautiful, all that is dignified or delicate in the spirit of humanity which, even more than its brutal shedding of blood, is so repugnant in the Jacobite tyranny. Before its tribunal the wisdom of a Lavoisier, the genius of a Chenier, the dignity of a Malesherbes, become only faults; amid the shouting of its Conventions we hear the cry, Distrust that man, he has written a book! Confounding the idea of democratic simplicity with Rousseau's state of nature, it would take the vignette of his first edition as symbolic of the antinomy between democracy and culture, that famous diatribe against the arts and sciences in the name of morality; a satyr, rudely seizing the torch of Prometheus from his hands, only to learn that its flame is mortal to him who touches it!

Equalitarian ferocity has not, indeed, yet shown itself in the democratic development of our century, nor opposed in brutal manner the serenity and liberty of our intellectual growth. But like some savage beast now domesticated, its later

progeny have changed their native ferocity to an artful and ignoble tameness, equalitarianism; and this mild tendency to all that is utilitarian or vulgar may fairly be blamed upon the democracy of the nineteenth century. No sensitive or sagacious mind has ever studied this without anxiously considering some of its results in their social and their political aspect. Contemporary thought, while rejecting that false conception of equality that made the delirium of the French Revolution, has yet maintained a severe scrutiny of the very theory of democracy, which you, who are about to create the future, must begin with; not necessarily to upset, but to educate, the spirit of our time.

Since our century began to assume independence, personal liberty in the evolution of its ideas, German idealist philosophy has rectified the equalitarian Utopia of the eighteenth century and again exalted, albeit with too much Caesarism, the part played in history by individual greatness. Comte's positivism, not recognizing in the democratic equality anything but a transitory wiping out of ancient class systems, and denying with equal conviction the definitive efficiency of popular rule, sought in the principles of natural classification a basis for that social classification which should be the substitute for the hierarchies recently destroyed. The criticism of the democratic regime took a severer form in the generation of Taine and Renan: to this modern Athenian the only equality which appealed was one like that of Athens, "an equality of demigods." And as to Taine, he wrote "the Origin of contemporary France"; and if, on the one hand, his conception of society as an organism leads him logically to reject all idea of uniformity opposed to the principles of dependent and subordinate organisms, on the other his fine instinct for intellectual selection leads him to abominate the invasion of the heights by the multitude. Already the great voice of Carlyle had preached against irreverent levelling, and for heroism; meaning by that word any noble superiority; and Emerson echoed this idea in the bosom of the most positivist of democracies. The new science spoke of natural selection as a necessity of all progress; and in art, where the feeling for the exquisite has its most obvious application, those notes reverberated which seek to express the feeling of what we may call the estrangement of the spirit to modern conditions of life. Nor to hear them is it necessary to copy that Parnassian spirit of a delicate and

feeble stock which an aristocratic disdain for the present drives to reclusion in the past. Of the constant inspirations of Flaubert — from whom springs directly the most democratized of all the modern schools — none is more intense than his hatred for a mediocrity animated by the spirit of levelling and the tyranny of mass. And within contemporary Scandinavian literature, so much preoccupied by social questions, the same idea most often occurs. Ibsen weaves the lofty harangue of his Stockmann upon the affirmation that "compact majorities are the greatest danger to liberty and truth." And the awesome Nietzsche opposes to the ideal of a mediatized humanity that of supermen who surge above its level like a tidal wave. A lively desire for a reform of the social system which shall make secure the leading of the heroic life and assure to its thought a purer atmosphere of dignity and just consideration is now everywhere apparent, and promises to be a fundamental note in the harmonies of the coming century.

Yet the spirit of democracy is essentially, for our civilization, a principle against which it were idle to rebel. The discontent we feel for the imperfections of its actual historic *form* has often led us to judge unjustly what it has that is both final and fruitful. Thus Renan's wisdom of the aristocrat it is which formulates the most explicit condemnation of its fundamental principle, equality of rights, which he believes to be permanently contrary to any possible government of intellectual superiority. He even goes so far as to call it, in a forceful image, "the antipodes of the path of God — since God has not willed that all should live in the same degree of spiritual life." These unjust paradoxes, together with his famous ideal of an omnipotent oligarchy of wise men, are like the exaggerated image in a nightmare of some true thought that has obsessed our waking hours. Failure to recognize the real work of democracy because it has not yet succeeded in reconciling its principle of equality with social safeguards for that of *selection*, is as to ignore the parallel labour of science because, when interpreted in the narrow manner of a certain school, it has occasionally wrought harm to the spirit of poetry or religion. Democracy and science are indeed the two props on which our civilization rests, the two Fates that spin our future; as Bourget phrases it, "In them we are, we live, we move." As it is impossible, therefore, to hope with Renan for a more positive consecration of the moral superiorities, the realization of a

hierarchy of reason, any effective dominion of the loftier gifts of intelligence and free will which shall be based on the destruction of that democratic equality, — the only thing left us is to bethink us how to educate, reform, democracy itself. We must seek how gradually to inculcate in popular feeling and custom the idea of that necessary subordination, the sense of true superiorities, the instinctive yet conscious cultivation of all that multiplies the cipher of human worth in the eye of reason.

Popular education thus acquires its supreme interest considered in its relation to such a work, and with thought for the future.¹ And it is at school where we first mould the clay of the multitude; there come the first and broadest manifestations of social equity; schools consecrated to the equal right of all to learning and the most efficient measures for superior attainment. They have to round out a noble task — to make the sense for order and the will for justice prime objects of its instruction; the realization of all that Authority which is legitimate.

There is no distinction more easily lost sight of in the popular mind than that between equality of opportunity and actual equality — of influence or of power — among members of organized society. All have the same right to aspire to a moral superiority which may justify and explain an effective one; but only those who have really achieved the former should be rewarded by the latter. The true and worthy notion of equality rests on the assumption that all reasonable beings are endowed by nature with faculties capable of a noble development. The duty of the State consists in seeing that all its members are so placed as to be able to seek without favour their own *best*; in so arranging things as to bring to light each human superiority, wherever it exists. In such wise, after the initial equality, inequality, when it comes, will be justified; for it will be sanctioned either by the mysterious powers of nature or the deserving merit of volition. So understood, democratic equality, far from antagonizing a choice of either customs or ideas, will become the useful instrument of that

1. "Plus l'instruction se répand, plus elle doit faire de part aux idées générales et généreuses. On croit que l'instruction populaire doit être terre-à-terre. C'est le contraire qui est la vérité." Fouillée: *L'Idee moderne du droit*, Livre, 5, IV.

spiritual election, the native soil for culture. For it is born of intellectual energy; as Tocqueville said, poesy and eloquence, the graces of the mind, the flashes of the imagination, all these gifts of the soul, scattered from the heavens at hazard, are co-workers in the labour of democracy and serve it even when they belong to its enemies; for they tend to bring into relief the natural — not the inherited — greatness of which man's spirit is capable. Emulation, the most powerful spur of all that urge to action, as well in thought as in other human activities, needs as well equality at the starting-point in order to produce at the finish that inequality which gives the palm to the apter scholar or the greater man. And the democratic regime can carry in its bosom both these two conditions of emulation only when it does not degenerate into a levelling equality, but is content to look forward to it only as a glorious ideal, a counsel of perfection, a future equality of all men in their common ascent to the highest culture possible.

Rationally conceived, democracy always admits that indispensable aristocratic principle which shall concede superiority to the better man when recognized and sanctioned by the common consent. It consecrates, as much as aristocracy, the distinction of equality; but it resolves in favour of such qualities as are truly superior — those of mind, character, virtue. It does not immobilize them into a separate class which shall have the execrable privilege of caste, but renews them continually from the living fountain of the people, making justice or affection the reason of their choice. In such wise recognizing, as a necessity for any progress, the selection and predominance of the best equipped, it avoids that humiliation which in other human contests falls to the lot of the vanquished. "The great law of natural selection will go on functioning in human society only so long as it works more and more on a basis of liberty," said Fouillée. The odious character of traditional aristocracies arose in that they were oppressive in their action and unjust in their foundation, and so their authority became intolerable. Now we know that there exists no other legitimate limit for man's equality than that which consists in the dominion of intelligence and virtue, freely consented to by all.

But we do know that it is necessary that this limit shall exist. On the other hand, our Christian view of life teaches

that those moral superiorities which are the basis of rights really give rise only to duties; and that each superior being owes to others more in proportion to his excess in ability over them. The anti-equality views of Nietzsche, who seems to have ploughed so deep a furrow in our contemporary literature of thought, have brought into his tremendous revindication of what he calls natural rights, implicit in human superiorities, an abominable and reactionary genius. For, in scoffing at all mercy, all fraternity, he places in the heart of the superman he deifies a Satanic disregard of the weak and the disinherited; he legitimizes all privileges of self-will and force to governments of the gibbet and the lash, and with logical resolution comes to his keynote: "Society does not exist for itself, but for its elect." Truly it is not this monstrous notion that we oppose as our standard to that false equalitarianism which aims at the levelling of all to a common vulgarity. Happily, so long as there shall be in our world the possibility of so disposing two pieces of wood that they form a Cross — which is to say, eternally — so long shall future man persist in thinking that it is Love that is the basis of all stable order; and that the only true hierarchy is that of those who have the highest capacity for love.

The new science — a fountain of inexhaustible moral inspirations — shows, in explaining life's laws, how the principle of democracy may be reconciled with an aristocracy of morals or of culture in the organization of human collectivities. On the one hand, as Henri Berenger's suggestive book has shown, the affirmations of science but contribute to sanction and fortify the idea of democracy in society, revealing how great is the value of collective effort, how valuable the labour even of the smallest hand, how immense the field of action reserved to the anonymous and obscure fellow-workman in any manifestation of our social evolution. It exalts, no less than Christianity, the dignity of the lowly; this new thought, which in nature ascribes to the labour of the infinitely little, the nummulite and the briozoon at the depths of the ocean, the construction of the cements of geology; which derives from the vibration of a formless primitive cell all the elevating impulses of organized life; which shows the great role that in our psychology we must ascribe to vague and inconspicuous phenomena, even the fugitive perceptions of our subconscious self; and which, coming to sociology and history, restores to

the heroism of the masses, often doubted, the share which was ignored in the glorification of the individual hero; and reveals the slow accumulation of individual research which through many centuries has prepared, in obscure workshops or laboratories of forgotten toilers, the discoveries of genius.

But at the same time that it thus demonstrates the immortal efficacy of collective force, and dignifies the participation of unknown collaborators in the universal work, science shows that it is a necessary condition to all progress that there should be leadership amid the immense mass of persons and of things. Relations of dependence and subordination are a condition of life, between the individual members of society and the elements of individual organization. In fine, there is an inherent necessity for the universal law of imitation that there be present models, alive and influential, for the making perfect human society, to realize their superiority by the progressive making general of it.

To show how both these universal lessons of science can be transformed into action, working together in the organization and spirit of society, we need only insist on our conception of a democracy that is just and noble, impelled only by the knowledge and sense of true superiorities, in which the supremacy of intelligence and virtue, the only limits to the just equality of men, receives its authority and prestige from liberty and sheds over all multitudes the beneficent aura of love. And at the same time that it reconciles these two great lessons of our observation of the order of nature, such a society will realize the harmony of two historic forces which give our civilization its essential character, its regulative principles of life. From the spirit of Christianity, in fact, is born the sentiment of equality, albeit tainted now with something of the ascetic disdain for culture and selection of the spirit. And from the classic civilizations rises that sense for order, for authority, and the almost religious respect for genius, though tainted with something of aristocratic disdain for the weak and the lowly. The future shall synthesize these two suggestions in an immortal formula; then shall Democracy have triumphed definitely. Democracy — which, when threatening an ignoble levelling, justifies the lofty protests and the bitter melancholies of those who see sacrificed in her triumph all intellectual distinction, every dream of art, each delicacy of life, — will,

now even more than the old aristocracies, extend inviolable guaranties for the cultivation of those flowers of the soul which fade and perish in the surroundings of the vulgar, amid the pitiless tumult of the multitude.

The utilitarian conception as the idea of human destiny, and equality at the mediocre as the norm of social proportion, make up the formula which in Europe they call the spirit of Americanism. It is impossible to think on either of these as inspirations for human conduct or society, while contrasting them with those which are opposed to them, without at once conjuring up by association a vision of that formidable and fruitful democracy there in the North, with its manifestations of prosperity and power, as a dazzling example in favour of the efficacy of democratic institutions and the correct aim of its ideas. If one could say of utilitarianism that it is the word of the English spirit, the United States may be considered the incarnation of that word. Its Evangel is spread on every side to teach the material miracles of its triumph. And Spanish America is not wholly to be entitled, in its relation to the United States, as a nation of Gentiles. The mighty confederation is realizing over us a sort of moral conquest. Admiration for its greatness, its strength, is a sentiment that is growing rapidly in the minds of our governing classes, and even more, perhaps, among the multitude, easily impressed with victory or success. And from admiring it is easy to pass to imitating. Admiration and belief are already for the psychologist but the passive mood of imitation. "The imitative tendency of our moral nature," says Bagehot, "has its seat in that part of the soul where lives belief." Common sense and experience would suffice of themselves to show this natural relation. We imitate him in whose superiority and prestige we believe. So it happens that the vision of a voluntarily delatinized America, without compulsion or conquest, and regenerate in the manner of its Northern archetype, floats already through the dreams of many who are sincerely interested in our future, satisfies them with suggestive parallels they find at every step, and appears in constant movements for reform or innovation. We have our *mania for the North*. It is necessary to oppose to it those bounds which both sentiment and reason indicate.

Not that I would make of those limits an absolute negation. I well understand that enlightenment, inspiration, great lessons lie in the example of the strong; nor do I fail to realize that intelligent attention to the claims of the material and the study of the useful, directed abroad, is of especially useful result in the case of people in the formative stage, whose nationality is still in the mould. I understand how one must try by persevering education to rectify such traits of a society as need to be made to fit in with new demands of civilization and new opportunities in life, thus by wise innovation counteracting the forces of heredity or custom. But I see no good in denaturalizing the character of a people — its personal genius — to impose on it identity with a foreign model to which they will sacrifice the originality of their genius, that, once lost, can never be replaced; nor in the ingenuous fancy that this result may ever be obtained artificially or by process of imitation. That thoughtless attempt to transplant what is natural and spontaneous in one society into the soil of another where it has no roots, historically or naturally, seemed to Michelet like the attempt to incorporate by mere transference a dead organism in a living body.

In Societies, as in art or literature, blind imitation gives but an inferior copy of the model. And in the vain attempt there is also something ignoble; a kind of political snobbery, carefully to copy the ways and acts of the great; as, in Thackeray's satire, those without rank or fortune ineffectually imitate only the foibles of the mighty. Care for one's own independence, personality, judgment, is a chief form of self-respect. A much-commented passage of Cicero teaches how it is our duty sedulously to preserve our original character; that which differentiates and determines, so far as may wisely be, the primal natural impulses, as they derive from a various distribution of natural gifts and so make up the concert and the order of the world. And even more would this seem to be true as applied to human collectivities. But perhaps you will say that there is no seal, no peculiar and definite thing to mark the quality for whose permanence and integrity we should do battle in the actual organization of our people. Perhaps there lacks in our South American character the definite contour of a personality. But even so, we Latin-Americans have an inheritance of Race, a great ethnic tradition to maintain, a sacred bond which unites us to immortal pages of history and

puts us on our honour to preserve this for the future. That cosmopolitanism which we have to respect as the irresistible tendency of our development need not exclude that sentiment of fidelity to the past, nor that moulding and directing force of which the genius of our race must avail itself in the fusing of the elements that shall constitute the American of the future.

JUSTO SIERRA (1848-1912)

MÉXICO

Justo Sierra Méndez was born in Campeche, Yucatan, on January 26, 1848, the son of a Mexican-Irish father, Justo Sierra O'Reilly, and Concepción Méndez y Echazarreta. His physician father was active in Yucatán politics, particularly in the mid-century move for Yucatecan independence, which engaged him in an unsuccessful mission in the United States to secure recognition of the short-lived independent republic. Justo, the son, was educated in Yucatan and, after the death of his father, in Mexico City, where he graduated in law.

Although his legal accomplishments were sufficient to bring his appointment as Secretary of the Supreme Court, his principal efforts were directed toward teaching and journalism. He taught history in the National Preparatory School, edited various journals, and was elected to the National Congress. A visit to the United States gave him mixed impressions, including admiration for its regime of freedom and distaste for what he called the rule of plutocracy. In 1892, his support of the *Científico* party caused Porfirio Díaz to block his election to the Congress, although he was later named Minister of Education. In this position he made his greatest achievement, crowning his accomplishments with the re-establishment of the National University, which had ceased to exist as an integrated body half a century before.

The passages which follow are from Sierra's *Evolución política del pueblo mexicano*, a Mexican classic. In substance it is his lectures on Mexican history given for many years in the National Preparatory School of the University. They reveal the important place of history in his social thought, as well as the manner in which he applied his social philosophy to an analysis of national history. It is positivist history, scientific-rationalist-evolutionary. Some of the anti-Spanish tone of an earlier period in Mexico persists, but in a subdued key. His anti-clericalism is the less violent and rather typically positivist emphasis upon opposition to the superstitious elements which have survived within Christianity. Sierra shares the tendency of his times to stress racial factors in the explanation of society and social change. But it is not a racialism slanted against the Indian or the mestizo, for he saw in the latter the dynamic element in Mexican social evolution, thus anticipating

something of the twentieth century *indigenismo*.¹ His views on education did not differ greatly from those of his great predecessor, Gabino Barreda, of whose work he had written critically in 1881. The chief difference lay in Sierra's greater emphasis upon historical cultural factors and upon evolutionism. It is not too obvious in the following selection, but a strong spiritual note runs through much of his writing. "The truth is, my heart is a monastery," he once remarked.² In this spiritual quality, and in a general spirit of optimism which permeates his work, one may see a portent of the new idealism which was beginning to challenge the dominant positivism of the end of the century.

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SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN NEW SPAIN

BY JUSTO SIERRA

(From *Evolución política del pueblo mexicano*. México: La Casa de España en México, 1940. Cap. VI, pp. 137-139.)

The classical division between colonial history under the house of Austria and under the Bourbons is factitious: neither the political regime, nor the economic, nor the social changed in any respect. Mexican society, with all its defects so finely observed by the Duke of Linares, its heterogeneous composition, continued to grow in the same way as during its beginnings.

1. See Chapter 27.

2. In an article, "El palatino," *El Mundo Ilustrado*, June 14, 1903. Quoted by Raúl Carranca y Trujillo, in "Justo Sierra, Maestro de América," *Orbe*, núm. 30, June 30, 1951, p. 15.

But it was a real and vigorous growth. The organism now had a new consciousness of its personality. Since the seventeenth century it had been taking form as a separate body, and this [process] continued in the eighteenth century. Socially it was controlled by an apathetic and deeply corrupt clergy. There was no longer any distinction between the catholicism of the Indian and that of the Creole. It was all an interminable series of devout practices without enlightened substance; the Creole, as much as the Indian was ignorant of [real] religion. The mestizo, to be sure, had glimmerings of enlightened belief because of his essentially curious, impatient, discontented, when not actually rebellious spirit, and this was the yeast of the Mexican society of the future.

Two things are clearly inferred from the observations of the Duke of Linares. First, clerical education and the firm feeling of the Creole and that of the Indian, openly expressed by the first and concealed by the second, that whatever the Spaniards enjoyed was a usurpation of the rights of those born here, gave the character of a venial sin to any crime against property. But it also imposed the charitable duty of protecting the thief and [produced] an amazing facility in imitating him. This thing of taking what is another's must be a capital defect since Mexicans have been and still are criticized so much for it, both by those within and outside of the country. Disregard of individual property, preached by the mendicant orders with word and example, is one source of the evil. Second, a passion for equality, an absolute lack of recognition that the distinction between those who command and those commanded could have any other basis than injustice and force, was characteristic of the nascent soul of the new society. This was the psychological element in the neo-Mexican. This was what formed the basis of his spirit, what made him reject all authority mentally even if he could not do so in practice. Since he could not do so, he acquired habits of dissimulation and adulation. There is no adulation which does not involve contempt, and the expression of submission is exaggerated for the very reason of hiding the inner protest. Unfortunately these congenital habits of the Mexican have proved a thousand times harder to overcome than Spanish domination and that of the privileged classes established by it.

But the society was growing downward, that is in its least visible aspect, by the mixture of mestizo and Indian, and

upward, by the mixture of the Spaniard and Creole. The Spaniard who intermarried in this way was not the worker who came from Spain but the merchant, [varying] from the great monopolizer of trade, who formed the aristocracy of the rich, who governed from the *Consulado* (the tribunal of trade), to the seller of oil and vinegar, as the Duke of Linares said. Along the coast and in the central mesa, these grocers constituted the bulk of the Hispanic American mixture. The shopkeeper, extraordinarily crude, pitiless exploiter of his customers, honest in his dealings as a merchant, and once enriched, honorable to the highest degree, worshipping his Mexican family, orthodox in his religious habits, customs, and practices, but extremely zealous to give his children the social superiority he had not been able to achieve himself—he and not the Conqueror is the true Spanish father of Mexican society, with its amusing defects and its solid virtues. The Mexican woman, infinitely sweet and submissive, weak because of the very strength of her love, admirably chaste and good, ruled that rude man and awoke in him that nobility of character which lies dormant within one who battles desperately for life during the period of his rise.

* * * * *

INDEPENDENCE

(From *Evolución política del pueblo mexicano*, Cap. VIII, pp 186-188).

A chapter of three hundred years of Spanish history was closed on September 27, 1821, and the real history began of a group born of the blood and soul of Spain, in an environment *sui generis* physically and socially. Both influenced the development of this group, the first by the simple fact of having to adapt itself to biological conditions sufficiently if not entirely distinct from the peninsular setting, and the other, the social, the family born of the soil, transforming it by the slow but certain ethnic penetration in which the Mexican family originated. To be sure the native group was also changed. Admirably adapted to the environment in which it had developed, it had acquired a social nucleus which was in full activity in the epoch of the Conquest. The latter, while endowing it with new means of subsistence, communication, and the faculty of widening that activity indefinitely, submerged it

suddenly in an absolute passivity, systematically maintained during three centuries [a passivity] which was extended little by little to all of the new society.

Spanish development, the ultimate expression of which was the Hispanic American nations, did not have the conscious objective of creating national personalities which would finally be self-sufficient, although this should be [the objective] of all well considered colonization. Spanish rule in America was everything but that. Instead she tried to prevent this group, which was taking shape and growing by an inescapable law in conquered America, from achieving mastery of itself. [She did this] by isolating the Spaniard from the Indian who was abandoned to rural serfdom and to religion which soon became a pure superstition, atrophied in spirit. Externally [it was done by a kind of] concentric isolation of New Spain from the non-Spanish world.

But the energy of the Spanish race was so great that the phenomenon occurred anyhow. By the end of three centuries, thanks to a kind of communication by osmosis between internal groups and with the ideas of the outside world, Spain found that she had engendered American Spains able to live by themselves. Yet she exerted herself to prevent this very thing by a stupid conflict. The violence which has so greatly influenced the future of the new nations could have been avoided if the profound and farsighted patriotism of O'Donojú had only animated Spanish statesmen of the days following the French Revolution.

The new personalities [nations], although they had shown the desire for emancipation and the strength to achieve it, were not educated to govern themselves. This was impossible for a nation in which Austrian absolutism and Bourbon administrative despotism had killed every political germ. They found the same shortcomings as Spain when they wished to try free institutions. Mexico wasted time and blood and came to the point of nearly losing her independence in the quagmire of endless civil wars which were merely a new form of the spirit of adventure peculiar to her race of origin, a spirit whose psychological explanation consists in the belief that every individual and social difficulty is resolved by the direct intervention of heaven in the form of a miracle. Another inherited belief has also dominated our history since that time.

Just as the Spanish people had inherited from the Jews the belief that they were the new chosen people of God, so the Mexicans believed themselves similarly chosen. They found the mark of this divine choice in the riches of their soil—*they were the richest people of the earth.*

Fortunately, the group which had begun to make up the intellectual nucleus of the country since colonial times soon understood instinctively the foolishness of this dogma and the calamity of such tendencies. The economic problem, which lies at the basis of all social advance or regression, stood out clearly before their eyes and they understood that it was necessary to undertake its solution, relying upon these principles: that Mexico, because of the lack of means for developing her natural resources, is one of the poorest countries of the globe, and that the spirit of adventure is a form of energy which needs to be channeled by force into [productive] work. If the problem is thus understood, its resolution requires the adoption of a policy completely opposite to that of conquering Spain, raising all barriers both internal and external. We shall now trace in broad outline the sad but virile history of this great work.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

VALENTIN LETELIER (1852-1919)

CHILE

Valentin Letelier was a great intellectual figure in Chile at the beginning of this century. Rector of the National University and leader of the Radical party in the Congress, he believed, with Sarmiento, in the obligation to put ideas to work. Generally speaking, his social concepts were those of positivism, but not so much the positivism of Comte as the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer, and verging upon Marxian socialism. This evolutionism and socialism distinguished him from his positivist contemporaries who defended the status quo.

He was born in 1852 in Linares, south of Santiago, Chile, the third of eleven children. His father, descended from a French immigrant, was a farmer of modest means. Through his mother he could claim descent from the old Madariaga family. After the death of his father, he was brought up by a paternal aunt. Graduating from the Liceo of nearby Talca, he entered the Instituto Nacional of Santiago. In 1875 he graduated from the Law Faculty of the University.

What was to be a lifetime of teaching commenced in the Liceo of Copiapó two years later. About the same time he began writing in *El Atacama*, and shortly thereafter married Doña Mercedes Beatriz Malta. An election as Deputy to Congress from Copiapó started him on a long congressional career. Appointed secretary of the diplomatic mission to Berlin a few years later, he employed his stay in Germany to study German education and social development. Returning to Chile in 1885, he gained national fame with two prize winning essays: *Concerning Political Science in Chile* (*De la ciencia política en Chile y de la necesidad de su enseñanza*) and *Why History Is Being Revised?* (*Porqué se rehace la historia?*) Domingo Amunátegui Solar had begun a compilation of the documents for Chilean history to 1845, and Letelier undertook to complete this work, which eventually comprised thirty-seven volumes.

The Revolution of 1891 surprised him in the midst of this busy life of teaching, politics, and scholarship. As a member of Congress he signed the act of deposition of President Balmaceda, convinced that his "tyranny" was a grave danger, and spent some time in prison as a result. Later, he seems to have regretted his opposition to Balmaceda, considering

the oligarchic control of Congress under the parliamentary system which followed a greater evil. But, on the whole, the experience of the Revolution led him to believe even more firmly in the importance of political parties and popular participation in politics. As rector of the University from 1906 to 1916, he was the center of the intellectual life of his country. Retiring in 1911, he devoted the eight remaining years of gradually failing health, until his death in 1919, to writing — chiefly two books published posthumously.

His ideas developed along three main streams. The first is represented in the issue of the *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*¹ devoted to his philosophy of popular education, as expressed in his *Filosofía de educación* and *La lucha para la cultura*. Political science was a second major stream. As a positivist, he believed that politics could be a positive science, could establish laws of causation, and determine the relationships of political phenomena. In his early essay, *Estado de la ciencia política en el país*, he argued the need for political education and for professional training of those who assumed government posts. These ideas on political science were developed further in his *Genesis del estado* (1919) and *Genesis del derecho y de las instituciones civiles fundamentales* (1919).

La evolución de la historia (2 vols. 1900), which falls in the third stream, was a further development of the ideas first expressed in his prize essay of 1886. Influenced by the ideas of Buckle² and the scientific concept of history, he was concerned with ascertaining the "laws" of history by investigating its sources. He believed that history, though treated sociologically, differs from sociology in dealing with specific facts. But it tries to discover within these phenomena the real evolutionary process and then to reconstruct the facts on this basis. One is reminded of F. J. Teggart's *Theory of History*.³

In some ways it would have been more appropriate to present in translation a chapter from *The Evolution of History*, which combines Letelier's ideas on political science with those on the philosophy of history.

1. Año CXV, primer trimestre de 1957, no. 105.

2. Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862) English historian.

3. New Haven, 1925.

VALENTIN LETELIER

But the following selection was chosen, instead, because it illustrates his three main interests — politics, history, and education — and because it shows the close links between his positivism and socialism. These were the ideas which led the Radical Party of Chile to adopt socialism in 1906 as against the philosophy of individualism urged by Enrique Mac Iver.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Letelier's *Evolución de la historia* (originally published as *¿Porqué se rehace la historia?*) was issued in an augmented two volumes in Santiago in 1900. *La lucha por la cultura, miscelánea de artículos políticos i estudios pedagógicos*, was published in Santiago in 1895. The first quarter, 1957, number of *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*, Año CXV, No. 105, was given to a symposium on Letelier, including some of his works. Biographies include Leonardo Fuentealba, *Ensayo biográfico de Valentín Letelier* (Santiago: Escuela Nacional de Artes Gráficas, 1956) and Luis Galdames, *Valentín Letelier y su obra* (Santiago, 1947). See also Leopoldo Zea, *Dos etapas del pensamiento en hispanoamérica* (México: El Colegio de México, 1949) pp. 212-230 and, in English, W.R. Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, pp. 74-78.

THE POOR

BY VALENTÍN LETELIER

(Speech to the Radical party (1896) which appeared originally in *La ley*. *Organo del Partido Radical*. Año II, lo. de enero de 1896. No. 483. Reprinted in *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*, Año CXV, primer trimestre de 1957, No. 105)

The formation of workers' parties, under the socialist or democratic name, is one of the political phenomena of the greatest transcendence in the agitated bosom of cultured nations.

Until today, if we except the revolutionary epochs during which lower elements have usually risen temporarily to the surface, only the middle class and the aristocracy have acted in politics.

It is an inexcusable error to imagine that it was the people who fought against the *eupatridae* in Greece, against the Patricians in Rome, against the barons of the Middle Ages,

or against the nobles and the powerful of modern times. The demos of Athens, the plebs of the Tiber, the *rotos* (*gueux*, *roturiers*) of the Netherlands and France, the *villanos* and *comuneros* of Spain were as much enemies of the nobility who oppressed them as of the proletariat⁴ whom they crushed under foot. Today, for the first time in the history of humanity, there appears, acting steadily in the play of politics, a force made up of the lower elements of society.

In nation after nation the new party has been born in an attitude of hostility against the old governing classes, castigating the worthiest public servants with such epithets as oligarchs, usurpers of property, exploiters of the people; and everywhere programs of reform have been formulated which aim not at the general welfare of society, but at the exclusive benefit of the workers.

Alarmed at this declaration of war, the historical parties have received it [this party] from one end of the civilized world to another in the character in which it has presented itself, that is, as the common and irreconcilable enemy. Not infrequently, to combat it, conquer it, and exterminate it, they have united their strength, making offensive and defensive pacts of alliance. But all this has been in vain. During the last thirty years there is no example of the workers' party experiencing a setback which can be considered an irreparable disaster. Its growth has been incessant. The suppression of their journals, the breaking up of their organizations, the prohibition of their meetings, the imprisonment of their leaders has only served to inflame and increase the proselytes of the *cause of the people*. The odious persecution of which they have been the victims has had the result of justifying all their complaints against the selfishness of the ruling classes, and their suffering has gained them the sympathy of all generous hearts in the same way that their perseverance has captured the admiration of all great souls.

In Chile this party appeared for the first time as an organ of the working class around 1887. Here, as in Europe, it made

4. I use the word proletariat in its present sense, which denotes a mass of workers who lack their own means of subsistence and live from day to day. In Rome the proletariat consisted of the mass of plebeians, individuals of the middle class, who disdained work and lived in idleness. Author's note.

its entry lancing against the *oligarchs* an alarming declaration of war; and although the historical parties received it either with disdain or with hostility, its growth has been as rapid as the cause of discontent and the restricted spread of public instruction permitted.

This is a political phenomenon which has left its mark on the studies of the most important thinkers. Wherever the party of the poor has been established, the reactionary parties have experienced a kind of bleeding, governments have begun to give attention to evils which had passed unnoticed, politics has modified its traditional course in order to interest itself in the lot of the disinherited, and a new justice (*derecho*) has been born, a justice which affirms and enobles the personality of the worker vis a vis the employer, the capitalist, and the enterpriser.

In Chile itself, the establishment of the new party has begun to scatter effects which, increasing from day to day, are bound to alter the respective strengths of the historic parties, to bring substantial changes in their programs, and to expel from the *Moneda*⁴ and from Congress the essentially negative policy of free exchange. One of its fruits is that many workers have been expelled from the reactionary guilds (*cofradías*), where their religious sentiment is exploited for the benefit of the very class responsible for their degradation. Another fruit is the opposition to the venality noted in the last elections (1894) because the interest of class was triumphing over personal interest among many of the poor. Still another fruit is that many citizens who previously abstained, because they felt unable to change the course of politics, are beginning to exercise their political functions.

Also among its fruits, unfortunately, are, on the one hand, the present decadence of the liberal parties (I do not speak of liberalism) and, on the other hand, the renewal of the class struggle, fatal to the continuation of the principle of equality.

These phenomena invite study. Every republic concerned with satisfying the new social needs must point out the causes which have given rise to socialism and what policy should be followed to quit it of its revolutionary character, preserving its organic tendency. In my judgment, it is an illusion of empirical

4. The residence of the Chilean president. — Trans.

rulers to imagine that it can be exterminated by a policy of hostility or annulled by eliminating its leaders.

A party is a political phenomenon produced by social causes; and in any realm of nature, if the causes are not removed, no human power is capable of preventing the production of their effects. It is a collective force established to satisfy, by the action of government, more or less general aspirations and, at the same time, one from which it is inferred that while these [aspirations] are not satisfied, there will always be those trying to satisfy them. To persecute the discontented in order to establish peace is like persecuting the thirsty to calm the thirst.

Let us not wish to elude responsibilities.

The appearance of every new party implies an accusation against the pre-existing parties in so far as it shows that they have neglected certain interests, failed to cure certain evils, failed to satisfy certain needs. To point out the causes for the new party is in substance to formulate the indictment of the old ones, and when an old party makes such an inquiry, in effect it examines its conscience.

In Chile it is the Radical party which can reap the greatest profit from such an interesting analysis, because to keep its position in the most progressive ranks it needs [only] to develop its program, noting the new needs. It is not so removed from the people that it can not understand the causes of its ill-being, nor so distant from the conservative classes that it does not understand the causes of their alarm.

* * * * *

The state has been defined as the organ of justice.

In my judgment this definition is incomplete, in as much as the state is required not only to guarantee judicial relationships, but also to encourage actively the development of the culture. Its mission is not reduceable to solely [maintaining] order: it also embraces progress; in addition to juridical functions it exercises political functions.

Finally, the definition given makes clear the existence of close relations between politics and law and explains why juridical education affects political education more or less

seriously. Men formed under the influence of this plebian⁵ tendency of Roman law will with difficulty develop within the government any tendency of a more social and generous character.

Let us but examine the work of the administration, of the Government, and of contemporary politics.

Among all civilized peoples, great public administrators endeavor to insure the capability and responsibility of the state functionaries; to this end, they require of aspirants, on the one hand, the acquisition of a minimum sum of knowledge and, on the other, the posting of monetary bonds of one size or another. Certainly these conditions of appointment tend to improve the services of the state. But they also make it more difficult for the poor to gain access to public offices and convert the administration into a monopoly of those who have the education and responsibility required, that is, the bourgeoisie. Proof of its advantages does not take away the odious character of the exclusion.

As a consequence of this regimen which links public office to the educated class, the families of the poor lack the opportunity of this means of subsistence. The salaries, as well as the pensions, widow's benefits, vacations, and gratuities benefit exclusively the well-to-do families. This bourgeois partiality with which the benefits of the state are distributed appears with the most iniquitous characteristics in the military organization of the Republic. On one hand, pensions are given to the families of officers and denied to the common soldiers, while, on the other hand, service in the national guard is compulsory for the poor and voluntary for the rich.

The same tendency is seen in many administrative actions. Is it proposed, for example, to extend the agricultural area? Very well, inspired by the dominant bourgeoisie, the state prefers to exchange its lands for money, which is the symbol of labor, rather than for labor itself, and instead of ceding them gratuitously to all who wish to cultivate them for themselves, sells them at public auction to the highest bidder. In plain Spanish this is called turning over farm lands to those who have pecuniary wealth, depriving the disinherited of any hope

5. Letelier seems to use this term in the sense of bourgeois.

—Trans.

of improving their condition, and selling for a plate of lentils a priceless medium for restraining the expatriation of [our] nationals.

A similar tendency may be seen in public law. The right of suffrage is granted only to those who earn a certain income.⁶

The electoral power consists of the greatest contributors, and no citizen may be a deputy or senator unless he has private means. In 1889, to accentuate even more the oligarchic character of the Chilean State and to make the entrance of the poor into Congress as difficult as possible, the legislature disgracefully established in the Constitution the gratuity of legislative functions.

For the future it remained immovably established that only the rich may be legislators, or at least that the poor are doomed to live on alms or die of hunger.

After organizing the Government on this oligarchic basis, the bourgeoisie might easily have made the monopoly pardonable by following a policy less exclusive and more generous. No one demanded that they sacrifice their own interests to improving the condition of the destitute.

Nor did anyone deny them [control of] the Government. To perpetuate themselves in power on a solid popular basis, it would have sufficed to devote one hour of the twenty-four, one day of the 365, to seek means of alleviating the lot of the poor. But they have not done so.

If we except the abolition of slavery, the establishment of public charities (*beneficencia pública*), popular education, and universal suffrage, four good things established for the benefit of the disinherited, the extraordinary political activity of the present century has been devoted almost exclusively to guaranteeing the rights, liberties, and interests of the bourgeoisie.

In fact, what is the political accomplishment of our day? What conquests has the liberal spirit achieved through [political] institutions? They are the establishment of the constitutional

6. Since 1874, in Chile, the law assumes that one who can read and write has this income; but in most European nations most of the poor are excluded from electoral functions.

regime, of the republican regime, of the federal regime, of the electoral regime; they are the abolition of entails, of titles of nobility, of industrial guilds; they are the institutions of civil marriage, the civil regime, and the lay cemetery; they are the separation of the political powers and of church and state; they are freedom of conscience, of press, of commerce, of education, etc.— all reforms which benefit directly only the governing classes and which are usually brought about with either the indifference or the hostility of the proletarian classes. If all are Catholic, how do they benefit from the liberty of cults? If no one knows how to write, what do they gain from freedom of the press? If they lack the resources to become proprietors, how are they injured by the continuation of inalienable property? And if, under the new regimen, they must live as wretchedly as under the old, what difference do the governmental and constitutional changes make to them?

I scarcely mean that what the bourgeoisie has done is evil. What I say is that among the social needs which have claimed the attention of the governments, few have been satisfied except those in which [those of] a superior state of political culture were interested, while those in which the poor had the liveliest interest were left in the greatest abandon.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

RAMON ROSA 1848 - 1893).

HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA

Ramón Rosa was born in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on July 14, 1848, the illegitimate son of Isidora Rosa and Juan José Soto. Among his ancestors were many distinguished Hondurans. He grew up and was educated in Honduras during times of continuous political disorder and anarchy. Guatemala, where he graduated in law in 1871, suffered under the long military dictatorship of Rafael Carrera. But the advent of Justo Rufino Barrios and the Liberal reforms he inaugurated in Guatemala, following the example of Benito Juárez in Mexico, gave a new direction to Rosa's life and that of his fellow student Marco Aurelio Soto. In 1876, Soto became president of Honduras and, with the assistance of Rosa as Minister General, carried out the Liberal ecclesiastical and educational reforms in Honduras. Soto and Rosa directed the nation until 1883, when Soto retired and Rosa went briefly to the United States. Political changes soon caused him to return to Honduras, where he devoted the last ten years of his life to study and writing. He died at the early age of forty-five, disillusioned and embittered by the return of *caudillismo* to his country.

The *Social Constitution of Honduras*, which has been translated here, was written in 1880 as the turbulence surrounding the introduction of the Liberal church and educational reforms was giving way to more stable and enlightened conditions under the rule of his friend and colleague, Marco Aurelio Soto. In it, Rosa retains much of the earlier, revolutionary liberalism, but shows even more of the influence of the contemporary social evolutionism. Significantly, he introduces the essay with a quotation from Linneus to the effect that Nature makes no leaps. The progressive party resembles the moderate national parties appearing elsewhere in Latin America. But while he fell into the general pattern of evolutionary positivism, relying basically upon science and proclaiming the end of the age of metaphysics, and while he trusted to science to solve all social problems, he did not follow this tendency to the point of reducing all social action to the evolutionary science of the inevitability of gradualness. Order and progress, the positivist motto, is the basic idea running through the selection which follows, but a persistent

note of idealism also appears. (His poetry also breathes the Romantic spirit). The predominance of the nationalist ideal is very evident.

SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF HONDURAS

BY RAMÓN ROSA

(From *Oro de Honduras, Antología*. Prólogo de Rafael Heliodoro Valle, con la colaboración del Lic. Juan Valladares R. Tomo primero. Tegucigalpa D. C. Honduras; Talleres Tipo-Litográficos "Aniston," 1948, pp. 139 - 150.)

Societies live, grow, and perfect themselves under the influence of ideas. No people can escape the forms of thought which dominate the epoch in which their destiny is accomplished. Ideas, so to speak, envelop social organisms in the same way that the atmosphere envelops our physical organism. Eliminate the atmosphere for a moment, and the breath of life which sustains all organic matter would become impossible. Suppress for a moment the influence of ideas, that enlightening atmosphere of the spirit, and the life of peoples would be impossible.

The predominance of ideas in social life is necessary, inescapable. But its influence is effected in very different ways, according to the degree of development of peoples. Primitive peoples and those who have been the prey of ignorance and of evil passions are not conscious of the ideas which form the texture of their existence, do not know how to define their needs and aspirations. Among such peoples a distorted or perverted instinct often takes the place of conscience and of insight. On the other hand, those peoples who have reached their maturity, or those who, in normal conditions, have happily enlightened their intelligence and moralized their spirit, understand exactly the ideas which regulate their conduct and assure the harmonious fulfillment of their destiny. They know where they are going, know their real necessities, determine their own aspirations, work with noble zeal for their fulfillment, and in the end achieve them, increasing their happiness. In such people, instinct, which is the highest expression of the brute, has little influence. Conscience, reflection, splendid crown of the human spirit, hold undisputed sway, almost in divine right power. A happy and blessed empire, which maintains social harmony, imparts the blessings of justice,

spreads the light of science, and forms the admirable concert of civilization!

When the great interests of science, commerce, and industry do not have recognized importance in a nation, it follows logically that social activity, which cannot act upon a vacuum, is centered, so to speak, within the sphere of the instincts rather than that of political principles. This is why, in our judgment, the people most inclined to politics are the most backward, those most lacking in wealth, in education, and in prosperity. For them politics is not a specific branch of social activity; for them politics is almost the entire life of the nation. It fills the thought of every day, of every hour, of every moment, and its tendencies, its endeavors, and its solutions almost wholly dominate public attention, calculated usually upon the satisfaction of selfish passions.

The social stage to which we have referred has for many years been that of this nation of yesterday, that of this young republic. By antecedents, errors, and misfortunes which there is no need to recall, work, agriculture, industry, commerce, and the sciences and arts have held among us a secondary role while, on the contrary, politics in its most narrow and barren sense has taken possession of the spirit of peoples and governments—a politics vague in its principles, vacillating in its ways of action, and nearly always dismal in the realm of events. Hence, our discredit in the outside world and the weakness and decadence within our society. While recalling this painful record, we refrain from incriminating anyone. Our purpose is solely to point out a fact as the basis of a thesis which we propose to develop with the patriotic purpose of implanting in the public conscience those political ideas which, in our modest concept, can contribute most efficiently to develop the well being and the good name of Honduras.

Every nation has its period of painful experiences and its days of bitter trials; and in the providential order of human events great public misfortunes are sometimes what cause societies to retrace their steps and to seek the unobstructed paths of honesty, work, and well being. Even the great North American Republic, during the first years of its independence, had unfortunate vicissitudes which seemed about to precipitate it into the chasm of complete disorganization; and this occurred even though the United States upon achieving its independence

had all the elements of wealth and education indispensable to a normal and civilized life. It is not strange, then, that in Honduras, the last limb [sic] of three centuries of domination by the Spanish Metropolis—that in Honduras, with our passionate and unreflecting character, with our lack of resources, our almost complete neglect of great social interests, a temple should have been erected to politics, in which we have blindly adored many idols which dispense the blessings of perturbations and revolutions which, like Saturn of the legend, devour their own children. And so we have our uncultivated lands, whitened with cadavers. Each valley, each hill, each mountain reminds us of fratricidal wars, recalls destruction and death!

If this political fanaticism, dismal as religious fanaticism, has merely destroyed, creating nothing for us, if because of the pernicious influence of political instincts, misled by evil passions, we have had an abundant harvest of misfortunes and disgraces for more than a half century, the hour has now come, in these times of peace and prosperity which we have achieved, to halt in our political wandering, to reflect, and to take account of our true situation, of our pressing needs, and of our legitimate aspirations. [We need to do this] so that we may know what we ought to propose to do to make order reign in our society, to enjoy respect at home and abroad, to increase our national wealth, to permit the enlightenment of the century to spread among us—in short, to have a recognized and unchanging political system which will carry out, so far as possible in our society, the most beneficial and practical ideas and at the same time repulse any personalistic system, whatever it is called, which implies the enthronement of blind instincts, groundless prejudice, and evil passions [for it is the latter] which have thrown into chaos this generous people who, like the Ajax of mythology, today begs Providence for light to carry on the combat. What it asks is light to combat disorder, injustice, backwardness, and the many forces adverse to its composure, to its happiness, and to the honor of its name.

The dignity of the honest and just majority of our country and its most vital interests demand the organization of its political structure [so that it is] disciplined, subject to well defined principles and rules of conduct, and based upon a harmonious group of principles, propositions, and aspirations which express correct judgments upon our antecedents and our

present manner of being, in a word upon our social constitution. [This system] should also have as its main purpose the greatest possible progress, and the highest possible approximation to the ideal of a true republic founded on the labor and the education of all citizens and upon the achievement of the fullest effective liberty.

In order to give organization and form to the political structure to which we refer, should we turn more or less to the elementary and confused ideas of the political factions improperly called Conservatives and Liberals in Honduras? Not at all. The more than fifty years of disturbances, trivialities, and nonsense which constitute the heritage from these political bands prevent us from adopting their ideas and procedures as the basis of the system we wish to see established and sustained in our country.

We cannot be Conservatives, least of all in the Honduran manner, for the very simple reason that there are no social elements or institutions to conserve. And apart from this, although the great evil which exists might be preserved for the sake of stability: Could we adopt the procedures of the Conservatives of the country when they have never been able to carry out their dogma, of *sacrificing everything to order and stability* because of the lack of firmness and consistence in their actions, their lack of foresight, and their inability to develop dependable and efficient measures? On various occasions and under very good auspices they have been in power. Have they ever given to the country order and complete tranquility? Let history and the public conscience answer for us.

We can be neither Liberals in the Honduran style nor liberals in the genuine meaning of the word, because the thoughtful study we have made of social conditions in our country prevents it. Undoubtedly the Liberal party of Honduras has embraced very noble aspirations. But it has not had the skill to organize its power, nor has it been able to give shape to its ideas, converting them into institutions and thus carrying them into the realm of practice. Its blunders and faults of logic have led to its instability, its vacillations in power and in the sphere of the events, to the absence of individual guaranties, and to the lack of that social progress, the achievement of which always marks the influence and rule of true liberalism. We do not deny that there have been and are among us today

men of liberal feelings which do them much honor. But that liberalism which has been made into a system and has not made felt its beneficent influence in real life is, in our judgment, a liberalism which exists in *spirit* but not in *truth*. And the truth is what we want, what we clamor for, because it alone sustains the life of peoples.

If the organization of the political party best suited to Honduras cannot be modeled upon the antecedents and ideas of the Liberal party, as we have concluded, should it be poured into the mold of genuine liberalism as understood and practiced by the radical school which limits the function of the state to giving security and liberty to its members, proclaiming the inviolability of the basic rights of citizens, and leaving to them the exclusive control of all other matters pertaining to the various social activities?

We are in accord with those ideas that the philosophy of law has taught us, that have been accepted by publicists of great renown, and that must undoubtedly prevail in the future, regulating in every country the relations of the state and its members, and invigorating the activity and the interest of peoples. But we do not agree that such ideas can be implanted in our country, at least for many, many years to come. The application of these ideas requires deeply rooted habits of order and of work in a society, through education, moral, intellectual, and political, in all social classes, a public opinion well informed as to its rights and duties, a high state of development of all the elements making up the civilization of the country, and a noble and broad sentiment of patriotism, before which the voice of passion is hushed and the influence of personal interests, of sect, and of party is lessened.

Unfortunately, we are far, very far from having these social and political conditions. Three hundred years of colonial education prevented the possession of such precious gifts, and subsequently we have fluctuated more than half a century between the extremes of despotism and anarchy. For a long time disorder came to be a profitable source of speculation for a part of our society, and even today order is imposed, in general, not by conviction but by necessity. With respect to work, among many of our people the indolence and secretiveness bequeathed to us by the colony still predominate. How, then, can we deny to the state, in the name of the radical principles

of liberalism, the great faculties, the many powers which it needs in order to sustain the public order with firmness? How deny it, also, all the initiative and extensive powers required to encourage work, to give it consistence and direction? If the state does not intervene in this matter, individual interest alone will be powerless to resolve the arduous problems presented us day by day, not through lack of enterprises, but because of lack of the will to work. The benefits of elementary education do not yet reach the majority of the public. Could we, in the name of genuine liberalism, proclaim universal suffrage, making all participants in rights and obligations of which they have not even an elementary or embryonic idea? When one is unable to read and write, when one lacks even the ideas indispensable for private life, there can be no political life, unless by this is understood the abuse of the ignorance of the unhappy proletarians by ward politicians.

Our disgraceful party rivalries, which long ago generated profound divisions and inflamed hatreds, still prevent the existence among us of a public, impartial, and just public opinion, above the interests of the moment. Can we then, in the name of true liberalism, proclaim the power of opinion to maintain the morality of the press and the institution of the jury to perfect the administration of justice? No! Opinion avails little in our society, and the jury would be among us the [source of a] verdict of passion or a decision of ignorance solicited by intrigue. The many elements which constitute the principal agencies of civilization—industry, agriculture, commerce, science, arts, and trades—are now beginning to develop, but do not yet have enough vigor to emancipate themselves from the action of the state and to organize themselves, by their own initiative, into real social activities. Patriotism, the supreme virtue which in their major crises saves peoples which have learned to feel it and to put it to the service of great causes, is not among us a virtue from which we may expect abnegation, sacrifices on the altar of public welfare and of the dignity of the country and its institutions. It grieves us to say it, but we believe that if placed on the scales, patriotism on one side and party passion or personal interest on the other, almost all the weight would fall on the side of egotism, the egotism always opposed to the great traits of generosity and of unlimited disinterestedness which many times are the salvation of peoples.

While in the previous reflections, feeling the pressure of a great sorrow, we have presented the picture of our evil social conditions which for the present prevent the organization of a true liberal party, do not believe that we performed such an ungrateful task in order to repeat the overworked phrase of the conservative school, "we are not prepared for progress and liberty," or to conceal with that commonplace a selfish resignation that sanctions backwardness and erects it into a system, opposing just and profitable innovations. No! If we have caused our vicious social constitution to stand out in relief, it has been to show by irrefutable facts the non-adoption of the radical principles of liberalism and, at the same time, to look for at least a partial remedy for our imperfections by means of political procedures which may be put into practice by an honest and high principled party which takes into account our way of life and works for the good of the country without wandering into liberal utopias or falling into the opposite extreme of the school opposed to progress and to the improvement of institutions. We speak as clearly as possible. We are neither optimists nor pessimists. Much less [are we] cynical fabricators of opportunistic phrases. If, in addition to our deeply rooted convictions, we have any talent, we will always carry this motto inscribed upon our device: *Character is the nobility of talent.*

For worthy, thoughtful men, who stand for something, it is indeed a matter of personal integrity to form a political party wisely and in good faith, one based upon accepted principles and having specific objectives. It is also a purpose that strengthens public morality and is connected with a patriotic interest. In fact, what inconsequences, what disloyalties are not excused among us upon grounds of factionalism and lack of firm principles? Today we speak and write in one way. Tomorrow we shall speak and write in the opposite sense. Yesterday we took one line of conduct and today we have changed course completely. Today we burn what yesterday we adored. Today we adore what yesterday we burned. With such changes, unfortunately, so common among us, what can be done, what can be expected in politics? What faith can be placed in the ideals and principles of men? What faith can there be in a political situation which, in order to be truly stable, requires good faith, loyalty, and even abnegation in its supporters? Yes, it is a matter of personal integrity and of general interest that the sincere friends of the nation's welfare should formulate

their political ideas and put them into practice without vacillation or deviation. It will be said that in spite of the acceptance of certain ideas some fickle persons will be incorrigible. We agree, but should this be sufficient and obvious grounds for withdrawing all confidence from such undependable persons and even for driving them out as Christ drove out the *merchants from the Temple*?

Before presenting the program and explaining the principles and rules of conduct of the political group which we advocate, we have stressed these factors in the nation's background which we have [just] analyzed, because we believe that a thorough understanding of them is of capital importance for our purpose. As proof of this belief we have the teachings of the political history of the republics of Central America.

In Guatemala, after the year 1848, a little group of men supported by General Carrera created a conservative system, clearly defined in its ideas and purposes. The system, though abominable, was executed with an undeviating consistency that does honor to Guatemalan Conservatives. The ideas of the Pavones, of the Batres y Aycinenas, raised to the level of a workable system, if they did not bring progress and liberty to Guatemala, at least gave her a long period of peace, of confidence, and of stability. After the Revolution of 1871, another small group of men led by General [Rufino] Barrios, following a clear out and consistent line of conduct, undertook to reform the Conservative institutions. That reform, although carried out by so few, is today an accomplished fact, applauded and accepted by the great majority of that nation.

In El Salvador, after the Republic had experienced earthquakes and painful crises, General Gerardo Barrios—who met an untimely end—founded his government of definitely progressive trends. The ideals of Barrios and of his Minister Irunguray, put into effect with inflexible consistency, became realities which laid the basis for the growth and prosperity of El Salvador. Notwithstanding the vicissitudes which that industrious people has since experienced, [these ideals] still contribute, and always will, to its social harmony, progress, and well being. A people does not retrogress, falling into [a state of] disorder, once it has entered upon the path of regularity and of work, and has experienced the benefits derived from the adoption of a good system.

Anarchy reigned in Nicaragua for a long period of time; but after numberless misfortunes the Granadine party was organized, made up of sensible and well intentioned men who for many years have given peace to the Republic and who today, by their initiative and administrative labors, give it very notable social progress in addition to the benefits of order.

In Costa Rica, Carrillo became wearied by the misery of the country and, in an impulse of noble patriotism, established *obligatory work*; notwithstanding the dictatorial abuses by that energetic man, and in spite of the misgovernment which Costa Ricans have experienced, the fruits of that system—industriousness, agriculture, wealth—have not been lost. To them Costa Rica owes its material growth and prosperity.

Honduras must not and can not always be a sad exception in the political life of the countries of Central America. We can not believe that this country, so rich in resources and intelligence, could be, like *Homer's Hector*, *condemned to the most tragic destiny*. We believe that Honduras can at least do what has been done in the other neighboring republics—establish a true party and create a political system, a party and a system which bring about order, strengthen public confidence, promote social progress, and prepare for the [eventual] coming of all free institutions by virtue of the fruits of good faith, high principled politics, [hard] work, and education.

Now that we have studied the social constitution of our country, examined our history, evaluated our needs and wishes, our necessities and desirabilities, what political party should we establish? What should be its platform? In our opinion, taking into account the principles and rules of conduct that we shall express, that party must be composed of all men of good sense, of character, of good faith, and of noble aspirations who desire the well being and respect of the country. And from our point of view, in order that this party may promise only what it can fulfill, in order that it may do what it should, in order that it may be worthy, devoted to principle, and respected, and in order that its name may not become merely a pretty phrase to cover up an immoral falsification of principles and of ideas, it should adopt without vacillation or hesitation, the only possible platform, the platform of a progressive party.

A progressive party should be established without regard to models in other countries having social conditions different from those existing in Honduras. Politics is not an abstraction, it is a positive science, and parties must be organisms devoted to following its teachings and carrying out its practical conclusions. Hence we can not ignore our social conditions, because that would be to build without a solid basis. Nor can we avoid gradual modification of this social status by opportune changes, because ignoring [these facts] would bring in its train a regime of sterile instability, the acceptance of everything bad in our society. It would mean, in short, closing the doors to a better future that must bring us liberty and civilization by virtue of evolutionary progress which is brought about in the midst of peace, order, and public confidence.

We must not forget that Honduras is passing through a truly transitional epoch and that for this to happen in the broadest and most beneficial sense, leaving permanent results, the progressive party must adopt all those principles and rules of conduct that our social conditions call for and which experience has taught us are useful in creating a strong and beneficial public order and in affirming respect for law and the maintenance of order in society. But, at the same time, it must adopt all those principles and rules of conduct which, by working violence in the spirit of peoples, banish from their spirit absurd prejudices and prepare them for work and education, for the enjoyment of civilized life, for more extensive exercise of their rights, and for the use of institutions more in accord with the dignity of man and with the high destiny of humanity.

To reach the highest level of social culture and true liberty it is necessary to climb slowly and painfully, supporting oneself on the terrain left behind, and fixing one's vision on the height which he is trying to gain. Our progressive party, like the traveler, worn out by the difficulties of his journey, but sustained by faith in his objective, looks back on the past, accepts the painful obstacles it faces and, full of faith and hope, fixes its sight on the better future which lies at the end of the journey. Let us recognize our starting point, which is the past with its colonial customs, with its habits of leisure, with its prejudices, with its anarchical spirit, and with its vices and sins. But let us not let our eyes wander, not even for a

moment, from the end of our painful road. Because there stand morality, the fruits of industry, enlightenment, the spirit of concord, all the beauties of social welfare in their glorious manifestations.

[The author lists the planks in the platform of the Progressive party, beginning with the moral principles for which the party stands, and including the constitutional rights it defends and the measures proposed in the areas of public administration, the treasury and public finance, economic development, law enforcement and the treatment of criminals, ecclesiastical policy, education, national defense, and foreign relations. These are discussed in the section which follows.]

Each and every principle and rule of conduct expressed has its basis in our social mode of being. These principles and rules satisfy urgent necessities of the country, to wit: political morality, order, and progress. If the Progressive party is organized and accepts the ideas stated, it will run no risk of its system being confused with that of the conservative school. The Progressive party does not consider order as a supreme end, but as a means to effect justice. Instead of drawing its inspiration from tradition and strengthening clerical influence, it accepts freedom of conscience and seeks the influence of free thought. It does not systematically favor the ignorance of the masses in order to dominate them and convert them into instruments of [political] passions, but urges that education be ample and effective among the people so that they may rise to the height of their destiny. It does not wish to grant privileges to certain classes but, on the contrary, desires equality in the enjoyment of rights and social benefits. It does not support stability by closing the door to the spirit of change, but encourages private and public initiative wherever progress can be realized. It does not generate maxims which feed a politics of hypocrisy and intrigue but those, above all, which clearly proclaim good faith, loyalty, and frankness. With attributes of such substantial character, the progressive party which we advocate will be separated by nothing less than an impassable chasm from the doctrines which the conservative school adopt in practice.

Nor should the system of the Progressive party, as we understand its organization in the country, be confused with the system of the genuinely liberal party. The liberal party

wishes universal suffrage, and the Progressive party would limit it by establishing fair restrictions. The former urges a government of limited powers, relying more upon public opinion, while the second urges a strong government, one with such powers that it may, under any circumstances, hold disorder in line. The former calls for complete administrative decentralization, the latter asks for gradual decentralization. The former asserts rights untouchable by law, the latter accepts some limitation of those rights by positive legislation motivated by high standards of order, morality, and public convenience. The former wishes to achieve immediately the ideal of true liberty, exercising without delay all the freedoms. The latter is content to arrive at the practice of liberty in its many aspects gradually, by means of order, work, and the education which shapes the conscience of the citizen. The former hopes for almost everything from the effect of principles, of great and generous ideas. The latter expects much from events which have their source in reality, even under the pressure of compulsion, [thus] improving the lot of the people and bringing them closer to the ideals of true and complete liberty. With such striking and profound differences, one cannot fail to agree that a great distance separates the positions of the progressive and liberal parties. The latter [is] more generous, the former more sensible. The latter points out the ideal, the former indicates the road which leads to the realization of the ideal.

It exceeds the limits which we have proposed to give to our work to point out the practical reason that we have in mind as the basis of each and every principle expressed in our program. The opportunity may perhaps come to make a special analysis of each of the principles and measures which we adopt. In the meantime, let us have confidence that all just men, free from inflamed passions, however superficially they have studied the situation of Honduras, who know the history and the effects of the politics of the country, will agree with us and, though only in the depths of their consciences, will at least do justice to our ideals and to our purposes. For our part, our conviction concerning the goodness and usefulness of the progressive ideas is such that we believe that no government can rule and accomplish good in Honduras except under the auspices of those ideas, and that no opposing party can carry on its opposition sensibly and in good faith, except in the name of the principles of the progressive school.

We are not blinded by the predilection, often exaggerated, which men have for the ideas they formulate and stand for, particularly in politics. For we believe, not on the basis of passion, but by conviction, that the Progressive party is the only party that can have a valid organization in Honduras and advance the welfare of the country. Here there are no great traditions, no powerful and wealthy clergy, no noble families with extensive capital, nor large abject masses which would make possible the successful founding of the clerical (*frailero*) party of Guatemala, or the "Big Wig" (*pelucón*) of Chile. Nor is there here the public spirit, nor the literary life, nor the influence of the press, nor the numerous ardent youth devoted to liberty which would support a genuinely liberal party, such as that which resisted the European intervention in Mexico or the one which established in Colombia the radical and famous Constitution of Rionegro. Here, because of our antecedents, because of our necessities, because of our resources, because of our temperament, and because of our education we have no alternative but to constitute the Progressive Party in opposition to the reactionaries and to the demagogues. In power or out of it we must, then, work for the triumph of the progressive ideas.

Without having given the matter careful thought, one might say that in spite of our claim of practicality we are merely dealing with theories, that the progressive party has no antecedents nor basis of existence in Honduras. To that supposition let us answer with recent events. It is now nearly four years since Sr. Marco Aurelio Soto, at the insistence of the people, began to direct their destiny as President of the Republic. That illustrious and generous man did not base his support upon any political party, but established it for the general good of the country upon the basis of popular good will and upon [generally accepted] ideas of impartial justice, *order, and progress*. Sr. Soto, with as much intelligence as good will, and in spite of finding the country in anarchy, almost destroyed by civil war, has put into practice a large part of the principles stated in our program. The result has been that Sr. Soto, without any precedent in our *old politics*, has established a highly respectable and beneficial government for Honduras. How has he kept order? How has he reformed the army? How has he given new laws to the country? How has he given it a network of telegraph lines? How has he strengthened the

public credit? How has he broadened agriculture and commerce? How has he encouraged education? How has he restored the principle of authority without impairing rights? How has he reestablished public confidence? This is the answer — by the invigorating strength (*virtud fecunda*) of progressive ideas.

Well then, since the evidence of the facts favors the ideas we urge, since they and they alone have sufficient basis in reason to become a true system, it is a patriotic duty to accept them with frankness and to serve them with loyalty. In politics, when a road is found to lead to the general welfare, it is neither prudent nor patriotic to deviate or turn back. One should go on with valor and conviction. Timidity and uncertainty can only be the product of a faithless conscience or of a superficial spirit, vacillating because of lack of convictions. The latter, according to a famous proverb, *have more power than an army*. So we must have the strength of our beliefs. At the same time we should remember, as in the words of the sublime poet Dante, that *the world has been lost for lack of logic*. Upon a par with our convictions, then, let us have logic consistent with all the facts. The situation of our country demands it and our honor requires it.

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To conclude, we want to confess that in science as in art we have a profound attachment, a deep loyalty to the ideal, and that if the government and the condition of our unfortunate country were different we would urge with full conviction the organization of a genuinely liberal party — the establishment of the most advanced and generous institutions, those which most ennoble a man, most ennoble a people, and glorify humanity most by bringing it closer to perfect justice, to the supreme perfection which lies in the bosom of God, the sublime ideal of art and science. But a feeling of profound sorrow afflicts us upon recalling the lot of our country and upon reaching, as the bitter fruit of our study, the unquestionable truth that we can not now urge the immediate realization of the social and political ideal as it is understood and felt by the true patriot. But in the midst of such a tragic realization, we are consoled by faith in the progress of our country....

(Trans. by D.M.C. and H.E.D.)

JUAN MONTALVO (1832-1889)

ECUADOR

That Juan Montalvo was Ecuador's greatest intellectual and literary figure is attested by no less than José Enrique Rodó of Uruguay and Miguel Unamuno of Spain. Born in Ambato, Ecuador, April 13, 1832, Montalvo attended but never finished the course in the National University in Quito. He went, instead, to Europe, where his education was completed through contacts with great literary figures of the day, particularly Alphonse Lamartine, the romantic poet and politician.

His importance in the history of Ecuador centers around the figure of the mystic-realistic-theocratic-dictator-president of the nation, Gabriel García Moreno, who was the foil for some of Montalvo's keenest thrusts, many of them written while in exile. After García Moreno's assassination, Montalvo could boast arrogantly, and with satanic humor, that it was the work of his pen! In passing, it may be noted that the Ecuadorians have deemed it appropriate to commemorate the significance of these two men in statues which face each other across one of the plazas of Quito. There, in eternal dialog, they seem to express two diametrically opposed personalities within the national spirit.

Montalvo's rhetoric often reflects the spirit of romantic revolt, but he is saved, as Unamuno says, by his spirit of "indignation."¹ Although it is possible to see influences of romantic and utopian socialist ideas, Montalvo is not so much a romantic in the European sense as a rational idealist who retains much of the earlier American-French revolutionary thought.

The elements of his social thought may be summarized as follows. Basically he was a skeptical idealist, influenced by Montaigne. His interest in the Indian, while idealistic, was too rational for the romantic concept of the "noble savage." Although he was the chief of the Liberal movement in Ecuador in his day, he never accepted the social ideas of this party completely. Rather, he carried over concepts of the earlier natural rights rationalism, joining them with certain ideas

1. Quoted by Manuel Moreno Sánchez in his *Montalvo*, "Prólogo," (México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1942) p. xxvi.

similar to the later Christian Socialism. His classic moral-idealist view of society is best seen in his *Geometría moral*. Rodó called him a mixture of Sarmiento and Bello (the romantic and the classic). His central idea of liberating man from clerical influence is the heart of the Liberal platform, but it is the earlier rational concept rather than the later positivist view. He opposed Marxist socialism, rejecting its economic determinism and the materialism which he saw in the socialist insistence that liberty was empty without economic bases. Unamuno was quick to sense a spiritual kinship with Montalvo in the latter's reconciliation of his faith in America with the Spanish cultural tradition, which he saw developing new forms in America. His concept of love as the social dynamic reaches back over the years to Esteban Echeverría, while the idea of the power of laughter, best exemplified in his *Capítulos que se olvidaron a Cervantes*, shows kinship with Montaigne, Voltaire, and above all Cervantes. Most of Montalvo's ideas, but not all, unhappily, may be seen in the following essay. One of the ideas most strongly expressed, and worthy of note, is that regicide is justified under the right circumstances.

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JUAN MONTALVO

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THE HEROES

BY JUAN MONTALVO

("Los héroes," *Siete Tratados*. From *Montalvo. Prólogo y selección de Manuel Moreno Sánchez*. México: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1942. Pp. 103-113).

BOLÍVAR

Bolívar called himself an American and, sensing the end for which he was born, converted the passion which was killing him into a grand unswerving life. The great defenseless prey which Spain had devoured for three hundred long years was finally giving the first signs of rebellion. Patriots perished, the executioner performed his job, and the feet of Pichincha were bathed with the blood of the noblest sons of the land. They well knew that the fruit of their daring would be death. They wished only to sound the call and set the fire that would destroy the oppressor. By what name could you call this offering of life without any hope of success? Sacrifice; and those who sacrificed themselves are martyrs, and the martyrs become saints, and the saints enjoy the veneration of the world. Our saints, the saints of liberty, of the fatherland, if they do not have altars in the temples, have them in our hearts; their names are carved on the face of our mountains, our rivers respect the blood running upon their banks and erase these sacred stains. Miranda, Madariaga, Roscio in chains; Torres, Caldas, Pombo on the scaffold. But those who gathered the flower of the tomb, those who first marched to eternity, crowned with thorns blessed in the temple of the patria, were Ascasubi, Salinas, Morales, and others, great in their obscurity, great for the way in which they surrendered themselves to the scaffold, the first born chosen for the mystery of the redemption of South America.

The first voice of independence was extinguished in the sepulchre. Quito, first in attempting it, was the last to enjoy it. Thus it was ordained by God, and for twelve years more the most virtuous of the heroes had to recoup themselves in the mountains. The cry of grief (*ay*) from such illustrious

victims — this cry says: Americans, awake! Americans to arms! — reached Bolívar, who believed himself summoned by the New World, which placed its destiny in his hands, to stand before posterity. He listens, proudly arises, and flies to where he has a tacit compact with the future generations. He flies, but not before consecrating [again] a promise which he had made upon Monte Sacro, the mausoleum of free Rome; because the spirit of Cincinnatus and of Camillus could help him in the stupendous work to which he was putting his shoulder. He meditates, prays, commends himself to the God of armies, and in a swift ship crosses the seas to claim what danger and glory await him in his country.

Austere, enduring all; few virtues are lacking in him. If he had not joined patience to his fiery spirit when the occasion required it, where would independence and liberty be today? His detractors insult him, he is silent. They slander him, he is contemptuous. His rivals create provocations, he remains prudent. With the enemy legions he is a lion: he falls upon them and devours them. The bones which are bleaching on the plains of Carabobo, San Mateo, Boyacá, and Junín testify that this king of the wild beasts was valiant in battle. If anything detrimental to the republic might result from this exaltation, [he was] the philosopher. When the purpose of the actions of a great man is other than his own aggrandizement, he knows well how to distinguish the cases in which his will must prevail from those in which he yields to necessity.

His intellect not only embraced things in the large, but defined them with sharp discernment; and the great cause of emancipation was never allowed to lack anything because of the smallness of suspicions, hatreds, or rivalries. In regard to the virtues, [he is] always above all; appearing as the captain, at once [he becomes] the Liberator. It is impossible that a man of his quality should not be first, even among kings. As a leader he is equal to the best; person to person, one to contend with the Cid: certain that while in ten hours of battle his arm might fail, his heart would never falter. But his strength never failed him; physical vigor is not an unimportant quality in one who rules others. Pallas lies stretched out open mouthed in the land of Evendrus with a wound in his chest which is nothing less than two feet in length. Aeneas did it. A horse charges through the battle camp from between the legs

of his rider who has fallen in two halves, one on either side, cleft from the head by a single blow. Pyrrhus is the master of that exploit. And who bounds to the ground, hurls himself on the grenade smouldering at his feet, and hangs it on the neck of his horse who dances away? Ah, these poets of action work their poems in visible forms, and the poets of the mind stamp them in eternal characters. Napoleon is as much a poet as Chateaubriand, Bolívar as much a poet as Olmedo.

Fervent, active, impulsive, swift, don Simón was not a man whose genius was to plod step by step in the operations of war; rather, if anything came out badly, it was because of excess of ardor of spirit and of swiftness of resolution. Of Fabius Maximus, not much, of Julius Caesar, little, but of Alexander, all was determined and accomplished in him. On a certain occasion when his rear ranks were left badly guarded, he restored with celerity the damage from his imprudence. Turning upon the enemy when least expected, he wrought such havoc that the lesson gained from the imprudence was equal to the daring; some at the point of the lance, others drowned in flight, he gave such a good account of them, that if anyone escaped it was by swift flight. Agualongo, the famous *caudillo*, Greek in his cunning, Roman in the strength of his character, [now] knows whether he may harass a Bolívar with impunity. Seldom did Bolívar err by lack of foresight: dexterity (*el don de acierto*) imparted strength to his ideas, and as his genius rose higher, his step became surer . . .

Reading and studying were in him industries carried out in the first flush of youth, without permitting them to rob him of the hours destined for the follies of love. In mature age, he lacked time because of the war, since he fought for twenty long years, with varying fortune, until he saw the image of liberty placed on the altar of the nation. The cultivation of letters requires more calm than the noise of arms permits. Nor is it given to everyone to employ the pen and the sword at the same time. Caesar transmitted to posterity his deeds as he was performing them, and in what prose, when you consider it! The works of steel, such as his; the prose in which he immortalized them, to the measure of Cicero. Among extraordinary men, those who prevail over a hundred generations and who dominate the land, lofty as a mountain, genius comes armed with all the arms, so that they flourish

the sword while they let the pen run, and loosen their tongues in torrents of eloquence. Warrior, writer, orator, Bolívar was all these, and of the finest quality. His mind aflame, his expression unmoved, when he speaks of oppression, "the sweet tyranny of the lips" is terrible in the man who was born for greatness. His voice does not thunder, but goes like a rapier to the heart of tyranny, flaming on those field monuments which victory erected after each great battle.

It is said that when he entered the hall of congress, Colombia now freed and the Republic established, there entered what seemed a being superhuman in appearance, in his walk, his manner, and an air of superiority and mystery, which had a humbling effect upon the leaders gathered there. An immense task carried to a happy conclusion; stupendous battles, incredible triumphs, feats of valor and perseverance and, as a crown, the admiration and applause of millions of men, combine in effect to communicate to a hero this aspect of the marvelous, overwhelming the spirit of those who look at him, their memories struck by the deeds with which he has come to be so superior over all.

With the passing of time, he finds himself ill in Pativilca, seized with a fever, broken down and melancholy. One of his admirers describes him to us seated there, his thin knees together, pale of cheek, a man more for the grave than for battle. The formidable Spaniards, masters of all of upper and of the greater part of lower Peru: fifteen thousand men of those who had conquered the Napoleonic hords and driven them from Spain. Laserna, Canterac and other valiant generals, well armed, rich and full of daring from a thousand triumphs: the republic, lost. "What do you intend to do, your excellency?" asks don Joaquín Mosquera. "To conquer," responds the hero. [These are] traits of an elevated spirit and forbearance which affirm the nobility of his blood and the greatness of his heart.

In what respect does he yield to the great men of antiquity? [Only] in what is less by virtue of twenty centuries, [since] only time, the prodigious old one, distills in his magic laboratory the oil with which he anoints the princes of nature. What will Bolívar be when his deeds, passing from generation to generation, embellished with the prestige of the centuries, come to those who will be alive a thousand years from now? Can unjust and selfish Europe belittle us as much as she wishes

now as we take our first steps in the world? But if the past is hers, the future is America's, and the ruins have no smiles of disdain for glory. Louis XIV, Napoleon, great men! Great are those who civilize, those who liberate people: Peter I of Russia is great, Bolívar is great, one the civilizer, the other the liberator. Louis XIV is the genius of despotism; Napoleon that of ambition and conquest. The spirit of liberty is in no manner inferior. Being a child of the light, his creation is divine, while the others flourish and grow to greatness in the shadows.

His enemies started the rumor of his desire for a crown given by the European powers, when nothing was further from his thought. It is true that there were Anthonies who tempted him in this direction. But, more loyal than Caesar, or less ambitious, he always refused in good faith such improper offers. His banner had been that of democracy and he could not relegate to forgetfulness the symbol of his victories without bringing evil upon himself. In time he would have died as a king, had he listened to those honeyed phrases of adulation, since surely they would have killed him if he had taken the crown. [When it was] the knife of envy enveloped in darkness, the blow missed its mark;² the purifying dagger (*el puñal de la salud*) in the hand of liberty would have gone straight to the heart. I put upon his detractors the task of founding their bad judgments on acceptable allegations. The dagger will have the strength of conviction when it speaks in the hand of a Brutus; in the hand of any other it swears falsely. Those who evoke the shade of this Roman will ensure the justice of the blow, if they wish to be liberators; for if the undertaking fails they will be assassins; success is necessary for the excellence of the cause.

What do I say? If Bolívar had died by the power of the Colombian Cascas and Cassiuses, the curses of America would have fallen perpetually on them, as the black drops that measure eternity and brand the countenance of the damned. The failure of their rash attempt has saved them; accordingly, I suggest, they are pardoned because of the good faith with which perhaps some of them embraced this horrible cause, either through excess of credulity or through too much ardor

2. An apparent reference to the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Bolívar.—H.E.D.

of blood. I go further and say that given the case in which the ambitions of the Liberator were manifest, the dagger was not the instrument for the salvation of the republic; parricide blackens all around it, it infests a huge space, and its poisoned shadows are capable of corrupting the light of day. The Chinese demolish, not only the house, but also the town where a parricide was born: kinsmen, strangers, old men, youths, women, and children — they kill all, even the animals, and they sterilize with salt the land which produced such a beast. In being free men and republicans we are all sons of Bolívar, the liberator and founder of the republic. We cannot kill him without deserving the punishment of murderers.

BOVES

The soldiers march silently through the encampment, the cannon are mute and sad. The lance, balanced on the shoulder of the *llanero*, does not threaten, and the charger grazes peacefully in the pasture. What has happened? The chief is in his campaign tent; a fever keeps him delirious. His wounds, deep and mortal, speak of death, and threaten the war with inconsolable widowhood. Spain is about to lose one of its fiercest but most dedicated (*esforzados*) sons. The cause of slavery will be deprived of its first minister. Boves is dying! Boves has died! [But] Boves has not died. Upon a fine horse that snorts and prances he reviews his *llaneros* (plainmen), his faithful friends, whose affection is for us the ruin of the nation. With black hair and pale face, he bears himself well on a prancing steed, making a show of his recovered health and the vigor of his constitution. The soldiers have seen their sadness change to jubilation, the discouragement of their hearts to fierce ardor. Boves is there before them, Boves their chief, Boves the cruel, Boves the scourge of the enemy; affable, good, generous with his friends. For the sake of Boves, not for the king, they battle with their compatriots, for him they are killed with their brothers. Love of war unites their fierce hearts, and this passionate union is terrible for the republicans. Boves the lion has infused a terrible loyalty in the breasts of his followers, other lions, more noble than those of Asia, those of the dank forests where sun and land combine to create the most powerful beings.

The chief comes and goes; his aspect animates the soldiers, his voice inflames them. To horse! To horse! The ground

trembles beneath the tempestuous gallop, their arms flash in blood-like flames, the scabbard sounds stridently upon the stirrup, and of dust swirls behind that human tornado. Who could resist the attack of these wild beasts, sworn before the prince of darkness to emerge with victory or to descend to the inferno. What neck is so agile as to dodge the murderous curve of the blade? What breast so strong that it could repel the blows of the lance? The shield of Ajax, covered with seven bullskins, would not be sufficient protection against this horrible tongue which comes vibrating like a maddened serpent? Now they attack, now they cleave with their swords, now they inflict wounds a palm in length.

But what stops them? Why do the terrified horsemen retreat? The enemy spoke in a thousand voices of flame, the grapeshot works havoc in the opposing ranks; the columns of San Mateo remain unmoved. All the forces of powerful Iberia could not break them though coming against them with fearful courage. And the royalist chief is there, active, ardent, furious. *Llaneros* to the attack! And the troops turn, because they were not retreating, and they attack with renewed vigor and are shattered by the infantrymen with unsheathed bayonets. A thousand horses flee the ground, others stampede stamping and kicking the agonizing owner hanging from the stirrup. The number of the *llaneros* diminishes, but their valor increases. The blood of their comrades revives the thirst which they have for that of the enemy, it enrages them, setting fire to their spirits. They wish to avenge the fallen and they fall in their turn. The land flows [with blood] while the air rings with the rattle of arms and the shouting of the warriors. No one retreats. The battle is embittered with a point of honor and of vengeance. That fire will not be extinguished except with the last drop of the enemies' blood. Boves rushes from one end of the battle lines to the other. In a loud voice Boves commands triumph at all cost. Boves is excited, Boves is maddened, and in his passage from one side to the other he resembles the fantastic hero of infernal battles. He pays no attention to the firing. "Draw the sword! Charge! *Llaneros*! Triumph!" Boves speaks; the *llaneros* charge blindly, thousands fall on each side, the victory is indecisive.

PICHINCHA

One day a child climbed to the heights of Pichincha. Although a child, he knows where he is, and his heart and head are full of the battle. The mountain in the clouds, with its mantle of haze to the waist — huge, masked, it inspires awe. The city of Quito at its feet throws to the sky its thousand towers. The green knolls of this beautiful city, fresh and pleasing, surround it like gigantic clusters of emeralds scattered carelessly on its wide belt. Rome, the city of hills, has none more beautiful, nor any greater number. A noise barely reaches the height, confused, vague, fantastic — that sound composed of a thousand sounds, that voice composed of a thousand voices, which comes forth and is raised from great cities. The clanging of the bell, the blow of the hammer, the neighing of the horse, the barking of the dog, the creaking of carriages, and a thousand moans that come from who knows where, sighs of homeless spirits, cast out from their lodging by hunger, perhaps, and risen to the height to mix with the smiles of pleasure and to corrupt them with melancholy.

The child listens, listens with his eyes, listens with his heart, listens to the silence, as it is said in the Scripture; hears the past, hears the battle. Where was Sucre? Perhaps here, on this very site, upon this green step. He passed here, ran through there perhaps, and finally charged headlong on this side into the fleeing Spaniards. The child stumbled upon a white bone, a bone half hidden among the creeping grass and wild flowers. He went to it and picked it up. Was it perhaps one of the royalists? One of the patriots? Is the bone blessed or cursed? Child! Do not say that! There are accursed men, but not accursed bones. Know that death, although frozen, is a fire which purifies the body. First it corrupts it, then decomposes it, then dissolves it; after ridding it of the foul odor, purifies it. The bones of the dead, washed by the rain, carved by the wind, burnished by the hand of time, are the remains of humanity; from this or that man, no. The [bones] of our enemies are not the bones of enemies; the remains are of our fellow man. Child, do not cast it away with disdain. But this youthful investigator of things of the tomb was mistaken. The bones of our dead forefathers on Pichincha are gages of the nothing (*la nada*). Their very dust took on a more subtle form, was converted into spirit, and disappeared. Now

it is deposited in the invisible amphora in which eternity gathers those of humankind.

It would have been good for this child, who should not be as others, to have found on the field of battle a column on which he could have read the principal events of that great conflict.

DEATH OF BOLÍVAR

By the shores of the Atlantic in a solitary villa one finds a man stretched out on a rather humble cot: few people, little noise. The sea crashes against the rocks or groans like a lost spirit when its waves die out on the shore. A few shadowy trees near the house resemble mourners—mourners, since the man is dying. Who is he? Simón Bolívar, liberator of Colombia and Peru. And the liberator of so much suffers the last agony in neglect? Where are the ambassadors, where the commissioners who surround the bed of this great man?

[But] this noted man is an outlaw, whose life anyone may take. His country has decreed it. "I feel myself becoming a god," exclaimed Vespasian as he lay dying. Bolívar breathed his last and became a god. The spirit which is liberated from the flesh and sinks into the abyss of immortality becomes god—luminous, glorious, infinite chasm: there is Bolívar. The dagger does not rise to heaven to pursue anyone. Bolívar died almost in want, a circumstance necessary to his greatness. Manius Curius, Fabricius, Emilius Paulus died indigent. Régulus, had he not tilled his smallholding with his hands, could not have maintained his family; and Mumius took nothing for himself from the inexhaustable treasures of Corinth. Aristides, the just, and Epaminondas, the greatest of the Greeks, left nothing for burial expenses, yet they had conquered kings for the benefit of liberty.

Wealth is a stigma for those who are born for higher things, live for the good, and die leaving the world filled with their glory. Covetousness is not the defect of great men, since ambition never ceases firing them with its ennobling aspirations (*comezones*): an illness pleasant for its voluptuousness, but dreadful if prudence does not temper it.

If Bolívar had been ambitious by nature, his correct judgment, his admirable tact, his incorruptible magnanimity

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would have turned his thoughts to things of more importance than a worthless crown which, by being unworthy, would have broken his head. A king is any child of fortune; a conquerer is anyone strong; liberators are the envoys of Providence. So great is the value of a superior and noble man that not to know him is a disgrace; to know him and oppose him is unpardonable evil. The enemies of Bolívar disappeared from day to day, leaving no heirs to their hatreds. Within a thousand years his figure will be greater and more resplendent than that of Julius Caesar, an almost fabulous hero, magnified with fame and hallowed by the centuries.

(Trans. by L.M.M.)

PART FOUR
Twentieth Century Trends

TWENTIETH CENTURY TRENDS¹

Latin America has entered more fully into world affairs during the twentieth century and has thus been thrown into more intimate contact with the main streams of western thought. A rapid population growth, even among the previously stagnant native peoples, has been accompanied by dynamic economic development. The population increase has averaged two percent in recent years, while the rise in per capita productivity during the years following World War II has been greater than the average increase in the United States during the years 1869-1952. This new social dynamism has brought many changes in society, stepping up the tempo of social change and producing such revolutionary movements as the Mexican Revolution, Uruguayan Batllismo, Peruvian Aprismo, and developments similar in some degree in almost every other nation. Another result was an expansion in intellectual activity which was further stimulated by the immigration of refugee scholars resulting from the Spanish Civil War and other European developments.

With more than half of the century now behind us, it is possible to view these twentieth century changes in historical perspective. What we see is an Ibero-American intellectual renaissance of considerable scope, an intellectual explosi3n expressed quantitatively in a veritable flood of books and journals, but also observable in qualitative terms. In the realm of social thought, the older lines of scientific and positivist thought continued, but with modifications in conformity with twentieth century trends in psychology, sociology, economics, and political philosophy. Marxist socialism, both the older nineteenth century varieties and the newer Russian revolutionary Bolshevism, found an increased number of adherents. The reader will perhaps recall that several of the writers treated along with Marti in the previous section, even though their lives extended into the twentieth century — Ingenieros, Rod3, Hostos, and Letelier, represent this persistence of older trends. The new trends which are most significant in the early years of the twentieth century — existentialist relativism (both idealistic and naturalistic), the neo-thomistic accent upon

1. Under the same title, but in somewhat different form, the substance of this chapter appeared in the *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. I, No. 1 (Jan. 1959) 57-71 and is used here by permission.

universalism and social voluntarism, humanistic personalism, and relativistic empiricism — closely parallel the general movements in western thought. But, as in the past, distinctive American elements also appear in certain influences stemming from American experiences and aspirations, as represented in the revolutionary political movements in the Americas. Except for relativistic empiricism, and sometimes even including that, these new trends often find a common denominator, although in the most varied forms, in an emphasis upon revolutionary idealism, as opposed to evolutionism and materialism — that is to say in their common criticism of what they understand to be Marxist thought in the traditional sense.

PERSISTENCE OF OLDER TRENDS

Positivist Social Science. Comptian positivism and Spencerian evolutionary thought had animated most of the significant development in social science in the late nineteenth century. As we have seen, these concepts of a free, secular society, in which increase of knowledge would gradually bring the benefits of freedom and economic well-being, were the guiding principles of the parties and leaders who brought political stability to many countries previously dominated by revolutionary regimes bred in petty personalist politics. In this connection, it may be added, it would be difficult to overemphasize the important contributions of positivist doctrines in Latin America. In the twentieth century these positivist ideas have continued to hold a place of prominence in the thought of scholars and, notably, in the minds of political leaders trained in the schools of a previous generation. Hence, as social studies of all kinds have multiplied, much of the resulting increased scholarly activity has still been influenced by the social concepts of an earlier age. These concepts have been modified under contemporary intellectual influences, of course, so that present day social philosophers express the same doubts concerning rationalism, progress, materialism, and the nature and certainty of scientific knowledge which trouble our generation in general.

Modified Spencerian and Comptian doctrines continued to be taught quite generally in the universities until World War II, and much of the contemporary theory taught may still be termed positivist. The revolt against positivism, for all the

TWENTIETH CENTURY TRENDS

attention it received, was not as profound as is sometimes assumed. Hence, as in the past, the dividing line between positivism and evolutionary marxism has often been elusive because of the similarity of their philosophical structure. This line is so thin, in fact, that critics have often confused the two, intentionally or otherwise. The chief changes which may be seen in the sociological concepts of such twentieth century "positivists" as Raúl Orgaz of Argentina, Carlos Vaz Ferreira of Uruguay, and Fernando Azevedo of Brazil stem in considerable measure from the psychologism of Gabriel Tarde and the syncretic sociology of Emile Durkheim. Tarde's concept of imitation has been widely accepted, while Durkheim's emphasis upon the religious roots of culture, and upon social control restraints imposed upon the individual by the group, appears in much of the social theory taught in the schools. Among others ideas which have tended to reinforce positivist thought is the anthropological theory of Franz Boas, as it appears, for example, in the Brazilian Gilberto Freyre. Quite generally in Brazil, and occasionally among such Spanish American philosophers as Enrique Molina of Chile, it is possible to see the pluralism and pragmatism of William James and John Dewey. By the mid-century, sociological relativism is plainly in the ascendent, as in the popularity of Karl Mannheim's sociological concepts, particularly his sociology of knowledge. In general, these new trends have tended to supplant the historical and evolutionary explanations of the past with an analysis which concentrates more upon forces of the present.

Marxism. In various forms, Marxism has continued to spread through the middle classes of the increasingly urban society, as well as in the ranks of the organized labor movement which has grown rapidly during the second quarter-century. Despite its revolutionary political ties, Marxism challenged few of the basic ideas of evolutionary positivism, except as it reduced social philosophies and religion to the secondary role of ideologies reflecting the economic interests of a certain moment in history. In the twentieth century, Marxism's basic concern with the labor movement led to an emphasis upon economic planning and industrialization which differed little from positivist ideas. This coincidence of objectives facilitated certain political unions of elements of the armed forces with labor, thus further confusing the differences between the two schools of thought. But Marxism's continued emphasis upon

the class struggle is still a distinguishing mark. Moreover, as twentieth century positivism abandoned its historicism, another aspect of Marxism stood out more clearly. This was its insistence upon a concept of historical process which moves toward rational ends — a dialectic or historical argument which yields meaning and can be the basis of firm social belief.

Socialist thought has been prominent in several of the political movements in the twentieth century: in *Batllismo* in Uruguay, in the Mexican Revolution, in Peruvian *Aprismo*, and in related movements in Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Guatemala, and elsewhere. While this has been a *criollo* or Americanized socialism, genuinely marxist ideas, particularly economic theory, seem to have found more explicit acceptance than in political movements in the United States, for example. In a broad sense, marxism penetrated the liberal and reforming social thought of the early twentieth century more than one would assume from the weakness of the socialist parties and labor organizations. Its strength lay in the intellectual middle class, in university circles, as in the student movement for university reform in the 1920's, and among immigrant labor leaders. On the other hand, while Russian Communism gained notable converts among intellectuals, poets, and artists, it made small inroad into the more general intellectual life.

Neither the Mexican Revolution nor *Batllismo* produced a marxist spokesman who was able to reconcile the inner theoretical contradictions of these movements. Batlle and his brilliant disciple, the later president Baltazar Brum, were the best spokesmen of the Uruguayan movement. But while the most obvious aspect of their thought on the concrete level is its socialism, neither did much more than to express the quasi-socialist principles widely accepted among liberal political leaders in the early years of the century, without serious attention to underlying philosophical assumptions. In both the element of nationalism predominated. This nationalist preoccupation appears even more clearly, in Chile, in the socialistic expressions of Arturo Alessandri and Pedro Aguirre Cerda, whose "socialism" seems to have been inspired or at least greatly affected by political opportunism. The agrarianism of the Mexican Revolution and the Peruvian *Aprismo* of Haya de la Torre add the most distinctively American note to socialist thought, linking *indigenismo* with a marxist analysis of the social or labor movement to produce a doctrine distinct

from that of the European labor movement.² Alfredo Palacios, who represents the older generation in Argentina, typifies the spokesmen of pre-Lenin socialism who are still numerous.

Communist thought of the second quarter of the century appears in two quite distinct forms: the unimaginative "party line" writing, on the one hand, and that of such intellectuals as Juan Marinello of Cuba on the other, who has retained considerable independence of thought. For artists like Diego Rivera and poets like Pablo Neruda, Communism seems to have been chiefly an expression of social revolutionary protest which they have deemed to be an esthetic necessity. Their intellectual importance should not be underestimated, however, on this account.³

NEW DIRECTIONS

Spanish Influences. As in the past, Latin American thought has oscillated between Americanizing and Europeanizing influences. The European influences have come from various sources, but notably from Spanish writers, who once again, in the twentieth century, have assumed a role suggestive of Spaniards of an earlier age. The literary and philosophical renaissance which accompanied Spain's loss of the vestiges of her empire in the New World and the Far East became a major stimulus to Spanish influence in Spanish American intellectual activity. Once again Spain has produced poets of the first order such as Juan Ramón Jiménez, historians like Rafael Altamira, and philosophers of world renown like Miguel Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset.

The ideas of Unamuno and Ortega have had great influence in Latin America. Ortega popularized existentialist views derived from Wilhelm Dilthey and other Germanic sources, while Unamuno brought from Søren Kierkegaard a dramatic emphasis on the tragic sense of tragedy and suffering, the quest for meaning in Spanish history, as well as a special emphasis on personalism in his philosophy. Unamuno's appeal to Spanish America was greatly strengthened by his interest

2. See, for example, Jesús Silva Herzog. *El agrarismo mexicano y la reforma* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1959).

3. On Communism in Latin America see Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957). For a Russian Communist comment on social interpretations by Latin Americans, see I. R. Grig, "Notes on the Status of the Science of History in Latin America," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 10, Oct. 1955.

in Spanish American literature and history. Like Bergson, he believed there was a kind of historical thinking distinct from that of science. His philosophy made history a sequence of states of belief, thus equating history with faith and making freedom a product of belief. Ortega made a natural appeal to class conscious Latin American liberals with his fundamental belief in the necessity of an intellectual elite to guide the masses, whose inevitable growth degraded everything. The fact that some considered him a spiritual father of the Spanish Republic also added to his influence upon the liberal thought of Spanish America.⁴ Rival ideological loyalties derived from the Spanish Civil War and from the revolutionary movements in Latin America complicate any judgment on the influence of Ortega as of Unamuno, but it is obviously great.

Among the Spanish influences also to be noted is that of the vague and diffuse Krausism, which was popularized in Spain through the teaching of Julián Sanz del Río and was passed on to Spanish America in the late nineteenth century. Karl Christian Krause (1781-1832) was a disciple of Hegel, but was also influenced by the metaphysics of Kant. He evolved an idealist philosophy in which God was equated with conscience, man and the universe were merged in a kind of pantheism, while man and society were assumed to develop in the image of God. Thus, as society became more closely integrated, man became God. Effects of this religious humanism may be seen in many young writers and political leaders of the early years of this century, giving a religious idealism to their social consciousness.⁵

The introduction of Krausism into Mexico centered around the question of adopting the philosophy textbook of the Belgian Krausist Tiberghien. Its Mexican advocate, Telésforo García, emphasized the ideals of "God, *patria*, and liberty" in attacks upon the "conservatism" of positivist social thought. Such krausist ideas animated the minds of many of the younger

4. Gerard Masur, "Miguel de Unamuno," *The Americas*, XII (October 1955) 139-156; Leopoldo Zea, *Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica*, pp. 16-17.

5. On krausism see Leopoldo Zea, *Apogeo y decadencia del positivismo en México* (México: El Colegio de México, 1944) 112-136; Francisco Larroyo, *La filosofía americana* (México: Universidad Autónoma de México, 1958) pp. 99-101; Gerhard Masur, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

followers of Francisco Madero in the Revolution of 1910. In Argentina, this "spiritualist" philosophy had a profound influence upon the leader of the Radical party, President Hipólito Irigoyen.⁶ In Uruguay it helped to form the idealism initiated with the writings of Rodó,⁷ while in Peru Alejandro Deústua acknowledged his debt to Krausism, especially for the idea that liberty is grace. "Spiritism," which has become popular in Brazil, is a related phenomenon, although it seems to have other and deeper roots in the persistent Kantian influence in Brazil.⁸

Spanish America, particularly, reacted to this Spanish renaissance with a revived optimism and confidence which often found expression in the somewhat superficial pan-hispanism and literary Yankeeophobia of the early decades of this century, as in the writing of Rodó, Manuel Ugarte, and Rubén Darío. But the philosophical interest which it aroused stirred more profound inquiry as well, both in these and in other authors.

Existentialist Philosophies. The most significant new directions, however, are what may be termed existentialist in a broad sense. They have roots in the irrationalism, intuitionism, and "creative evolution" of Henri Bergson, but derive more particularly from the Danish Søren Kierkegaard (by way of Unamuno) and from such German writers as Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger. These, and other kindred authors who have been widely read in Latin America, represent a wide span in thought, joined chiefly by their common acceptance of being or existence as reality, and concern with its nature. Many of the German philosophers first became known in Latin America through the pages of Ortega's *Revista del Occidente*, and not a little of Ortega's influence rubbed off in the process of their introduction to Latin American readers.

Acceptance of existence as reality led these "existentialists" to reject the Cartesian dichotomy of matter and idea, subject and object. Questioning the positivist idea of gradual progress, they tended to reject deterministic and evolutionary views of

6. Manuel Gálvez, *Vida de Hipólito Irigoyen*, 2d. ed. (Buenos Aires: the author, 1939).

7. Arturo Ardao, *La filosofía en el Uruguay en el siglo xx* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956) p. 144.

8. João Cruz Costa, *Esbozo de una historia de las ideas en Brasil* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1957) pp. 128 ff.

history. Sometimes a general tendency which might be termed "relativist" has seemed to lead to increased scepticism and disillusion, but more frequently it has brought greater confidence in the possibility of decision making in history. As will be noted later, a lively argument over philosophy of history is one of the outstanding characteristics of the contemporary scene.

Personalism and Humanism. One of the twentieth century trends, of which Antonio Caso and Samuel Ramos provide examples (although differing in many respects) is what may be termed personalist and humanist. Behind this development a vaguely Krausist influence may be seen. Ideas derived from Bergson and James are more important, however, while a kinship with Nietzsche and Unamuno is readily apparent. This trend is personalist in that it seeks the freedom of the individual from social determinism and humanist in regarding man as more than animal, though less than God, and in making philosophy neither primarily theological nor rationalistic. The personalism of Caso has obvious roots in Nietzsche and Miguel Unamuno, while Samuel Ramos derives more definitely from Kant. Sometimes personalism tends toward the stoic idealism earlier expressed by Rodó, manifesting ties with Renan. In a more general sense, because of its stress on individual freedom within the limits of the cultural tradition, this personalist thinking has tended to be conservative in its social outlook and has been critical of reforms emanating from the socialist labor movement. Frequently it has been supported by the literary and sometimes political pan-hispanism stemming from the Generation of 1898 in Spain.

Spanish American personalism and humanism have also suggested comparisons with literary humanists in the United States, such as Norman Foerster and Irving Babbitt, as well as with the "personalist" philosophers Edgar S. Brightman and his disciples.

Neo-Thomism. In the early years of this century, when Jacques Maritain launched his attack on the secularism and "anti-Christian" tendencies of the Bergsonian philosophy of intuitionism and creative evolution, his ideas made a great appeal in Catholic Latin America, partly because they seemed to be a clear response to the appeal to philosophers made by

Pope Leo XIII in the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*.⁹ But although Maritain found many followers in Latin America, their voices were not heard much until after the 1930's, when the Spanish Civil War had aroused political passions, stimulating an anti-Marxist Christian labor movement and a lay movement for social action within the Church.

Since that time a revival of religious commitment may be seen among political leaders and in political movements. Several philosophers have dedicated themselves to re-interpretation of the philosophy of Aquinas, attempting to do for the twentieth century, and its bewilderment over the nature of being and knowledge, what the latter did for the thirteenth. Like Aquinas, they are searching for universals within the new scientific knowledge in biology, psychology, and physics. Whether these neo-Thomists and neo-Aristotelians really restore God and theology to the heart of philosophy as they claim, or whether they merely create an illusion to that effect, their influence upon social thought has been great, if for no other reason than the emphasis they give to social voluntarism and their consistent opposition to Marxism. Insofar as they share Saint Thomas' preoccupation with the problem of being, they tend to find a common ground with existentialists. Many of them, accordingly, assert what is a kind of troubled Christian existentialism.

Representatives of the neo-Thomist trend in Brazil include Jackson de Figueiredo, whose education, strangely, began in a Protestant mission school,¹⁰ and Alceu Amoroso Lima (Tristan de Athaide) whose *O problema do trabalho* shows the *Rerum Novarum* influence in his discussion of the social significance of labor.¹¹ The philosopher Clarence Finlayson and the journalist politician Eduardo Frei M.¹² represent the tendency in Chile, while Nicolás Derisi of the Catholic School of Philosophy and Theology in San Miguel, Argentina, and the late Oswaldo Robles of the National University of Mexico have also been gifted spokesmen, each displaying elements of originality in his thought.

9. Jacques Maritain, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955).

10. Cruz Costa, *op. cit.*, pp. 150ff.

11. (Rio de Janeiro: AGIR, 1947.)

12. See his *Pensamiento y acción* (Santiago, Chile: Ed. del Pacífico, 1956).

AMERICANISM

Scholarly and scientific study by Latin Americans of their society, people, and geography has increased notably, but unevenly, in the decades since World War I. Archaeology has opened up new vistas in indigenous history, while anthropological studies have widened acquaintance with the traits of native cultures and with the processes of cultural change which have affected the mestizo and Afro-American peoples. Most of this study is an extension of scientific activity within previously established principles, raising few questions concerning its theoretical or philosophical premises. Often, however, it reveals a trend away from the older nineteenth century positivist premises of racial and cultural determinism. Some writers have gone further along the lines of empirical anthropological and historical philosophy in an effort to find a theoretical basis for cultural pluralism. Among these a number have looked for elements which presumably distinguish thought and art in America or give to American history some meaning distinctly its own. The resulting trends in thought, based upon aspects of American experience or existence, sometimes lay claim to being American philosophies. Usually they are pluralistic, empirical, naturalistic, and one frequently discerns the influence of North American anthropological thought, particularly that of the Franz Boas school. Occasionally, however, this Americanist quest is couched in neo-idealistic terms. Sometimes it has a tinge of Unamuno.

Indigenismo. Interest in studies of the indigenous cultures has profound roots in the socio-political movements of the twentieth century and has been, therefore, a source of this element of Americanism. Archaeological and anthropological studies have received official support through UNESCO, the Inter-American Indian Institute, and various national institutes and museums, as well as private support from North American foundations and universities. The French *Société des americanistes*, which has long enlisted the collaboration of Latin Americans, has also played a role. *Indigenismo* has been an important element in the literature and programs of the Mexican Revolution, in Peruvian APRA, in the Guatemalan Revolution under Arévalo, in the Bolivian Revolution (MNR), and to a less extent elsewhere. In some respects it is a more profound re-assertion of the concept earlier expressed by certain independence leaders, that the cultural history of America is

significantly continuous with that of the pre-Conquest civilizations.¹³

Such a theory makes of indigenous cultures and their influence much more than a question for the social scientist, as it introduces cultural value concepts to condition the very science which seeks to analyse and ameliorate these twentieth century problems. This theory of an American cultural continuum, moreover, has been a source of a profound spiritual disquietude which has prompted, in turn, an inquiry into the meaning of the term American and of the American concept of man. One by-product of this philosophical inquiry has been enlarged perspective to our historical understanding of the constant vacillation in American thought between Europeanizers and Americanizers, a sense of the extent to which this process has gone on since the very discovery and colonization of America.

The influence of *indigenismo* may be seen clearly in the study of history in Mexico, where the basing of national history upon indigenous origins has been considered essential in the assimilation of the native peoples.¹⁴ The concept of the continuity of Indian history through the period of European domination has resulted in a distinctly new perspective in American history and, accordingly, has produced a number of efforts to establish the significant epochs or decisive historical moments from this standpoint.¹⁵

Afro-americanism, like *indigenismo*, has directed attention to non-European cultural influences which also appear among

13. See Bette Salz, "Indianismo," *Social Forces*, XI (Nov. 1944) 441-469; Alejandro Lipschutz, *Indoamericanismo y la raza india* (Santiago, Chile: Nascimento, 1937) and his *Indoamericanismo y el problema racial de las Américas* (Santiago: Nascimento, 1944); Juan Comas, *Ensayos sobre indigenismo* (México: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1953); the excellent introduction to Aida Cometta Manzoni, *El indio en la poesía de América española* (Buenos Aires: Joaquín Torres, 1939); and Luis Villoro, *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México* (México: El Colegio de México, 1950).

14. See Rafael Ramírez *et al*, *La enseñanza de historia en México* (México: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, 1948).

15. See particularly Juan Comas, *Ensayos sobre indigenismo* and Luis Villoro, *Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México*. Also the work of the Swedish scholar, Sverker Arnoldson, *Los momentos históricos de América* (Madrid: Insula, 1956).

the results of American experiences. But its effect upon social thought seems, on the whole, to have been less profound. The racism and geographic determinism of Da Cunha continued for many years to influence such writers as Arthur Ramos¹⁶ and to inspire regional novels in Brazil. A more distinctive note was struck by Gilberto Freyre in his *Casa grande e senzala*. Freyre portrays the Negro outlook from within a changing culture, with special emphasis upon the effects of slavery as distinct from those of race. As he presents it, the process seems to escape mechanical determinism, both that of culture and of geography. At the same time, it asserts a cultural regionalism which enables the author to see many attitudes and cultural values in the Brazilian areas of former plantation-slave economy which are similar to those in North America.¹⁷ In somewhat similar vein, Fernando Ortiz of Cuba, in his studies of sugar production and of Negro cultural influences, has pointed to cultural influences which may be considered American.

A different kind of American philosophy, taking the form of a *mystique* of the land, has developed in Indian and mestizo Bolivia, perhaps reflecting some influence from the indigenous worship of nature. There a group of writers, including Franz Tamayo, Roberto Prudencio, Humberto Plaza, and Fernando Díez de Medina, ascribe to the Bolivian landscape the source of a spirit which is communicated in some mystic way to the subconscious in man, thus giving form to American culture and American thought. An idea of the Cuban Fernando Ortiz is similar, though it avoids the mysticism. Ortiz has found in the spiral form of the hurricane a cultural symbol whose highest expression is the generalized deification of the plumed serpent.¹⁸

Sometimes the pursuit of an American element or influence in culture has led to the quest for an American aesthetic, as in Ricardo Rojas's *Eurindia*,²⁰ or Luis Alberto Sánchez's *Vida*

16. *The Negro in Brazil*, trans. by Richard Pattee (Washington: Associated Publishers, 1939).

17. *The Masters and the Slaves*, trans. by Samuel Putnam (New York: Knopf, 1946); and *An Interpretation of Brazil* (New York: Knopf, 1945); also Spanish edition (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956).

18. Guillermo Francovich, *El pensamiento boliviano en el siglo xx* (Buenos Aires and México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956).

19. *El huracán* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947).

20. (Buenos Aires: J. Roldán y Cía., 1924). *Obras completas*, Vol. 5.

*y pasión en la América.*²¹ Pedro Henríquez Ureña, in his *Historia de la cultura en la América hispánica*, has traced the development of what he conceives to be distinctively American in the literature of Hispanic America.²²

The idea of Man in America. Felix Schwartzmann of Chile, unfortunately not represented in the selections which follow this chapter, has propounded the existence of a distinct concept of man, or of the human, in America. He derives this idea from experiences peculiar to American existence and believes that the American concept of man provides the key to the interpretation of American cultural history, and that the phases of its trajectory should determine the epochs of American historiography.²³

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

This pursuit of Americanism, as might well be expected, has given special significance and a distinctive direction to the lively argument over philosophy of history in recent years. Concern over the meaning of history is not new, of course, for nineteenth century Latin Americans, as has been noted, rejected their historical past during their independence movements, as they later rejected the doctrines of evolutionary historical and economic determinism developed in European thought.²⁴ Even when they accepted the idea of a natural and inevitable progress, nineteenth century historians continued to write national history in terms of the revolutionary natural rights rationalism, displaying an almost complete preoccupation with national political history.

This inherited American view that the history of American nations was the building of a new civilization upon the ruins of the old inevitably gave a somewhat different turn to the contemporary disillusionment of the Occidental world concerning history based upon inevitable and evolutionary progress. The

21. Santiago, Chile: Biblioteca América, 1936 and his *Los fundamentos de la historia americana* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Américalee, 1943).

22. (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947). Also in English version.

23. *El sentido de lo humano en América*, tomo I (Santiago, Chile: Universidad de Chile, 1950).

24. Leopoldo Zea, *Dos etapas del pensamiento en hispanoamérica* (México: Colegio de México, 1949).

neo-Hegelianism of Benedetto Croce, Oswald Spengler's concept of the decline of civilization, the Christian ecumenicalism of Arnold Toynbee, Unamuno's tragic existentialist view, that history is the source of personal and cultural values, and the neo-idealist existentialism of German origin expressed in the Spanish speaking world by José Ortega y Gasset — these philosophies of history have had great vogue and have not lacked spokesmen in twentieth century Latin America. But the advent of historical disillusionment also happened to coincide with a period of revolutionary social and political change — the Mexican Revolution, *Batllismo* in Uruguay, *Aprismo* in Peru, and similar movements which called for social philosophies of action. Particularly in the literature of the Mexican Revolution and that of *Aprismo* in Peru, it is possible to see a special significance for the discussion of the meaning and philosophy of history.

An extensive and often vindictive argument over the nature and philosophy of the Mexican Revolution was initiated in 1935 with the publication of José Vasconcelos' controversial and widely read autobiography.²⁵ The rapid pace of agrarian and labor reform under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas was arousing increased resistance in certain quarters, while the Spanish Civil War sharpened the conflicts over socialist measures in Mexico as elsewhere in Spanish America. This mounting feeling gave a special pungency to the charges exchanged between the partisans of Madero, Carranza, Obregón, and Cárdenas in the form of reminiscences and polemics. While the argument failed to eventuate in a definitive expression of a social philosophy of the Revolution, it served the purpose of bringing the divergent views more clearly into focus and stimulated the interest in an interpretation of Mexican history which has since become so striking a characteristic of the Mexican intellectual scene.²⁶

25. *Ulises Criollo* (1935), *La tormenta* (1936), *El desastre* (1938), *El proconsulado* (1939), published by Botas, México.

26. Among the many books which constitute this discussion of the Mexican Revolution, the following may be mentioned: José Vasconcelos, *¿Qué es la revolución?* (1937), Blas Urrea (Luis Cabrera) *Veinte años después* (1938), J.M. Puig Casauranc, *El sentido social del proceso histórico de México* (1936), Manuel Gamio, *Hacia un México nuevo* (1935), Alfonso Teja Zabre, *Panorama histórico de la revolución mexicana* (1939), Moisés Sáenz, *México íntegro* (Lima, 1939), and Miguel Alessio Robles, *Historia política de la revolución* (1938). Also Jesús Silva Herzog, *El agrarismo mexicano y la reforma agraria* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1959).

As in the past, twentieth century Latin Americans have seemed to reject the more pessimistic and fatalistic views of history, preferring to find in Ortega, Croce, or Unamuno a philosophy which permitted historical decision making, assigned a significant role to leaders, and accepted the possibility of change by revolution. Thus the increased interest in history brought new defenders of Bolívar, not only in Venezuela, but elsewhere as well. San Martín's glory was revived upon the centenary of his death, and even Agustín Iturbide assumed more importance in the history of Mexico. At the same time, the exploitation of history for political purposes by Mussolini and Hitler stimulated a tendency to magnify the historical importance of Latin American "strong men" such as Diego Portales of Venezuela, Justo José Urquiza of Argentina, Antonio Guzmán Blanco of Venezuela, and Porfirio Díaz of México.

The history and critical analysis of revolutions have interested Latin Americans since the days of national independence, beginning with José M. Mora's *Means of Preventing Revolutions*. Early in this century Enrique José Varona criticized contemporary revolutions as sterile, predicting the day, however, in which the forces of socialism and Caesarism would "come like hurricanes."²⁷ Around the year 1930 three Argentines produced significant studies of revolution: Alfredo Poviña, Arthur Grompone, and Alfredo Colmo. Luis Alberto Sánchez of Peru has also sought the meaning and popular basis of revolutionary change.²⁸

José Gaos, who found refuge from Franco Spain in Mexico, influenced the thinking of a group of younger scholars there who were interested in the philosophy of history. Among this group was Edmundo O'Gorman who, while retaining the Hegelian concept of America as a land without a history (note how he differs from the indigenistas), has found the central meaning of America in a concept of experience in applying natural laws to the creation of a better society.²⁹ His

27. D. Agramonte in Medardo Vitier, *José Varona* (Habana: 1937) pp. 253-254.

28. *El pueblo en la revolución americana* (Buenos Aires: Américalée, 1942); Alfredo Poviña, *The Sociology of Revolutions* (Buenos Aires: 1932); Antonio Grompone, *Filosofía de las revoluciones* (Buenos Aires: 1932); and Alfredo Colmo, *La revolución en la América Latina* (Buenos Aires: 1932. An important new work is Lucio Mendieta y Núñez, *Teoría de la Revolución* (México, 1959).

29. *Fundamentos de la historia de América* (México: Imprenta Universitaria, 1942) pp. 131-132.

examination of the nature of historical knowledge after the manner of Heidegger leads him to the existentialist concept that historical knowledge is authentic only "when the reality examined is raised to the level of personal revelation."³⁰

Leopoldo Zea, another of this group, has distinguished himself especially for his studies of the history of thought in Mexico and Spanish America.³¹ His neo-Hegelian interpretation, as previously noted, emphasizes the paradox that Latin American thought began with an outright repudiation of the authority of historical tradition —that of Europe— yet has always sought to create a history of its own within the Occidental tradition.

Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the organizer and leader of the Aprista party in Peru for more than a quarter of a century, is a Marxist theoretician of originality. He retains the concept of history as a dialectical process. But in his famous essay on historical time-space, which appears in part in the following section, he accepts a philosophy of general relativism and pluralism which leads him to accept the idea of many histories, thus finding a theoretical historical basis for an American socialism distinct from that of Europe.³² Although his approach is fundamentally different from that of Haya, Gilberto Freyre resembles him in his pluralistic approach to the history of cultures. Following Franz Boas in interpreting the psychology of a culture from within, he too arrives at a regional concept — of regions determined by elements in American cultural experiences as well as by geographic factors. In passing, it may be noted that the author of the article in *Voprosy Istorii* mentioned in footnote (2) calls Freyre a "vulgar sociologist . . . under the baneful influence of various North American subjectivist schools," but does not even mention Haya de la Torre.

LEGAL THOUGHT

While it has not been practical to include selections representing legal thought in the following chapters, its

30. *Crisis y porvenir de la ciencia histórica* (México: Imp. Universitaria, 1947) pp. 308-309.

31. See especially his *Dos etapas del pensamiento hispano-americano*, previously cited, and *El positivismo en México* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1943).

32. *¿Y después de la guerra, qué?* (Lima: Ed. P.T.C.M., 1946). The essay first appeared in the magazine *Hoy*, August 1942.

importance must be noted, both because of the basic influence of juridical concepts upon all social thought and because of the special importance which legal philosophy has had in Latin America. Alberdi, as we have seen, extended the historical concept of law into the whole realm of social thought, in a generally materialist vein. His contemporary, Manuel J. Quiroga Rosas, in a book entitled *Sobre la naturaleza filosófica del derecho* (1837) called for a more idealist but still historical, basis in accord with Eclectic ideas. The continuing influence of both is to be seen. In the twentieth century, Ricardo Levene has continued and deepened this historical tradition through his extensive writing on Argentine legal history and through the Instituto de Historia del Derecho Argentino which he founded in the University of Buenos Aires. The purpose of this Instituto, "to cultivate the national juridical tradition, which is not a web of illusions and reminiscences, but a defensive and progressive moral force, a principal part of the history of civilization," links its work with the institutional history of Rafael Altamira, who was Professor of the history of American political and civil institutions in the University of Madrid. Levene has insisted that the sources of Argentine legal institutions combine American and European sources.³³ Ricardo Zorraquín Becu and Carlos Mouchet, two of Levene's disciples, continue this tradition vigorously, but with some significant differences which reflect contemporary social thought, particularly an effort to strengthen the concept of universality in judicial norms.³⁴

Two Mexican scholars, Luis Recasens Siches and Eduardo García Máynez have made notable contributions to this contemporary discussion of legal philosophy. Both reflect current sociological theory in their concern for the nature of the juridical norm and its basis. In the First Inter-American Congress of Philosophy García Máynez attacked the idea that

33. See the review by Osvaldo Vinitzky of two books by Levene in *Revista del Instituto de Historia de Derecho*, Num. 9, 1958, p. 164; also Levene on Quiroga Rosas, in Num. 6, 1954, pp. 11-22 and Sigfrido Radaelli, *El Instituto de Historia del Derecho Argentino y Americano* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Coni, 1947).

34. See their *Introducción al derecho* (Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1943 and subsequent editions).

natural liberty can be the basis of a legal order, defending, rather, the concept of heteronomy, in which juridical norms whose validity is intrinsic have objectivity.³⁵ This view was expressed in a more general sense by José Vasconcelos, in the excerpt from his autobiography which appears in a subsequent chapter. Vasconcelos defines the legal philosophy for which he is searching as one which would analyze laws, legal actions, and legal process as part of the dynamics of society — “a dynamic causal relationship to explain social functions and especially the conflicts of natural desires which establish the need for laws.”

The Latin American preoccupation with the nature of juridical norms, usually with the idea that these norms have objective being even when not fully coactive, seems to have deep roots in the tradition of the Civil law. It has been accentuated by a century of striving, against great difficulties, for political stability and the rule of law in national political life. Today it seeks a rationale in neo-idealist, existentialist, or neo-Kantian thought. Thus, the Argentine Sebastián Soler has defined the juridical norm as “an idea endowed with power . . . [which] subsists even when what it desires does not occur; events do not destroy it, but merely give occasion for it to achieve or not the desired result. Only another norm destroys the norm.”³⁶ José Salvador Guandique of El Salvador has discussed the juridical norm in somewhat similar idealistic terms: “Thus the susceptibility to violation (*violabilidad*) of a juridical norm indicates nothing against its intrinsic validity, since we find ourselves in the realm of the *ought to be* (*deber ser*), even when in fact the latter does not come to pass.”³⁷ José Manuel Delgado Ocando, defining philosophy of law as a branch of axiology (concerned with values), has applied the

35. Luis Recasens Siches, *La filosofía de derecho de Vechio* (México: Uthea, 1947) and his paper presented at the Fifth Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, Washington, 1957: “Justicia: Investigación sobre las implicaciones axiológicas de la idea formal de proporción.” Eduardo García Maynez, “Libertad como derecho y como poder,” with Eng. trans. by Cornelius Kruse and commentary by William Ernest Hocking, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Dec. 1943) 144-166; also his *Introducción al estudio del derecho* (México: Porrúa, 1953).

36. *Ley, historia y libertad* (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1943).

37. “Problemas en torno a la norma jurídica,” *Proyecciones* (San Salvador, El Salvador: Ministerio de Cultura, 1957) pp. 111-125 at p. 119. First published in *JUS* (México) marzo 1942.

concepts of knowledge of Husserl's phenomenology in presenting the study of law to students in Venezuela.³⁸

International law has long held an important place in Latin American intellectual life. Hence it is not surprising to find a group of international lawyers, including among others J.M. Yepes and Edgardo Manotas Wilches of Colombia, Pedro Baptista Martins (1896-1951) and Jorge Americano (1891-1951) of Brazil, Francisco Cuevas Cancino of Mexico, and most notably Alejandro Alvarez (1868-1960) Chilean member of the World Court, advocating what they call a "new" and, in the case of Alvarez, an "American" international law. For Alvarez, the essence of international law is psychological, derived from a study of "the life of peoples, in their full extent and in all their profundity."³⁹ His controversial concept of an American international law rests basically on the view "that due to social, psychological, and geographical circumstances, the Americas have consistently entertained a peculiarly intense sentiment of solidarity."⁴⁰ While he hopes for a fusion of the Roman and the Anglo-American schools, he does not believe this must imply ultimate universality.

38. *Lecciones de filosofía del derecho* (Maracaibo, Venezuela: Univ. Nac. del Zula 1957, pp. 185-191.

39. *Después de la guerra*, p. 123, quoted in H.B. Jacobini, *A Study of the Philosophy of International Law as Seen in Works of Latin American Writers* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954) p. 106.

40. Jacobini, p. 126, citing Alvarez, *Le droit international américain*, pp. 17-21.

JOSE VASCONCELOS (1882-1959)

MÉXICO

Perhaps Vasconcelos' genius was a kind of madness, as some of his close associates have insisted. Certainly there is no denying the contradictions and inconsistencies in his writings. But neither is there any disputing the fact that his mind is one of the most original and productive of twentieth-century Spanish America. His brilliant political career, culminating in the ministry of education, where he launched Mexico's great popular educational movement, ended in bitterness and frustration when he was defeated for the national presidency in 1930. But his lasting fame derives from the more than a score of substantial volumes which attest his intellectual productivity while making him at the same time the most controversial intellectual figure of his country.

He was born in Oaxaca on February 28, 1882, the son of a Mexican government official, and educated in the public schools of Eagle Pass, Texas, in Yucatán, and in the National University of Mexico, from which he graduated as a lawyer. His successful legal practice was interrupted by the advent of the Mexican Revolution which diverted him to a political career. Meanwhile, however, he had been associated with the group of keen young men, including Alfonso Reyes, Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Diego Rivera, and Antonio Caso, the *Ateneo de Juventud*, which launched the attack upon positivism in the University. His philosophical differences with some of the others in this predominantly literary group appear in the brief excerpt from his autobiography, *Ulises Criollo*.

The ideas of Bergson contributed much to his early intellectual formation, but Vasconcelos cannot be explained as the disciple of any contemporary "school." He devoured the writings of contemporary authors of the most diverse tendencies and he quarrels with most of them. Like so many Spanish Americans, he was looking for an autonomous American, that is to say Spanish American, culture and philosophy, which would also be universal.

This concern led him on to the problem of reality, which he discovered in the harmony of being or existence. To transcend the dychotomy of idea and matter he rejected neo-Hegelian idealism, as appears in the following excerpt from

his *Bolivarismo y monroismo*, as well as the "materialism" of positivist thought. Strong links with Anglo-American thought, surprising perhaps to readers who have known only of his hostile expressions against the United States, may be seen in his concern with the principles for a philosophy of knowledge which are implicit in the expanding frontiers of scientific thought. Some phrases suggest Alfred North Whitehead. From the natural sciences, he has written, arises the basic problem of joining nature with spirit.¹ The discussion of the basis for an Ibero-American sociology in the excerpts from *Bolivarismo y monroismo* also reveals a quality of anti-intellectualism which has Kantian overtones, a preoccupation with the central reality of being or existence, an insistence upon the primacy of esthetics and upon its connection with the cultural heritage, the Platonic harmonious linking of esthetics and ethics, the search for a philosophical basis in natural science, particularly biology, and an emphasis upon personalism and individualism which, while differing from that of Antonio Caso, also resembles it in some respects.

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The best account of his life is the four volume autobiography, published by Botas, México, 1935-1939: *Ulises Criollo*, *La tormenta*, *El desastre*, and *Proconsulado*. José Sánchez Villaseñor has written a somewhat inconclusive interpretation in *El sistema filosófico de Vasconcelos* (Mexico: Ed. Polís, 1939). In English, Ronald Hilton has written "José Vasconcelos," in

1. "Pensamiento contemporáneo," *Memoria de El Colegio Nacional*, t. II, No. 2 (1947) 9-16, at p.9.

The Americas (Academy of American Franciscan History) Vol. VII, No. 4 (April 1951). Patrick Romanell writes of him in *The Making of the Mexican Mind*. Richard Baker Phillips presented a thesis on Vasconcelos at Stanford University and Philip Raine has treated him in a thesis at The American University on the broader subject of the idea of America in Mexico. See also W. R. Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, pp. 260-276, and H.E. Davis, *Makers of Democracy in Latin America*, pp. 107-109.

A YOUTH ATHENEUM

BY JOSÉ VASCONCELOS

(From *Ulises Criollo*, 4a. ed., Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1935, pp. 266-269.)

Caso inaugurated our group with conferences and discussions upon philosophical themes in the Salon del Generalito of the Preparatory School [of the National University], and it assumed the form of an Atheneum with the arrival of Henríquez Ureña, a formalist and academic spirit. The Atheneum part was acceptable, but to call it a Youth Atheneum when we were some twenty-three years of age did not please a person like me, for I always considered myself older than my years. I found myself in the minority¹ at the beginning of the battle launched before the arrival of Pedro Henríquez — the philosophical battle against positivism. Caso was always the leader and our support Boutroux. The latter's book on the contingency of natural laws, which Caso skillfully drew on and commented upon, destroyed in one series of conferences all the positivists' work of the previous thirty years. I can not say that the book of Boutroux impressed me so much. [It was] negative in its conclusions, and I did not attach great importance to the question whether the laws of science were simply the essence of experience or coincided with logical necessity. What I anxiously desired was experience capable of demonstrating the validity of the spiritual within the very field of the empirical. And this is what I believed I deduced from Maine de Biran and his theory of the "sentiment of the action . . ." Hence the twofold direction of the ideological movement of the Atheneum — rationalist and idealist with Caso, anti-intellectualist and spiritualizing in my mind.

1. *Era como ampararse en la minoría*: literally, "It was like enjoying the protection of the minority." — Translator.

For their part, the litterateurs Pedro Henríquez, Alfonso Reyes, and Alfonso Cravioto impressed on the movement a cultist tendency, ill understood at first, but useful in an environment accustomed to acclaim genius for some chance improvisation and to grant lasting fame upon no more basis than a pretty poem, a good article, or a clever remark.

On the other hand, my activity in that Atheneum, as in similar circles, was always mediocre. What I believed I had within me was not something to be read in cloistered cells, almost not to be written. Every effort to write produced in me a feeling of irritation and frustration. Everything became entangled for lack of style, I told myself. In reality it was lack of clarity in my own thinking. Moreover, I was in no hurry to write. Before doing so I needed to read much, think much, and live a great deal. A few of my colleagues understood this and affirmed their hope as to what I would ultimately do. There was not lacking, however, the precocious hack-writer of no latter consequence (*mas tarde fallido*) who would say to me, as if denying my right to be a member of the Atheneum: "Well now, and you, what do you write? What do you do?" I replied enigmatically, with deliberate pedantry, "I think."

Meanwhile, the date of my professional examination approached, and it was necessary to present a thesis. No juridical theme interested me. Political economy had been studied in the sense of refuting the supposed character of law given by the professor to the law of supply and demand, opposing socialist arguments, á la La Salle and Henry George, to the text of Leroy Baulieu.² But that was the store-room of the scientific edifice, a theme for the housekeeper of the intelligence. Eliminating here and there, I came at last to the only question which had aroused my interest in the legal discipline: What place does the latter occupy in the general order of motives of action? What is the inner essence of the juridical phenomenon? What is the relation between the juridical act and the most general law of science, the principle of the conservation of energy? In other words, I wished to bring into the doctrine of the Preparatory School the method

2. "La economía política . . . como el que más, rebatiendo al catedrático el supuesto carácter de ley que daba a la oferta y la demanda, oponiendo al Leroy Baulieu del texto, los argumentos socialistas a lo Lasalle y Henry George." The author suggested the translation. — Trans.

of [Aemilius] Papinianus. To this end I urged giving to law a value connected with the general principle of the knowledge of the epoch. Thus, since, for the Roman, logic applied to social relations gave the juridical norm, so now there must be sought a dynamic causal relationship to explain social functions and especially the conflicts of natural desires (*apetencia*) which establish the need for law.

A dynamic solution! With the mere enunciation of it I had marked out the road, but it was an anxious moment. All my companions wrote on the basis of citations and quotations. The books of Caso himself gave support to this faith in erudition. The litterateurs of my group, for example, could not make up their minds to write a novel; they spent themselves in commentaries and criticisms of foreign work á la Henríquez Ureña, who had become their master. Aware, then, of my very audacity, I sought analogies of the juridical act to the voluntary act of the psychologists, to the biological act, to the chemical process, and finally to the mechanical. Just as conflicts of forces were solved, so, in a perfect society, juridical conflicts should be settled. In theory, whoever has the greatest need for a thing, whoever places upon it the greatest desire and will, should be its possessor. In relation to these sincere desires society should operate as in the balancing of [natural] forces, cooperating with desires [which are] strong and noble but free of pettiness.

Then I felt the need of discussion, of speaking the ideas before writing them. I started to speak of them with Caso, and his natural wisdom and clear understanding helped me. He did not agree with my insight. Law [to him] was a social phenomenon, it did not appear without coercion, it was not proper to conceive law as a natural impulse, even less as a force. We discussed at length upon the basis of the *Treatise on Political Ethics* of Spinoza. Taking my stand on the book of [Alfred] Fouillé upon ideas as forces, I objected that even ideation, the most puzzling phenomenon which the will displays in law, could and ought to be assimilable to the concept of force, the physical concept of all philosophy, a modern idea.

I wrote upon law as force and inner dynamism of social relationships. Starting with the basic idea of impulse, I succeeded in determining how, within the multiple inter-play of the dynamic, juridical controversy emerges as inevitably as

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the force of the oars and the current clash and combine when the boat goes up the river. When I came to the point of defining the "Dynamic Concept of Law," I felt a lightening flash pass over my brow. Before anyone else I read my pages to Caso. "It is curious," he remarked. "You have written a good many pages without making a citation and without losing sight of your theme. It is rarely that we can write so. In short, your work is original and I congratulate you."

His congratulation was sincere because, realizing his own worth, Caso felt no jealousy; he is naturally generous.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

SUGGESTIONS FOR AN IBERO-AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

BY JOSÉ VASCONCELOS

(From *Bolivarismo y Monroismo*, 2a ed. Santiago de Chile, 1935. Translated from *Vasconcelos*, Prólogo de Genaro Fernández MacGregor, México: Secretaría de Educación, 1942, pp. 131-138, 150-154.)

CONCEPTS OF SOCIOLOGY

In the first place, we shall define the principles which we follow in examining the social phenomenon of Ibero-America. We see in sociology the last stage of the empirical science which begins with Galileo and develops its method in Bacon and Comte. We believe that the experimental discipline and systematic and direct observation are essential for the study of concrete reality. And we shall apply this method to the area in which society shares [the realm of] biological nature. We shall not apply it, exclusively, to that area in which society reveals its subordination to [the realm of] the spiritual. In this way we shall escape being driven by certain acknowledged limitations (*descrédito legítimo*) of the empirical method into the scholastic reaction of judging facts by the rules of logic and metaphysical assumptions which have validity only in the conscience. The contemporary philosopher must proceed as a scientist whenever he is examining practical reality, organic or inorganic [and as] a mathematician or naturalist when he is exploring the realm of that which is defined and revealed according to its own law. This means the exclusion of hegelianism, phenomenology, and metaphysics when the purpose is to observe the phenomena of the world of sense, both in physics and social biology, but only to the point where the biological penetrates the social. For there is no doubt that what is most important in society and must be properly characteristic of sociology does not answer to the exclusively analytical criterion of the empirical investigator. Because of the spiritual factors encountered in society, its study rises above the realm of the natural physical sciences and calls for a criterion capable of including facts in a spiritual plan — the simple phenomenon in the coherence of a development which transcends it. By virtue of this attention to humane development (*devenir*), spiritual in temper, injected into biological becoming, sociology is akin to philosophy. Just as man, who in the organic is bound to the physical and the chemical and moves within the confines of biology, rises to the

spiritual; so also society has a kind of triple being, living at the same time in the physical, biological, and psychic modes. Trinitarian labor (*esfuerzo*) of the dispersed (*lo disperso*) in its return to Unity.

Unity which does not exist in nature but is constructed or imagined in the consciousness, this is philosophy. And without it there would be no sociology nor, properly speaking, any science, because no partial discipline is valid unless it is clarified by being integrated into a whole which complements it by rising above it. By itself alone sociology could never be a philosophy, just as psychology and physiology are not.

So far as it consists of things and facts, society is an object of empirical science; so far as it pertains to human conduct and to individual spiritual manifestations, society can be judged only by the higher criterion of philosophy. Always provided [that is] we understand by philosophy the definitive effort [to achieve] Unity and the hierarchical ordering of values. All this assumes the rejection of idealisms which try to apply the rational method to the empirical. This requires recognition that reality, as sensible phenomenon, moves in accordance with sequences of cause and effect and not according to a dialectic. But even this determinism, from the time it appears in natural history, seems to be renewed, transformed by unpredictable factors which assure the development and the multiplicity of life — for example, the appearance of the different species. Thus the empirical method, as applied to physics, does not suffice. But neither is it the place to use ideological mechanisms where a rhythm of innumerable creations rules — where the non-determined emerges constantly from the determined.

In one respect, sociology is a psychology elevated to a complex power. It includes an interaction of elements which can not be analyzed strictly as the meeting of forces in mechanics, because often the effect seems disproportionate to the cause or causes. Nor are the conflicts of the collective life to be explained by the dialectic mechanism of antithesis and synthesis. Excluding, therefore, the mechanical and the dialectic, materialism and idealism, we find ourselves obliged to discover a complex criterion, similar to the manifestations of becoming, incarnate in history — unitary like life, which is the constant triumph of synthesis, and totalitarian like philosophy, which must impart logic to the complex. Like any other science,

sociology must seek in philosophy the ultimate rationale of its processes. But like any other science, also, it should have a discipline adjusted to the varied nature of its content in action.

Thus, elementary scientific considerations make it appropriate to seek, so far as possible, the thread of unity suspected by Comte [to extend] from mathematics to the humanities. But note that the heterogeneous always appears as an exception or a rebellion against the homogeneous and not as its necessary causal continuation. Science posterior to Comte and Spencer tells us quite the contrary of what they supposed. That is to say, that the heterogeneous tends to recede into the homogeneous with the arrest of the rising impulse, the creative and miraculous factor upon which our ordered (*orientada*) diversity rests. [This is] quite different from simple biological variation which shows itself in the appearance of natural species which, on the other hand, display no other purpose than their extinction after a longer or shorter interval. On the contrary, human diversity, closely involved in the social phenomenon, shows itself [to be] creative of purposes which elude the cycle of determinism, engendering developments of an indestructible nature which likewise respond to their own law — a law not mechanical but ideal, spiritual. Thus, sociological becoming, which participates in both the material and the spiritual, requires a method which rises above without excluding determinism. In other words, the social process is not arbitrary, but neither is it mechanical. In sociology the spiritual factor is not just one datum among many, but an active element, the source of events, the cause of processes. And it is not enough to observe its behavior. It is necessary to take into account its contradictions and rejections, its innovations and miracles. In sociology that unsolicited desire which is individual consciousness multiplies its complex action as revealed in psychology. The spiritual example emerges from cosmic phenomenology not just as one of so many in the chain of events, but as the exception which contains within itself its own rule. [It is] the surprise which is the beginning of unforeseeable development, or schematically, that is, the living point in which a spiral breaks out and begins to rise.

The problem of knowledge is coincidental with the case of man — spiritual. Is the former a consequence of the new creation and not the cause of it? On what basis is it inferred that all idealistic thought arises a posteriori? Likewise, is it

not possible to postulate reason as the basis and origin of the individual, rather than the social process? There is no objective Hegelian ideal which becomes concrete in society and uncoils itself in history. Nor is there any reality which aspires to the world of ideas. The idea is the instrument which the [act of] becoming applies in one of the stages of its course. In the biological order the spirit moves diminished and confused; the human conscience begins as a contingency in the vein of the human spirit which is then illuminated and endowed with spirit. The spirit is revealed in consciousness while it remains latent in zoology and diminished, almost forgotten, in physics. Hence the material continues to disintegrate, but the spiritual continues to fight for the purpose of perfecting, completing its integration.

From the time it appears the spirit exerts its reason, but only to judge things in common relation to the idea, which always means some physical object. For its own destiny, on the contrary, the spirit follows a law similar to the melody governed by purified and creative jubilation, which discovers the path and attributes of the absolute. [It is] also free, that is to say, independent of the ordinary rhythms of physics and biology and master or even servant of the law of the spirit. But by the spiritual law there should not be understood any syllogistic premise, nor accord or discord of precepts, but sequence of love. Not a dialectics but joy of the divine esthetics. An esthetic order above the logical order and above the physical-biological order — such is the discipline which must be established, differing as much from Hedonism as from conceptual logic (rationalism). [It is] a science of love latent in the mystics, but which today science can organize as rigorously as once the sophists and later the scholastics [did in] introducing method into rationalization. A metaphysic of the esthetic. Without this the greater part of the social phenomenon would pass without our notice.

The [social] phenomenon exists before reason, revealed in the presentiments (*fatalidades*) of the unconscious, oriented in the instinctive. Taking rational form during the stage of subject-object, it comes to transcend reason upon revealing itself in the series of contingent creations of which our species forms a part, until there prevails in the spirit that order of love of which St. Augustine spoke — the African philosopher of the

tropics, endowed by that fact with a broad comprehension of the universe.

We look at a natural phenomenon with impartial judgment, detached from any personal prejudice. [However], the fact that our will is not outside the social development, but a part of its impulse, puts us in a peculiar situation when we begin to consider sociological data. It is not enough merely to uncover [the facts]; it is necessary likewise to exercise imagination. Indeed we know that each point of view can give rise to an unexpected chain of events just as [does] every act completed. To clarify with an example we see that the law of the expansion of gases is a fixed but not inevitable formula of the physical process. No logic is violated by merely supposing the rhythm of nature altered, and the imagination may well amuse itself inventing worlds in which the laws of physics are contradicted. What they are we learn by observation and not by the inevitable determination of premises. Logic, on the contrary, represents an inflexible way of putting ourselves in communication with objects and a necessary manner for the functioning of ideas which are the image or generalized representation of objects. The mechanism of the idea is more narrow, inflexible, limited, and conventional than the mechanism of the material. When we say that two things equal to each other are equal to a third we formulate an axiom which finds strict validity only in the formal order, because neither physics nor esthetics knows the perfect equality which could provide the basis for such a conclusion. Both in the physical and the spiritual [realm], in all non-formal orders of reality, the terms [used] have specific characteristics which correspond to analogy but never to identity. Likewise, they cannot be manipulated by means of the syllogism, unless we are satisfied with approximations of practical validity but without any meaning in essence (*sentido esencial*). Hence both the rigorous empirical method and the pure logical method are inadequate for sociology.

The very facts of experience are a long way from [having] an unchanging validity. Thus, for example, it is often said that a period of anarchy always follows dictatorship. But it is obvious that a people which had managed to educate itself and to enjoy a normal economic life might well pass from dictatorship to peace with liberty. No postulate, no thesis can embrace all the elements of social experience, and no specific law is able to rule the multiplicity of heterogeneous factors in

the rhythm of their development. The simplest instance relating to society involves geographic, economic, ethnic, ethical, esthetic, and religious factors, each of which requires, aside from the scientific discipline peculiar to its nature, a sense of unity which sociology must seek in philosophy. And this can not be given if the philosophy is one founded solely on logic or solely on mechanics.

In any case, it is clear that sociology needs the empirical method so far as it rests upon anthropo-geographical and biological fact; but it also requires the general philosophical discipline because of the content of human, ethical, esthetic, and historical action implicit in every group of men.

At once scientific and philosophical, the matter of sociology calls for the rigor of empiric observation and philosophical understanding of the fact and the intent, what was and what could have been, the reality and the ideal, the consummate and the imaginary.

The importance of sociology, as it has developed since the time of Comte, is built upon the effort to give unity to disparate elements of knowledge, as [in the case of] anthropology and law, economics and history, statistics and art. But anyone fails who, like the evolutionists, attempts this unity upon the basis of biology, or like the materialists upon the basis of psychology, or like the Marxists upon the basis of economics. For the unity in the complexities of the material can be found only in a position which transcends the conflict subject-object and the relation of individual to individual — the ego and its fellow — incorporating the dissimilarities in an organic and absolute whole.

On the other hand, once the knowledge is organized which comes from empirical science, no idealism can be anything more than scholastic irrelevance. It is easy to understand the disdain with which the modern scholar (*sabio*) speaks of metaphysics when one observes how it is pretended to explain by means of so-called "spiritual laws," dialectical or logical, phenomena which unfold by chemistry or biology, by a necessity of the will, or from excessive [scruples of] conscience.

In a certain sense society is an extension of the biological species, but it is a case of natural history being transformed into a spiritual thing by the effect of the conscious units which

act in its bosom. Hence it combines more than the regular empirical sciences. And since the empirical content of the social phenomenon should not be judged with the theoretical criteria of a philosophy of concepts, it is likewise not legitimate to identify sociology with a philosophy of society. We shall see in it, rather, a specialized science which, broken down into its components, and in accordance with them, shares in the physical-biological discipline and in the ethical-esthetic discipline. Consequently, upon achieving a unified reintegration, we shall obtain a sociology incorporated in the general philosophy of the Absolute — a science of society which discovers its meaning upon debouching into the total current of the spirit. (Pp. 131-138).

* * * * *

POLITICS

Purposely, I am leaving economic questions to the last, for what people has ever resolved the problems of its wealth if it had not given itself a good race, that is an ethical, virtuous temperament, and if with the good race there was not established politics?

Upon the basis of the empirical-sociological doctrine described at the outset, we recommend democracy as the only possible form of government in America, as is demonstrated by the history of a century in which epochs of progress appear only in coincidence with epochs of liberty. Aside from the empirical proof, [this is so] because only in a democracy does the spirit find the atmosphere necessary for its development and its salvation by truth. This relates to the interior regimen of each state. As for its external policy, it will suffice to record what every intelligent foreigner who studies us confirms, and that is that we are an ethnic and political bloc from the Bravo to the Plata. And that if we do not recognize this unity in public action we are condemned to continue being profitable trading stations; markets of wool and wheat in Argentina; gold, silver, and petroleum in Mexico; and [to continue being] peoples introducing foreign customs, customers of the Hollywood movies and of the imported alcohols, whiskies, which no slave in the civilization of our ancestors, happily founded on the vine, would have swallowed.

[A paragraph on economics is here omitted.]

CULTURE

In the New World, culture must be of a formative and creative character, attentive more to building the future than to recording and analyzing the past. Judgment [must be] directed toward the future, even with all the risk such an attitude involves. But since some foundation is indispensable, it is appropriate to avoid the error of these past decades, which consisted in removing and changing foundations. In philosophy, for example, we pass from Catholicism to the Enlightenment and from this to positivism. Then, to free ourselves from the latter, we leap into the tangled maze of Germanic neo-idealism, as if it were legitimate to escape the stage of scientific empirical experience. It is explained that Spain, after falling into Krausism,³ seized upon the neo-scholastic version of phenomenology; hence, for her, science never existed. But, among us, the only road is that of a spiritual philosophy which rises above science without rejecting it — a philosophy based upon science and one which, in its natural development, culminates in the esthetic and even in theology. This road has the advantage of closing a cycle. And this cycle, hence, may be the beginning of an indigenous, scientific-Catholic, spiritual formation.

In the social aspect, it is necessary to stay on the alert lest novelty, which is our continental sport, lead us to a lowering of esthetic standards, as when we replace our art and our nascent theatre with the commercialized vulgarity of industrialism. The recollection of what we once were in the continent should give us strength to resist contamination by the mediocre and crass. The consciousness of being a branch of the great Latin culture might protect us. What matters, above all else, is the reacquisition of a pride based upon the knowledge and evaluation of the foreign and upon the consciousness and feeling of what is our own.

CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE

We have spoken of culture. Sociologists hold forth concerning what culture is, as distinguished from mere

3. Krause, writing in the early nineteenth century, advocated the reconciliation of theism and pantheism, in the sense that God, without being the world nor being exclusively outside the world, contains it and at the same time transcends it. — Trans.

civilization, and in order to clarify our purpose we may say that civilization is technology and culture is the collective flowering. [It is] a formation of the spirit, or more exactly, and in order not to fall into the haziness of neo-Hegelianism and Phenomenology, a creation. Civilization is a matter of the body and its power over things. Culture is the accretion and closing off of the soul in its progress toward the absolute.

To illustrate with a few examples, we may say that in ancient times the Greek was cultured and the Roman barely civilized, at least before he was regenerated by adopting Christianity. North America had a culture in the days of Emerson and Poe, but this has been changed to mere civilization in the days of mechanism *à la* Ford. The transformation which the missionaries made in the rudimentary civilizations of the Aztecs and the Incas was cultural. Inquiring, next, into the individual, we observe that the rural youth of Italy or Spain is refined and cultured, for although he works with antiquated tools and does not know how to read, yet he enjoys the music of Palestrina and Monteverde. On the other hand, the youth who drives an automobile, but dances "jazz" and amuses himself with the motion pictures of Hollywood, is civilized but uncultured. Civilized, nothing more, is the Nebraska farmer who drives tractors but surrenders his emotions to the "blues" of the African. And between two illiterates, a French farmer who is backward in technology but kind to his children and a Moslem who is also backward in techniques, but who is brutal and beats his children, there is all the difference which separates barbarism from culture even though technically both may be relatively civilized.

Culture is the poetry of conduct and the music of the spirit in accordance with the faith of the Christian. Civilization means industrialization of agriculture or art.

In its formative tendencies civilization tends to level the values of the spirit, absorbing them in the object produced en masse, while a culture tends toward the individualization of effort and the rising above merely material values.

All our antecedents incline us toward preferring the cultural act to the action which is merely civilizing. The century of imitation of the Nordic, the century of anguish due to the acquisition of a reflected civilization, is liquidating itself. To

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the prejudice concerning the inferiority of the Indian and the mestizo, the undeniable pith of our population, there succeeds today, in view of the failure of the North, the conviction that the secret of cultures lies in making adequate use of each temperament in its skill and aptitude. Thus, a future enlightened state will put the Indian to drawing and the white to systematic production, while industry is reforming itself. Everyone according to his skill. No one in submission and each one [pursuing] his mission. Thus society will have done something more than to perpetuate itself. It will have realized its highest objective insofar as man will have devoted himself to rising above it.

The advantages of our fertile, unpopulated lands place us under obligation. All humanity expects of us not merely a greater civilization, but a culture freer, broader, and more equitable. It would be treason to the hope of the world for anyone to obstruct our vigorous (*inadulterado*) growth. Honor imposes upon us the obligation to create and consolidate an authentic and indigenous culture. (Pp. 150-154).

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

ANTONIO CASO (1883-1946)

MÉXICO

Antonio Caso was born in Mexico City on December 19, 1883 and lived there all his life, receiving his education in the schools of the capital and in the National University. During most of his adult life he taught in the University, and many contemporary Mexican intellectuals were his devoted students. Although many of his youthful colleagues in the *Ateneo de Juventud* became involved in the politics of the Mexican Revolution, Caso generally avoided political activity. The chief exception occurred during the Cardenas regime. Forced out of the University at that time because of his forthright opposition to the law requiring that education be socialistic, he was later restored to his position.

Caso was a man of independent ideas, but he was also one of the principal channels through which new philosophical tendencies were finding their way into Mexico. More than anyone else, for example, he was responsible for introducing the philosophy of Bergson in the early years of the century. Later, he helped to make known the ideas of Emile Meyerson, those of such German neo-idealists as Max Scheler, the phenomenology of Husserl, and the philosophy of history of Berdyaev.

The selection which follows, taken from a book combatting Marxism, shows one of Caso's most distinctive concepts — the Bergsonian view of history as not being a science but "an intuition of that which was," a normative as well as a cultural study. It also reveals the emphasis upon individual freedom which makes his philosophy one of "personalism." "To be personal," he held, "is to assume the supreme manifestation of the real." Through linking the culture in which he lives to the perfection of a world still unfinished, that is through social expression in pursuit of ideals, the individual achieves full expression of his personality. Democracy and liberty are merely means to this end.

All of Caso's books, and especially his *Discourses to the Mexican Nation* (1922), are pleas to the Mexican people to pursue social ideals. In the passage which follows, he considers what he believes to be one of the basic contemporary limitations upon the freedom of the human mind — the Marxist doctrine

of historical materialism, to which he opposes an historical idealism which suggests both Unamuno and, in some respects, Immanuel Kant. Holding man's freedom to be a product of his history, he finds the history of America to be particularly rich in meaning for human freedom, because it has offered the greatest possibility for human development. His axiological idealism has roots in Max Scheler and phenomenology, while his well known aphorism, "The first vice is laziness and the first virtue enthusiasm," as well as his intuitionism, reflect the persistent influence of Bergson.

His economic thought is closely linked with his concept of history. Although he rejects historical materialism, he continues to accept much of the thought of the historical school of economics, particularly the ideas of Gide, in whom he seems to have discovered the idea of faith as the basis or essence of wealth.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

BY ANTONIO CASO

(From *La filosofía de la cultura y el materialismo histórico*. Mexico: Ed. Alba, 1936. Pp. 13-14, 17-27, 154-159.)

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CULTURE

We are witnessing in our times the unquestionable decadence of certain forms of thought which have aged incurably. In their place new activities in the sphere of philosophical speculation take on meaning in the spontaneous developments of our day. The forms of naturalism, materialism, and empiricism are doomed. Spiritism, axiological idealism, and intuitionism are the progressive forms of independent thought.

Political economy centers its efforts upon the notion of economic value. Into this concept all the streams of the science flow. However, economic naturalism is powerless to clarify the notion of value, because nature never exhibits values but phenomena governed by laws. Hence to try to assimilate political economy to the natural sciences is to separate it from its very essence, depriving it of what makes up its object of study. Hence economic naturalism represents, in itself, a great fallacy of ignoring the question.

The economic must be classed with other cultural values; but it is not — like the good, the beautiful, and the true — *intrinsically* valuable. It has merely an instrumental value.

If it is true that all economic notions center around the concept of value, that the economist does not study things directly, but rather "goods," wealth, rent, interest, wages, money, and credit, then all political economy is separate in its object of study from the sciences which speculate upon nature, and belongs to the sciences which treat values. And since the sciences which treat of values are cultural and not natural sciences, political economy is then, by all rights, a cultural and not a natural science. (Pp. 13-14)

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SOCIAL SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, AND MARXISM

The complexity of social facts defies all abstract schematics. Economic determinism is false precisely because it is schematic, like historical intellectualism. Comte tries to base social evolution on the growth of reason and Marx undertakes to base it upon the vicissitudes of economic factors. But the constant error of both thinkers lies in selecting a single social factor and making it all powerfull (*elevarlo a la categoría de factotum*). It is impossible to compress into a rigid mold the multiple and constant variation of history.

To think that all social facts are inter-related and correlated among themselves as phenomena of solidarity is to deny a priori all unilateral economic determinism. No one of the diverse orders of the historical life of humanity can be called "fundamental," because all are closely interwoven. At the center of economic life lies the intellectual factor; similarly, invention and social imitation are made possible within the economic structure and the division of labor.

Just as, in an organism, the life of relationships becomes possible thanks to the support of vegetable life, so the moral and intellectual life of a society requires economic factors. But the latter can not explain it [society] in the guise of any fundamental structure in history because, in turn, they require the intellectual and moral characteristics of humanity. To produce wealth is not a primary act. If the purpose of a given process of production is taken away, the production disappears.

Historical materialism supposes a basic structure (the economy) and, above it, juridical, political, artistic, scientific, and religious superstructures. This is an obvious fallacy, because it [historical materialism] denies the very concept of structure upon which it claims to be based. The so-called economic structure presupposes social life complete and whole. Without language there is no economy, without invention there is no production, without moral and religious ideals to orient production the supply of goods (*la oferta*) is not conceivable. Without customs there can be no exchange.

Economic values, because they are means and not ends, are inconceivable without the ends. Wealth is not the determining entity which the Marxists suppose, but an outcome (*llegar a ser*) determined by the complex of social life.

The categories of political economy are production, circulation, distribution, and consumption. The real cause of production is consumption, because one does not produce in order to produce but in order to consume. *Posita causa, ponitur effectus*. When the purpose of consuming an economic good exists, the effort which its production costs is conceived. Hence the outcome or purpose, the purpose of consumption, is what explains production. The being (*ser*) itself is not the cause of its coming into being (*llegar a ser*); but the outcome (the utility of the product) [is] the cause of the being (the article produced).

Moreover, if the state of the demand is modified, the possibility of the offer (supply) is likewise modified. *Variante causa, variatur effectus*. No one produces what no one desires. And in this subordination to the social purposes of consumption all historical activities are joined: religious, ethical, esthetic, scientific, juridical, and political. Once more it is proved that the coming into being, counter to the opinion of Feuerbach and Engels, determines the being.

Finally, eliminate the utility of a given product and its very production will cease without remedy. Thus economic value, far from depending upon a single effective cause, implies an order of desires and historical beliefs. It is intrinsically somewhat psycho-social. *Sublata causa, tollitur effectus*.

As for production, could you have anything more intellectual than the production of wealth? In our day, all production of wealth is highly intellectualized. Pure manual labor does not exist, because technology is the scientific law incorporated in machines. Industries are concentrated in large factories which coordinate intelligence by means of the "knowledge of profit" (*saber de aprovechamiento*), as [Max] Scheler would say. And if our century witnesses the fulfilment of the apotheosis of activity, it is merely because it constitutes in its social aspect the apotheosis of intelligence.

As for the circulation of wealth, nothing is more psychological and spiritual than exchange, nothing more "mental" than value and price. The characteristic of human society as against communities, strictly speaking, is trade; because value is not only labor but the desirability of what labor produces. One need only consider the exquisite

phenomenon of credit to be convinced of the non-material character of the category of exchange. Credit is faith. In a magnificent lecture on "Materialism and Political Economy," Charles Gide says: "First came land wealth (*riqueza-tierra*), then labor-wealth (*riqueza-trabajo*), and finally the faith-wealth (*riqueza-fe*) which today joins all the peoples of the world in the dramatic events of the *world economy*."

Finally, distribution of human goods is not only an economic question, as Marxism would wish, but [is also] ethical and juridical. The idea of the just is bound to that of utility in indissoluble union. All societies, in all epochs of history, have tried to fulfill the ideal of justice. The "ideologies" of humanity (among them historical materialism itself, with a double heritage derived from philosophical idealism and utopian socialism) are the preponderant cause of the social problem. Far from being a proof and exposition of materialism, political economy is a clear and obvious image of idealisms. The spirit in production, the spirit in the circulation of wealth, and in its consumption!

Clearly, the objects exterior to the mind — things, matter, being — are always here; but they are not converted into economic values unless, as a result of the transformations which intelligence causes them to undergo, they satisfy human ends (*fines*). "Exterior goods receive their value (*bonitatem*) from their purposes, that is to say, their worth and validity are derived from their use. That which serves a certain end," says a great philosopher of the Middle Ages, "receives its value from this end." It is necessary, therefore, that exterior wealth be a human good, not of the highest, but of a lower order. Because the end is a good in itself, [exterior wealth is] the means only as it serves the end. There is no pure matter in political economy. Economic determinism has meaning only through the mind. Hence the laws of economics can not be reduced to the form of simple natural laws, to the causality of ends in the biological and social worlds. History is the point in which both forms of causality meet, through the human mind. Values and ends mutually complement each other; because if a thing has value it is certainly valuable for the achievement of an end. Only through the spirit does economic determinism have meaning.

But the supreme reason which prevents questioning with any probability of success the thesis which we defend of economics as a cultural, not a natural science, is that the basis of all the economic categories is this: "Maximum production obtained with minimum effort." Well, the statement of the operation of intelligence does not differ from this in any way. According to the empirical criticism of Avenarius y Mach, the work of human intelligence is defined in this [same] formulation of law. To produce wealth, therefore, is to fulfill the intellectual order economically. "Thus, then, as Professor Hearn of the University of Melbourne describes it with precision, political economy," says [William] Stanley Jevons, "is the science of efforts to satisfy necessities; it teaches us to find the shortest route to the realization of our desires. The object which we propose to ourselves is to achieve the largest possible number of goods at the cost of the least possible labor." Identity of economic principle and the logical principle of the operation of intelligence!

Historical materialism, in consecrating the preponderance of the economic order among all the social orders, in declaring the latter epi-phenomena and superstructures, does not nor can escape from the unbreakable confines of the spirit. Thus historical intellectualism and historical materialism are indissolubly linked, because human needs, felt as desires, can be satisfied only by the mind. *Matter* is not manipulated socially except through the culture. In this manner it is converted into wealth. (Pp. 17-22)

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Historical materialism holds economic value [to be] preponderant. Here are some relevant texts, the work of Marx himself, which we prefer to the mass of commentators, often starved of culture, minuscule beings, without science or conscience, who thrive equally among the European agitators and in the Indo-American provinces (*arrabales*). "In connection with social production in their lives, men enter upon definite, essential relationships, independently of their wills. These relationships of production correspond to a certain level in the development of their material productive powers. The complex of these relationships of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which a juridical and political superstructure is built up, and to which certain

conscious forms correspond. The manner of production of the material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual process of life in general."¹

Let us grant at once that the determining action of the "economy" upon the "ideology" is unquestionable, as the Marxists say. But let us also insist upon an admission that determination of "the economic" by "the ideological" is unquestionable. For the Marxists the unconscious determines the conscious. This is true but not absolutely true, because the conscious also determines the unconscious. In other words, human society in its exquisite complexity is the most notable example of reciprocal action. A acts upon B and B reacts upon A. Religion, for example, determines the economy: trade of tribe with tribe, of one human group with another, is not carried on in an early stage [of society] because a complex of prohibitions of a mythical character forbids it. Another example: religious articles are kept out of commerce because some taboo or stigma forbids them. In these, as in innumerable examples, the "ideology" is the determinant and the "economy" the determined.

But it is also true that the economic engenders historical aspects of religious development. Example: the preaching of indulgences in Germany was, undeniably, part of the cause of the Protestant movement. Another proof: the growth of Christianity in the ancient decadent society [of Rome] was due partly to the psychological and moral condition of the classes oppressed by slavery. If the mentality of the slaves and the poor had been different, the social environment might not have been so favorable, perhaps, to the spread of Christianity.

Thus we see that "the economic" explains the religious in part; we also note that the religious "determines" aspects of "the economic". This means reciprocal action, not unilateral determinism! Not "structure" and "super-structure," but concatenation and social synthesis. Not economic causation but social determinism. Not historical materialism, but mutual and reciprocal action of the material upon the ideal and of the ideal upon the material. Moreover, in all strictness, nothing is material, not even the economic order itself, because it is impregnated with ideas.

1. Quoting Karl Marx, *Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, "Vorwort." Caso quoted, apparently, from a Spanish edition, but the English translation has been made from the 1859 German edition, p. xi. — Trans.

The Egyptian myths are, in part, the flora and fauna of the country deified: the falcon, the ibis, the ox, the crocodile, the palm, the sycamore. On the other hand, the wealth of the Jews in the Middle Ages was due partly to the fact that usury was not anathematized as severely in the law of Moses as in the Christian communion. In the case of the Egyptian myths, as Marx would say, "the mode of production of the material life conditions the intellectual process;" and in that of the Israelite bankers, the moral law and the religious creed affect the economic form; or, reversing exactly the formula of Marx, "the intellectual process" (the "ideology," as a "*criollo marxist*" would say) conditioned the mode of production of the material life. Therefore, in conclusion, to pretend that the economic is fundamental and the religious the "super-structural" is inadmissible. In the early stages of social evolution, religion plays a very important role; but so does the economy also. In sum, there is no *oberbau* or *unterbau* (neither root nor branch). A "fundamental structure," such as Marxism would wish, does not exist.

To try to make human society an "organism of ideas" without relation to the physical environment is impossible; but to pretend that culture is something objective, and the economic and technological something substantive, is false; because technology and economy are clearly spiritual. Various social forces constantly join everywhere, constituting in this manner the essence of the social life. Marxism is a false schematism of history, now superseded, fortunately, in contemporary speculation. Taken by themselves, economic values lack meaning. Nothing is useful unless it is useful for something; nothing is wealth unless it enriches for the purpose of pleasure or power; nothing has economic value in itself. Value in its essence is an "ideological" category even when the partisans of decadent (*periclitados*) social systems do not or seem not to believe it.

On the other hand, the materialist concept of history, in its social philosophy, discards the individual factor. This is as absurd as to insist on eliminating chance in history. In this way economic determinism becomes a lazy fatalism. Without the personality of Jesus, called the Christ, Christianity is inconceivable. His divine example fills the Gospels. Suppress the "historic individuality" of the Messiah and you would

destroy Christianity. Mohammedanism, likewise, would be nothing without Mohammed, nor Cartesianism without Descartes and Malebranche. Make an abstraction of Marx, and that which for some reason is called Marxism would also be extinguished. How is it possible, in the development of a social, moral, or religious doctrine, for the person who principally and eminently engenders it to have been a mere accident? This absurd refusal to recognize the individual in the historical development of humanity will always invalidate the "collectivist" explanations of Marxism.

But, it will be replied, the individual is explained by his social environment. Yes, but only in part, because he also constitutes a causal element within the social environment. Once again reciprocal action! The individual acts upon society and society reacts upon the individual. Hegel, more profound than all the Marxists, pointed out in the "historic individual" one of the causes of history. Eliminate Marius, Caesar, Pompey, Augustus, and Marcus Antonius and explain, if you please, Roman History. Pascal claims that if Cleopatra's nose had been shaped differently the course of European history might have been different. In conclusion: The hero alone does not, as Gracián² and Carlyle said, explain the evolution of culture; but neither is history understandable in any way without him.

The onesidedness of the Marxist conception, essentially inimical to the individual and to religion, is concealed in the ambiguous style of the celebrated revolutionary thinker.

In this respect, the distinguished French logician, Edmond Goblot, says in his recent book, *The Logic of Value Judgments*, "Marx is difficult to understand. Through our fault or his? According to his followers, it is because his genius escapes us. His thought rises to heights where average minds can not follow or descends to depths where the obscurity ought not to astound us.

"It is natural for ordinary minds to be confused. But it might also be that the thought of Marx is too formless and ambiguous for our intelligence. When I do not understand

2. Baltasar Gracián (1601-58) was the author of *El Héroe*, portraying an imaginary Christian prince, *El Arte de Ingenio*, a work of literary criticism, and (best known) *El Criticón*, a symbolic novel in which a savage speaks of the refinements of civilization.— Trans.

a page of Marx I re-read it slowly, carefully, analyzing it in detail. I ought, then, to discover the thought which was hidden from me; but on the contrary I encounter only confusion of ideas and logical incoherence, which explain to me why I have not understood."

This is directed to the pedants and fanatics, as numerous in Mexico as in Europe, who have made of Marxism a taboo and of Marx himself an improbable totem — a Moloch-like sacred Messiah of the proletariat. (Pp. 23-27)

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RENAN AND BERDYAEV

It is obvious that if one approaches the history of ideas without passion or prejudice, with the single purpose of discovering the truth, one always finds an antecedent for the thought which seems newest, the theory which at first view would be said to lack a history. Indeed Pascal thought that humanity is like a single individual who constantly improves and instructs himself. Few of the books published in our day will have affected general public opinion as has *A New Middle Age* by [Nicholas] Berdyaev. In its pages the religious spirit is opposed to the work of Russian Communism.

A New Middle Age has its antecedent, however, in the final chapter of the celebrated book of Renan, *History of the People of Israel*. This Chapter xviii of Book Ten is inscribed: *Finito libro, sit laus et gloria Christo*. In it the celebrated French thinker develops the position which views Christianity as the conclusion, end, or cause-objective of Judaism: "Once Christianity is produced, Judaism still continues, but as a dried up trunk beside a single flourishing branch. In the sequel, life departed from it. Its history, although it may be interesting still, has only secondary importance from the general point of view. Christianity is the masterpiece of Judaism, its glory, the summary of its evolution."

Judaea and the Graeco-Roman world were like two universes revolving, one beside the other, under the action of opposed influences. "Until 1848, socialism dug its mines under a soil whose surface showed no trepidation. It was warmed in the sun, insensible to the work being carried to a head in its bowels."

But, in the Revolution of 1848, the work of revindication came out into the light of day. Henceforth the problem of the just distribution of social wealth was called, by antonomasia, "the social problem." And all the institutions of the Culture unquestionably felt the striking and unique effect of the tremendous subterranean mine. Socialism in its growth resembled all events which develop slowly in the shadows. Upon coming out into the light, it was already full grown and ready to expand into unsuspected forms, changing by its powerful action the structure of human society, at least the traditional forms of European social life. The work of the social vindicators, since the middle of the nineteenth century, has been the great human problem, the constant preoccupation of philosophers, moralists, and sociologists.

"The immediate future is obscure. It is not likely to favor the work of light. Credulity has deep roots. Socialism, by its complicity with Catholicism, may bring in its train a new Middle Age, with its barbarians, its churches, its eclipses of individualism and liberty — in a word, of civilization. . . ."

In this astonishing paragraph the illustrious French thinker seems to have anticipated the extraordinary content of the book of Berdyaev — not only the ideas, but the very title and spirit of the contemporary work.

Renan fears that the work of the Judaic spirit (*obra*) will obscure the Graeco-Roman; that it will obscure but not destroy it. What he fears is an eclipse but not the extinction of the classic genius. "The Greek work, that is science and rational, experimental civilization, without charlatanism, without revelation, based upon reason and liberty, will continue without end."

In brief, Renan is worried over the approach of a new Middle Age Compare these words of Berdyaev: "The spiritual center, in an imminent future, will be, as in the Middle Age, the Church alone. Because the life of the church today develops along paths which are not official and which are invisible from the outside, the frontiers of the church do not appear clearly; they can not be pointed out with the finger as a natural object. The life of the Church is mysterious, and its paths are not comprehensible to reason. The spirit breathes where it listeth. . . . The new Middle Age will conquer the

atomism of modern history. This atomism is conquered illusively by communism, truly by the Church and the ecumenical spirit.

"All the social utopias of the nineteenth century were unable to spread except in a Christian setting. They all show a transfer of the notion of the Kingdom of God to the European social milieu. Even the Marxist idea of the messianic role of the proletariat has a religious origin, though it may be more Judaic than Christian. Graeco-Roman civilization, aristocratic in principle, disdained labor, considering it the patrimony of slaves."

Could you have a clearer confirmation of the profound phrase of Renan? "The immediate future is obscure. It is not likely to favor the work of light. Credulity has deep roots. Socialism by its complicity with Catholicism, may bring in its train a new Middle Age, with its barbarians, its churches, its eclipses of individualism and liberty in a word, of civilization...."

For Berdyaev, the new Middle Age will be demotic, not democratic. "Henceforth, the laboring masses and the popular classes will play a great role in the destinies of government. Upon that all politics of the masses must reckon, seeking the means to limit the risks which the power of the masses causes qualitative culture to incur."

This is what moves Renan: the synthesis of the Judaic spirit and proletarian vindication. Because Israel "was the first to give form to the cry of the people, to the complaints of the poor, to the obstinate clamor of those who thirst for justice." Thus Judaism and Christianity signify for Antiquity what socialism [does] for modern times.

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The complicity of the two internationals, Catholic and Bolshevik, denying individual values in order to submit intelligence to untouchable dogmas — this is what, according to Renan, will endanger the bases of European culture. Dogmatism in thought is fanaticism in sentiment and tyranny in action. What cannot be discussed, what must be adored, and what is imposed upon us to do, without freedom to criticize, is what will engender the new Middle Age!

ANTONIO CASO

Disdain of humanism can become the denial of humanity, because it already signifies the abomination of culture. Freedom of the individual conscience, the right to independence of thought, will have been abolished But it will not be forever!

Individualism and liberty are culture itself. The new Middle Age will pass. It will be merely one episode in the passage of the centuries, and the eternal spirit of Greece "will continue without end." (Pp. 154-159)

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

MANUEL GALVEZ (1882-)

ARGENTINA

More brilliant than profound, Manuel Gálvez is essentially a literary critic, pleading for a more vigorously idealistic Argentine literature. When he applied the techniques of his craft to social and cultural questions, he often involved himself in contradictions. Beginning in a vein of Argentinism and Hispanicism in 1910, during the following quarter century he advanced to a position which might be described as intellectual and moral fascism — authoritarian, anti-communist, anti-materialist, Catholic, mildly anti-Semitic, admittedly reactionary and anti-democratic — a position from which he could condemn the university youth movement and extoll the virtues of Mussolini, Hitler, and such Latin American "strong men" as Juan Manuel Rosas and Gabriel García Moreno.

His intellectual career began with a university thesis on the white slave traffic, and the attack upon vice and pornography was one of his recurring themes. His first literary work to receive attention, *El diario de Gabriel Quiroga* (an imaginary figure), was a passionate nationalistic appeal to restore the Argentine spirit, which he believed still lived in the provinces but had been submerged in urban cosmopolitanism, materialism, and anti-intellectualism. *El solar de la raza*, from which the following excerpt is taken, was published a few years later. This is still the Gálvez of his earlier phase, in which the dominant themes are the restoration of traditional Spanish spiritual ideals as preserved in the provinces and of Christianity as the most perfect expression of these ideals. It is presented here as one of the great literary expressions of the hispanicism stimulated by the Generation of 1898 in Spain and America.

El espíritu de aristocracia, published in 1924, echoes Rodó in its reconciliation of the principles of aristocracy and democracy. In it, the struggle with the twentieth century problem of the nature of being appears, as is reflected in his aphoristic statement that if he had to choose between art and life he would choose life, though realizing that only works of imagination last, while those of "social science" perish.¹

By the mid-nineteen thirties he is prepared to go much further in rejecting universal suffrage and parliamentarism as

1. Cited in Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, p. 156.

MANUEL GÁLVEZ

"lies" and politics as evil. *Este pueblo necesita*, published in 1934, was later to furnish more than a little of the Peronista ideological background. In this book he listed ten Argentine needs: youth, patriotism, a heroic sense of life, moral reform, idealism, order and discipline, a sense of social hierarchy (only General Uriburu has it!) state action rather than politics (democracy has been a "stupendous failure"), social justice, and political authority to carry out the program. His concept of social justice — solution of the social problem by state authority, without resort to the class struggle or party politics — is obviously the kernel of Juan Perón's later ideology of *justicialismo*.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

In some ways, Gálvez' novels, such as *La tragedia de un hombre fuerte* (Buenos Aires, 1922) and his biographies of Juan Manuel Rosas, Hipólito Irigoyen, and Gabriel García Moreno best express his social ideas. There are several editions of *Solar de la raza* (Buenos Aires: La Facultad, 1930; Madrid: Saturnino Calleja, 1920, and others). Other important works: *El Diario de Gabriel Quiroga* (Buenos Aires: A. Moen & Hno., 1910), *El espíritu de aristocracia y otros ensayos* (Agencia Gen. de Librerías, 1924), *Este pueblo necesita* (Buenos Aires: A. García Santos, 1934), and *La Argentina en nuestros libros* (Santiago, Chile: Ercilla, 1935).

For comments on his ideas see Max Daireaux, *Littérature hispano-américaine* (Paris: Ed. KRA, 1930) pp. 196-200; Otis H. Green, "Manuel Gálvez, 'Gabriel Quiroga,'" and *La maestra normal*," *Hispanic Review* July 1943, and W.R. Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, pp. 149-164.

THE CRADLE OF OUR RACE

BY MANUEL GÁLVEZ

(From *El solar de la raza*. Madrid: Ed. Saturnino Calleja, 1920, pp. 13-60.)

Our beautiful nation of Argentina is now passing through its supreme hour: the hour in which her best minds and her greatest hearts call for the spiritualization of the national conscience.

This movement, if we exclude the precursors, is barely five years old. After our early years of physical daring, of heroism,

we felt the need of tempering with touches of spirituality the barbarism of our physical energy. At first the preaching [of spirituality] seemed strange; the enthusiasm of a few was regarded by people as mere literature, inoffensive lyricism, which took pleasure in things excessively abstract. To use the word idealist, to speak of the popular soul, to state that the spiritual life constitutes the only lasting greatness of nations sounded and, unfortunately, still sounds in these pampas like an unintelligible jargon.

It was not and is not our intention at his moment, although it is a desirable goal, to create a unique Argentine idealism. A single generation can not perform such a miracle. Our only aim is to lessen the dull materialism which today aggravates and shames us.

This campaign is nationalistic as well as idealistic. A common ideal was once the pride of our nation and hence represents a traditional value. In contrast, the skeptical materialism of today is something new, which appeared with the modern fever of riches, coming with it from Europe. The immigrant, by his great success in acquiring wealth, brought into the country a new concept of life. He came with no purpose but to enrich himself, and the Argentines were naturally infected by the contagion of his exclusive respect for material values. Soon, as the romantic vestiges upon which the national spirit had been built vanished away, idealism disappeared. Now, combining patriotism and idealism, we want to instill again in our country its own national characteristics and sentiments and to call forth springs of ideals in that dried up soil, so miserably parched, which is our material life. Otherwise, this nation will be only a body without soul, a poor thing with no transcendence. Already, by our energy and riches, we have built strong dykes; now we must pour into the immense reservoir formed by these dykes the water of life, which is spirituality.

I, also — I must state it so that the purpose of this book may be understood — have devoted my efforts to the double

patriotic task, which in my judgment is one of nationalism and the spiritualization of my country.²

First, in a book of poems, I tried to reproduce my impressions of the Argentine landscape, evoking particularly the atmosphere of those provincial cities which, unlike Buenos Aires and other cities in full progress, still retain the old national spirit, the love of country, the deep spirituality of the race, and the ingenuous, dreamy, romantic condition of an old Argentine town. In this way, performing the nationalist task, I attempted to show my countrymen that poetry of our country which was completely unknown to the inhabitants of the coastal cities. Later, I dedicated a book of prose to preaching national idealism, asserting that "with the advent of the materialistic and transitory epoch through which we are passing," we had abandoned the ideals "which were the most noble ornament of the Argentine people, to devote ourselves exclusively to the expansion of our material wealth and to the acceleration of the progress of the country." I proposed the reconquest of Argentine spiritual life through "the education of citizens, the study of our collective soul, the revival of the old ideals." The present book, which continues the task begun in the previous ones, carries, latent in its intimate depths, the same patriotic aim as the others.

* * * * *

Other writers would probably have sought in Germany, or England, or perhaps in France or Italy, the secret which illuminates and enlivens those great nations, in order to reveal it and propagate it later in our country. But, believing in our admirable Latin race, and especially in the Spanish lineage to which we belong, I could make no other choice. The images of Spanish spirituality are what, preferably, we must present to our countrymen. The Spanish influence is essential for us

2. Two political tendencies exist in my country. The first, conservative, and in a sense traditionalist and regressive, clamors against the loss of the old moral and material physiognomy of the country; it seeks to limit immigration, especially the non-Latin; and pretends to restore the sharp nationalism of former times. The second tendency is cosmopolitan and liberal; it repudiates the romantic past and perhaps our Spanish origin; it looks too much toward Europe and the United States; it wants progress at any cost and seems little interested in the country having its own soul. This last tendency has recently been called *progressive nationalism*, while to the first tendency, which is the true nationalism, the qualification of *historic* has been given. I believe that both tendencies should be joined in one.

because, instead of detracting from our character as certain exotic influences do, it helps us to affirm our American and Argentine nature.

But [in certain other aspects] it constitutes a less valid influence. I do not urge that we adopt the concept of life of the Spaniards, nor their ideas, nor their institutions. All this would be ridiculous and unpatriotic. I only wish—and I will repeat it in other words—to make known, in order to advance our idealist resurgence, some “films” of the spiritual geography of Spain. We should take the spiritual teachings of Spain as a mere point of departure, as a seed which, transplanted to the moral climate of our nation, will take root with new vigor and in its distinctive form.

In the final analysis, the primary purpose of this book is merely to produce in those Argentines who read me sympathetically the spiritual contagion of my impressions of those Spanish cities in which the soul of the race still lives and the remains of an old spiritual grandeur survive.

I also endeavor to arouse that affection for Spain which will produce love of our race, which so many *snobs* place second to the Anglo-Saxon, and love for our language, the most musical, the richest, and the most virile of modern languages. I also want my countrymen to understand and love Spanish literature and, above all, Spanish art—that marvelous art upon whose peaks of beauty nest the eagles of mysticism. I desire, moreover, that we should know Spanish history, which is the deepest and greatest source of kindness, of energy, of valor, and of idealism which has ever existed in the world. Finally, I want my countrymen, who are so addicted to travel, to visit the regions of Spain from which they will gather innumerable teachings and find the most intense and fruitful pleasures for their souls.

Let us build Argentine idealism, drawing it out of the depths of our race, that is to say, from the Spanish and the American qualities that we carry within us. And perhaps in some not distant day the efforts of this generation will fructify in a typical and modern form of Argentine idealism.

My country once had a certain spiritual life. This was when, small and poor, we liberated five sister nations. Then, we were great: we were giving freedom to the world. Today

we give meat and wheat. Let us use the virtues of the past by engrafting some stems of its spirituality on the vigorous plant of our nation today. And since the problem now is not one of giving liberty to our American brothers, let us give them ideas and idealism. These are gifts as valuable as liberty; even more, they are liberty itself, because the individual and society are not free but enslaved when they live without ideals.

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Why is Spain difficult to understand? In my opinion, for these reasons: the concept of life which predominates among Spaniards, their exaggerated individualism, their Catholic spirit, together with the concept of Spain and the absurd legends about this country which cloud the eyes of the observer and distort his view of things.

The Spaniards, or more exactly the Castilians, have a concept of life which is not that of our epoch. The whole basis of modern industrialized societies may be synthetized in these words: live to earn money and to enjoy the sensual pleasures of life. The influence of money is contemporary. One does not study, write, paint, care for the sick, or do anything without thinking of the consequent gain. It is inconceivable that men have showed any other concerns than wealth and pleasure. The Uruguayan writer, Carlos Reyle, the exalter of gold and of force, says: "In shops, universities, and gymnasias men are armed for the conquest of Gold, not only because it offers real pleasures to avid appetites and the effective possession of the beautiful things of the earth; nor only because Gold is the *immediate possibility*, as the skeptic [Anatole] France says, but chiefly for hidden reasons, extracted from past generations, and is, in sum, something like a seed of the will, the mysterious germ which stores up, potentially, all the acts of thought and all the achievements of desire."

In Spain it does not happen so. The Castilian, the most sober being on earth, does not live preoccupied in material pleasures. He does not love effort for effort's sake, nor does he seem convinced that the happiness of peoples is in proportion to their commerce and their industry. His way of being has originated ways of living, of feeling, of working, and of creating which are different from those which predominate in the rest of Europe. It is the Christian concept of life, a concept deeply rooted in the Spanish spirit. That is why Spain can

not be understood by those who regard existence as activity and pleasure.

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Castilian individualism is another great cause of the universal incomprehension concerning Spain. Every people measures others with the yardsticks of its own qualities and does not understand that other people may consider a virtue what they regard as a defect, and vice-versa. A certain degree of difference is tolerated if it is not excessive. Among men, one who differs too much from the others is not well liked, often he is hated. The same happens with nations. Switzerland, a mediocre nation, can arouse neither love nor hatred; but nobody can be indifferent toward England and Spain. The Spanish qualities and defects are so Spanish, so *castizo*, so unique that foreigners in order to understand them would have to feel and think like Spaniards, which is almost impossible. Spain is the most personal and original of all European countries. England, France, and Germany are spiritually closer to each other than to Spain. Modern civilization—from which certain regions of Spain are exempt—has partly contributed to this, for it makes all nations resemble each other. A modern German city hardly differs from a modern French city. But in Spain each city has a character, a soul, an exterior aspect entirely its own and distinct from the character, soul, and appearance of other cities of the country. The reason for this extreme diversity seems clear to me. Spain still retains something of the medieval civilization, that is, of the civilization individualistic *par excellence*.

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Absurd legends, a product of the marriage of perversity and ignorance, have built up several stereotypes of Spain that prevent our seeing the real one. Thus, people attribute to the Spaniard defects which he never had: avarice, laziness, cruelty.³

3. Sarmiento called Spain *barbarous* because, among other things, in the year 1840 travelers were robbed on the mountain routes. What adjective would rescribe Paris where everyday, in the twentieth century, in the central streets of the city, transients are despoiled. In this case there is not even the excuse of the picturesque. What would Europe have said if it had occurred in Madrid, of an event, narrated without astonishment by the Parisian press: some Apaches, imitating the American Apaches, tied a little girl to a post, sprinkled her with alcohol, set her on fire, and danced, sang, and laughed around her while she agonized?

The greatest lie is this one of Spanish cruelty. I know no people more compassionate, more generous, less egotistic than the Spanish. Their exterior harshness and rudeness are merely a mask for their virility. Lacking the tearful sentiment of the Frenchman, the Spaniard has in his soul a deep well of tenderness. The countess of Pardo Bazán has described the case of forty workers, laborers in a mining colony, and two young engineers, sons of a millionaire from Catalonia, each of whom gave ten centimeters of his own skin in order to save the life of a working child, skinned alive in a mine accident. Such things are possible only in Spain. Moreover, let us not forget that cruelty takes many forms. The egotist is by definition a cruel being. Englishmen display an irritating moral cruelty, which is usually worse than physical cruelty. It is notorious that the barbarity of some modern wars has surpassed the famous barbarity of the Conquest of America. The same could be said of all the other bad qualities attributed to the Spanish people as is said of their cruelty. The legends about Spain would provide the material for an amusing volume. Has not it been said in the English newspapers, concerning the Ferrer case, that in Spain the police agents were Jesuits? Of no other country does calumny, like envy, grow with more vigor.

In my opinion, the principal source of these legends about Spain is the falsification of history for racial and religious ends. History has been made by English Protestants who, naturally, felt little sympathy toward a Latin and Catholic nation. The distortion of history can be seen in Buckle, whose chapter about Spain is a *bric a brac* of lies and absurdities. Talented Spaniards would fulfil a patriotic and noble mission by writing the history of their country with Spanish criteria. Unfortunately, they do not do so. Spain is not a land of historians.⁴

Finally, Spain is hated for its supposed Catholicism. There is no anti-clerical who does not detest Spain, presuming it sunk in backwardness because of friars and monks.⁵ But, as a matter

4. An unjust criticism of Spanish historians. H.E.D.

5. This backwardness is not an absolute truth. What happens is that travelers visit almost exclusively the cities of art; cities in which time has stopped. Clearly, in certain Castilian provinces and in Extremadura there is backwardness. But, what country does not have some poor regions? In Argentina the miracle of the coastal region has not erased the desolation of Catamarca, San Luis, or La Rioja.

of fact, Spain is the least fanatical in belief of the Catholic countries. I have witnessed great religious festivals in Bavaria, France, and Spain, and the contrast between those of the former countries and of the latter was evident. The magnificent representations of the Passion in Oberammergau and the French national pilgrimages to Lourdes are the expression of an intense and growing faith. The festivities of Holy Week in Seville show very moderate faith and reveal a decline of the old beliefs. In the church of the Bavarian town, thousands of visitors, almost all from Germany and Austria, communed together with the artisans who were to represent the Passion in fulfilment of their three centuries old pledge, all of them with a faith such as I have rarely seen. In Lourdes I have witnessed pilgrimages from almost all the European countries, including Spain, but nothing is comparable for intensity of faith to the national French pilgrimage. Those who speak of religious decadence in France⁶ would be astonished to see that crowd of fifty thousand persons who, in the calm of the night, standing before that marvelous basilica, beside the sweet current of the Gave, under the serene sky of the Pyrenees, filled with faith and patriotism, and carrying torches in their hands, sing the Credo and the Salve in Latin, with the gravely moving music of the plain song praising from the depths of their hearts Him who is the consolation of the afflicted and the health of the ailing.

There is no religious fervor in Spain such as the unbiased observer can see in France or in the profound Catholicism of the Belgians, Canadians, Irish, Bavarians, and Italians. At first glance there may seem to be a contradiction between these words and those of all the previous pages. But there is no such contradiction. The mystic and Catholic atmosphere felt in Spain comes from past centuries when faith was very intense; it does not come from the present day Spaniards who, in general, are more formalists than believers. The medieval spirit persists in the cathedrals, in art, even in the streets of certain cities. Spain continues to be mystic and Catholic in its spirit, but not through depth of faith nor through religious enthusiasm.

6. In France people are returning to the Church with unusual enthusiasm. Recent surveys have revealed that the French youth is Catholic; that... three fourths of the studentbody of the school for teachers at Paris openly practised this religion, while ten years ago only three students did so. There is in France today a religious movement in which the intellectual class takes a decisive participation....

Yet, unquestionably, whether believers or non-believers, practising faith or not, Spaniards are fundamentally Christians. And this is the reason for the anti-clerical hatred. Perhaps more than anywhere else, Catholic traditions, customs, and morality are deeply rooted in Spain. Historically, Spain was the Catholic nation *par excellence*. She tried to convert the world, to impose her beliefs officially. She made of religion a political program which she carried out completely within the country. Naturally, something of this situation still endures. The king of Spain is addressed as His Catholic Majesty, the State there embraces religion, and secularism is not found in schools. And for the anti-clericals, according to their slender logic, this is sufficient basis to consider Spain a backward country and even to hate it. Furthermore, even if Spain were an ultra-Catholic country, it is not religion which would hold it in a secondary place. Belgium, Bavaria, and Canada are religious countries, yet their standard of civilization is as high as that of any other people. And in Spain herself, the richest, the most industrialized, and the most energetic regions are those in which religious faith is most profound and militant: Catalonia and the Basque provinces.

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Latin Europe, drugged with decadence,⁷ begins to see in our Argentina the salvation of the race. Restless men avid for a new life, troubadours of the Golden Age, the eagle tribe, finding the route of ascent closed, crowd the transatlantic steamers bound toward this fatherland. They are the modern *conquistadores*.

Heroes of energy and of will-power, they create an illusion of their strength; and at night, on the crowded deck, under the lyric pantheon of the great maritime sky, these present day Corteses and Pizarros dream of actions of great audacity and

7. These words should be taken in a very broad sense. In Italy, for example, there is an evident resurgence, as there is, although less strong, in Spain. Nevertheless, one can speak of a Latin decadence. France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal are in decline, because they do not exert upon the world the old influence of former centuries. The Anglo-saxons are today the owners of the world, and it may be affirmed that with the end of the hegemony of the dark men (the men of the Mediterranean) the hour of the blond man has come. Moreover, the Latin decline is a fact because Latin ideals have lost their force and prestige. Now they no longer animate even those nations which gave rise to them; and when the latter are revived in a certain sense, it is because they practise the Anglo-Saxon ideals.

of wealth. The Latins of Europe, and almost all these men are Latins, might be called priests of their lineage. They have the providential and secret mission of preserving the Latin excellences in the mixture of peoples, of assuring the predominance, in the amalgam of so many metals, of the pure gold of Latinism.

A new race is taking form here. In a violent and secret struggle, in a formidable Babel of temperaments, peoples from all regions are absorbing each other, fusing and mixing together, devouring each other, and amalgamating. Israelites of Bessarabia, whose eyes express the mystery of the steppes and the terror of persecutions, are united in gaucho homes with natives of bronzed complexion. Intrepid Basques share their daring lives with women of aboriginal stock. Saxons, Armenians, Latins, Greeks, Slavs—no one escapes absorption by the environment. This nation, generous to the foreigner, demands in exchange for its gifts that all nations be forgotten. And thus, in the common love for this prolific land, in the enjoyment of liberty and democracy, a new race is being born on Argentine soil, a race predestined in a near future to magnificent achievements.

Despite the mixtures, [it will be] a Latin race. We are gathering up the virtues of the stock which our brothers in Europe have begun to forget. The men who come to populate this country are Latins in overwhelming majority. Our spirit and our culture are Latin. But within our Latinism we belong, and will eternally belong, to the Spanish caste. Immigration, while unconsciously breaking down our character, has not succeeded, and will never succeed, in taking away our common physiognomy. Castile created us in her form and image. She is the matrix of our people. She is the cradle of the race (*solar de la raza*) which will be born from the amalgam in fusion.

Let us love Spain. She is perhaps the most noble nation which has existed upon the earth. [Even] her decline should not evoke our disdain, but our gratitude. It is in fact the Latin decadence which gives us the unique position we hold among present day nations: that we are destined to make prevail in the world, like a sun among stars, the virtues of the race. If Spain were a great power and if France and Italy were not now stricken by the virus of decline, the future of Argentina

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would be quite different. Then, the Latins of Europe would not come to this land, and the virtues of the race, conserved there without the mold of decay, would not be bequeathed to our country. Those nations, above all Spain, do not regain their greatness, but our country ascends. They abandon to us those ideals which they no longer use; they weaken their strength to augment our vigor. Let us be grateful to them and let us recognize that from those nations come our merit and our hope.

The future of our country is not just material. She will be the granary of the world, but must not be only that. A higher and lasting destiny will make her great. But shall we have any spiritual influence upon the world? Shall we create in the centuries [to come] a beautiful and harmonious form of civilization? An immense longing is the basis of my hope. I would not know with what arguments to justify such an illusion, but in the depth of my being some one speaks these words to me.

We possess hidden energy. But ours will not be a barbarous and automatic energy, like that which boils incessantly in the United States of North America. Ours is and will be a harmonious energy, a force tempered by Latin elegance, an intelligent impulse, the spiritual arm of a being in whom action has not destroyed the ability to dream. Consequently, the poet of our race will not be a Walt Whitman. The barbarous rhythms, the biblical tone, the rudeness, the disorder of the Yankee poet, would be alien to our temperament.

(Trans. by E.A. and H.E.D.)

RICARDO ROJAS (1882-)

ARGENTINA

Ricardo Rojas was one of the great literary critics of the present generation. As a humanist, he was responsible in no small degree for arousing in Argentina a sense of the importance of humanistic studies and giving them an important place in the universities. Although he wrote on a wide range of subjects — educational, historical, and political — his most distinctive work was a plea for an American, or as he called it, Eurindian esthetic. This was the theme of his book, *Eurindia*, from which the following excerpt has been translated.

Rojas had in him much of the poet, something of the romantic, and something of the mystic as he argued that the soil of America bred the spirit of freedom. Like Manuel Gálvez, he sought to rebuild the spiritual basis of Argentine nationalism in her culture. Like Gálvez, he resembled Unamuno. But, unlike Gálvez, while he sought this basis in history, he did not look for it in the colonial tradition. Rather, he looked for a dynamic fusion of what he deemed to be the two essential elements of this culture — that of Europe and that of America — in an autonomous pattern.

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RICARDO ROJAS

EURINDIA

BY RICARDO ROJAS

(From *Eurindia*, tomo V, *Obras de Ricardo Rojas*, Buenos Aires: Juan Roldán y Cía. 1924. Chs. ii and iii.)

ANOMALIES OF OUR CULTURE

A continent is a geographic organism destined to serve as the seat of a [certain] type of culture. [When] its autochthonous civilization of the Incas and the Aztecs was broken up abruptly by the European conquest, America began a new cultural process, in whose initial stages we still find ourselves. The American culture, when it has been achieved, will have to be distinct from European culture.

It already begins to be different. In the Argentine Republic, for example, what is commonly called the question of Latin in European education has no meaning for our people; nor does what is customarily called the religious question; and in politics the conflict between monarchy and democracy is dead. Militarism, imperialism, anti-semitism are absurd words to us, although there are those who, through perverse imitation, undertake artificially to give them here the strong significance they have in Europe. As for literary problems, the schools called there classicism, romanticism, realism, and the decadents degenerate here and, like plants carried to the wrong climate, become sterile or produce unexpected fruits. When Americans achieve an understanding of these phenomena, nothing in our thinkers (*pensadores*) will seem so ridiculous as their zeal in proposing to us illusory exotic models, among them the mimicking of extracontinental literary modes. Every civilization is the special fulfillment of a culture; every culture the temporal form of a tradition; every tradition the historical function of the spirit of a people.

If we examine carefully the American evolution, we shall see that the city, the source of civilization, has always been a fortress of military conquest or a factory of economic conquest. Our historical cities have not grown by the gathering together of country dwellers in a spontaneous cultural process, but by the penetration of armed men, come from abroad. The American city, consequently, has not had in its genesis the creative nutriment of the native gods as did the European

"polis." Hence our civilization is materialistic; hence our culture is weak. It will cease to be so only when the spirit of the countryside will have entered into the city, [now] foreign in all its attributes. The American genius languishes in an environment which is not its own because it is historically European, and the European genius also suffers in it, because geographically the atmosphere is American. This tragic conflict is the real test of colonies which made themselves nations and which aspire to create a culture without taking pride in the adornments of a civilization mechanically transplanted to its soil.

Sarmiento saw this conflict of the Argentine city and pastoral countryside in his happy antinomy: "civilization and barbarism." He viewed it with European eyes, and merely in its political aspects, during the civil war whose consequences he suffered as an exile. If he had viewed it with American sympathy and the serenity of a philosopher, penetrating the metaphysical essence of the phenomenon, he would have spoken in another manner. Our cities were [then] extra-European episodes of European culture; our rural regions and their instinctive human forces were the new nature struggling to make itself into history, creating new esthetic and moral forms. In my book, *Blasón de Plata*, I have given this other formula: "Indianism and exoticism," which to some has seemed paradoxical, but which explains all the Argentine or American processes of progress and reaction, as well as the territorial character which the European historical rhythms acquire in the evolution of our culture. With it I explain the crises of our political history and the renovations of our intellectual history.

INDIANISM AND EXOTICISM

The Indians of our America were living upon the basis of their own rudimentary culture when the European conquest, which founded the cities, came from abroad. In our case, the Spaniards hispanicized the native; but the Indies and the Indians [also] indianized the Spaniard. The conquerors penetrated the aboriginal empires, destroying them; but three centuries later the peoples of America expelled the Conquistador. Independence was a nativist, that is to say an Indian, revindication, as against the civilizer of exotic origin. One declaration of independence said: "We wish to expel from the country all Spanish residents." The "Hymn" of the Argentine

Revolution sings of its exploits, invoking the pre-Colombian Incas.

The autonomous impulse of the revolution, Indian in its objectives, unleashed the lesser cities, tied more closely to the American soil, against the vice-regal cities, linked more closely to the European tradition; it also unchained the genius of the countryside, with its Indians, its gauchos, and its caudillos. Once the crisis of the civil war was past, which was disentangled in the federal and democratic organization imposed by the "barbarians" of the moment, the "civilizers" opened the country to the European immigration necessary for the development of these peoples in this new period of our history. Thus a new cycle of cosmopolitan exoticism was established, within which we now are; but already one senses indications of a new Indianist reaction, which should not be a militant xenophobia, but a peaceful creation of American culture, a nativist justification by means of intelligence, the spiritual conquest of our cities by the American genius. Toward this synthesis we march, and it will be achieved in a philosophical and artistic renaissance whose proximity is already to be noted.

In the aforesaid historical scheme we have: first, the pre-Colombian Indians conquered by the Spanish conquistadores; next, the Spanish conquerors themselves overcome by the American gauchos; later, the Argentine gauchos conquered by European immigrants; and finally we shall have the immigrant merchants conquered by the autochthonous artists, or that is, exoticism newly overcome by Indianism. In literary history the outline is repeated: first, the indigenous folklore; next the gaucho poetry; later, positivism and the decadents. We now await the absorption of the exotic civilization by the Indian tradition, so that its synthetic expression may appear in philosophy and art.

Let us observe, then, that while the European development is achieved through chronological rhythms within its own continental tradition, in America the process of "before" and "after" is intermixed with the tides of "the here" and "the there," that is of the outer toward the inner and of the inner toward the outer, in a kind of inter-continental rhythm. This is what I have called *indianismo* and *exotismo*. The *exotismo* is needed for our political growth, as is *indianismo* for our esthetic culture. We wish neither gaucho barbarism nor

cosmopolitan barbarism. We wish a national culture as the source of a national civilization; an art which may be the expression of both phenomena.

Eurindia is the name of this ambition.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI (1895-1930)

PERU

It may be surprising to find a man who established the Peruvian section of the Third International, and who was once known as the "dean" of Latin American Communism, recognized as a great intellectual in conservative Peru (not by all Peruvians, of course). But Mariátegui's *Seven Essays of Interpretation of Peruvian Reality*, from which the following excerpt has been translated, justifies this recognition because of its influence upon the mind of twentieth century Latin America.

José Carlos Mariátegui, born in 1895, grew up in poverty in Lima. His formal schooling ended at the age of twelve when he entered a printing shop to work as a copyboy. Continuing his education by reading, he began to write at an early age, making himself one of Peru's well known journalists by the age of eighteen. Meanwhile, an injury to his knee made him a cripple. Later, as this injury developed into a tuberculous condition, it was to cause his early death. As a writer, he associated himself with a group of young men who opposed the "futurism" of the critic Riva Agüero, giving an emphasis, rather, to social and political questions. Their ideas had considerable similarity to those of the popular movement headed by Augusto Leguía, the later president-dictator.

Because of their journalistic support of Leguía in the election of 1918, he and a literary companion, César Falcón, received grants from the government for study and travel in Europe. From this study, and particularly from an examination of the careers of Lloyd George and Lenin, Mariátegui evolved a theory of political leadership, somewhat along Marxist lines. The agrarian aspects of the Russian Revolutionary program provided another important element in his concept of the problem of Peruvian social renovation. In Italy he joined the Communist party.

Back home in Peru, he founded the journal *Amauta*, in which much of his writing appeared, and collaborated in the student movement for university reform, helping to channel it toward cooperation with labor groups and into a program of social reform, including, especially, the redemption of the Indian. His *Seven Essays*, published in 1926, soon became a kind of bible of the political opposition which gave the now dictatorial

regime of Leguía increasing trouble. It also provided much of the ideological basis for the new APRA (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) founded by Haya de la Torre, despite the latter's break with international Communism.

Although clearly Marxist in its historical determinism, Mariátegui's book is far from being a Communist tract. One of its most distinctive features is its analysis of pre-Conquest economic development. This process, as the author sees it, was interrupted by Spanish colonialism. The latter became the source of all Peru's later trouble, which could be solved only by renewing the lines of pre-Conquest development. Here we have *indigenismo* of a certain sort.

It is ironical, of course, that while he himself was identified with international Communism, Mariátegui should thus have provided through his *Seven Essays* an essential element of APRA's nationalist and American revolutionary socialism. In effect, the classical Marxist concept of the class struggle as the product of a certain historical stage is obscured by Mariátegui's preoccupation with the Indian. The doctrine of the primacy of economic causation appears more clearly in his exposition, but it too is lost in the explanation of the Conquest, which is presented as "more of a military and ecclesiastical . . . than of a political and economic enterprise."

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ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF PERU

BY JOSÉ CARLOS MARIÁTEGUI

(From *Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana*, prólogo de Guillermo Rouillón. Santiago, Chile: Ed. Universitaria, 1955. Pp. 5-21.)

THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

The extent to which the Conquest marks an epoch in the history of Peru is best seen on the economic plane. On this level, more clearly than on any other, the Conquest appears as a product of [historical] continuity. Until the Conquest, Peru was developing an economy which sprang freely and spontaneously from the Peruvian soil and people. In the Inca empire, an aggregate of sedentary agricultural communities, the most interesting aspect was the economic. All historical sources agree that the Incaic people — industrious, disciplined, pantheistic and simple — lived in material comfort. The means of subsistence abounded; the population increased. The empire was completely unaware of the Malthusian problem. Collectivist organization, ruled by the Incas, had weakened individual initiative among the Indians; but it had developed in them extraordinarily, as a result of this economic regime, the habit of humble and religious obedience to social duty. They [the Incas] extracted from this virtue of their people all the social utility possible. They developed the vast territory of the empire, constructing roads and canals. They extended it, conquering neighboring tribes. Collective work, the common effort, was employed fruitfully for social purposes.

The Spanish conquerors destroyed, without being able to replace it of course, this formidable machinery of production. Indigenous society, the Inca economy, fell to pieces and died under the blow of the Conquest. The links of unity broken, the nation dissolved into scattered communities. Indigenous labor ceased to function in a solidary and organic manner. The conquerors scarcely concerned themselves with anything except dividing up and disputing over the rich booty of war. They

plundered the temples and palaces of their treasures; they divided up the lands and men without even a question as to their future as forces and means of production.

The viceroyalty signals the beginning of the difficult and complex process of forming a new economy. In this period Spain endeavored to give political and economic structure to her immense colony. Spaniards began to cultivate the soil and to develop the mines of gold and silver. Upon the ruins and remains of a socialist economy they built the bases of a feudal economy.

But Spain did not send to Peru, nor for that matter to her other possessions, a dense colonizing mass. The weakness of the Spanish empire lay precisely in its having the character and structure of a military and ecclesiastical rather than of a political and economic enterprise. Great bands of *pioneers* did not disembark in the Spanish colonies as on the coasts of New England. To Spanish America came almost nothing but viceroys, courtesans, adventurers, clergy, doctors, and soldiers. Hence, a true colonizing force was not formed in Peru. The population of Lima consisted of a little court, a bureaucracy, a few monks and nuns, inquisitors, merchants, servants, and slaves. Moreover, the Spanish *pioneer* lacked the ability to create nuclei of labor. Instead of utilizing the Indian, he seemed to pursue his extermination. And the colonists were not sufficient in themselves to create a solid and organic economy. Colonial organization lacked a base. It lacked a demographic foundation. The Spaniards and mestizos were too few to develop the riches of the land, on a large scale. And, since the importation of Negro slaves was resorted to for the work of the coastal haciendas, the elements and characteristics of a slave society were added to those of a feudal society.

Only the Jesuits, perhaps, with their ingrained positivism, showed in Peru, as in other American lands, some economic creativity. The *latifundios* assigned to them prospered. The vestiges of their organization remain as a lasting mark. Anyone who recalls the great experiment of the Jesuits in Paraguay, where they so skillfully used and developed the natural tendency of the indigenes toward communism, can not be completely surprised that this congregation of the sons of San Iñigo de Loyola, as [Miguel] Unamuno calls them, should be able to create on Peruvian soil the centers of work and production

which the nobles, doctors, and clergy, resigned to a soft and sensual life in Lima, never bothered to form.

The colonists were almost solely preoccupied with the exploitation of Peruvian gold and silver. I have frequently referred to the tendency of the Spaniards to install themselves in the lower lands, and to the mixture of respect and distrust they always felt for the Andes, of which they never really came to feel themselves the masters. Very well. The formation of the creole populations of the sierra is due to the work of the mines. Without this avarice for the metals buried in the entrails of the Andes, the conquest of the sierra would have been much more incomplete.

These were the historical bases of the new Peruvian economy — of the colonial economy — colonial from its very beginnings — whose process has still not terminated. Let us now examine the lines of a second stage, the stage in which a feudal economy slowly develops into a bourgeois economy, but without ceasing, from the world point of view, to be colonial.

THE ECONOMIC BASES OF THE REPUBLIC

Like the first, the second stage of this economy is forced by a political and military event. The first stage is born in the Conquest. The second stage begins with Independence. But, whereas the Conquest wholly engenders the process of the formation of our colonial economy, Independence seems to be determined and dominated by that process.

Previously, and since my first Marxist effort to base Peruvian history on the study of economic facts, I have had occasion to concern myself with this phase of the revolution of Independence, sustaining the following thesis: The ideas of the French Revolution and of the North American Constitution found a climate favorable to their diffusion in South America, because South America already had, although in embryo, a bourgeoisie whose needs and interests enabled it and caused it to be infected with the revolutionary spirit of the European bourgeoisie. The Independence of Hispanic America could not have occurred, certainly, if it had not had a heroic generation, moved by the feeling of the epoch, with the capacity and the will to effect a true revolution among these peoples. In this respect, independence appears to be a romantic enterprise.

But this does not contradict the thesis of the economic configuration of the emancipation movement. The leaders, the caudillos, the ideologues of this revolution, were not previous to nor above the economic premises and causes of the event. The intellectual and emotional fact was not prior to the economic fact.

The policy of Spain hindered and completely blocked the economic development of the colonies by reserving to the metropolis the exclusive rights to trade and enterprise in its dominions.

The natural impulse of the productive forces of the colonies was to break through this restriction. The nascent economy of the embryonic national formations in America, to continue its development, needed to escape from the rigid authority and free itself from the medieval mentality of the King of Spain. The scholar of today can not fail to see here the predominant historical factor in the South American independence movement, [which was] moved and inspired in a manner too obviously evident much more by the interests of the creoles, and even the Spaniards, than by the interests of the indigenous population.

Viewed from the plane of world history, South American independence appears to have been decided by the necessities of the development of Occidental, or more accurately, capitalist civilization. In the working out of independence, the rhythm of the capitalist phenomenon had a function less apparent and ostensible, but without doubt much more profound and decisive than echoing the philosophy and literature of the encyclopedists. The British Empire, destined to represent so thoroughly and transcendently the interests of the capitalist civilization, was then in formation. In England, the seat of liberalism and protestantism, industry and the machine were preparing the future of capitalism, that is, of the material phenomenon of which the political and religious phenomena appear in history as the spiritual and philosophical leavening. This is why it fell to the lot of England — to whose clear consciousness of historical destiny and mission her hegemony in the capitalist civilization is attributable — to play a primary role in South American independence. And, hence, while the premier of France, the nation which had given them the example of her great revolution a few years before, was refusing to recognize these South American republics which might send her "their

revolutionary ideas along with their products,"¹ Mr. Canning, faithful interpreter and executor of the interest of England, consecrated by that recognition the right of these peoples to separate themselves from Spain and, incidentally, to organize themselves democratically and as republics. Mr. Canning had been virtually pushed [to this course], on the other hand, by the London bankers who had financed the founding of the new republics with loans no less opportune and efficacious because they were usurious.

The sun of the Spanish empire was setting because it rested only on military and political bases, and above all because it represented a superceded economy. Spain was unable to supply her colonies abundantly except with ecclesiastics, doctors, and nobles. Her colonies desired more practical things and needed newer implements. Consequently, they turned toward England, whose industrialists and bankers, colonizers of a new type, wished in turn to capture these markets, fulfilling their function as agents of an empire created by a manufacturing and free trade economy.

The economic interest of the colonies of Spain and the economic interest of the capitalist Occident were completely identical, even though, as often happens in history, the historical protagonists of neither side may have taken adequate account of it.

As soon as these nations were independent, guided by the same natural impulse which had led them to the revolution of independence, they sought through trade with the capital and industry of the Occident the resources and relationships which the growth of their economy required. They began to send the products of their soil and sub-soil to the capitalist Occident. And from the capitalist Occident they began to receive textiles, machinery, and a thousand industrial products. Thus, a continuous growing contact between South America and Occidental civilization was established. Naturally, the countries benefiting most from this traffic, because of their greater proximity to Europe, were those situated on the Atlantic. Argentina and Brazil, above all, attracted European capital and immigrants to their territory in great quantity. These vigorous and homogeneous Occidental inundations accelerated a transformation of the economy and culture of these countries, which gradually acquired the functions and

1. The phrase is that of Chateaubriand.— Trans.

structure of the European economy and culture. The liberal bourgeois democracy was able to plant its roots there firmly while in the rest of South America it was impeded by the persistence of extensive and tenacious residues of feudalism.

During this period the general historical process of Peru enters a stage of separation and differentiation from the historical process of other South American peoples. Because of their geography, some were destined to advance more rapidly than others. Independence had united them in a common enterprise, only to separate them later in individual enterprises. Peru found herself at an enormous distance from Europe. European ships, to reach her ports, had to venture on a very long voyage. Geographically, Peru was a closer neighbor to the Orient. And commerce between Peru and Asia, logically, commenced to become considerable. The Peruvian coast received those famous contingents of Chinese immigrants destined to replace on the haciendas the Negro slaves introduced by the viceroyalty, whose emancipation was also, in some ways, a result of the work of transforming a feudal economy into a more or less bourgeois economy. But the trade with Asia could not contribute effectively to the formation of the new Peruvian economy. The Peru whose emergence from the Conquest was affirmed in independence needed the machines, the methods, and the ideas of Europeans, of Occidentals.

THE PERIOD OF GUANO AND SALTPETER

The chapter of the evolution of the Peruvian economy, which opens with the discovery of the wealth of guano and saltpeter and closes with its loss, explains completely a series of political phenomena of our historical process which a concept of Peruvian history, better termed anecdotal and rhetorical than romantic, has been pleased so superficially to disfigure and confuse. But this rapid outline of interpretation is proposed, not to illustrate and bring into focus those phenomena, but to fix or define some of the substantive characteristics of the formation of our economy in order to understand better its colonial character. Let us consider merely the economic aspect.

Let us begin by noting that it was the lot of guano and saltpeter, humble and gross substances, to play a role in the affairs of the Republic which had seemed to be reserved for gold and silver in more knightly and less positivistic times.

Spain wished us to be and kept us a country producing precious metals. England preferred us as a country producing guano and saltpeter. But this different semblance does not prove, of course, a different motive. What changed was not the motive; it was the epoch. The gold of Peru lost its power of attraction in an epoch in which, in America, the staff of the pioneer was discovering the gold of California. Instead, the guano and saltpeter — which for previous civilizations would have lacked value, but which might acquire extraordinary value for an industrial civilization — constituted a reserve almost exclusively ours. European or Occidental industrialism — a phenomenon in full development — needed to be supplied with these materials from the distant coast of the South Pacific. On the other hand, exploitation of the two products was not blocked, as was that of other Peruvian products, by the rudimentary and primitive state of land transportation. While it was necessary to overcome the obstacles of rugged mountains and enormous distances to extract gold, silver, copper, and coal from the entrails of the Andes, saltpeter and guano lay in the coastal region, almost within reach of the ships which came to seek them.

The easy exploitation of this natural resource dominated all other manifestations of the economic life of the country. Guano and saltpeter occupied a place of exaggerated importance in the Peruvian economy. Its returns became the principal fiscal revenue. The country felt rich. The government made excessive use of its credit. It lived like a spendthrift, hypothecating its future to British finance.

This, in broad strokes, is the whole history of guano and saltpeter for the observer who feels himself to be purely an economist. The rest, at first glance, is for the historian. But in this case, as always, the economic fact is much more complex and transcendental than it appears.

More than anything else, guano and saltpeter performed the function of creating an active trade with the Occidental world in a period in which Peru, poorly located geographically, lacked large means for attracting to her soil the colonizing and civilizing currents which were already enriching other countries of Indo-Iberian America. This trade placed our economy under the control of British capital, to which, because of debts contracted with guaranties based on both products, we were

later to turn over the administration of the railroads, that is, of the very bases for the development of our resources.

The guano and saltpeter opportunities created in Peru, where property until this time had retained an aristocratic and feudal character, the first solid elements of commercial and banking capital. Those who gained directly or indirectly from the riches of the coast began to constitute a capitalist class. There was formed in Peru a bourgeoisie, mixed and interlaced in origin and structure with aristocracy, formed principally from the successors of the *encomenderos* and landowners of the colony, but obliged by its function to adopt the fundamental principles of liberal political economy. Related to this phenomenon are the following conclusions to which I refer in various passages of the studies which make up this book: "In the early days of Independence the conflict of factions and military chieftains seems to be a consequence of the lack of an organic bourgeoisie. In Peru, the Revolution found the elements of a liberal bourgeois order less defined, more retarded, than in other Hispanic American peoples. Even the embryonic functioning of this order required the formation of a vigorous capitalist class. While this class was organizing, power was at the mercy of military caudillos. The government of [Ramón] Castilla marked the stage of solidification of a capitalist class. State concessions and the profits of guano and saltpeter created a capitalism and a bourgeoisie. And this class, which then took form in 'civilism,' soon moved in to the total conquest of political power."

In the period dominated by the commerce of guano and saltpeter, the process of transforming our economy from feudal to bourgeois character received its first strong impetus. Unquestionably, in my opinion, if instead of a mediocre metamorphosis of the old ruling class it could have brought the advent of a class of new knowledge and elan, the process would have advanced more organically and more surely. Our postwar history proves it.² Defeat, which along with the loss of the saltpeter territories brought a long collapse of [national] forces of production, did not bring as compensation, even in this order of things, a liquidation of the past.

2. The period following the war of Peru and Bolivia with Chile (1879-1883) in which the latter annexed the territories of Antofagasta, Tacna, and Arica.— Trans.

CHARACTER OF OUR PRESENT ECONOMY

* * * * *

Defeat not only meant for the national economy loss of its principal sources, saltpeter and guano. It also meant paralysis of the nascent productive forces, general depression of production and commerce, depreciation of the national currency, and the ruin of foreign credit. Bled and mutilated, the nation suffered a terrible anemia.

Again, as after independence, power fell into the hands of military chieftains who were spiritually and organically unprepared to direct a work of economic reconstruction. Very soon, however, the capitalist layer formed in the days of guano and saltpeter returned to its position and resumed its function. Hence the policy of national economic reorganization was completely tuned to their class interests. The solution found for the monetary problem, for example, corresponded typically to the criterion of large landowners or proprietors, indifferent, not only to the interest of the proletariat, but also to that of the small and middle bourgeoisie, the only social levels which the sudden annulment of the paper currency could damage.

This measure and the Grace contract were, undoubtedly, the most substantive acts as well as those most characteristic of a liquidation of the economic consequences of the war, inspired by the interests and views of the landowning plutocracy.

The Grace contract, which ratified British predominance in Peru, handing over the state railroads to the English bankers who, up to this point, had financed the republic and its wasteful expenditures, gave to the financial market of London the privileges and guaranties necessary for new investments in Peruvian business. Restoration of the credit of the State did not bring immediate results. But prudent and secure investments began anew to attract British capital. The Peruvian economy, by means of a practical recognition of its colonial condition, achieved some aid for its convalescence. Completion of the railroad to Oroya opened the Department of Junín to industrial commerce and transit, permitting the large scale development of its mineral wealth.

The economic policy of [President Nicolás] Piérولا was fully keyed to the same interests. This democratic caudillo,

who for so long strenuously stirred up the masses against the plutocracy, prided himself in establishing a *civilista* administration. [But] his tax methods and his fiscal system dissipate any mistaken ideas his phraseology and metaphysics might generate. All of which confirms the principle that the meaning and scope of politics, of men, and of their deeds may be perceived more clearly on the economic plane than on the political.

* * * * *

I will point out one final conclusion: That in present day Peru elements of three different economies coexist. In the sierra, some living residues of the communal indigenous economy still subsist under the regime of feudal economy born of the Conquest. On the coast, a bourgeoisie economy grows upon a feudal soil, giving, at least in its mental development, an impression of retardation.

AGRARIAN ECONOMY AND FEUDAL LATIFUNDIO

Despite the increase in mining, Peru retains the character of an agricultural country. Cultivation of the soil occupies the great majority of the national population. The Indian, who makes up four-fifths of it, is by tradition and habit a farmer. Since 1925, because of the decline in cotton and sugar prices and the lessening of harvests, mineral exports have greatly surpassed those of agriculture. The export of petroleum and its derivatives, increasing rapidly, has powerfully influenced this change. (From 1,387,788 Peruvian pounds in 1916 it has increased to 7,421,128 Peruvian pounds in 1926). But agricultural production is represented only in part by export products: cotton, sugar and derivatives, wool, hides, and gums. National agriculture and herding provide for national consumption, while mineral products are almost all exported. Imports of food and beverages reached 4,148,311 Peruvian pounds in 1925. The largest item in these imports was wheat, which is still produced in very insufficient quantity in this country. Complete statistics of national production and consumption do not exist. Calculating a daily per capita consumption of fifty centavos of the *sol* would give a total of more than 84,000,00 Peruvian pounds for the population of 4,609,999 estimated in 1896. Assuming a population of 5,000,000 inhabitants, the value of the national consumption

risers to 91,250,000 Peruvian pounds. These figures show the great primacy of agriculture and fishing in the economy of the country.

Mining, on the other hand, still employs a small number of workers. According to the Statistical Extract, 28,592 workers were employed in this industry in 1926. Manufacturing likewise employs a modest contingent of hands. Sugar cane haciendas alone employed 22,367 men and 1,173 women to work in the fields in 1926. Cotton haciendas of the coast, in the 1922-23 season, the last covered by published statistics, employed 40,557 workers; and the rice haciendas, in the 1924-25 season, some 11,332.

Most of the agricultural and herding products consumed in the country come from the valleys and plateaus of the sierra. In the coastal haciendas, the cultivation of food is under an obligatory minimum established by a law enacted in the period in which the rise in sugar and cotton incited the landowners almost wholly to neglect its cultivation, resulting in a serious increase in living costs.

The landowning class has been able to transform itself into a capitalist bourgeoisie, patron of the national economy. Mining, commerce, and transportation are found in the hands of foreign capital. The landowners are satisfied to serve as intermediaries for this [foreign capital] in the production of cotton and sugar. This economic system has retained a semi-feudal organization in agriculture which constitutes the worst obstacle for the development of the country.

The survival of feudalism in the coast is translated into the languor and poverty of its cities. The number of coastal towns and cities is insignificant. And the village, strictly speaking, does not exist except in the few areas where the *campiña* (large estate) still kindles the joy of its small landowners in the midst of a feudalized countryside.

In Europe the village descends from the broken up fief. On the Peruvian coast the village practically does not exist, because the fief still subsists, more or less intact. The hacienda—with its more or less classic house, its generally wretched workers quarters, its sugar mill, and its *colcas*³ is the dominant type of rural group. All the points of an itinerary are marked

3. From The Quechua *Kollka*, a rustic granary or deposit for crops.— Trans.

by the names of haciendas. The absence of the village, the rarity of the town, prolong the desert within the valley, in the cultivated and productive land.

Cities, according to a principle of economic geography, are usually formed in the valleys, at the point where highways cross. In the Peruvian coast, rich and extensive valleys, which hold a conspicuous place in the statistics of national production, have not so far given birth to a city. Barely, indeed, at her crossroads or stations, a town appears, a stagnant *pueblo*, malaria ridden, dreary, without rural health or urban dress. And, in some cases, as in Chicama, the *latifundio* has begun to suffocate the city. Capitalistic business becomes more hostile to city customs than the feudal castle and rule [were]. It competes for its [the city's] commerce, despoils it of its function.

Within European feudalism the elements of growth, the vital factors of the town, were much greater, despite the rural economy, than within the creole semi-feudalism. The countryside needed the services of the town, however isolated it held itself. Above all, it sold [to the town] the remnant of its products of the soil which it had to offer. In contrast, the Peruvian hacienda produces cotton and sugar for distant markets. Since the transportation of these products is assured, contact with neighborhood holds no interest, except secondarily. The growing of food crops, if not completely extinguished by the cultivation of cotton or sugar, is for the purpose of supplying the needs of the hacienda. The town, in many valleys, neither receives anything from the countryside nor owns anything in it. Hence it lives in misery, [existing] on some urban employment or other, on the men who contribute to the work of the haciendas, and on the sad fatigue of a station through which annually pass thousands of tons of products of the soil. A real village (*porción de campiña*), with its free men, with its hacienda community, is a rare oasis in a succession of deformed fiefs with machines and rails, without the timbre of seignorial tradition.

* * * * *

His Spanish heritage and education weight down the creole proprietor, preventing him from perceiving and understanding clearly all that distinguishes capitalism from feudalism. The

moral, political, and psychological elements of capitalism do not seem to have found their climate here. The capitalist, or rather the creole proprietor, has the concept of income rather than of production. The readiness to venture, the creative impulse, the organizing ability, which characterize authentic capitalism, are almost unknown among us.

Capitalistic concentration has been preceded by a state of free concurrence. Consequently, the great modern property did not arise from the large feudal estate as creole landowners probably imagine. On the contrary, the rise of the great modern property required the fractioning or dissolution of the large feudal estate. Capitalism is an urban phenomenon. It has the spirit of the industrial, manufacturing, mercantile town. Hence, one of its first actions was the liberation of the soil, the destruction of the fief. The development of the city had to nourish itself on the free activity of the farm worker.

In Peru, contrary to the spirit of the republican emancipation, the creation of a capitalist economy has been entrusted to the spirit of the feudal fief — the antithesis and negation of the spirit of the city.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

VICTOR RAUL HAYA DE LA TORRE (1895 —)

PERU

Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre was born in Trujillo, northern Peru, in February 1895, into a family of considerable wealth and national prestige. His father, who was the editor of *La Industria*, instilled liberal ideas in his son's mind, by setting him to read Tolstoy, Darwin, Kropotkin, Marx, Kant, Hegel, Einstein, and Laski. He later studied under the last of these in the London School of Economics.

As a university student, Haya identified himself with the movement for university reform and social reform in cooperation with the workers' movement. He was forced into exile in 1923 because of his leadership in opposition to the dictatorial regime of President Leguía. He traveled and studied in Switzerland, the Soviet Union, France, England, the United States, and Mexico. In Paris, in May 1924, he formulated the five basic principles of what was to become the APRISTA doctrine: anti-imperialism, Latin American unity, nationalization of land and industry, internationalization of the Panama Canal, and solidarity with all oppressed peoples and classes in the world.¹

After the fall of Leguía in 1930, Haya returned to run against Colonel Miguel Sánchez Cerro for the presidency, as the Aprista candidate. The Apristas charged that the subsequent election of Sánchez Cerro was fraudulent, and the president's later assassination was accordingly blamed on them. The party was then suppressed until the election of 1945, when its legalization resulted in the election of José Luis Bustamante. Haya was the power behind the throne. But when the coalition behind the president fell apart and he was driven from power by the (later) President Odria, Haya was forced to take refuge in the Colombian Embassy where he remained for years, while the dispute over his right of asylum was carried to the World Court.

The Apristas use the term "Indoamerica" to indicate the basic importance of the Indian cultural element and the Indian problem in America. "Hispanic Americanism belongs to the colonial epoch; Latin Americanism to the republican; while PanAmericanism is a Yankee imperialistic expression. [Haya

1. Haya de la Torre, "¿Qué es el Apra," *Acción femenina* (enero-feb. 1937), p. 18.

later reversed the anti-United States stand of Aprismo] Indo-Americanism is the expression of the new revolutionary conception of America which, having passed through the period of the Iberian and Saxon conquests, will evolve into a definite economico-political and social organization on the national basis of its labor forces."² But Aprismo also appeals to all "manual and intellectual laborers" who are urged to unite in a "common program of political action."³

In the following selection from his essay on "Aprismo, Marxism, and Historical Time-Space," Haya brilliantly develops a relativistic and existentialist theory of history which enables him to find in Indo-America the basis for a socialism distinct from that of Europe. The other excerpt shows his applications of this general concept in the elaboration of the Aprista program.

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2. *¿A donde va indoamerica?* 3d. ed. (Santiago, Chile: Biblioteca America, 1936) p. 23.

3. "¿Que es el aprismo?" loc. cit. p. 18.

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APRISMO, MARXISM, AND HISTORICAL TIME-SPACE

BY VÍCTOR RAÚL HAYA DE LA TORRE

(From *Y después de la guerra, ¿qué?* Lima: Ed. Talleres PTCM, Lima 1946. Pp. 176 ff.)

Since the theory of Historical Time-Space is again arousing discussion some years after first being presented in "Claridad" of Buenos Aires in 1935, and since it is not possible to write at length in the pages, necessarily limited, of a magazine such as "Hoy," permit me to synthesize my views on dialectics, Marxism, and historical time-space. Thus, summarily, I will return to the subject of the philosophical foundations of Aprismo, defending it by the same dialectical methods with which the orthodox of Moscow attack it.

I. Starting from the dialectical principle that contradictions are inseparable from all things, and that the process of these contradictions constitutes the dynamics of all evolution, it is evident that ideas and ideological systems, and therefore the philosophies and concepts of the world, are subject to processes which are reflections and expressions of those contradictions; and consequently, they evolve also.

II. Marxism, as a philosophical system, as "a concept of the world" (Plejanov)⁴ is not a divine expression of this universal process of contradiction which is inherent and consubstantial to all things. "All motion is a dialectical process, a living contradiction" (Plejanov). Marxism can not stand apart from the dialectical laws which preside over the evolution of the Cosmos, nature, and society. Nor, consequently, is Marxism beyond the dialectical laws which determine the evolutionary process of human thought and of its scientific, artistic, and philosophical expressions.

III. This universal process of evolution, determined by the contradictions which, I repeat, are inherent in all things, is the very essence of dialectic. "Contradiction is the root of

4. *Questions fondamentales du Marxisme.*

all motion and of all life," writes Hegel, because "only when a thing has a contradiction within itself does it carry with it impulses and activity." (*Wissenschaft Der Logik. Lib. II*). And this universal process of contradictions is fulfilled by what we know as the negation of the dialectical negation and the opposition of contraries.

IV. The dialectical negation "is not to say no" writes Engels in the *Anti-Dühring*. Consequently, to dialectically deny is not to "give a death certificate" to that which is denied: that would be killing and not denying. It is to conserve and to surpass at the same time; it is to deny and to continue. And thus, before Hegel, the whole process of evolution of philosophical thought, and the whole process of the social evolution of history, of nature, and of science which that thought reflects, is a succession of negations and surpassings determined by the fact that "all things are in themselves contradictory." (Hegel, *op. cit.*)

V. The process of evolution of the Cosmos, of nature, of society, of thought—of history in other words—does not stop in our time. It continues flowing uncontainably. And this century in which we live is nothing more than a passing link in the moving chain of millenniums in perpetual advance, from the past to the future. However grandiose the thought of egregious men may be, however extraordinary and influential their genius and far-sightedness, they always pass, are superceded. And as Heraclitus passed — the discoverer of the principle of eternal flux or "becoming" (*devenir*)⁵ — as Thales, Pythagoras and Democritus, Plato and Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Descartes, Spinoza, Bacon, Kant and Hegel passed, as all the great spirits who contributed to the discovery of the mysterious keys of the universe passed, so will Marx pass, and he also will be surpassed...⁶ This necessary "becoming" is not a diminution of their glory. Rather, it is their affirmation, but affirmation in their space and in their time, as a historical continuity of their thought and of their work. Thus also the authority and contribution of each genius of science, art, technique, philosophy,

5. The Spanish *devenir* in its philosophical sense is defined in the Academy dictionary as *llegar a ser*, literally succeeds in becoming.— Ed.

6. "The first category of history consists of the vision of change of individuals, of peoples and of states which exist during a period, attract our attention and then disappear. This is the category of the "becoming" — *Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*.

and politics is affirmed, always from his space-time, relativistic determinator of immortality.

Starting from these five points, Aprismo faces another great question: How does Marxism pass, what is its future transformation? How is it denied and still continued? And we can suggest — always synthesizing — that this passing, flowing, and denying is not mechanical, automatic, yet determined.

"Omnis determinatio est negatio," Spinoza exclaims. All determination is negation. Hegel says in his "Logic" (Chap. II) that this Spinozian problem is of "an infinite importance." And Engels cites it also in *Anti-Dühring* (First Part, Chap. XII), as a pioneer of modern dialectics. Thus, through historical determinism, based on the inherent contradiction of all things, which carry within themselves the principle of their own negation, we see the future of Marxism. It passes, is denied, and transformed to be surpassed.

To support the argument it is worth recalling what Engels wrote in his criticism of Hegel: "The old method of examination and of thinking which Hegel calls metaphysical method... had in its time its historical reason of existence.... The old metaphysics which considered a thing as completely finished originated from a natural science which examined dead or alive things as also finished. But when this investigation advanced sufficiently to permit the decisive progress, that is, the transition of the systematical examination of the transformations experienced by these things to nature itself, then the hour of death also sounded for the metaphysical science. De facto, if until the 18th century the natural sciences were eminently collectionist — the science of finished things — in the 19th century they are transformed into the science which coordinates, into the science of process of origin and of evolution of things and of the chain which joins into one great wholeness all these natural processes." (*L. Feuerbach and the Purpose of the German Classical Philosophy*. Chap. IV.)

This reference raises the same question which Einstein and Infeld briefly treat in their book "The Evolution of Physics" (New York, 1938, p. 55) with the following words: "Philosophical generalizations must be based on scientific results." Or, philosophy is the expression, reflection and sum of those

results. Therefore, in each epoch philosophy has a historical reason for existence based on the science of its time. And, therefore, Hegel could not advance much beyond the limitations of scientific discoveries and conclusions of his century.⁷

Notwithstanding, *Marxism also has its historical reason of existence*, and it can not advance further than the limit set by scientific discoveries and conclusions of its time. And not being a prophecy, but a science and system of reality, Marxism can neither congeal nor close the direct path to the negations and surpassings of the future, in which science and philosophy advance always further. This is our central argument.

When Engels recognized that the conception of a world as a complex of processes, and not of stationary things, is Marx's, and points out the path of examination and dialectical explanation of those processes of each concept, he announces that "the pretension of definite solutions to the eternal truths will have ended forever." And he adds this valuable and expressive sentence: "We should not forget the obligatory limitations of our knowledge." (*Reason in History*, Chap. IV).

These limits of knowledge are certainly the inevitable frontiers of the scientific advances of each epoch or, in the case we are analyzing, the limitations of Marxism, since — remember again — "Omnis determinatio est negatio."⁸

The advance of science has not stopped, nor will it stop after the nineteenth century. However outstanding the discoveries of that illustrious century may have been, ours continues in its astounding progress and opens grandiose and unexpected perspectives for the future. Today's science surpasses day by day all the knowledge of the past. And its development shows what it will become in the coming centuries. "In science there are no eternal theories. It always happens that some of the facts predicted by a theory are not proven

7. "Although Hegel, as Saint-Simon, had the most universal brain of his time, he had as his limitations the necessarily finite extension of his knowledge and also the knowledge and ideas of his time, also limited in extension and profundity." (*Anti-Dühring*. "Introduction").

8. "Spinoza is a crucial point in modern philosophy. The alternative is: Spinozarianism or no philosophy. Spinoza establishes the great principle: "All determination is negation." (Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, III, 373-375).

by the experiments. Each theory has its period of gradual development and triumph, after which it may experience a rapid decadence." (Einstein and Infeld, *op. cit.*, p. 77.)

There is no eternity in scientific theories, there is also none in philosophy, the sum of scientific laws. The most grandiose concepts arise, culminate and, having been surpassed by others, pass. Each has its historical reason for being, its place, its time, but the development of human thought is perennial. Thus, as with all sciences, Marxism cannot be a supernatural exception to the law to whose proof it has contributed so much.

What are the fundamental characteristics of contemporary scientific evolution?

Here are the words of a great scientist of our time: "A century of which only the third part has passed has witnessed two great revolutions in physical science. These are linked to the words relativity and quantity and have obliged the physicists of today to look at nature with an outfit of ideas very different from those in fashion in the 19th century.... The old philosophy ceased to be efficient at the end of the 19th century.... The physicist of the 20th century is building a new philosophy." (James H. Jeans: *The Foundations of Science*, Spanish edition, Calpe, Chap. I, pp. 11-12.)

And this revolutionary stage of physics does not only give the scientific world a new concept of matter, energy, motion, gravity, and electromagnetic fields. With a new geometry which denies the tri-dimensionalism of Euclid, it incorporates the principle of the fourth dimension, and thus appears a category of thought, the continuing of space-time inseparable from each physical phenomenon observed.

Thus, the twentieth century faces a new concept of the fundamental scientific principles of philosophy. The mathematical and physical sciences on which philosophy based its great generalizations are now being revised. Classical geometry has been denied. Consequently, "Space by itself and Time by itself pass to forgetfulness, and only a sort of union between both will conserve an independent existence." (Mikowsky, cited by Eddington in *Time-Space and Gravity*. Calpe, p. 51.)

Hence, it is not difficult to accept this argument: If there has been a true revolution in the fundamental concepts of science, it must project itself into philosophy. And if this revolution shares the same concept of matter, to the point where the theory of relativity has established that neither mass, motion, nor extension in space can be classified as true primary qualities of matter (Jeans, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22), then we face a new revolutionary concept of philosophical materialism. In other words, we face a new system of relationships between thought and matter. Therefore, the new continuity of space-time is already an indisputable mental category. "Today the theory of Einstein explains a complex group of natural phenomena and there is no known fact of nature in contradiction to it," says Jeans (*op.cit.* p. 49). And Eddington gives us this short expression of the new relativist comprehension: "Give me matter and motion, said Descartes, and I will build the Universe." The mind inverts the terms: "Give me the Universe (a universe in which relationships exist) and I will construct matter and motion" (Eddington, *op.cit.* p. 274). From this new and stupendous step of science is obtained a new and different method of seeing the world. Philosophy has to find its bases in the new scientific categories. And among them is the philosophy of history, because is not the essence of history the relation of space and time with social events?

Aprismo thus applies to the philosophy of history the new scientific and philosophical concept of space-time. And on this concept it bases the examination of the objective conditions of the social reality of Indo-America and the interpretation of its historical future. Therefore, it does not accept that our reality should be interpreted from Europe, but from the Indo-American historical time-space. Therefore, it rejects the division of world history formulated from the European viewpoint into Ancient, Middle, and Modern, subject to the chronology of the Old World. That world has its own historical time, inseparable from its space. Consequently, that division of history is not universal. It is the "European Universe," conceived *from* the European reality and *for* the European reality. But with American eyes and from American soil, now not a colony, our historical antiquity does not coincide with the European antiquity, chronologically; nor are their Middle Ages ours.... Therefore, when the orthodox Marxist affirms from European historical time-space that "imperialism is the

final stage of capitalism," the Indo-American Aprista answers, "Superior or final there; but here, when capitalism arrived under its imperialist form, it was in its first stage." History demonstrates that; it is only necessary to examine the process of our beginning industrialism.

Each historical time-space forms a system of cultural coordination, a geographical stage, and an historical event which determine the relationship of thought and "becoming" inseparable from the spatial concept and from the chronological measure. Each time-space is the expression of a grade of collective conscience capable of observing, understanding, and distinguishing its own field of social development as historical dimension. And if a people reaches cultural adulthood only when it achieves conscience of its own process of economic and social development, that conscience is only complete when it discovers, with the passing of its history, the intransferable and indivisible category of its own time-space. And this is the background of the philosophy of Aprismo on attempting an interpretation of the "People-Continent of Indo-America."

(Trans. by D.V.W.)

THE PLAN OF APRISMO

BY VÍCTOR RAÚL HAYA DE LA TORRE

(From *El Plan del Aprismo — Programa de Gobierno del Partido Aprista Peruano*. Lima, Peru: Editorial Libertad, 1933.)

...Aprismo renovates democracy because Aprismo incorporates, for the first time, new ideas, new people and new methods in national politics; and above all because Aprismo maintains that it is necessary to have responsibility in politics. Responsibility has been lacking in our politics. Therefore, we have no prestige, no action, no authentic force in the popular roots. Politics based on bribes, threats and fraud can not be responsible politics....

MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PROGRAM

The maximum program of Aprismo has a continental significance which does not exclude the program of national application. We consider that Peru cannot withdraw from the problems of Latin America and that Latin America cannot withdraw from the problems of the world. If we live within an international economic system and the economy plays a

decisive role in the political life of the people, it would be absurd to think that Peru, which relies on an economy partly dependent on this international economic organization, could live isolated from every scientific concept and from the whole current of intercourse which is a guarantee of progress.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

In the strictly economic sense, Latin America constitutes a zone—a productive zone of primary materials; an agriculture—mining zone; a zone of incipiently developing industrialism; a zone of foreign influence; a zone in formation, the various nationalities of which do not exclude the immense unity of the problem; a zone, then, which in the geographical economy of the world is situated and limited within the boundaries of Latin America. Peru forms part of this zone and we have to promote its incorporation as an economic zone in the overall Latin American economic zone.

* * * * *

Aprismo considers it indispensable to combine, in the intelligent conduct of the state, economic concepts with the political concepts. We all know that in this country economic science, especially in the government, has not been incorporated except in elementary form. It has been said—and rightly it seems to me—that the majority of our politicians have ignored political economy, even if they have been wise in their personal economies. I am going to show later that there has been no economic concept in our politics. But I wish to mention this simple fact: in Peru, economy and finance are frequently confounded. Furthermore, Peru has not been economically governed because there have been no statistics; we are a country in which we do not know how many inhabitants there are. There cannot be an economy without statistics, and we in Peru, if we do not know how many we are, can not determine what we need and can not know exactly what we produce. The only census of Peru is that of 1876; there is a calculation of 1896 and an estimate by eye of 1923. There has not been, then, in our politics a notion of economics, and from this results, undoubtedly, the form under which we have been governed.

(Trans. by W.H.)

ALEJANDRO DEUSTUA (1849-1945)

The life of Alejandro Deústua spanned almost a century – a century of great change, incidentally, both in Peru and in all of America. He was born in Huancayo in 1849 and died in Lima in 1945. Graduating from the University of San Marcos, he began almost at once to exercise the office of professor in his alma mater, a position he held for most of his life. Later, he was Director of the National Library, Dean of the Faculty of Letters, and Rector of the University.

The structure of his thought shows positivist influence, as one may see in his essay "The Idea of Order and Liberty in the History of Human Thought." But two traits distinguish his ideas from the general run of positivist thought, giving it characteristics much like some of the newer twentieth century trends. The first is the influence of Krausism, for in Krause he found that "liberty is the essence of grace." This "mystic" concept led him to seek an esthetic founded on the principle of liberty, and hence to an approach to philosophy in which esthetics was fundamental. Although in this position he came near that of Vasconcelos, his bases were different, and one of the intellectual arguments of the day centered around Deústua's criticism of Vasconcelos' *Esthetics*.

In the following essay, Deústua does not present so much a social philosophy as an argument for its necessity, on esthetic bases. His central concept is that of creative liberty and the relation of thought to action which this implies. Here one senses a trace of Bergsonian influence. He arrives, finally, at a somewhat Kantian concept of a moral imperative in man's conscience, which rules his will.

In another essay, "Las ideas de orden y libertad en la historia del pensamiento humano,"¹ his concept of the evolution of thought is positivist in structure, although he rejects the positivist substance. The external world, he says, tends to suppress man's activity, including thought, which is the basis of all action. But since order is the essence of science, science in turn leads to speculative thought. Hence he arrives at the importance of the Hellenic concept of balance. Roman civilization, as a balance of ideals, was a collective liberty reduced to exterior action, with imperialism, or infinite power, as its symbol.

1. In *La filosofía latinoamericana contemporánea*, Selección y prólogo de Aníbal Sánchez Reulet (Washington: Unión Panamericana, 1949) pp. 55-67.

Later, he writes, excesses of sensual life led to concentration on the mystic and to complete surrender to divine power. A new political (ecclesiastical) order then arose based on this mysticism. Individual conscience lost its spontaneity and freedom of action, and conscious activity was dissipated in seeking perfection and affirming tradition. The only form of freedom left was moral, which met a practical need for reinforcing authority. Liberty as a creative force lacked an objective.

The Renaissance and Reformation did not change this basically. Liberty of thought did not change the deterministic concept of the universe, and liberty had merely practical objectives — social, economic, and political. The Renaissance made scientific thought independent, but science, on the principle of order, excluded it, as it still excludes everything except the cognitive, wishing to explain what should be by what is. The powerful artistic movement of this period had no influence upon science, receiving its ideas from the classic spirit of order — intellectualism.

This intellectualism converted order, which should be a means, into an end. While intellectualism, on the basis of logical order, created the various distinctions and orders which are the basis of all the sciences, "pure liberty, psychic liberty, remained untouched, because its disinterested character excluded it from these forms."

Rejecting five other concepts of liberty as "causal," Deústua concludes that the only sense in which man is really free is in that of a "will governed by moral purposes." But this is still causal in the psychological sense, and it is only in the realm of esthetics that genuine creative liberty occurs. The problem of philosophy in the future, he holds, is to found a philosophy based on esthetics. The concept of the esthetic basis of liberty solves the old Aristotelian problem of the opposition of the theoretical and the practical by a more radical concept of the relation of order to liberty, science to art.

"Creation, liberty, art, imaginative activity, expressions of the same idea and opposed to those of repetition, order, science,

and logical activity, will be the new elements of philosophical criteria in the future, against which the objective man will always fight — the utilitarian man, who aspires to confound himself with nature to gain the advantage of her laws, as the mystic renounces interior expansion in order to be absorbed by divinity and find there absolute repose." The task of philosophy is to rise above the utilitarian to the realm of the disinterested and the universal. In this connection, Deústua poses the problem of how to achieve the inner life without falling into mysticism. But he does not answer the question.

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BEAUTY AND FREEDOM

BY ALEJANDRO O. DEÚSTUA

(From *Estética general*, Lima, 1923, in Anibal Sánchez Reulet, *Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy*, Albuquerque, N. M.: University of New Mexico, 1954. Pp. 38-41. Trans. by Willard R. Trask. By permission.)

We believe that the analysis we have made of esthetic activity permits us to establish its essential element as freedom,

felt in harmony, conceived in artistic activity, and expressed in its works. This concept can serve as criterion to explain the objective characteristics attributed to beauty and to provide a definition comprehending those characteristics: a definition applicable not only to static beauty, beauty which knows no discord, no struggle, no lawless movement, but also to dynamic beauty, beauty of free action, which realizes an ideal, consummates a painful struggle, into which discord enters as a means. This twofold aspect permits the reduction of classic beauty and romantic beauty to a single criterion, explaining esthetic evolution in the history of art by the development of freedom.

Grace has been regarded as the expression of this freedom in works of beauty. Grace comprises two elements and therefore two different ideas: the idea of *freedom* and the idea of the *order* in which that freedom is realized — ideas which correspond to the subjective and objective factors of the esthetic consciousness. Hence Lemcke defines beauty in general as freedom in order, given in representation; understanding by freedom the possibility of a being's developing itself in accordance with its own intimate essence, without undergoing any disturbing or harmful influence from without.

We acquire the idea of freedom directly in the state of movement, and indirectly in the state of rest; both states, by induction, suggest the idea through the effect of a negation: the negation of resistance.

The idea of *order* is obtained through an *idealization* of reality. The mind rises to the idea of order by idealizing the state in which freedom develops, in order to attain a higher state which offers more enjoyment and happiness by the development of more energy with less resistance, combining new forms, which constitute this higher state or order, which it calls more perfect.

Order is a certain accord between subject and object, says Bergson. It is spirit returning to find itself in things. But spirit, according to this philosopher, can apply itself in two opposite directions: either it follows its natural direction and then it is progress in the form of tension, continuous creation, free activity; or it reverses its natural direction, and this reversal, carried to its conclusion, leads to extension, to the necessary

reciprocal determination of externalized elements; finally, to geometric mechanism. Now, whether experience appears to us to adopt the first direction, or whether it orients itself toward the second, in both cases we say that there is order, because spirit is found in both processes; but the two orders are different; the second, which is the geometric order, evokes ideas of inertia, of passivity, of automatism; the first is the vital order, the order of the desired, it is the free order.

This free order of life and the spirit in its creative evolution is what is contained in the idea of grace. This idea is formal; but the element of freedom is the real element which serves it as content, because it is inseparable from spirit and from life. It is the element which relates to activity, to movement, no less to biological energy than to psychological energy which is its concomitant.

The real is also the resistance which limits this activity and which thus, by reaction, determines this instinctive aspiration to the better, this creative activity of spirit. The imagination, in abolishing this resistance, by means of a spontaneous or a reflective abstraction, invents, creates an order or state in which it sees the possibility of the disappearance or diminution of this real resistance, and consequently, the possibility of the expansion of energy, in which it makes happiness consist, and it undertakes to realize this better state or it limits itself to contemplating it with joy.

It is in this that the process of idealization consists. Man is born with an innate tendency to movement, which engenders an aspiration for unlimited freedom and the desire for the most complete systematization of the outer world, in harmony with his needs and pleasures. As this desire is unrealizable in the reality of Nature, man largely satisfies this instinct for the better in the world of the imagination, creating forms which contain the greatest freedom through the most perfect systematization of the elements offered in perceived and felt reality. Thus, as we have seen, is born the ideal, the expression of a freedom engendered by a concord between Spirit and Nature, and which presents itself as the most perfect integration of the elements favorable to progress.

This idealization is executed by a simultaneous twofold process: by suppressing or abstracting the real factors which oppose the expansion of energy, and by magnifying or altering

ALEJANDRO DEUSTUA

the positive, favorable factors which determine what man considers *characteristic* of the ideal. It is a double process of integration and adaptation on the one hand and of disaggregation and discarding on the other, their criterion being the feeling of pleasure or pain. What pleases in the object constitutes a positive factor, what displeases forms a negative factor.

JOSE FIGUERES FERRER (1906-)

COSTA RICA

José Figueres has been one of the most articulate spokesmen of what may be called, in general terms, the social democratic (Aprista-like) movement of thought and politics in twentieth century Latin America.

He was born in San Ramón, Costa Rica, the son of recent immigrants from Catalonia, and was educated in the University of Mexico, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Columbia University. His son bears a name which is perhaps significant of an important intellectual influence of these years: José Martí. The stirring events of the year 1948 found José Figueres operating a prosperous coffee finca, in a valley south of Cartago, which he had built up from a badly run-down condition. There he had become the center of a group of younger intellectuals, the Democratic Action, concerned for the future of their country. As spokesman of this group he had gained national prominence in 1942 when his radio speech criticizing the President, Rafael Calderón, and suggesting his resignation, was interrupted by the police. Figueres was first imprisoned, then exiled for a time. After his return to Costa Rica, he took the lead in combining Democratic Action, with other groups, into the Social Democratic Party.

In the civil strife following the contested presidential election of 1948, he organized on his finca the successful military resistance against the government forces. Figueres then became provisional president, but gave way to Otilio Ulate when the latter's election was confirmed. The principal measures of Figueres' brief regime were the outlawing of the Communist party, the nationalization of banks, and abolition of the national army. His followers were later reorganized into the National Liberation party and, with the support of the incipient Christian Socialist movement, elected him to the presidency in 1952. His reform measures, continuing the direction of his provisional regime, encountered understandable resistance in the country, but his administration was one of the most progressive, if not one of the greatest in the nation's history.

The social and political thought of Figueres resembles that of Aprismo in many ways, but shows significant differences as well. The influence of Christian socialism may sometimes be

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seen, but it will be noted that his view of the labor movement is secular. It does have overtones of the other kind of idealism, non-religious in character, which has been seen as one of the significant aspects of twentieth century Latin American thought. In the economic sphere, in general, he advocates a mixed system of socialism and capitalism. His secular idealism is most apparent in his consistent emphasis upon strengthening democratic institutions through inter-American cooperation. All in all, his thought is empirical.

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UNITY AND CULTURE

BY JOSÉ FIGUERES

(An address delivered before the Inter-American Conference for Democracy and Freedom, Havana, May 12, 1950. Revised by the author.)

THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

I have been asked to put before you the ideas of the Movement of National Liberation of Costa Rica, in relation to the life of our hemisphere. On numerous occasions I have addressed my own fellow citizens, commenting on the ferment and the aspirations of our time. I have presumed to contribute to the formation of a national conscience in a small, benevolent and sympathetic country. Today, however, as I speak before prominent citizens of the Americas, I feel that the roles are reversed: here I should come to express doubts and to ask advice.

Suppose Bolívar were to visit the New World now, a century and a quarter after his campaigns. Undoubtedly he would be impressed by the spectacle presented by the United

States, where a new branch of our civilization is taking root. But the overall picture of the hemisphere probably would prompt him to three unfavorable observations:

1) *Our political system* is full of imperfections in its performance. Representative government is the object of scorn in many of our countries, where the rights of man are respected only in the written constitutions. The other countries do not seem to worry about this contagious disease in our midst, although they fight it in the farthest corners of the earth.

2) *Our economy* still presents the contrast between a well-to-do minority of the population and a miserable majority. The economic middle class is small. The production of wealth is meager.

3) *Our culture* offers a similar aspect: there is an educated elite and a large mass of illiterates. The average cultural level is low.

These three deficiencies of American life, political, economic and cultural, bear to each other a relation of cause and effect, and present the phenomenon of effects reinforcing causes. They cannot be separated and I shall endeavor to examine them conjointly . . .

Trees that grows on arid land are not invigorated by the simple act of pruning. If we limit ourselves to pruning, the new shoots soon reproduce the defects of the old branches. Two additional measures have to be applied, which are well known to the farmer: irrigation and fertilization. With water and fertilizer, trees put out new leaves and take on new life; pruning becomes merely a cleaning operation. The tree of America needs the nourishing effect of a sound economy and the vivifying stimulus of the stream of culture. If we could give our peoples a higher standard of living, together with a more widely diffused education, unhealthy political ambitions would lessen, and the function of government would acquire a more wholesome aspect. The hemisphere would feel the rejuvenating flow of the new sap and the pruning of political vices would be easy and decisive.

Effects would continue to strengthen causes. Productivity of human effort would increase. A more technical government would lead to a higher degree of efficiency and to a better distribution of income; this in its turn would raise the general level of education.

Because of this relation of cause and effect, the crisis of democracy in the Americas cannot be treated by itself. The crisis of our democracy is also the crisis of our economy and the crisis of our culture.

AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH DEMOCRACY

Bolívar in his time had his doubts as to the advisability of adopting representative government in Latin America. It seemed to him improbable that a people with severe educational limitations and ethnological differences could assimilate the political philosophy of the French Revolution as affirmed in the Constitution of the United States of North America.

Nevertheless, the constitutions of our countries copied the political texts of the epoch. The life of the various nations scattered throughout the vast continent followed a rudderless course, and governments took on the physiognomy of the men who ran them. Thus we drifted through the first century of our independence. The continent was divided into numerous nationalities, each revealing three distinct streams which should follow one single course but which have seldom run together: a) the constitutional text, b) the actual government in power, and c) the life of the people. This situation has been so general among us that those countries where it does not prevail, and the occasional lucid interludes in others, seem striking exceptions.

If Bolívar were to come back in our time, he would probably find that his doubts of yesterday were well founded. But what would he recommend now? Unquestionably he would advise us to persevere in our democratic efforts for two reasons: first, because political science and practice have not found a better permanent method of appointing rulers than the electoral system, in spite of its defects; and second, because during one hundred and fifty years we have preached to the peoples of America the virtues of universal suffrage, equality before the law, the division of powers, respect for human dignity, and all other precepts of the democratic philosophy. Now, even if we wished, we could hardly introduce a new concept of civic values. If the cloak of democracy is still too large for some of us, the remedy lies not in diminishing its size but in striving to grow till we fit it.

[At this point the author discusses certain difficulties for democracy, education, and the achievement of a unified culture, which have their origin in the division of Central America into small political units.]

COMMUNISM IN AMERICA

A new pitfall is being dug in the road of American democracy. A powerful force has been added to the enemies of freedom. In the name of social justice, Russian Communism intends our destruction. Western civilization has never before faced so serious a menace. The sword has never before been at the service of a fanaticism so blind and at the same time so intellectual. Those dictatorial movements which we recently defeated, Italian Fascism, German Nazism and Japanese militarism, were less integral in their scope, less global in their aspirations.

American culture cannot refuse to examine openmindedly any current of ideas. Our civilization is a structure which is being raised with diverse materials, embodying the constructive thoughts of many minds, in an intelligent and balanced orientation. But any contact with Communism reveals two characteristics which we of the Americas reject: in the ideological field, an inexorable dogmatism; in international politics, the threat of Russian conquest.

Fanaticism is a mental disease which has caused serious damage throughout history. It is the abnormal growth of a faith which blinds the intellect in all directions but one. When this disease becomes epidemic in a community, it leads to war. The fanatic prefers death to the acceptance of a point of view opposed to his own. All ethical values vanish from his soul. He adopts the old sophism that the end justifies the means.

Fanaticism is dangerous. I disagree when I hear it said that we should oppose Communism with some other fanaticism. Despite the popular saying, we do not fight fire with fire. Communism is inflaming the Orient, where the illiterate and poverty-stricken peoples are dry tinder to the spark of revolution. The Western World should confront this advance with a calmly analytical mind in the field of ideas, with a spirit of justice, and with overwhelming force. The Americas, heirs to Western civilization, can safeguard their heritage, and even perhaps avoid a Third World War, by the same means that are essential

to solve their own internal problems. These means are Unity and Culture.

Let us see how American culture, whose highest expression is to be found in the United States, is seeking a wise solution to the great ideological controversy of the twentieth century.

In these times of intense economic activity brought about by technology, two old currents struggle for supremacy as the compelling force behind human effort: one force is *the profit motive*, and the other is *the spirit of service*. The profit motive, a primitive force, has been almost the sole inspiration of man's economic struggle. In a better educated society the spirit of service, a rational force, is offered as an alternative. The incentive of gain fosters the enterprises of so-called private business; while the spirit of service motivates institutions which seek the general good.

In the process of production, private enterprise is apt to attain a high degree of efficiency which always benefits the owner, and sometimes the community. Public enterprise, on the other hand, seeks its own success merely as an indication of good management, and governs itself by standards of over-all efficiency which apply to the whole community, present and future.

In a political philosophy such as ours, in which the final goal is a human being of the greatest worth, the chief advantage of the public institution over private enterprise is the different type of man that each tends to mold. The incentive of gain cultivates selfishness. The spirit of service elevates man, and gives to his efforts the scope of society as a whole. The spirit of service is in economics what Christianity is in ethics.

These advantages of service institutions over private business are difficult to comprehend by many people. But at least it is easy to understand that public undertakings seek to benefit the greater number. Also, that an over-all efficiency in the work of the community is more desirable than various isolated efficiencies, mutually antagonistic.

Progress in this field must be gradual, because it depends to a great extent on the advance of education. Each step forward brings some dislocation. A too-rapid development may cause economic and social upsets. We must allow profit seeking in those fields where higher motives cannot be easily and

advantageously substituted. The life of the community cannot be held back in order to make way for a noble doctrine. Life must precede philosophy.

The Communist fanatic claims that a complete transformation of society can be accomplished for the better by World Revolution. That the stern measures which the Soviet Government applied to the Russian peasants could be imposed on the more cultivated peoples of the West. That to renovate the economic system we must abandon our moral standards and our political principles, which are based on the respect for human rights. And as if that were not a sufficient price, that we should accept the world hegemony of the Soviet Union, probably imposed by a Third World War.

A marked contrast exists between this attitude and the democratic concept of the gradual solution of the economic dilemma of the twentieth century. In the first place, we accept the premise that, with the advance of technology, abundance for all has been made possible. This amount of wealth is not produced and enjoyed because of defects in general organization and deficiencies in education. Therefore, an evolution of our economic structure is desirable, and a rise in the cultural level is essential.

In the second place, our democratic system permits the free play of two opposing political forces, one that tends to accelerate change, and one which seeks to retard it. As a result of this struggle, we move at a pace which is probably the least harmful to present production. In the third place, many of the economic functions have passed in the United States from the hands of individuals to those of large associations known as "corporations." These entities do not merely seek efficiency and profit for one person, the owner, but for many people, the shareholders, who may be at the same time consumers of the company's products or services.

SOCIAL CONTROL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Some corporations, particularly those called "public utilities," are regulated by the state to such an extent that they retain only the name and the autonomy of private enterprises. Actually, all companies are of public service. The difference in many cases is only a question of degree.

Social control of economic activities is increasing. A "private" aviation company, for example, cannot be established without the authorization of a government department. The state regulates the sale of its shares. The state issues flight permits to each type of plane, for reasons of safety. The state assigns the routes and fixes the rates. The state decides the minimum wages payable to the personnel. And finally the state limits the profits by means of the income tax. What then remains of private enterprise? Efficiency, maybe, and administrative flexibility, and a certain respect for tradition.

North American corporations, constitutionally similar to the limited liability companies of other countries, have played an important role in the development of the United States. However, they have not done well, in general, with Latin American entrepreneurs and investors. Whether they will flourish in the future is questionable. Latin Americans do not seem to have, to a sufficient degree, some of the personal inclinations that such enterprises require.

Another type of association appears to be better suited to the development of Latin America: the autonomous authority. This is a state owned enterprise which combines some of the operating advantages of "private" corporations with the protection of general interests. The success of the autonomous agencies depends to a large measure on the method followed for appointing their directors. Appointments should be as non-political as possible, and changes should be made gradually, one man at a time.

With the separation, in modern "private" corporations, of management and ownership (a phenomenon of which Karl Marx probably had no notion), it is difficult to find important differences between large U.S. companies and Latin American autonomous institutions. The difference becomes even smaller with the tendency to multiply the number of corporation shareholders. In my experience, I have observed that the directors and managers of autonomous entities are as much interested in a smooth operation as if they were handling their own property; and they also become fervent defenders of the general welfare. The autonomous authority engenders a new spirit. It tends to produce a more social type of man. It fulfills a democratic aspiration.

The Movement of National Liberation of Costa Rica has tentatively arrived at what would be an overall plan for economic institutions in a small country. Entrust autonomous agencies with the rendering of certain general services such as credit, electric power, the principal means of transportation, scientific stabilization of prices, regulation of a balanced production; and encourage a large number of private enterprises to function freely within defined limits.

Thousands of farmers produce corn on their own account, but public institutions regulate and protect their business, lend them technical and financial aid, and guarantee a market at a fair price. The stabilizing agencies operate on a basis of reserves. The guaranteed price must be high enough to to stimulate the desired production but not so high as to cause unwanted surpluses. This price level can only be established by trial and error and must be subject to prudent modifications. . . . The stabilizing organism must be technical, not political. The price level must be free from pressure groups.

A combination of large autonomous entities and numerous private businesses thus leads the economy towards overall efficiency, but still distributes the administrative responsibility for the economy among many individuals. This administrative responsibility, the pursuit of high production at low cost, is an element of the utmost importance in the economy, for the greater the number of people concerned with results, the higher the productivity of the social group, provided a wise general orientation is given by public institutions.

Moreover, the producer who feels the stimulating influence of the State, in a democratic political system, realizes that he is a part of the economic community, and finds satisfaction in growing corn to fill a social need. This coordination of the State with the free individual in the great task of production dignifies the worker, enhances his sense of responsibility, and contributes to form a nobler type of man.

All these considerations tend to show how democracy can adapt itself intelligently to a changing world, effecting the social revolution of the twentieth century with the least possible dislocation. We do not oppose the Communist doctrine out of mere conservatism or stubbornness, but because we are surpassing it.

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Allow me one more example. One which is not often commented on in the newspapers, or at least not with the praise that it deserves. I refer to the manner in which the Government of the United States, through its technical bodies, is handling the post-war economy. Without trying to mold reality to any preconceived theory, but rather allowing general principles to emerge from concrete problems and from their solutions, the economy is being directed towards permanent prosperity, avoiding a repetition of the crisis of 1929 and saving the world from collapse.

Some people criticize the United States Government because there is a surplus of wheat or potatoes, which may be a loss. I wish all problems of mankind were as serious as a surplus of food. Since perfect equilibrium is difficult, happy is the country that has one pound too much rather than one ounce too little. Besides, what would happen to the economy if the growers of wheat and potatoes could not afford to purchase the products of industry?

We should look at the overall picture: rising wages, increased production, larger sales, growing national income, higher standards of living. It is a picture of general efficiency, before which isolated inefficiencies are relatively unimportant. Although Utopia has not been achieved, a notable contrast exists between this orderly prosperity and the chaos that would be brought about by the adoption of a so called "free" economy at this time; or, on the other hand, the confusion that would be created by the violent imposition of an ideal system of centralized economy. Democracy is opposing sectarianisms with technology, research, education.

THE DEMOCRATIC LABOR MOVEMENT

A force operates among us which is contributing to the solution of the economic problem of the times, and thus to the solution of the cultural and of the political problems. It is a force which also opposes sane reasoning to Communist fanaticism. This force is the democratic labor movement.

The labor movement, in addition to its obvious social influences, exerts some others of an economic nature. It fosters better management and higher productivity. It tends to eliminate those businesses which subsist on low wages, thus

operating a favourable selection of activities. Above everything else, the labor movement increases consumption.

To increase consumption is to stimulate production. There is no economic factor which, by itself, is so encouraging as demand, provided that the possibilities of production exist. Even war consumption enriches a nation, as long as it does not exceed the productive capacity.

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The worst enemy of the labor movement, as of democracy, is abuse, which is the product of a faulty education. The best ally of the labor movement, and of democracy, is culture.

HEMISPHERE COOPERATION

If culture is a powerful weapon, no less powerful is union. If we could develop Latin America rapidly — if we could count in the Western Hemisphere on three or four hundred million people of an approximately uniform standard, coordinated as one economic unit, within a single geographical area which produces everything — then the penetration by fanaticisms which exploit poverty would be difficult, and military attack highly improbable.

Large undertakings are sometimes easier to accomplish than small ones. If tomorrow our hemisphere were attacked in a new Pearl Harbour, and rapid unification of the Americas for a war effort became necessary, we would probably realize in a short time the dreams of a century and a half. New methods would be improvised everywhere. A uniform technology would be established in all production areas. Education would be intensified at a dizzy pace. There would be no shortage of capital goods and no budgetary limitations for training centers or for laboratory equipment in fields, universities, or factories. The co-ordinated work of over three hundred million Americans would produce enough for the needs of all and for the assurance of victory.

Historians of a later day may be surprised that we Americans of 1950 did not act as if another Pearl Harbour had already occurred. Why do we wait for the lightning to strike when the storm clouds are darkening the skies? The enemy is consolidating the vast Orient and half of Europe and has its

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columns infiltrating every country in America. He may attack us if he finds us weak. He may attack us because of fanaticism, because he believes himself endowed with the Eternal Light, or because of Caesarism and the traditional desire of military adventure.

To halt the ideologic-military threat, and perhaps to avert a Third World War, one of the most effective measures would be the development of Latin America. This must be a development guided by the spirit of respect for the individual, extended to include respect for the different peoples. This development would bring unity.

FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT

The opinion is being expressed insistently that the economic development of Latin America should be brought about by the investment of private capital from abroad. For this purpose it is required that fundamental guarantees be given, such as non-discrimination and the free remittance of profits. It is necessary, we are warned, to make investments safe and attractive.

The Latin American countries should bear in mind, first, that the economic aspect is only a part of their entire development; and, second, that the exigence of guarantees must be reciprocal. The history of large foreign companies in our midst, in spite of recent and praiseworthy improvements, is not a story of efforts for the well-being of our peoples. When the suggestion is made to Latin Americans that they open their countries to new investments, they ought to state their points of view on the proposed means of development.

In the first place, there should be little interest in private investment in public utilities. The controversy of public-private power in the United States is worsened in Latin America by two additional issues: absentee ownership and foreign control. No nation would like to have its power development, transport, port facilities, and other public services subjected to decisions made abroad, based on commercial considerations. If it is desired to help Latin America in developing its resources, loans and technical aid should be made available to proper local institutions. Endeavoring to own a country from outside is not a good way of encouraging its growth.

In the second place, we should be skeptical of investors who come to Latin America exclusively to tap sources of low wages. We have enough trouble with our own barons to maintain a low standard of living. The incentives for foreign business in our countries should be others: the desirability of industrializing our raw materials locally, the economy of supplying certain markets from here, the payment of moderate taxes during a reasonable period. But low salaries and discrimination against local workers should not be the lure held out to possible investors.

It is understandable that foreign businessmen draw benefits from the present period of gradual amelioration in wages, which is bound to last some time. But the policy of the companies should rather be to explain to their customers that the prices of Latin American products must bear relation to fair wages. This is more constructive than the tendency to induce our countries to maintain low wage scales so that purchasers abroad may buy our goods cheaply. If we keep our standard of living low in order to supply outside markets with cheap articles, we shall never attain the objective which is the reason for the encouragement of new investments.

I do not share the view, sometimes demagogic, which attributes disproportionate profits to North American companies operating in Latin America. In recent years, at least, these profits have not been greater than those earned internally in the United States. The figures in this regard are a matter of public knowledge. The truth is that satisfactory earnings are being made at home and abroad. The real difference lies in the fact that companies which operate within the United States (steel, automobiles, etc.) charge the consumer a price which includes not only adequate dividends for the investor and high taxes for the Government, but also fair wages for the workers; while companies established in Latin America have shown in the past a tendency to contribute little towards our Government expenditures, or towards the improvement of our workers' lives. It is short-sighted to believe that this attitude benefits one community, the consuming country, at the expense of the other community, the producing country. In the long run, poverty in any section of the hemisphere retards the development of the whole.

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COFFEE PRICES AND A LIVING WAGE

Other mistakes are being made. The tendency to pay low prices for coffee, cacao, and other Latin American products is an example. The Gillette Committee, appointed by the Senate of the United States to investigate the causes of the "high" price of coffee, has become a symbol of inter-American misunderstanding.

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There is one detail of which the members of the Gillette Committee are not aware. It is a sad detail, not known to house-wives in the U.S. Yet, the just price of coffee can not be determined without knowing this detail: the daily wage of a coffee worker. I shall mention only the highest wage paid in Central America — the prevailing wage in Costa Rican plantations, after a long labor struggle. The income of a head of family, in 1950, is ten cents of a dollar per hour. This is one eighth of the U.S. minimum wage and it shows how far we are from attaining a just relation between the agricultural and the industrial regions of the hemisphere.

What kind of customer can Latin America be? How can these countries contribute, as consumers, to provide employment for the husbands, sons and daughters of the housewives whose interests the Gillette Committee is supposedly protecting? On the other hand, let the landowners of Latin America, who sometimes express the opinion that the present prices are satisfactory, just because they can clear a profit based on peon wages, let them think how much the cost of coffee would be if their labourers exercised the right to live as human beings.

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DEMOCRACY AND DESPOTISM

In the political field, the deficiencies are worse. Some procedures which are contrary to the American ideal may be not errors, but regrettable necessities of the moment. For example: the attitude of the democratic countries towards the dictatorships of America.

The complacency with which these regimes are viewed strikes dismay into the hearts of worthy men and women who are fighting for a democratic New World. However, the cause

of this tolerance may be the state of war, virtual or actual, in which our world has lived for four decades. In the face of an immediate outward problem, we have been unable to attend to our responsibilities at home.

The established governments have been the only available instruments for an improvised hemispheric organization. The dictators, the opportunists who would gladly join the totalitarian forces if they had a chance to win, have been treated as gentlemen. They have received aid, which they use to force their peoples into further subjugation.

To secure democracy for the world, we have been compelled to sacrifice it on our own hearth. To prevent the consolidation of tyranny elsewhere, we have made a truce in our own struggle for the rights of man. Probably at such price we have forestalled a possible attack on the hemisphere. If so, we have confirmed once more that before one can philosophize one must survive.

The two great dictatorships that in our time have attempted to dominate the world have failed, thanks to God and to America. But they have achieved their vengeance indirectly, forcing us to suckle their offspring in our own house. This subordination of ideals is not new in the Americas or in the world. Lincoln thrice sacrificed the ideal of emancipation to the ideal of unity. To win the war, he entered into alliance with slave states. He was convinced that the force of the Union would finally guarantee liberty for all.

Those who bear responsibility in a great struggle are forced to many sacrifices. The democratic nations of America, led by the United States, have had to sacrifice in this hemisphere the very principles for which they fought abroad, extending their friendship to regimes which are the negation of those principles. This is an attitude which the oppressed peoples cannot understand, although it is understandable in the light of the overall situation. But even though it is explainable it is deplorable. It is a sacrifice imposed by international action. The interdependence of nations is a force which sustains established regimes, whatever be their political ideology or their moral worth.

At the present time (1950) for example, it would be cruelly ironic to say to the people of the Dominican Republic or of Nicaragua that their political situation is their own affair and

that they are the only ones responsible for its solution. The United States Marines organized in those two countries a praetorian guard which takes the place of political forces. There has been a prolonged recognition, tacit and explicit, by almost all American democracies, of such regimes that freeze the spiritual development of their peoples. How can the new generations, brought up in this atmosphere of administrative venality and juridical chaos, be expected to show the civic virtues and the energy necessary to put an end to this situation?

When it is announced that democratic influences are ending the political supremacy of the military caste in Japan, what joy can the educated youth of Venezuela or of Peru feel? These generations are being forced to conclude that America is an example of "Light in the street and darkness at home."

The remedy will not come unless we create an atmosphere of reproach for non-representative government. The afflicted peoples have a tendency to expect everything from the largest country, the United States, whose influence is decisive in all American affairs, by commission or by omission. But the United States is now pursuing a policy of non-intervention, which was at a time a triumph for the smaller nations.

But the United States is still a leader in the formation of Inter-American organisms, fated to perform the functions which one country alone should not assume. Hence, in the Organization of American States, the U.S. tradition of liberties could exert a healthy influence, without injury to the independence of other nations.

The American Republics in their conferences, and through their permanent bodies, have established international juridical norms of a surprisingly advanced character. One such principle lifts to the category of a supra-national responsibility the defense of human rights in any country.

Until now, the Organization of American States, necessarily including representatives of un-American regimes, has been unable to act in defense of the oppressed peoples. But the Organization marks a step towards the establishment of the general standards to be maintained by the governments of this hemisphere. Neither conferences nor permanent organizations

can overthrow dictatorships, but they should at least express their moral reproach. Besides, if causes rather than effects are fought, in one generation there will be no more tyrants or corrupt political bosses in the New World.

Recently the Organization of American States, through an investigating committee, verified the existence of large groups of political exiles in several countries of the Caribbean. These are the "displaced persons" of America. Among them are found some of the most notable Latin American thinkers. They are the living proof of the persistence of un-American regimes in the hemisphere. These regimes are the cause of unrest in the Caribbean. The displaced persons are only the result, and the countries which give them refuge are fulfilling their democratic duties. Such countries deserve the gratitude of history, in the same manner as the United States deserves it for having harbored within its borders the planning of the glorious campaign of Palestine. The Jews of the world had the right to a piece of earth which they could call their country. The citizens of the Americas have the right to live freely in their own home, and when they are denied this right they have an obligation to conquer it.

Special mention should be made of the anomalous situation of the great Peruvian statesman and philosopher, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who has been in asylum for a long time in the Colombian Embassy in Lima. This is not a problem exclusively involving Peru or Colombia. It is a case for America. America itself is offended in the person of the illustrious prisoner. As long as Haya de la Torre does not recover his liberty, America will not enjoy political health.

In all this dark panorama, the American ideal is subject to a severe test. In order to keep faith, the democratic forces represented by this Conference should extend a word of hope to those peoples who are still suffering despotism in the New World. We should urge the democratic governments to revise their policy of tolerance, bordering on connivance, with regard to those regimes which are the negation of the American ideal.

The democratic countries now have, in the Organization of American States, an institutional means of exerting influence on behalf of those peoples. Let that influence be applied. The dictatorships of America are as recognizable as Communism.

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The conscience of America has them identified. Let us use neither subterfuge nor evasion.

A new phrase has been coined lately: "total diplomacy." This recalls the slogan of "total war" which inspired the co-ordinated efforts of the Allied countries some years ago. Now we should use "total diplomacy against all kinds of oppression." Such diplomacy, applied by the democratic nations through an international organization, would avoid many difficulties and sufferings. It would eventually produce an America united by an ideal, and perhaps strong enough to exorcise the danger of another total war.

CONCLUSION

Gentlemen, the preceding considerations express the point of view of the members of the Movement of National Liberation of Costa Rica, in whose name I have been asked to speak. None of us holds office in our country today, though we constituted a temporary government, the Founding Junta of the Second Republic, in 1948 - 49.

As you see, we have found no magic formula for the problems of democracy in America. We do think that political problems cannot be examined by themselves, apart from the social, economic, and cultural efforts. The picture should be examined as a whole. America is a fine, uncut jewel whose several facets must be polished. The shape and size of each facet is determined by the others, and each one is important; but only the whole is precious.

The orientation of America could be helped by an organization which may be born from this present Conference representing, as it does, the official and unofficial democratic forces of the hemisphere and excluding, as it does, the regimes which are not an expression of the American ideal. The new entity should promote closer relations among the democratic movements and provide all possible encouragement for those countries which, deprived of their liberties for many years, have not developed the necessary political forces and do not have the means needed to establish institutional life through their own efforts.

Few people know that in 1948 Costa Rica sacrificed two thousand lives in the War of National Liberation to restore

its democracy. We took up arms for the one reason which justifies internal violence: the denial of the electoral right.

As a proof that in our time there are no isolated problems, our peaceful country was converted into an international battlefield. These facts should be known: on the same front with our venal politicians were united the dictatorships of the Caribbean and the Russian Communist Party. Both foreign allies left their dead on our land as mute witnesses to an armed assault on freedom in America. On the other side, the democratic exiles of the Caribbean area fought together with the people of Costa Rica.

First we struggled in the underground for six years (1942-48). Then, in March 1948, we engaged in what was the first battle against Communism in America. Our cause was not known to the world, because the Soviet Union was then the ally of the United States. For some time we suffered from the same indifference of the democratic forces that other Latin American countries suffer from today in the fight against tyranny.

The armed struggle was waged by our people with a fury never seen before in our country. Costa Rican women deserve respect for their heroic participation in this campaign. The peasants provided the fighting forces with whatever supplies they had and exhibited a spirit of touching sacrifice. Some of them died protecting with their bodies the ballot boxes which had been entrusted to their care on election day.

The citizen Army of Liberation was formed by the educated young men from all walks of life. Bolívar and Martí would have wept with emotion at the efforts of these boys to get hold of a gun. No army ever had higher quality soldiers. These conscientious young citizens, in everyday life, work, study and assume their responsibilities peacefully; but when they fight for their ideals, the very bullets seem to fear them.

The success of the Movement of National Liberation is due to Culture and to Unity. To Culture, because for half a century we have had almost no illiteracy in Costa Rica. To Unity, because some democratic forces of Latin America lent us their support. Unity and Culture, like some old medicines, tried and true!

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So when we are asked to bring before this Conference our ideas on the problems of democracy in America, we come with nothing new; just the same recommendations of the leaders of the past: Unity and Culture.

If we could send a herald with a silver trumpet, who, poised upon the peaks of the Andes and the Rockies, would announce to the American Republics a sacred watchword, surely the echoes in the valleys of the New World, from the Great Lakes to the Pampas, would ring with the slogan: Unity and Culture.

JUAN JOSE AREVALO BERMEJO (1904-)

GUATEMALA

Juan José Arévalo was born in the little town of Taxisco, in Esquintla, a southern province of Guatemala, on September 10, 1904, the son of Mariano Arévalo, a small landowner, and Elena Bermejo Arévalo, a school teacher. Before he was seven, he was sent to school in Guatemala City. In 1917 he entered a secondary school in Chiquimula. Returning to Guatemala City, he attended the Normal School from which he graduated in 1922. Several years of school teaching followed, during which he continued his studies, eventually entering the Law School of the National University. For a while he was employed in the Ministry of Education.

A trip to Europe was soon followed (1927) by a scholarship to study in the University of La Plata, Argentina, where he pursued studies in education and philosophy under such notable professors as Alejandro Korn (philosophy), Alfredo Calcagno and José Rezzano (education), Ricardo Levene and Rómulo Carbia (history), and Juan José Nájera (geography). In 1929 he married Elisa Martínez, an Argentine school-teacher. Two years later he returned to Guatemala, but in 1934 he was back in Argentina, where he received the doctoral degree with a dissertation on "The Pedagogy of Personality." Back in Guatemala again, he worked in the Ministry of Education until 1936, when a period of voluntary exile began which led him to Hamburg, Berlin, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and finally to Argentina, where he made his residence for a number of years.

There he was named to the chair of Literature in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Tucumán, in western Argentina. A few years later he went to the University of La Plata as Secretary of the Faculty of Humanities, and in 1941 became Director of the Normal School of the University of Cuyo. Three years later he returned to the University of Tucumán to teach courses in education and psychology.

In July 1944, while still in Argentina, he was nominated for the presidency of Guatemala by the National Renovation Party. This party consisted in general of the leaders of the movement which forced the resignation of President Ubico and of the military junta which assumed control of the country

after his overthrow. In an undisputed election, Arévalo won by an overwhelming majority.

The nature of Arévalo's presidency is controversial, partly because of a bitter struggle for power which went on behind the scenes — a struggle from which the Arbenz faction eventually emerged victorious, backed by some of the most radical influences involved in the revolution. Arévalo maintained an uneasy balance between the rival forces, while giving voice to the revolutionary objectives of the movement, couched in terms of his optimistic and idealist philosophy. Perhaps he tried too much to govern by speech-making. His speeches voice principles of collectivism, but these are expressed in terms of a spiritual idealism. The passage which follows is from one of the books written during the Argentine years and reveals an attempt to reconcile the doctrines of socialism and a pluralistic concept of culture and history with a philosophy of idealism.

Arévalo has personally admitted a debt to such diverse influences as Plato, St. Augustine, Kant, Bergson, and Max Scheler. He insists that he rejects the metaphysics of Hegel, as well as the existentialism of the present day. "Idealism, spiritualism, personalism, and axiology," he has observed, are the most consistent notes in his writing. One may also add to his own list of rejections, that of historical materialism. Nor is any kinship with neo-Thomism shown. The most persistent note seems to be that of neo-Kantian spiritualism.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION IN OUR AMERICA

BY JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO BERMEJO

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I

Before examining the social roots and projections of public education in this part of the world called Ibero-America, we should first consider, for methodological purposes, the antinomy universe-region and clarify the claims of each of the two extremes within the framework of educational theory. The subject is worthy of thorough analysis, but this is not the opportune moment for it. In this essay, with permission for the inversion, we shall limit ourselves to the discussion of a few ideas which have been confirmed in our intermittent meditations.

Pedagogy partakes equally of the universal and the regional and is therefore concerned with the totality of human nature, which is universal in spirit, but actual and local by virtue of its organic cover and environment. Indeed, the universal nature of the human soul perpetuates itself through the ages in such a manner that the history of mankind can be described as an irregular curve, ascending and continuous, by means of which we perceive that we are all heirs to the spiritual legacy of the past, inevitably laboring for the future of the species. But the spiritual heritage of mankind is molded in each of us by our temporal life, the exigencies of our milieu, and the type of instrumentalities at our disposal.

Universalism and regionalism, therefore, are like two poles around whose axis spherically turns the life of each person, each nation, and each epoch. When one of the two extremities predominates, the sphere ceases to exist as such, assuming a grotesque shape devoid of unity or of sense. Thus, pedagogy

in America calls for the study of the great educational problems of all times and countries, in order to examine the facts from a different viewpoint and to throw light on the anxieties now common to our society of American nations.

But, at the same time, our America is 'another universe. From Baja California to Tierra del Fuego, the Ibero-American "region" assumes a plural form. Only the presence of common traits reveals its regional character and distinguishes it from other periods and areas of the world.

No one who observes our social reality in the light of history can deny that one of the characteristics of life in this part of the world is that the nations lie halfway between colonial organization and full-fledged republicanism. The elimination of colonial patterns from our social structure is progressing very slowly, and they have subsisted to such an extent that it will take nothing less than persistent, concerted efforts to attain a definitive republican way of life.

Pedagogy, unlike other branches of knowledge, can not afford to forget, even for one moment, this dramatic social ambit. Without confusing itself with medicine or religion (necessity and consequence), pedagogy gathers the knowledge of the ages in order to alleviate as much as possible the spiritual poverty of the multitudes for the apostolic purpose of converting the horde into community and the individual into person, stripping the zoological "I" of its asperities and immersing it in the spiritual current of the "we." Without confusing itself with sociology, pedagogy presumes adequate understanding of contemporary social economy; this comprehension of the present, combined with the secular experience of other peoples, enters into the realm of pedagogy, which is concerned not only with the purely academic, but also with immediate realization in the community. Without confusing itself with philosophy, pedagogy implies a panoramic vision of world thought and a criterion which will illumine the course to be followed and direct it with firm conviction. Without confusing itself with psychology, pedagogy also requires constant and wise contact with the masses, with school pupils, country children, government officials, families in all walks of life; pedagogy must also make frequent use of the scientific method in contrasting problems and try to explore all the manifestations of psychic reality to be acted upon. Without confusing itself with politics, pedagogy

requires a clear awareness of the supreme aims of nationality, a genuine knowledge of its inherent factors, and a keen perception of the causes of corruption operating in the legal and political sectors. In addition to all of this, pedagogy includes something which is not shared by any of the above mentioned disciplines, being essentially a study of spiritual projection in the formative stage, to be verified in fact, as well as the advice and direction which adults give to the inexperienced conscience of the younger generations.

From this general scheme we must now proceed to study our continental problems, as they appear from far off Buenos Aires in October of 1939. However, this presentation lays no claim to discovery, intending solely to emphasize the common background which precedes, accompanies, and pervades every educational activity and pedagogical preoccupation in our America. This outline will show that the problems confronting us do not admit of [merely] clever solutions or abortive remedies.

Nor does the following exposition propose to give an exhaustive enumeration or hierarchical classification of the problems. In order to present the questions according to some criterion of values, it would be necessary to justify our opinion, and this would entail an analysis beyond the scope of this topic. Furthermore, we do not believe in the existence of exclusive primary problems nor in the possibility of dissolving the pedagogical mechanism into successive parts. All pedagogical questions by right touch upon every aspect of cultural life. Simultaneous collaboration must exist between education and pedagogy, each acting in its own sphere without losing sight of the collective undertaking.

II

The Ibero-American republics are marked by conspicuous racial heterogeneity. Everyone of them includes, in varying proportions, an indigenous element, a well grounded creole element of colonial Spanish origin, plus European, African, and Asiatic elements of more recent incorporation, not to mention all breeds of mestizos. The tremendous task of spiritually unifying such a divided population is a threefold problem: political, economic, and cultural. The work of unification is a prerequisite of ultimate national orientation. The physical

problem of racial mixture is thus translated into a psychological problem. We can all appreciate, indeed, the strong influence exerted upon the life of an individual by his racial affiliation. Without denying the dignity or the possibility of progress of any race, the activities of the state, the government, and the educators must aim at a prompt spiritual union, founded on the juridical and moral freedom of individual citizens. Evidently these questions cannot be resolved during a single period of government or in the course of a generation.

These nations were organized more than a century ago, motivated by democratic ideals; yet in many of them today one can find millions of natives who do not participate in the life of the nation, as they have always been denied effective intervention in political and cultural life. With the exception of a few centers of rapid and extraordinary assimilation, European contingents in America remain isolated, organizing themselves into factories and openly despising all things American. The masses of African blood, who share with the Indians the heaviest burdens, continue to occupy a humiliating position in the economy of their respective nations.

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Racial heterogeneity in contemporary American societies is closely related to the problem of social heterogeneity, that of the "classes" through which certain people seek to protect fictitious or usurped privileges. Any educational project will fall short of the national goals of a republican country, if law and government fail to abolish the distances maintained by all manner of economic exploitation and spiritual emptiness, as a caricature and survival of obsolete social patterns. This problem has cultural as well as political and economic ramifications. By virtue of its republican character, the nation requires that all citizens live in an economic environment and absorb an ideology thoroughly compatible with the democratic way of life. While legislators seek to resolve the gigantic problem of redeeming the masses in servitude, all the educational agencies of the nation must strive to eliminate the spiritual remnants of colonialism. A necessary task of both state and school is the spiritual redemption of the masses, a goal which cannot be achieved without thorough cauterization of vanities and usurpations.

The history of more than a hundred years of independence reveals that state and school authorities, in the majority of American countries, have done little to regulate the distribution of public wealth and to strengthen the spirit of republicanism in the consciousness of the people. Particularly, the so-called "popular" school has continued to be the patrimony of populous cities and villages. The isolated child, the feeble, the orphan, the poor still constitute inferior "classes" in the estimation of government officials, who are often indifferent to the social problems which should engage their exclusive attention. In recent years some of our republics (and only in certain important cities) have begun to take away from public charity and private initiative the state duty of helping those who are deprived of health, money, or family. On the other hand, education itself should never lose sight of the economic and social conditions which inhibit the development of the spiritual potential of large segments of the population, nor [forget] that the republic ought to provide the kind of education which inspires, strengthens, and diffuses a sentiment of social solidarity of the purest Christian affiliation.

Closely related to these educational problems is that of the "spiritual occupation" of those areas which are in a condition of total cultural neglect. For the nations of Western Europe, with centuries of culture, this problem does not exist. In each of these countries a minimum of culture is equally available to all sections, and differences in its distribution can be seen only in centers of higher culture. But every American republic has within its territory more than one extensive zone untouched by material and spiritual progress — deserted zones without schools and teachers, where public as well as personal hygiene have yet to take their first steps, where primitive systems of farming persist, and where there is no idea of the civic role pertaining to the citizens of a democratic country. The preference given to the capital city constitutes an "oasis" type of policy (*oasismo*) resulting in economic, political, and cultural privileges. But government authorities, de facto educators (frequently in a negative sense), and school masters should bear in mind that a country of concentrated culture is an unprovided country, exposed to future dismemberments to the detriment of national unity and to the benefit of nations with greater spiritual vigor and foresight.

With the exception of the gigantic case of Sarmiento, public education has not been a real "obsession" for the leaders of Ibero-American nations and, of course, it has been even less so for the classroom worker. In countries which are still in the formative period and in a primitive stage of culture, the elementary school teacher continues to be the leading promoter of culture, and he can be taken as an unequivocal example of the spiritual status of the nation. And as he well knows, the teacher continues to be in our America an isolated oasis, a professional without . . . profession, without legal protection, without economic security, without prospects of superior culture, without a "career" in any sense. It would be futile to alarm oneself over the persistence of this scholastic and extrascholastic problem, if no effort were made to obtain from the classroom laborer exclusive dedication to his duty and sincere willingness to work.

All of this proves that public life in many American countries has failed to identify itself with the spirit of democracy and the will to act in the interest of the future. In most cases, the government is concerned with projects of immediate realization, thus confusing efficiency with improvisation. Rare are statesmen who commit their executive prerogatives to projects of profound and far-reaching significance, intended to lay the foundations of future life, and even more rare are those willing to undertake the work which will have to be completed by their successors. This is one of the reasons underlying the failure to provide for public education a carefully planned legal system, well informed, sufficiently broad and provident, a system which would preclude frequent reforms, partial abrogations, gross neglect and omissions. There is no legal system publicly discussed, gradually corrected, and definitively molded by a corps of technicians. This is the only way to secure laws imbued with a genuine pedagogical doctrine, extending beyond administrative considerations and traditional requirements: laws rising above the prejudice which sees education merely as a scholastic enterprise and as the exclusive function of teachers: laws manifesting the intention of the state never to obstruct the educative function, which is to be promoted by the people and guided by technicians in voluntary fulfillment of their social obligations.

Finally we must consider a last category of problems for the sole purpose of calling attention to them, namely questions

of a technical nature which narrow professional minds have hitherto viewed as the only pedagogical problems, and which intransigent non-professional thinkers treat as a matter of entertainment of little consequence for the solution of social problems. Questions of programs, curricula, schedules, equipment, building, and so forth — these are the problems which no doubt preoccupy some teachers in our America, but we are not in sympathy with the latter in spite of spiritual, historical, and social relationships. For each category of problems different solutions have been proposed, up to this time, in every republic. There is no agreement on the duties of the state in regard to preschool education; there is no similarity in the orientation of primary schools; we do not pay the same attention to the problem of adolescence. There is still no definite criterion of technical education. Various countries in our delightful America do not know yet what constitutes a real university. Not everyone of them recognizes the existence of an educational and social problem beyond the purely academic. The criterion also varies as to the limits of obligatory competition in the schools. There are even some countries in which the concept of the free school has begun to lose ground, and others which are returning to compulsory religious instruction. In sum: not even for these questions of undeniable professional character is there a solid common criterion. And if we pass to a related sphere, namely the clinical experience of the new school, if we ascend to the plane of university debates over anthropological, psychological, sociological, and ethical questions, extending finally to topics of educational philosophy, we shall see how meager, obscure, and scattered are the fundamental ideas entertained in different countries and to what extent educators disagree among themselves.

But we are not primarily interested in pointing out questions of a technical nature, such as the foregoing. We intended to do no more than describe the peculiar social environment of public education in this region of the world, in our America. Our aim is to present simple annotations which may serve as the basis for new and more elaborate commentaries. At this moment, they serve to remind anyone who might have forgotten that within and beyond the realm of academic minutiae and scholastic labor there exists a distressing social reality of specifically Ibero-American character, which we can not honestly ignore. Such a distress deserves

devoted study and every sacrifice; for the goal of independence will not be realized as long as more than fifty million people who do not even possess the juridical status of personality continue to live around more fortunate foci—more than fifty million people subjected to economic servitude, surrounded by a spiritual vacuum, and obliterated by political incapacity.

(Trans. by M. B. D.)

AUGUSTO MIJARES (1897-)

VENEZUELA

Augusto Mijares, although of the twentieth century, is in some respects another of the transitional figures like Martí, Hostos, and Sierra. The structure of his thought still resembles the scientific rationalism of the nineteenth century, but he also reflects twentieth century idealism, especially in his concepts of historical reality. Americanism is a fundamental trait of his thought, resembling that of the Spanish philosopher Miguel Unamuno, and the influence of the latter may be seen in other ways as well.

Mijares was born in Villa de Cura, Venezuela, in 1897 and educated in Caracas, where he graduated from the National University. He has been closely associated with the educational life of his country during the past two decades, was minister of education from 1948 to 1950, and has represented his country abroad. In 1956 he received the national prize for literature.

His *Pessimistic Interpretation* was written in 1938, shortly after the death of the despotic President Juan Vicente Gómez, while Venezuela was undergoing one of the most dramatic political transformations of the present century. These events give his revolt against the positivist interpretation of American history as centering around the phenomenon of dictatorship a special significance. But he also took issue with the view of Alberdi and Sarmiento that civilizing influences in America came only from Europe. He views the colonial period in Venezuela as one of the formation of the nation, the wars of independence as collective action leading to the establishment of the nation, and the republican epoch as a period of reconstruction and consolidation of nationality after the crisis of independence.¹ His historical philosophy in this and other respects is the institutionalism of the Spanish and Latin American school. He stresses the persistence of a Spanish-American tradition of a civil society, finding it even in the verbal excesses of Latin American politics. This, essentially, is the source of his optimism.

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1. "Introduction," pp. 11-12, 2nd. ed.

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PESSIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF HISPANIC AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

BY AUGUSTO MIJARES

(From *La interpretación pesimista de la sociología hispano-americana*, 2nd. ed. Madrid: Afrodisio Aguado, S. A., 1952. Pp. 15-21, 24-28, 40-47.)

I presume our fathers were often enraged to hear that Spanish America was thought of in foreign lands as "a country of generals and revolutions." Nevertheless, it is unquestionably true that the Hispanic American himself has considered *caudillismo* to be the characteristic phenomenon of our social and political customs.

It matters little that certain countries, such as Colombia and Chile, experienced little of it and that in others, such as Argentina, a vigorous reaction guided by the very spirit of the nation rooted it out shortly after a half century of independent existence.

The simple consideration of these facts should have sufficed to explain Hispanic American sociology as the manifestation of two opposing traditions, both equally vigorous and fundamental: The tradition which we shall henceforth call that of the "civil society," which is a tradition of political regularity, of order thought of as an equilibrium governed by the law, and the tradition which we might call that of *caudillismo*, because it was formed around the latter and has as its basis personal loyalty and mechanical coercion.

But the fact is that the latter is the only one which has been considered a characteristic synthesis of our public life. For the man of science as well as for the man in the street it is the inevitable result of our historical heritage and at the same time the expositor and symbol of all our defects and virtues.

One can well understand why our Hispanic American sociology began with that dogmatic simplification. The two traditions were in constant conflict during the past century, and since the second almost always triumphed in military and political affairs, it alone could be the object of study for the first American sociologists, inasmuch as their works were dependent upon the history at their disposal — history reduced to the mere chronicle of outstanding events.

To discover the civil and legal tradition it was necessary to derive it from colonial life, so discredited until the present day, and to pursue it further in a history still to be written — the history of intellectual manifestations, of certain irreproachable lives, many of them exemplary even during a long public career, of social actions little apparent or barely outlined but significant because of the constancy with which they are reproduced, even of political verbalism. The latter seems at first sight a repugnant demonstration of incapacity, but from another point of view it reveals an obvious concession to an indestructible social aspiration, the respect for an ideal which no one dares deny openly because it is linked with highly treasured concepts of personal and public dignity. They are annals of so many daily sacrifices, of the proposals brought forward by each generation of youth which, although they are lost when faced with [the need] for action, are constantly reborn in successive generations.

Data were lacking, and also time and interest, for a study so exacting. Nevertheless, that history which conducts in some fashion an explanation of the collective sub-conscious is the one which can best guide the sociologist when he wants to distinguish what is episodic from what is fundamental in the life of a people, since often the deepest and most intimate aspirations of the national soul, before acquiring consciousness and expression, struggle for a long time against the determinism of exterior events. Pursuing the simile suggested, is this not, in effect, a kind of violent sanction which forces the true

character of a nation to reveal itself outside the visible and converts into a tormenting inner debate what might, under other conditions, have been spontaneity and force?

And perhaps the whole tragedy of our America during its independent life — “the dolorous American republics” as Martí sensed — may be summed up in that situation. The most precious element in their culture was perhaps the proud tradition of municipal government, deliberative and jealous of its autonomy, both oligarchic and individual, which the conquerors brought before it was lost in the metropolis under the Austrians and Bourbon absolutism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, that tradition, reanimated and enriched by the world-wide aspirations for liberty and social justice, arose linked to the sentiment of nationalism and filled with faith in its ability to give structure to the political ideal which served as its basis. But suddenly a train of events which appear accidental, but which for the time being multiplied and linked themselves with each other with fatal prolixity — *caudillismo* — defeated that vital ambition and choked it into immobility, apparently suppressed forever.

That the civil tradition and those aspects of our social life have not been incorporated into the body of doctrine on American sociology is proved by the fact that *caudillismo* and the tendency toward arbitrary power have been considered fundamental in the history of Hispanic America, as much by the critics who condemn them as by those who might wish to glorify or defend them.

One of the latter, García Calderón, may be said to sum up their viewpoint in this paragraph: “The history of these republics is reduced to the biographies of their representative men. The national spirit is concentrated in the *caudillos*, absolute chiefs, benevolent despots. They rule by their courage, personal prestige, and bold audacity. They resemble the democracies which deify them.”²

However, those who, like Sarmiento and Alberdi, believed that personalism was not so honorable nor its benefits so evident, when they wished to point out a remedy, did not find any other than to Europeanize these countries. This shows that

2. F. García Calderón, *Les démocraties latines de l'Amérique*, p. 83.

they could not see within nationalism itself elements able to effect the reorganization.

According to Alberdi: "What exists is little and bad. It is well *to increase the number* of our population and, what is more, *to change its character* is a sense advantageous to the cause of progress. With three millions of natives, Christians, and Catholics you will certainly not create the republic. Nor will you bring it about with four million peninsular Spaniards, because the pure Spaniard is incapable of that achievement either here or yonder. If we are to fit our population to our system of government, if we are more likely to build the population for the [political] system proclaimed than to [build] the system for the population, it is necessary to encourage the Anglo-Saxon population on our soil." (*Bases y puntos de partida para la organización de la República Argentina*, p. 212).

Thus, for the author of the *Bases*, caudillismo was an ethnic inevitability which should at the same time be considered a historical necessity. Hence he speaks to us of the "gloomy colonial past" (p. 211), of "abject and backward colonialism" (p. 18) and, considering these peoples "without other political antecedents than two hundred years of obscure and abject colonialism" (p. 211), he concludes that not even in the cities are constructive elements for the future work to be found. "Hardened remains of the old system, the great cities of South America are still the garrison and fortress of colonial traditions. They may be beautified superficially by the wealth of modern commerce, but they are incorrigible for political liberty. The reform must put them to one side." (p. 187).

Sarmiento observed more calmly the cultural elements of the past. "In the cities there were books, ideas, a municipal spirit, courts, justice, laws, education, all the points of contact and fellowship which we have with Europeans; there was a basis of organization, incomplete, backward one might say . . ." (*Facundo*, p. 95).

But he believes that basis of organization had disappeared because of the War of Independence. "Before 1810 there were two distinct, rival, incompatible societies in the Argentine Republic—two diverse civilizations, one Spanish, European, and civilized, the other barbarous, American, almost Indian. The revolution of the cities was merely to serve as a cause or motive

for their coming into each other's presence, attacking each other and, after long years of struggle, the one absorbing the other." (p. 92).

For Sarmiento, then, *civilization* was restricted to a small *European* nucleus, gathered in the cities. It could only be considered a weak facade of orderliness in front of a formless mass of *American* barbarism by which it was finally destroyed. From the beginning of his book he gives us to understand that the triumph of *caudillismo* is really the predominance of "all the brutal and ignorant colonial traditions" (p. 34). In the final chapter, when he is looking for existing resources for the reconstruction of the republic, there is not a single allusion to that tradition of liberty and civilianism which at times he glimpsed, at least in the cities.

In accordance with these views, both Sarmiento and Alberdi considered the independence movement, not as a manifestation of collective and essentially American forces and aspirations, but as a contagion — momentary, may we add — of European ideas. "It is useless," says the first, "to stop long on the nature, object, and purpose of the revolutions of independence. Throughout America they were the same, deriving from the same origin, that is, the movement of European ideas" (p. 93). And Alberdi says, "What is our revolution, in respect to ideas, but a phase of the French Revolution?" (p. 82).

Both therefore sought, as the next stage of republican reorganization, a new but more profound Europeanization. Sarmiento wants cultural Europeanization; Alberdi does not believe this is enough and demands ethnic Europeanization also.

Nothing could be more logical than this pessimism of Sarmiento and Alberdi. They were the first critics to face the problem of *caudillismo* in the doctrinal realm, and it also fell to their lot to fight it as patriots, that is in torture of soul and impelled by the necessity of solving [the problem] which was a matter of life and death for their nation and for all America. For years and years they chafed under their own impotence and that of their companions, vainly seeking a favorable opportunity against the protean adversary which beset them. Hence it was natural that they were unable to consider

this [enemy] a mere phenomenon of our political reorganization and that in their ardent imaginations it takes on the aspect of an omnipresent destiny, rooted in the essence of our history and of our nature.

It amazes us, rather [than anything else], that so much grief was not wasted in sterile anathema and that uprisings to denounce the first sins of the great American *patria* should also retain the common sense and combativity needed in order to point out some road to redemption.

Nor should we forget, either, that during the past century and the beginnings of the present much of the Hispanic American intellectual life was dominated by a poorly understood positivism which, in the final analysis, was merely an anti-Romanticism, but with all the exaggerations of the Romantic era. Its elaborate pretension of viewing everything, including historical phenomena, objectively, just as they were, without injecting moral judgments or feelings of any kind, made these writers in the end as prejudiced and one-sided — although on the side of the mechanical and disagreeable — as their predecessors seeking the beautiful and the noble. Hence not one of these critics escapes this reproach voiced by Taine to the romantic Michelet: "We are skeptical, also, when we see a little fact built up to be the symbol of a civilization, an individual transformed into the representative of an epoch [in such a way] that such a personage appears as a messenger of providence or necessity, that ideas are incarnated in persons, and that men lose their real nature and features to become moments of history."

Minute facts erected as symbols and personages of circumstantial value transformed into representatives of historical inevitability — could a more definitive synthesis be given of what has been called among us positivist sociology?

* * * * *

III

The declamatory literature which seemed a necessary accompaniment of the war of emancipation had to present colonial life as a sinister night, in which Americans groaned under the double yoke of ignorance and tyranny.

This view might have been rectified by asking immediately how this abject condition could engender the political renaissance which was manifested simultaneously in 1810 by all the countries of America under the civic direction of the *cabildos*. By virtue of what inconceivable *fiat* did each of these nations suddenly present itself with such clear consciousness of its mature personality? And how can you explain merely as an improvisation from external causes the rise of the generation of Liberators who fulfilled those ideals with such determination and consistence, with such vigor and at the same time with such restraint, that in spite of the devastating nature of the war [of independence] the New World became a moment of hope for Europe?

And rightly so, because this was where the world conflict between liberal principles and reactionary tendencies was finally decided.³

The Hispanic American colonies with the capacity for renovation and political sense not then to be found in the metropolis itself, America conserving for the world the revolution which was losing its force or perishing in the old continent — were these not facts whose significance needed to be investigated? Were they not the basis for a fuller and more honorable American history than the narrow, monotonous glorification of external independence, considered as a personalist creation without connection with anything else?

3. It may be noted, in fact, that [the reactionaries] began with an attack upon the legitimacy of the very principles of the world revolution; but encountering scorn in this direction, they then turned to its practicability, and the liberal and democratic aspirations were converted into a problem of political capacity. On this account the American Revolution, which was conducted in countries of incipient culture and political life, had the importance of a major experiment. "If the New World becomes completely republican," said Chateaubriand, "the Monarchies of the old world will perish." (W. P. Cresson, *Diplomatic Portraits*, p. 30, cited by García Samudio in his *Capítulos de historia diplomática*). According to Castelar, the American peoples "were established upon social bases which were new, different, and even antagonistic to the social bases of European monarchy. That new social concept, reacting upon Europe herself as she sallied forth to combat it with arms, through warlike Spain, and by the political pressure of the Holy Alliance, has succeeded today in both hemispheres." (Cited by the *Revista Bolivariana*, núm. 24). "Emilio Olivier, the minister of Napoleon III, writes truthfully that in Bolívar's time his name passed among the people of Europe not excluding Spain, as a synonym of liberty. The revolutionists of 1830 took Paris with the name of Bolívar on their lips, in patriotic songs." (*Don Quijote Bolívar* by Don Miguel de Unamuno).

Unfortunately the dire and disturbing contemporary scene concealed that historical perspective. Civil wars, the reign of brutality, the alternate horrors of anarchy and tyranny constituted an immediate reality so absorbing that not even the most enlightened spirits could rise above it.

That partial and transitory truth was considered the sole basic truth of America. It was never more than a passing phenomenon, but its sudden and universal triumph was so surprising that it was made to seem the very substance of our psychology and our history. It came to be connected with the supposed heritage of ignominy which hung over the continent, and thus, because of momentary confusion, all our sociology was over simplified as the manifestation of a crushing, multiform destiny for which no remedy could be expected but the providential appearance of a Reformer or mixture with a foreign race.

Caudillismo was nothing more than an evil by-product of the war of independence, but popular desperation — expressed in those trying circumstances in the blasphemous generalizations, "It has always been so!" and "There is no remedy for it!" — was made to be inevitable by sociological writers.

A sub-conscious elaboration of this "It has always been so!" is what produces the phobia of Sarmiento against everything Spanish. In Alberdi a similar pessimism, which happily is also constructive, causes him to reduce the whole science of government to "*poblar*" (populate), that is to dilute the tares of the race by race mixture.

For Sarmiento the evil lay in provincial barbarism, redemption in urban culture. But he considered the latter too debased and weak to be able to react [strongly] by itself. It seemed to him inescapably necessary to strengthen it and adorn it with the attributes of an exotic culture — with everything European but not Spanish.

Alberdi, more bitter, denied even Sarmiento's men of civilization, the urban creoles; he also distrusted the gaucho. On page 210 of his *Bases* he concludes that the Argentine peons and gauchos "were little better than Indians," and for him an Indian was a savage (p. 83). Hence he was not satisfied with a new culture but wanted a new race.

The highly emotional basis of these opinions, and their consequent contradictions, appear even in the purest thinkers of the continent, as may be observed in José Martí.

Thus the incomparable Cuban apostle — as pure as Sucre and as American, because now the Old World would not produce leaders like him — might be said to have been blinded at times with anguish. "America first began to suffer," he says, "and [still] suffers from the exhaustion [caused by] reconciling the discordant elements which she inherited from a despotic and evil colonizer with imported structures and concepts which have been retarding rational government by their lack of [correspondence to] local reality." And at the end of his unforgettable historical reminiscences he comes to symbolize thus the difference he is concerned with establishing between Hispanic and Anglo Saxon America: "North America was born of the plow, Spanish America of the blood-hound (*perro de presa*)."

Fortunately, however, that pessimism does not represent his deep convictions, nor does it restrict the flight of his genius nor stain his spirit of abnegation. Within the work whose charge he has assumed may be distinguished from such deceiving appearances [something] understood as follows: "The independence of America came from the past century bleeding; not from Rousseau nor from Washington comes our America, but from herself." This is proof of full recognition of the secular tradition we have been pointing out. [It is] the sociological justification of the liberating hero and the founder, of Martí himself. And his expressions in this sense are so numerous and so spontaneous that Mañach correctly notes how "the South American, Spanish, Latin consciousness" of Martí annoyed Sarmiento.

We have cited García Calderón as the outstanding man of letters among the glorifiers of *caudillismo* and Sarmiento and Alberdi as its clearest adversaries. But even among the writers who have aspired to achieve the most strict objectivity we find the same pessimistic systematization of our sociology.

Such is the case with [Carlos] Bunge, whose book had continental reverberations. This last fact is worth recording because it shows us to what extent Hispanic American youth was ready to accept the interpretation of our historical

phenomena as vices essential to our temperament and indicative of our fundamental political incapacity.

It is unquestionable that Bunge was moved by sincere Pan American sympathy. But in making his clinical study of "creole politics" and searching for its possible therapeutic, his book definitely becomes a justification of that policy at the expense of "our America." The race mixture produced in the latter could suggest nothing to the author but the accumulation within our psychology of the supposed tares derived from each one. *Caudillismo*, accordingly, is the genuine, natural, and necessary product of that heritage. There is an "American illness," and since we are Americans it is ridiculous to nourish ideals which are suitable only for peoples very superior to us.

When, for example, he discusses the government which García Moreno wished to impose upon Ecuador, his opinion is, "I agree that this theocratic-Catholic ideal would have been rather antiquated for European peoples of the nineteenth century; but in Ecuador, for the reasons pointed out, it was a leverage of order and relative progress." Later he adds: "Thus, clearly, since García Moreno was born after his natural epoch, Ecuador, and it might be added all of Spanish America, lost its best opportunity for declaring itself independent, the eighteenth century, when it might have retained monarchy until, with independence, it was prepared for liberty. It is said that liberty is the best condition for a people, but give liberty to the New Zealand [natives] or to the Bushmen and see what kind of republic they establish."

And his judgment of Porfirio Díaz [is this]: "The Yankees have honored him in every way because he is a convenient neighbor. But ask a Yankee how he would like this man, if he were his fellow countryman, to be President of the United States, and he will look at you astonished that such an absurd supposition could be made, scratching his ear, as if you were to propose to exchange Roosevelt for Menelik. He is right. North America is a European nation."

For Bunge, then, we Hispanic Americans have nothing in common with Europeans, and our republics can not excell those which the Bushmen or the New Zealand [natives] might form.

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V

There is also another fact upon the basis of which we can appreciate how widely this unilateral view of the American character and of our history has been spread, and it is worth examining because it is so often the crux of all discussions in this respect. I refer to the fact that it is today an unchallenged truism to say that political order was achieved in the Argentine republic by bringing in the European element.

As we have seen, it was natural for this to be the conclusion of Alberdi and Sarmiento. Themselves actors in the struggle, they could not see themselves as we see them today, above the despot who was their adversary, as representatives of a historical necessity and a social tradition as strong at least as those which gave strength to their enemy

Very quickly the rapid Argentine renaissance was to show them that within that very nationality there were unrecognized vital forces which merely awaited the appropriate occasion to assert themselves in the direction of restoring political order [in accordance with] the patriotic and juridical ideals they pursued. Yet at the time they were plunging into the chaotic reality of their *patria*, in their search for guidance and remedy, they were clearly unable to understand the full scope of that collective aspiration, disseminated for the time being without [any expression in] word or act.

Today we distinctly perceive, at their side, the Alcortas, the Alsinas, the Avellanedas, the Vélez's, and the Mitres; beyond, in the penumbra of anonymity [we see] the eager multitude of those awaiting the word of faith, ready and apt for the work of reconstruction. To rectify in this respect the theoretical pessimism of Alberdi and Sarmiento is to do justice to their patriotic labor and that of their colleagues.

By the mere employment of historical perspective we now discover two opposing groups — Rosas and his adversaries — with the significance which really belongs to them. Today we know in detail all the political skill, perseverance, and self-denial those *Argentines* were able to offer to their country. Who would dare to say that the tradition they represented was less national than the other?

Nor [was it] less powerful. What is certain is that the immigrant never would have come to the Argentina of Rosas, nor would he have been able to make any progress in it. This one consideration is enough to prove that national reorganization had to come before the immigration, and that the latter merely strengthened and added to the economic prosperity.

Furthermore, in recognizing that the "civil society" was reconstructed in Argentina, as would happen in the other American countries, by the renewal of an internal tradition and not by a foreign importation, we take into account the fact that the latter could not have made itself felt except very late. It is absurd to assume that it worked by simple contact, in the manner of a mysterious catalytic element, to which the chronological relation of the two phenomena would force us.

The statistical data are conclusive. The Argentines consider the year 1862 to be the critical date of their national reorganization, not only because in that year the state of Buenos Aires was reincorporated in the Confederation, a truly national congress installed, etc., but also because henceforth the progress of the nation continued without interruption, and the material and moral anarchy which divided it may be considered as having disappeared forever. In the final analysis [it was] because behind these favorable political developments there may now be observed the existence of a solid social basis, the wished for moral reconstruction of the whole country. Now then, for that year the number of immigrants was merely some 33,017.

In 1875 the total number of immigrants was 327,992, including 54,455 Spaniards and 208,760 Italians. The former introduced no serious change in the ethnic composition of the country and less in its social and political customs. As to the influence which the second [Italians] could exercise in such matters, one may judge upon the basis of what Taine observed in Italy a few years before: "Under the Bourbons only three things were done or could be done — drink, eat, and sometimes amuse onself. As for everything else — complete prohibition. Neither studies, nor journals, nor travel, nor conversations about religion or politics [were permitted]. Denunciations were constant and the imprisonments horrifying. At each turn one felt the hand of an inquisitor on his body."

Such was the situation in the Kingdom of Naples; in the States of the Church it was no better....

* * * * *

And with this reservation [the clear benefits of immigration] I may still insist upon the fact that the Italian and Spanish immigrations, inferior in quality according to the ideas of Alberdi, were at the time and because of their numbers the first to strengthen the prosperity of the Argentine Republic. [This is] proof that the real importance of immigration is merely economic, and that the moral force capable of assimilating that immigration and preparing it for the further task of social improvement must be sought in the very entrails of the nationality.

The fact that an Argentine nationality already existed in that complex of social and political customs which I group under the heading of "tradition of the civil society" is the reason why the fear that a numerous and sudden immigration would create a babel on the shores of the Plata turned out to be groundless. [This was] a fear which would have been very logical for those who believed that the Republic was reduced to a mere hundred Europeans in the city surrounded by an immense desert peopled with savage gauchos. How could one explain in that case the assimilation of this disconcerting avalanche of peoples of different tongues, religions, customs, ideals, and individual abilities which overwhelmed the native population in the lapse of a few years.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

GILBERTO FREYRE (1900-)
BRAZIL

Gilberto Freyre, one of the keen minds of contemporary Brazil, is alert to a wide range of literary, philosophical, and scientific thought, ranging from the anthropological method of Franz Boas and existentialist philosophy to the neo-Thomism of Jacques Maritain. His emphasis upon regionalism and upon social and ethnic "fusionism" make of Freyre a good illustration of how the search for an "American" philosophy may continue amidst the argument over essence and existence as the basis of reality which goes on in the twentieth century neo-idealist intellectual environment.

He is the product of education in Brazil and the United States, broadened by travel in Europe and by journalistic and teaching experience. Even more he is the product of the province of Recife, in northeastern Brazil, in which he was born on March 15, 1900. His studies as a sociologist and social historian have centered around this sugar plantation area and its mixed racial population — Indian, Negro, and white. In this respect his best known, and perhaps his greatest work, is *Casa Grande e Senzala*, translated into English under the title, *The Masters and the Slaves*.¹ The passages from this volume which appear on following pages show Freyre's interest in the ethnic basis of Brazilian development. He obviously owes a debt, as do other contemporary Brazilian writers, to da Cunha's dramatic development of this theme in his *Os sertões*. But Freyre's cultural pluralism makes his treatment significantly different.

The second passage is from a book consisting of lectures given at the University of Indiana, published originally in English. The reader will note at once the emphasis on psychoanalysis which springs from contemporary cultural anthropology and the pluralism which usually accompanies it. This basic pluralism may be seen especially in his defense of regional autonomy in philosophy. Certain influences from Keyserling and Durkheim may also be seen. The criticism of "Castilianism" seems, in the main, to be an objection to the authority of ideas.

1. Rio de Janeiro, 1933. The English translation by Samuel Putnam, published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. in 1946, is used below with the permission of the publisher.

GILBERTO FREYRE

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In addition to the works from which the following excerpts are taken, the important works of Freyre include: *Sobrados e mucambos. Decadência do patriarcado rural no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1951); *Nordeste. Aspectos da influência da canna sobre a vida e a paisagem do nordeste do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1937); *O mundo que o português criou. Aspectos das relações sociais e de cultura do Brasil com Portugal e as colônias portuguesas* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1940); *Região e tradição* (Rio de Janeiro: J. Olympio, 1941, and *Na Bahia em 1943* (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Brasileira de Artes Gráficas, 1944).

For a discussion of his ideas see Nelson Werneck Sodré, *Orientações do pensamento brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Vecchi, 1942) pp. 41-58; *Gilberto Freyre*. Prefácio de Monteiro Lobato. (Rio de Janeiro: Casa do Estudante do Brasil, 1944); Lewis Hanke, "Gilberto Freyre: Brazilian Social Historian," *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations*, July 1939, 24-44; and W. R. Crawford, *A Century of Latin American Thought*, pp. 203-217.

BRAZILIAN SOCIETY

BY GILBERTO FREYRE

(From *Masters and Slaves*, English translation by Samuel Putnam of *Casa grande e senzala*. New York Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1946. Pp. 79, 83, 181. By permission.)

From a general point of view, the formation of Brazilian society, as I have stressed from the first pages of this essay, has been in reality a process of balancing antagonisms. Economic and cultural antagonisms. Antagonisms between European culture and native culture. Between the African and the native. Between an agrarian and a pastoral economy, between that of the agrarian and that of the mining regions. Between Catholic and heretic. Jesuit and fazendeiro. The bandeirante and the plantation-owner. The Paulista and the prospector. The Pernambucan and the peddler. The landed proprietor and the pariah. The university graduate and the illiterate. But predominant over all these antagonisms was the more general and the deeper one: that between master and slave.

It is true that, acting always upon all these clashing antagonistic forces, deadening the shock or harmonizing them, have been certain conditions peculiar to Brazil that have made for fraternization and vertical mobility: miscegenation; the dispersal of inheritances; the possibility of a frequent and easy change of profession and of residence; frequent and easy access to public office and to elevated political and social positions on the part of mestizos and natural sons; the lyric character of Portuguese Christianity; the spirit of moral tolerance; hospitality to strangers and intercommunication between the different parts of the country. The last mentioned factor has been due less to technical facilities than to physical conditions: the absence of a mountain chain or system of rivers such as would really interfere with Brazilian unity and a cultural and economic reciprocity between the geographic extremes. (P. 79)

* * * * *

Hybrid from the beginning, Brazilian society is, of all those in the Americas, the one most harmoniously constituted so far as racial relations are concerned, within the environment of a practical cultural reciprocity that results in the advanced people deriving the maximum of profit from the values and experiences of the backward ones, and in a maximum of conformity between the foreign and the native cultures, that of the conqueror and that of the conquered. A society was organized that was Christian in superstructure, with the recently baptized native woman as wife and mother of the family, who in her domestic life and economy made use of many of the traditions, experiences, and utensils of the autochthonous folk. (P. 83)

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The truth is that in Brazil, contrary to what is to be observed in other American countries and in those parts of Africa that have been recently colonized by Europeans, the primitive culture — the Amerindian as well as the African — has not been isolated into hard, dry, indigestible lumps incapable of being assimilated by the European social system. Much less has it been stratified in the form of archaisms and ethnographic curiosities, but rather makes itself felt in the living, useful, active, and not merely picturesque presence of elements that have a creative effect upon the national development. Neither

did the social relations between the two races, the conquering and the indigenous one, ever reach that point of sharp antipathy or hatred, the grating sound of which reaches our ears from all the countries that have been colonized by Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The friction here was smoothed by the lubricating oil of a deep-going miscegenation, whether in the form of a free union damned by the clergy or that of regular Christian marriage with the blessing of the padres and at the instigation of Church and State.

Our social institutions as well as our material culture were suffused with Amerindian influence, as later with that coming from Africa. Even our laws were contaminated by it, not directly, to be sure, but subtly and indirectly. Our "juridical benignity" has been interpreted by Clovis Bevilacqua as a reflex of the African influence. A certain characteristically Brazilian mildness in the punishment of the crime of theft possibly reflects the special compromise that the European had to make with the Amerindian, the latter being almost wholly insensitive to the notion of this crime by reason of his communistic mode of life and economy. (P. 181)

BRAZILIAN UNITY AND REGIONAL DIVERSITY

BY GILBERTO FREYRE

(From *Brazil, An Interpretation*. Patten Foundation Lectures, 1944. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. for the University of Indiana, 1945. Chap. 3. By permission of the University of Indiana Press and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.)

Professor Glenn R. Morrow, of the University of Pennsylvania, not long ago pointed out that the first Congress of Regionalism in Brazil — perhaps the first in America — met in Recife in 1925. Recently, at Yale University, the subject of Brazilian Regionalism was discussed at the Inter-American Conference of Philosophy, where I fear that it was not entirely understood by some members, though all comments were sympathetic and generous. Regionalism, as understood and described by Brazilian regionalists, is a social philosophy; and one of the main objections voiced at the Conference was that philosophy, being "a work of reason," cannot "accept regional data, forms of thought and of sentiment of local content, unless it corrupts

and destroys itself." The view was therefore advanced by one critic that as regionalists my friends and I put too much emphasis on the regional aspect of Brazilian culture.²

Before attempting to discuss the two antagonisms of Brazilian life and culture — unity and regional diversity, or unitarism and regionalism — I wish to make as clear as possible the idea of regionalism as understood by modern Brazilian regionalists. They distinguish regionalism from nationalism and also from mere sectionalism — to use Professor Turner's word for sterile or self-sufficient regionalism. A region may be politically less than a nation. But vitally and culturally it is more than a nation; it is more basic both as a condition of life and as a medium of expression or creativeness. To be a genuine philosopher a man has to be super- or supra-national; but he can hardly be supra-regional in the sense of ignoring the regional condition of the life, the experience, the culture, the art, and the thought that he is considering or analyzing. As Mr. Joseph E. Baker writes in his analysis of regionalism: "The regionalist who ignores the universal is at fault, of course; the life of his region is his medium of expression, not his message, and the picturesque — that was the error of the local-colorist. But the internationalists (to which, indeed, our present brand of nationalism must be referred) recommend to us a literature which gives neither the universal ideal of humanity at its best, nor the subtle essence of a local culture; but rather those elementary physical and economic interests which are common to man at his crudest in Atlanta, Manchester, and Hamburg — the lowest common denominator, not the profoundest human potentialities. We are much more likely to rise to a conception of man as fully human by contemplating his achievements as they flower in different regions — of America, and of Europe."³

The regional point of view, considered as an approach to the study of history or sociology, seems to some of us Brazilian regionalists as philosophical as any other. This is also the conclusion reached by a South African student of regionalism,

2. Afranio Coutinho, "Some Considerations on the Problem of Philosophy in Brazil," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, IV, No. 2 (Dec. 1943) 187-193, at p. 191. Author's footnotes re-numbered.

3. "Regionalism: Pro and Con. Four Arguments for Regionalism," *Saturday Review of Literature*, XV (1936), 14.

Professor Bews. He defines regionalism — under the name of “human ecology” — as “a special way of regarding the ultimate reality of life”; as a “philosophy of life,”⁴ and not merely as a science or a technique. One may object to Professor Bew’s philosophical regionalism by saying that a strictly regional “philosophy of life” has a tendency to be incomplete. But it is a philosophy; it is a philosophical attitude or point of view. It is perhaps incomplete without its antagonistic point of view: universalism or cosmopolitanism. I agree with those who think that these two currents of thought — by some called localism and internationalism — mutually enrich each other. I agree with those who expand to the cultural sphere the well-known idea of Professor Bonn concerning economic life — the idea that there is a process of counter-colonization, as opposed to that of colonization.

It is as counter-colonization that regionalism seems to us Brazilian regionalists to be a healthy tendency in Brazilian as well as in continental American life, a tendency opposed to excessive national, as well as to exaggerated international or cosmopolitan, tendencies. But the three types of cultural influence — the indigenous or regional, the national (probably the most transitory and artificial of all), and the supra-national, or cosmopolitan — enrich each other; and the ideal is apparently to secure, through a combination of the three, the constant and stimulating interaction of all their antagonisms. As a political scientist wrote recently: “The principal task of the student of international organization is not to waste more time debating over regionalism versus universalism, but to study the ways in which, in concrete cases, the two principles can be utilized in combination and the standards to be applied in the dosage of each to be adopted.”⁵

Some students of the social international situation that has developed in the world since the Industrial Revolution in Europe — industrial world-conquest based on ideals of standardization of all places according to the standards of the most powerful capitalistic states — have recognized the need for a creative regionalism in opposition to the many excesses

4. J. W. Bews, *Human Ecology* (London, 1935), p. 284.

5. Pitman B. Potter, “Universalism Versus Regionalism in International Reorganization,” *The American Political Science Review*, XXXVI (1943), 862.

of political centralization and unification of culture stimulated by politically and economically imperial interests and forces. It is the basic theory of such students that a growing number of separate cultural units will contribute to the stability of the world by preventing the formation and the expansion of imperialisms and of empires.⁶ The regionalist movement that a group of authors, artists, and scientists started in Brazil twenty-two years ago and that was perhaps the first systematic movement of its kind in America was and continues to be an effort to encourage a more spontaneous cultural life in Brazil through a freer expression of culture by the people of the various regions. The North-east, where the movement started, is a region with a particularly rich history and is noted for its human potentiality. That region was losing consciousness of the values of its history as well as of its possibilities; the loss was occurring not only because of general standardizing influences originating in industrial world-conquest but also because of similar influences originating inside the American continent and within the Brazilian nation itself.

* * * * *

The problem of Brazil as a culturally creative nation has been not only the problem of resisting outside imperialistic attempts to maintain as cultural colonies countries like those of Latin America under various pretexts and so-called reasons or needs for strict unity or unification — as a Pan-American unity sometimes used for the sole benefit of the United States or a Hispanic unity meant to be an instrument of domination by Spain over its former colonies of America. It also has been and is the problem of combining sub-regional diversity with national unity.

Ecologically Brazil is a region, to a large extent a natural region — so clearly so that it is considered by some geographers a "continental island." It is also a cultural region, a population whose predominating cultural values and standards are of Portuguese origin, in contrast to the Spanish, Dutch, English, and French values and standards of its American neighbours.

But Brazil is not simply one natural and cultural region; inside the almost continental immensity of that part of America, Nature and culture have their own subdivisions. Therefore Brazil needs to defend itself permanently against its own

6. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (Chicago, 1942), II, pp. 1334-5.

enemies of its organic regionalism. For Brazil has more than once in its history had leaders whose ideal or whose mystical conception of a Brazilian Nation or Empire or Power has been that of Philip II in regard to Spain: the absolute supremacy of some Castile — I use the name Castile as a symbol of the tendency to over-emphasize unity over diversity — over the other regions of the country.

Castilianism in Brazil, as I see it, has not meant only a region striving, through some Philip II, to dominate the other regions. Nor has it been only a State — technically a Federal State with no more rights than any other, but actually an imperial power — striving to dominate the remaining States. This happened during the first Republican period of Brazil: more than once a State — an almost entirely artificial political State — dominated the other States of the Union through quite mechanical or quantitative advantages, such as a larger number, not so much of people as of voters or votes, and through a larger number of banks, factories, and manufactures.

Castilianism in Brazil — again as I see it — may mean and has meant other forms of domination by brutally powerful majorities over minorities whose rights should be respected to a larger extent than those majorities are willing to admit — that is, if we are to have really creative cultural diversity instead of a mere imitation of it. It may mean and has meant other forms of domination by technically powerful minorities over abused or exploited majorities. An example of the first type would be the excessive zeal of certain members of the vast Portuguese or Luso-Brazilian majority for the cultural uniformity or unity of Brazil so far as Portuguese or Luso-Brazilian values are concerned; they consider a menace to Brazilian unity any opportunity for creative expression given to non-Portuguese European groups or to non-European or mixed groups. Of course, here we are not concerned with inter-regional antagonisms of a strictly geographical configuration, but with inter-regional antagonisms or conflict in social and cultural realms rather than in physical space. Most of the Brazilian cultural sub-regions, however, have natural or physical sub-regions as their main bases: the purely white minority of Brazil, for instance, is located more in the South than in the North. That is also true of the non-Portuguese or non-Luso Brazilian; their "sub-regions" are more in the extreme southern part of Brazil than in any part of the North.

Obviously a healthy minimum of cultural basic uniformity is necessary if Brazil is to remain a confederation instead of becoming a vast boarding-house — the “boarding-house” of Theodore Roosevelt’s famous metaphor in regard to the United States. And that minimum is traditionally composed, in Brazil, of Luso or Hispanic basic values and cultural means of inter-regional and inter-human communication. The most important of these means is the Portuguese language. That minimum is made also of values and even techniques predominantly European, and not Amerindian or African — predominantly but not exclusively.

The entire subordination of historical and geographical differences to a rigid ideal of uniformity would be too narrow an ideal of unity for such a complex cultural “continent” as Brazil. Over-simplification of the problem of Brazilian complexity through its subordination to mere political convenience was one of the weaknesses of the Empire in Brazil, noted for its excess of centralization. Some students of Brazilian problems think that it is one of the defects of the present political regime. That regime has gone too far in its reaction against the excess, not of creative regionalism, but of “state rights” developed in Portuguese America during the so-called “first Republic.” “State rights” was one of the Anglo-American political theories imported by Brazilian republicans from the United States without a previous careful study of Brazilian geographical and historical conditions. The result was that national parties almost ceased to exist in Brazil; populous and powerful rival States like São Paulo, Minas Geraes, and Rio Grande do Sul developed into something like political parties. Each one of them had as its real political program not so much the solution of national, or Brazilian, problems of social and human interest as the promotion of narrowly sectional or state interests, industrial, commercial, and agricultural. There was a railroad built in one of the powerful States, with Federal or national money, that was an almost luxurious enterprise for Brazil — most of it with double track — while there were Brazilian regions in which transportation needs were entirely neglected. Descendants of Germans were allowed liberties or privileges entirely incompatible with Brazilian cultural basic unity (such as the right to have schools where Portuguese was not taught) by politicians who needed German votes in order to dominate or control their particular State. Other politicians were interested

in making of their particular State the economic Castile or the political and even military Prussia of Brazil — power politics within the national sphere. There was a time when the police force of the State São Paulo was nearly as powerful as the Brazilian Army. It had its own French military instructors and other features characteristic of a national army. The same, or almost the same thing, has happened in Rio Grande do Sul and in Minas Geraes. I once came from Minas Geraes with the vivid impression that I had been in a Brazilian Prussia. A vast amount of public money was being spent, not on public works or for the permanent benefit of the people, but to maintain a police force almost as powerful as the national army. What for? Apparently for the defence of state rights — really, perhaps, for the defence of a political group that was then in power in that particular State. Whatever the reason, the fact was not an expression of healthy or creative regionalism but a horrid caricature of it. American students of the problem of regionalism are right when they establish a fundamental distinction between regionalism and sectionalism. Some of the pages written by Turner about sectionalism in the United States might have been written about the same problem in Brazil.

At present, under a regime that some describe as an “authoritarian democracy,” the prevailing *mystique* (to use the French word) in Brazil — that is, the *mystique* that official propaganda emphasizes through its radios and newspapers as the only basis for orthodox patriotism — is the opposite extreme of the doctrine of “state rights” as it was known from 1889 to 1930. It is the dangerous *mystique* of Castilian unity or Castilian uniformity. “Castilian” in this case does not mean, as it did in old Spain, the supremacy of one Brazilian region over the others. It means centralization: political centralization. It means the excessive subordination of a country as vast as Brazil to its political capital: to Rio.

One cannot deny that Senhor Getulio Vargas and other “unionists” or “centralists” have done away with excesses or abuses of “state rights.” For the fact is that the 1889 Republic in Brazil was marked by a “tariff war between the states — between them and the Union.”⁷ But some have reached an extreme point in their ideal or their policy of political centralization and national uniformity — a point at which the

7. J. F. Normano, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

cure may do more harm to the politically sick nation than the disease. The disease was an excess of state rights, so prominent and harmful in Brazil before the 1930 Revolution. The cure is the present excess of uniformity, with the central power directing everything in Brazil. There are exceptions: States like Pernambuco have since 1937 been almost independent from Rio in the semi-Fascist or para-Fascist characteristics that they have developed. Such exceptions show that the modern regime needs modification, not only for the sake of a freer local life, but also for the sake of a more effective control of national affairs by a vigilant, independent, and critical public opinion and press.

"Unionism" or "centralism" is not an innovation in Brazil. The Brazilian Empire, as I said, was noted for centralization. That was one of its defects. But it did probably less harm to Brazilian regional and cultural diversity than the present system of centralization and uniformity is doing. For during the Empire centralized power was in the hands, not only of a constitutional emperor whose abuses, or attempts at abuse, of centralized power were sharply criticized in Parliament and in a free press, but also of the intellectually and morally best and ablest public-minded men of Brazil. Most of these reached supreme power after having given public evidence, in their own provinces, of their capacity and honesty, and not (like most of them today) through a strictly personal choice by the President or chief of the nation. Some of them rose to power from very humble origin. At least two of them — Rebouças and Saldanha Marinho — were almost jet-black and of slave descent; and several were mulattoes, the descendants of slaves. For the Empire in Brazil was remarkable for its combination of politically aristocratic methods with ways and customs as democratic as those of any republic that the continent has had. It was remarkable for its tendency towards an ethnic and social democracy — not only a remote Brazilian tradition but a Portuguese tradition as well. I shall later stress this tradition as a characteristic of Brazilian social and cultural development.

The men who founded the Federal Republic that in 1889 replaced the Empire had been impressed by the excesses of centralized power in their vast country. They adopted a constitution that copied that of the United States. Instead of seeking to combine unity with regional diversity, they borrowed

from the United States the principle of "state rights," thus putting such an emphasis on a political state autonomy derived from merely quantitative conditions and advantages held by one state over the others that many abuses became possible. The problem of combining diversity with unity — perhaps the most fundamental problem in organizing Brazil as a community — seems to have suffered as much from the political methods of combining them adopted by the Federal Republic of 1889 as from the centralization methods followed by the Empire. The solution of the problem appears to be not a narrowly political one, but a social one, whereby states are reduced to a minimum of importance and natural and cultural regions are treated as organic realities, each with its own characteristics but all vitally interdependent in their economic interests and needs; all vitally interdependent for the solution of their social and cultural problems and aspirations. Diversity will then become creative as never before; and unity will be less of a problem than now, with regions co-ordinated by an inter-regional organism but not oppressed or exploited by the region or sectional group economically or technically most powerful at the moment.

It seems to some of us, as students of regionalism, that countries with a regional past, like Brazil, ought to keep constantly in mind the example of Spain, where centuries of systematic Castilianization did not succeed in imposing Castilian regional culture on all Hispanic regions as their only or sacred culture. From the point of view of unity, Brazilians are fortunate in having a single language — the Portuguese. Differences of pronunciation have never been significant in Portuguese-speaking America, though a Congress met recently in São Paulo — a *paulista* initiative, not one of the central government of Rio — at which some of the best philologists, authors, composers, musicians, historians, and sociologists of Brazil were present to study the problem of the Portuguese language in Brazil. There it was decided that the Portuguese spoken in Rio by the so-called *carioca* (the inhabitant of the capital of Brazil) is the most agreeable to the ear and the best adapted to music, to song, to the theatre, to the cinema, and to public speaking. Its adoption as the Portuguese to be used by composers, dramatists, and professional public speakers was a unanimous decision of the São Paulo Congress and was well received by all Brazilians. This does not mean that regional

linguistic peculiarities are to be avoided by writers, or in the theatre, the song, and the drama when regional characters appear: far from it. It means that one of the Brazilian regional ways of pronouncing the Portuguese language — the carioca way — has been chosen by a very representative group of Brazilians as the official language for the Brazilian theatre, Brazilian song, and the Brazilian cinema when regional characters do not appear in them.

So reasonable and sensible a measure is a good example of the possibilities of combining unity with diversity in a country almost continental in its extension. And a significant thing about it is that it came from São Paulo — a sort of Catalonia of Brazil: a manufacturing region that has no equal in Latin America, with a capital that is the most European and at the same time the most "Yankee" of the Brazilian cities, and a people whose cult of efficiency and love of toil are in sharp contrast to the almost Chinese indifference and resignation to poverty of certain Brazilian groups of other regions.

* * * *

Based on the assumption that Carnival for the Brazilians is only an exaggeration — sometimes, I admit, a morbid exaggeration — of their ordinary and characteristic behaviour, I have suggested that through a careful study of the ways in which they dance their Carnival dances it is possible to classify their regional and sub-regional differences of temperament, ethos, and personality as well as to recognize their Brazilian unity of behaviour and their universality of human personality. The first results of such a study seem to indicate a considerable difference in the temperament or personality of such close neighbours as the gauchos and the *missioneiros* of the Rio Grande do Sul region. Along with this study, I have suggested also a study of the characteristic Brazilian way of playing the very Anglo-Saxon game of association football, or soccer. The Brazilians play it as if it were a dance. This is probably the result of the influence of those Brazilians who have African blood, or who are predominantly African in their culture, for such Brazilians tend to reduce everything to dance — work and play alike — and this tendency is apparently becoming more and more general in Brazil and is not solely the characteristic of an ethnic or regional group.

Since I published my first notes on these two subjects — the regional ways of dancing and of playing football, as a dance with something African to it — I have read Mr. Waldo Frank's brilliant comment that the tango is "a *sculptural* dance-music"; and elsewhere he tells us that, watching a group of men in Brazil playing soccer, he observed that they played "weaving the ball intricately (like the melodic line of a *samba*) to the goal."⁸ It is almost the same remark that I had made in an article written in 1938, which I am sure Mr. Frank never saw, just as he never saw the one I published in 1940 about the Brazilian ways of dancing Carnival dances. I rejoice at the coincidence of his observation with mine, for I consider the author of *South American Journey* one of the few Americans who have written really illuminating pages on Brazil — illuminating for outsiders and for the Brazilians themselves. . . . Too many foreign observers tend to see only what is metropolitan or picturesque, what is very progressive or very primitive or archaic: São Paulo or Rio, naked savages or the Amazon River. But it is between these two antagonistic extremes that the real Brazil lies, with its variety of regional situations.

8. Waldo Frank, *South American Journey* (New York, 1943), p. 50.

ALCEU AMOROSO LIMA (1893-)

BRAZIL

Alceu Amoroso Lima has been well known in Brazil, under the pen name Tristão de Ataíde, for his writing as a literary critic in *O Journal* of Rio de Janeiro. He has also been a popular professor of philosophy in the University of Brazil and in the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. His writing is voluminous and upon a wide range of subjects. During the years 1951-1952 he was the dynamic Director of the Department of Cultural Affairs of the Pan American Union. Since his youth he has been a spokesman for the growing Christian movement known as Social Action, dedicated to the social Christian objectives of the *Rerum Novarum*; he was a founder of the Catholic student movement in Brazil and has participated in the Christian Socialist party.

Born in Rio Janeiro on December 11, 1893, he was educated in Rio de Janeiro and in France. His career has embraced law, government service, literary journalism, education, and politics. But his chief fame derives from his writing and lectures.

The passage which follows shows his popular, though sometimes prolix, style. It contains suggestions of an idealist philosophy of history for which he may be indebted to Benedetto Croce, but is in general neo-Thomist. In this connection, Amoroso Lima doubtless owes a debt to Jackson de Figueiredo, the original innovator of such ideas in Brazil. The reader will note the characteristic emphasis on voluntarism of liberal Catholic social thought. Like Jacques Maritain, whose influence is obvious, he admits an element of pluralism,¹ some suggestions of which may be seen in his discussion of method. Here and there, too, something of the persistent positivism of Brazilian thought seems to appear, perhaps more in the structure than in the substance of the ideas.

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1. See his "Silvio Romero and the Evolution of Literary Criticism in Brazil," *The Americas* (Academy of American Franciscan History) X, No. 3 (Jan. 1954) 277-288. — Trans.

AGIR, various dates. *O problema do trabalho* appeared in 1947 as volume 20. Other works important for the student include Volume 12, *Preparação a sociologia* (originally published 1931); Volume 22, *Política* (originally 1932); Volume 13, *Problema da burguesia* (originally 1932); Volume 6, *A estética literaria* (originally 1945); Volume 17, *Meditação sobre o mundo moderno* (originally 1942); and Volume 14, *Pela reforma social* (originally 1935).

THE PROBLEM OF LABOR

BY ALCEU AMOROSO LIMA

(From *O problema do trabalho*. Rio de Janeiro: AGIR, 1947. Pp. 19-49.)

THE GREATEST PROBLEM OF OUR TIME

It is not just in the present day that I have come to consider labor the biggest problem of our time. In an article written thirty years ago, in 1917, I also expressed myself upon the theme to which I return today with the additional experience of six lustrums:

"In Europe they have traversed the social question, with gigantic strides, [searching] for a radical solution. From the destruction of the infernal tempest which desolates the fields of Europe only one victor appears: the proletariat. Authority triumphs in war, anarchy will triumph as a result of the war. [That is] unless peace is made without delay. It is a law of history, advanced by Ferrero, and each day supported by new examples, that great social reforms accompany great wars. The social revolution which is preparing is bound to react weakly in our environment, one of conditions quite different from those of Europe, where classes are a fact and not a name, as among us. I believe the European example has proved that the structure of classes with entirely diverse interests and objectives results in war between them, and it is the clearest common sense to prevent their achieving in Brazil a personality as strong as they have in the old continent. The readiest means of arriving at this result would seem to be a more equitable distribution of wealth, avoiding the poverty which, thanks to fortunate circumstances, does not yet exist among us." 2

2. "O Exodo," in *Revista do Brasil*, S. Paulo, Setembro de 1917, pág. 39.

It was not without a certain melancholy irony that the author re-read this old article in the light of later events which are revolutionizing in a fundamental manner the historic conditions of our century. Written *a month before the Bolshevik Revolution*, it saw "the proletariat" as the victor in the war, which was true. But, in this triumph, [it saw] an indication of the victory of anarchy over authority, which was false. The dictatorship of the proletariat installed in Russia one month later would come to represent the primacy of *hyper-archy* and not of an-archy.

In any case, it was the problem of labor and that of a more equitable distribution of wealth which we saw in the social forecast of the other war. Likewise, it is again the solution of these two enigmas which stands at the end of the new world catastrophe and on the threshold of this somber atomic era, as the first question. (Pp. 19-20)

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THE METHOD ADOPTED

I do not believe that scientific methods must by nature conflict with artistic methods. In the latter the principle of singularity predominates. In the former that of universality. Science has to do only with the general. Art has to do only with the particular. Yet this does not mean that science and art are activities which contradict each other or are mutually incompatible. They are merely two different ways of considering the same combination of realities which present themselves for study or to the operation of our intelligence. Criticism and the essay are clearly two modes of knowledge which stand between the two extremes and partake simultaneously of scientific and aesthetic methods. Similarly, in all the sciences and arts which are concerned directly with man, it is necessary to take into account these two aspects in order to prevent the aesthetic point of view from carrying us to pure arbitrary phantasy or the scientific point of view from inclining us to overlook in man that which is irreducible to any deterministic generalization — *liberty*. (P. 20)

LABOR AND RELIGIOUS INSTRUMENTALITIES

Before considering these two attitudes, let us stop again to look at another sphere which many, many times and with such great harm to the true solution, views the problem of labor with conservative and inert indifference. I refer to the religious medium. In this fear predominates. Nor are indifference and conventionalism lacking. As a result of education, habit, or a false view of the permanence of mystic values or of the stability of the Church, one may easily conclude that religion is bound by necessity to everything which constitutes the conservative element in the social order. Hence that confusion, as tragic as frequent, between the religious spirit and the spirit of conservatism. Frequently, among us Catholics, this preconception is seen, causing in the final analysis the most tremendous evils. The great politico-social schism among Catholics — which today is a secret to no one, although it affects neither dogma nor morality and barely the social reflection of the Faith in regimes and institutions — that schism is the daughter of this preconception. Some hold to the conviction that to be a Catholic and to be a conservative are synonymous. Even when they do not say so they act in this way and reject with horror anything which might mean social change; or they enter into the realm of open reaction.

They ally themselves to reactionary political regimes. And they imagine they can combat the errors of the Revolution with the equal but opposite errors of the Reaction. Rather than being [socially] conscious, this movement expresses itself in indifference and conformity. All agitation, likewise, is attributed to an abnormal condition of society. Everything will turn back to its axes in time [it is believed] and each one will occupy his place in the social order. The social order, for these empirical minds, is a synonym for the existing order. The Church and the Faith thus become the guarantors of accomplished facts, or the instruments of a purely transcendental view of the world and of human life. The latter we find expressed by ignorant or selfish preachers. In Colonial Brazil the chaplains of the feudal lords of the times counseled the slaves, as today [they counsel] the workers, to be docile under social injustice.

All this is the product of a religious ignorance inexcusable today in view of all that the Church, through the voice of its

clergy, its theologians, and its faithful, has said and repeated to the four winds this long time. Clearly, one of the principal tasks of Catholic Action is to combat the lamentable effects of this prejudice. [It is] all the more lamentable insofar as it is from this very Christianization of labor that we must hope for the solution of the conflict, apparently insoluble, between revolutionaries and reactionaries, conservatives and radicals, in the contemporary world. If Catholic forces permit themselves to be infiltrated by the same prejudices or by the same discontent as the conservative and proprietary economic [forces], then the only prospect for the future is bloody conflict, the dictatorship of the proletariat, soviet imperialism, and the indefinite postponement of the more human and rational society, constructed on simpler bases, to which we aspire. But it is necessary to hope even against hope. Error and evil never triumph completely. Thus a bloody and unjust revolution, a long tyranny, and the rule of Marxist totalitarianism will yield at last to common sense and natural law. What we should try is not to defend an unjust social order, such as the present, not to precipitate the advent of a new tyranny, but to avoid a useless revolution, with its suffering and its excessive loss of lives and wealth useful and necessary for the general well being. Such a thing would be possible only through the sanctification of labor and through its elevation to the position which it deserves in a just balance of social forces. This essay has no other objective. Nor [does] the summary study which we now make of the false attitudes concerning a phenomenon which fails to impress itself upon the eyes only of those who do not wish to see. Unhappily, in our Catholic circles, the number is great of those who, in good faith or for unjustifiable motives, cross their arms or react erroneously before the movement. And they accuse us of communism. . . .

Indifference to the problem of labor is not, however, the privilege of this or that social group. It is rather the product of certain temperaments. In all social groups, in all classes, indifference thrives. Even in labor groups themselves we find it, chiefly among those who through ignorance or isolation have not yet come to face the problem. All those who, for diverse motives, become tired of a living society, that is of social life in its current dynamism, are attacked by this evil of boredom. And they constitute so many additional centers of contamination and of the propagation of erroneous solutions, hasty or *contra-*

producente (having an effect opposite to that intended). Industrialists, soldiers, servants, women, the old, and the devout are most likely to suffer this evil, just because they live more isolated from events, in the world of ideas, of discipline, of the past, of imagination, of the home, and of devotion. These are not causes which justify. They merely explain, nothing more. The great task remains to educate, to enlist, and to catechise [them].

For in the morass of indifference valuable forces are lost or docile masses are prepared for messianic (*carismáticos*) tyrants and totalitarian regimes. And it is around labor that the destiny of all contemporary societies revolves — from the far east to the far west, in all the continents, under all political regimes. (Pp. 25-27)

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NOMINAL DEFINITION OF LABOR

We are now at last in a position to propose a nominal definition and a real definition of labor, of that activity which has in it nothing of that which we have just encountered in our intimate life, however it may be confounded with all that in the profound unity of our daily existence.

The most general and nominal definition which we can give of labor is *an effort* (*um esforço*). Labor is the act of exercising force. Labor is an effort which we make for some purpose. To work is to exercise force. To work is to take the initiative in something and to apply oneself to its realization. According to the classic Aristotelian division of human activities, labor is simultaneously of the practical order and of the speculative order. Man exists either to know or to act; either to reflect upon matters of the ego and of the non-ego, or to act upon them. Hence the classic division of our activities into the speculative and the practical. It follows therefore that labor, by nature, does not pertain to either of these categories to the exclusion of the other. It is at the same time of the speculative order and of the practical order. Rightly so, for it is, in its broadest concept, an effort, a force which emanates from man as the first consequence of his vitality.

We place life above labor, as the observation of reality teaches us. But the first consequence of life is labor, since all

life presumes the exercise of an initiative, of a personal force. The first cry of the new-born infant, the first apparent sign of life, is also the first symbol of his effort and hence of his labor. Little by little this original fusion between life and labor gives way to a differentiation, in which labor comes to occupy merely a place among various vital activities, active or reflective. Labor is, however, the first sign of life. It is a symbol representative of something else, even in this initial moment of apparent confusion; but a symbol which also has its own value. It is valuable in itself as well as for that which it represents. The work-cry in the newly born is not life; it represents life. But it possesses on this very account a value of its own, in its turn irreducible to its own life. Man, later, will be able to work to negate his life. Consequently this initial symbol of the human life may rebel against its creator, physically as well as morally. Voluntary inaction can provoke death. This is proof of the independence of labor as an act of living in the face of life. As a systematic aversion, voluntary or instinctive negation of the will to work can provoke moral death and the degradation of life. It is labor turning itself against the life which gave it birth, which is and always was its cause of being. But on the whole, in the acceptance as in the negation, what we see is labor, reduced to its simplest expression, but not thus confused with life — labor as effort. To work is to exercise force. Labor is the force of life — something which life brings with it and performs with what comes to be, more each time, the simplest, most immediate, and most general expression of human life. And not merely of human life; not even of animal life itself; nor just of life. But let us not anticipate. We are now starting with the observation of that which is closest to us — with that of our own body, with that of our own spirit, with all which is most intimately leagued to our own existence. When we attempt, then, to *isolate* labor from everything which in us is joined with it, what we find — is the effort. Where there is individual effort, autonomy of activity, there is labor. Where there is not effort there is no labor. When we ask what is the opposite of labor the natural reply is idleness. To work is to exert oneself. Not to work is not to exert oneself. Non-effort is clearly idleness. What characterizes idleness is passivity, surrender. This, its initial characteristic, is fundamental. Later, we will find in this passivity, in this surrender, new forms of activity. But in itself and by itself *idleness* is the absence of

effort. Hence idleness is a recompense for work. The latter is the effort. Its negation would necessarily be the cessation of effort. What ties repose indissolubly to labor is fatigue. Fatigue is a natural result of labor. Repose is the necessity, not the less natural, of a restoration of the energy, physical and psychological, exhausted by labor, that is by effort.

Moreover, fatigue is not a consequence of labor only. It may also result from idleness. Man also tires of not working. Clearly, [this is] because labor is a natural consequence of life itself, the first of its repercussions. Enforced repose becomes a burden and even an effort harder than work itself. But human life is not merely repose nor merely labor. It is a synthesis of these two complementary activities. I call repose an activity in a broad sense in order to show that the apparent negation of labor does not always represent a denial of the well-lived life. Nor is the work or the effort which stems from ourselves all. Labor is the fullest expression of the nature of our life. All there is of autonomy in our existence is intimately tied to the character of our effort, as the simplest and most general expression of our very being.

REAL DEFINITION OF LABOR

This notion of *autonomous effort* is, moreover, the essential nucleus of the idea of labor. This is not to speak of any chance effort, of a reflex effort, of an accidental effort. At this point we are not satisfied with a definition so broad and general that it embraces, in its vast structure, many things [in] the analysis previously made, from which we disassociate ourselves for better understanding of the phenomenon. We can then propose a real definition in which the phenomenon can be understood in a stricter and more appropriate sense.

We can realistically define labor as being *all habitual effort of the human being directed toward an end*.

Let us return to the characteristic note of all labor, the effort.

This effort, as a typical note, is not found only in our own work. If we look around us, according to the best of the philosophical methods, we shall see that a machine represents an enormous effort. We shall see also that an ant exerts itself to carry leaves to its ant-hill. We say commonly that a machine

works or an animal works. In one case as in the other we observe an organism or a mechanism producing a determined mechanical or animal product. In a broad sense, therefore, we can say that the machine works and that the animal works, in the same way which we speak of human labor.

Hence, there are, in a broad sense, three great forms of labor — mechanical labor, instinctive labor, and rational labor. (Pp. 43-46)

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RATIONAL LABOR

Strictly speaking, we may only call rational and free effort labor. When we define labor, realistically, as the habitual effort of the human being, it is to say that only man really works. The machine or the animal are *worked*, they are put to work. They are constructed or dominated by man to aid his effort. They are instruments of his labor. It is only in man that labor acquires its authentic character of autonomous activity. On this account we cannot be satisfied with a nominal and broad definition which includes in labor any and whatever effort. Only the *rational and free* effort represents true labor. Hence slavery is merely a caricature of labor. All forced work, all servile labor, is merely an application to the human being of the nominal notion of mechanical or animal energy. It is therefore an extravagant and incorrect concept. Imposed work is always belittling. Certainly, the ideal to which all work should conform is liberty. We will come back later to the theme. Meanwhile let us agree, henceforth, that the proper definition of labor embraces rationality and liberty.

In its essence (realistically defined) labor is a human effort. It is not just any effort. Only by extension do we call mechanical or animal activity labor. The latter, by its true nature, is a rational and free effort, a conscious act. The consciousness with which man disposes of his strength for productive activity is what places it in the category of authentic work activity. Irrational work, forced labor, unconscious work — all are forms foreign to the true nature of the concept we are analyzing. Labor joined with intelligence, with liberty, with conscience — that, indeed, constitutes the true notion we seek.

ALCEU AMOROSO LIMA

In the strict sense, only man labors. All the rest, physical nature, mechanical instruments, animals, all are put in motion by man, as an aid to his conscious, rational, and free effort.

Labor, therefore, is indissolubly linked to the human personality. This is the most important of the conclusions we can draw from this preliminary observation of the facts. (Pp. 48-49)

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

ROMULO BETANCOURT (1908-)

VENEZUELA

Rómulo Betancourt was born in Guatire, state of Miranda, Venezuela, on February 22, 1908 and was educated at the Caracas Liceo and the Central University of Venezuela, majoring in political science. While at the University he became a student leader in the movement against President-dictator Vicente Gómez. Imprisoned in 1928, he was expelled from the country the following year, beginning the travels which eventually took him to all parts of America. During this first exile he lived in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Peru, and Costa Rica, studying economics and politics. In Costa Rica, in 1930, he joined the Communist Party, from which he was later expelled because of his independent ideas.

After the death of the dictator, Betancourt returned to Venezuela in 1936, founding a newspaper to express his views. This stay was short, for he was again ordered into exile the following year. For two years he hid from the police, however, while secretly organizing the Partido Democrático Nacional. He was finally deported in 1939, living thereafter in Chile, Mexico, and the United States, until his return to Venezuela in 1941 to work for the Izquierda Democrática group of parties in support of the candidacy of the novelist Rómulo Gallegos for the presidency. After the defeat of Gallegos, Betancourt became the Secretary of the newly formed Acción Democrática de Venezuela, an Aprista type party.

In October 1945 Acción Democrática, supported by a group of army officers, effected a revolution which made Betancourt, first, President of the ruling military junta and, later, provisional president by action of the Constitutional Assembly in December 1946. He held this position until Rómulo Gallegos was elected and duly inaugurated as president on February 15, 1948. A military *golpe de estado* overthrew the Gallegos regime on November 24, 1948, leading to a series of transitional regimes from which the authoritarian presidency of Marcos Pérez Jiménez emerged. Betancourt went into exile again, continuing his opposition to the regime in power from the United States, Costa Rica, and other parts of America to which he travelled. After the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez he returned to become the successful candidate for the Venezuelan presidency in the December 1958 elections.

ROMULO BETANCOURT

His inaugural address, from which the following extract is taken, reflects the ideology of the Aprista-like democratic American socialism of the Acción Democrática party, although the reader must find the ideas implicit rather than explicit in the policies and measures proposed.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM

BY RÓMULO BETANCOURT

(From *Address Delivered on his Inauguration as Constitutional President of Venezuela before the National Congress, February 13, 1959, Caracas, Venezuela* [1959] 12p.)

In respectful compliance with the decision of the sovereign Congress, which set today as the date for the beginning of the constitutional regime, I have just sworn that I shall faithfully obey and see that others uphold the Constitution and the laws of the land during my term as President of the Republic. In appearing before the Legislature, which is a true reflection of the people because it was they who elected it—through the democratic process of direct vote, universal suffrage, and secret ballot, in the free elections held December 7 last—I have not gone through the motions of a ritual. Awed by the magnitude and responsibility of the task that lies ahead as a challenge to the Venezuelans of today, I am impressed with the enormous importance of that ceremony, which is one more highly significant step in the process of our restoring our national values, begun on January 1, 1958.

On that memorable date, in the face of the dictatorship established on November 24, 1948, the long-silent but sustained opposition to the arbitrariness characterizing that government,

which was always felt in large sectors of the armed forces, burst into the open. That insurgent outbreak by military groups, temporarily subdued, was preceded in Caracas and elsewhere by the heroic street fighting of unarmed students and townspeople, including women, against the powerful despotism; this was the nation's answer to the mockery called a plebiscite. The first phase of Venezuela's determined march toward reconquering its freedom and regaining its collective dignity culminated in the historic events of January 23, when the armed forces and throngs of people, joined in the task of liberation, toppled the rotten structure of despotism. The dawn of liberty glowed again in this land, where the longing for a life of freedom and dignity had never ceased to exist. In contrast to the almost wholly dark picture of the ten years of infamy, there was one ray of light: during that decade the prisons throughout the land and the other countries that had opened their doors to the political exiles held thousands of Venezuelans who clung to that which is most dear to a nation: the passion for liberty. In 1952 that inextinguishable passion expressed itself by dealing a crushing defeat to the dictatorship in disregarding and mocking the results of a so-called election; because of that striving for freedom dozens of eminent Venezuelans died in prisons or in exile or were assassinated in the streets. The mothers, widows, and orphans of some of them are here today as honored guests in the Legislative Palace.

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The dictatorship left the country on the verge of bankruptcy. Unpaid debts run into sums so large that they defy exact calculation. As a result, the outgoing government was led to seek credit with foreign banks in the amount of more than six hundred million bolívares,¹ to be utilized by the constitutional government if it sees fit to do so. The new government will continue giving serious study to the origin of those debts, but it is already apparent that the obligations due in the fiscal year 1959-60 will exceed five hundred million bolívares. The modification of the income tax law, which the provisional government put into effect and which our government does not plan to alter during the present economic situation, by increasing the tax burden, will prevent the imbalance in the national treasury from reaching alarming limits. There is no doubt that, because of the dictatorship's fiscal policy of squandering, we are faced with a limited rather than abundant exchequer.

1. One bolívar equals US\$0.30

If the constitutional government is to restore order in the nation's financial situation and set the country on the right path, it must adopt a policy of austerity. The time of *nouveau-riche* extravagance in official circles is past. Showiness and sumptuousness in public works will be done away with. Moreover, firmly and unhesitating in its efforts to restore public morality, the government will relentlessly punish the crimes of graft, influence peddling, percentage cuts, and favoritism exercised by those who make purchases on behalf of official agencies or extend contracts to private firms. The legislation prohibiting the unlawful enrichment of public officials will be strictly enforced. The tribunal provided for in that law will be composed of representatives of the National Congress, the Federal Court and the Court of Cassation, the presidency, and the political parties holding congressional seats. Any citizen may place before that tribunal a complaint against an official misusing public funds; and, by the same token, officials may denounce private individuals who propose dealings that would defraud the public trust, for those who offer bribes are no less guilty than those who accept them. All officials handling treasury matters will be instructed to make sworn statements on their personal finances, before a judge, those declarations becoming a matter of public record. "Honesty must be made fashionable," said Martí, and the Liberator asked the Congress of Peru to levy "terrible penalties against treasury officials who in any way mishandle public funds." We who will govern Venezuela in the next five years will be faithful to that tradition of strict morality in administration, begun by the heroes of the Independence but since abandoned.

By restoring morality in public administration, carrying on and reaffirming the positive accomplishments made since January 23, and doing away with all unnecessary or lavish public projects, the government will be in a position to tackle the problems of national economic development and improvement in the living conditions of the people. Both of these tasks must be undertaken without delay.

As for the first, the time has come—indeed, long since—for the country to face the need to diversify and Venezuelanize its production. As a nation and as a state, we are virtually hanging by one thread: petroleum. Most of Venezuela's dollar income

derived from the petroleum-rich subsoil goes toward imports from abroad, including consumer goods that could easily be produced at home. Clearly, the income-producing investments made through the Venezuelan Development Corporation, the Industrial Bank, and the Agricultural and Livestock Bank are among those calling for immediate attention by the state. The balanced development of agricultural, livestock, and industrial production will permit the country to diversify its present single-product economy and to face without fear the inevitable moment when the petroleum reserves will become exhausted. In keeping with such a policy of economic development it seems appropriate to begin conversations at the ministerial level with the friendly government of the United States, with a view to revising, by mutual agreement, the trade treaty in effect between the two countries; and this your government intends to do. Likewise we shall seek to arrive at the proper formulas for reconciling a tariff policy designed to protect national production and the government's firm pledge to favor the purchase of national products over imports, on the one hand, with the interests of the consumer, who demands domestic products of acceptable quality and so priced as not to cut into his already weakened buying power, on the other.

National economic development calls for well-organized programs, some under state control, like the petro-chemical and steel projects, and others under joint control, like the huge Guayana region project. Because of the Coroni's electric-power potential, the practically inexhaustible iron reserves, the extensive land open to colonization, the nation's developing steel industry, and the Orinoco's usefulness as a waterway for transoceanic traffic, this latter project offers one of the most exciting possibilities to those of us who envisage a great, prosperous, and happy Venezuela. But the fact is that we need roads in the interior of the country to supplement existing trunk routes, speedier electrification, a network of ports and airfields, irrigation projects, and a modern system of telecommunications. I believe, and shall so propose to the Council of Ministers, that we should contract for the study or execution of those projects, in accordance with technically sound advice, so that they may be carried out as quickly as possible and so that the European or United States firms engaged to do the job may be paid within the reasonable period of ten to fifteen years. Similarly, we should be thinking

of taking advantage of the sizeable degree of capitalization of Venezuelan construction firms so as to contract with them for the undertaking of works to be paid for in several annual installments, through budgetary allocations in successive years. The belief that a country gives up part of its sovereignty by using its credit in the national or international market belongs to the storehouse of worthless, obsolete concepts. What is needed is full, open discussion of any negotiation of the type mentioned that is to be carried out, the sovereign Congress and the country being fully informed of any such plans.

This rational utilization of public credit will make it possible to apply large sums, on a continuous basis, to the solution of pressing problems. There is widespread unemployment in the country, the number of jobless, though not recorded exactly, reaching impressive proportions. The average daily wage of a large segment of the population is so low that the income index of the rural family—and the rural population is extremely numerous in the country—is scarcely eight hundred bolívars a year, some sixty-three a month. Each year sixty-five thousand Venezuelans join the ranks of jobseekers, because there is an apparent predominance of young people, almost fifty per cent of the population being under twenty years of age. The farm population for the most part lacks both credit and land, and its typical shelter is a primitive thatched hut with adobe walls and dirt floors, with no sanitary facilities whatsoever. Seven hundred thousand such dwellings constitute the sum total of housing for several million Venezuelans living in subhuman conditions.

There is more to the picture: more than two million illiterate adults; approximately a half million school-age children with no schools to attend; barely six thousand students in technical and arts-and-crafts schools; an acute shortage of teachers and professors; inadequate school buildings. Infant mortality in the age group of one to four years is ten times greater in Venezuela than in countries of advanced development. Almost every town lacks proper water-supply and sewage facilities, and if their installation were to continue at the present rate it would take a hundred years until those services could be offered to the entire population. Welfare services are insufficient and hospitals are lacking; consequently it is a matter of extreme urgency to construct new buildings throughout

the country so as to make up for the present shortage and meet the needs of a growing population for whom three thousand additional hospital beds are required each year.

Compulsory Social Security barely covers illness and accidents caused by work. We must provide for disability, old age, death, and family allowances in accordance with the number of children. The Venezuelan government contributes less to its social-security system than does Chile, a country going through a difficult financial period.

Venezuela is critically in need of permanent sources of employment, agricultural reform, education, housing, public health. To ignore those needs would mean not only criminal neglect on the part of society and the state of their duty toward those less favored in the distribution of national income, but a sure risk that sooner or later the country will be rocked by an uprising of desperate masses, similar to the one that took place in the Federal War.

To set forth here and now the concrete details of a program of administrative action would hardly be a sign of responsibility on my part. Such a program must be discussed by my cabinet within a reasonable period after the new government has gotten under way. In due time the country will be informed of the specific projects growing out of these general concepts, which are, furthermore, in keeping with the joint government program to which the presidential candidates subscribed on December 6.

Sufficiently reliable data are not now available on which to base a fully rounded program of administrative action for the next five years.

The Department of Economic Planning, which will be established and staffed with qualified national and foreign technicians, will make it possible by the year 1960-61 to offer the country a plan to be carried out in the last four years of the government's five-year term. The program may even be projected beyond that time, because we cannot insist too strongly that we shall never reach a whole solution to our complex and difficult problems if we continue the system of piecemeal and unrelated planning. Broad and coordinated action on the part of the government and the entire country, carefully planned and forcefully carried out—this is what Venezuela is crying for in its desire to move forward toward a new social order.

We are in a position to state as of now that the administrative plans of the government will be carried out with the participation of private enterprise, so as to ensure greater success. The country's problems are so immense and difficult that their solution depends upon the cooperation of all socially aware Venezuelans.

In regard to our domestic policy, there can be no doubt that the government will respect the rights of the people and see that they are fully exercised. No one will be prevented from expressing his ideas through any means of verbal or written communication. The only restriction will be that established by law in the case of those who show disrespect for the institutions freely chosen by the people or those who, taking refuge in their freedom, seek to incite subversion or rebellion. Order and democracy are not at all incompatible; disrespect for, and aggression against, legally constituted authority cannot and will not be tolerated.

As for international affairs, the government's course of action will follow the democratic lines of its domestic policy.

We shall support the United Nations and the Organization of American States, respecting and living up to the international treaties subscribed to by their member nations. We shall call upon other democratic governments of the Americas to act together in urging the Organization of American States to exclude dictatorial governments from its membership, for not only are such regimes an affront to the dignity of the Hemisphere but, according to the Charter of Bogotá, which established the OAS, membership in that organization should be limited to governments of respectable origin, born of the will of their people as expressed in the only legitimate source of power: free elections.

Regimes that do not respect human rights, that trample on the liberties of their citizens and tyrannize them with totalitarian political police forces, should be subjected to a strict sanitary cordon and eradicated through the peaceful collective action of the inter-American juridical community. Views like these are held today by influential parties and individuals in both Latin America and the United States. And I wish to express Venezuela's gratitude to, and the Continent's admiration for, a man who, because he upheld these ideas in having Costa Rica not attend the Tenth Inter-American

Conference, at Caracas, on the unimpeachable grounds that the host country was then under the rule of a despotic regime, had his country invaded by troops recruited, trained, and armed by the Dictatorship International. The person to whom I wish to pay this tribute is with us today, an honored guest of Venezuela, former Costa Rican President José Figueres.

We shall maintain cordial relations with the United States, a country to which we are bound, as with the rest of Latin America, by geopolitical and economic ties. By reason of the United States' being the most powerful nation of the Hemisphere our relationship with it must be other than one of colonial subservience or provocative impudence. I have reason to believe, and in all responsibility tell the country, that the diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the United States will be normal, smooth, and mutually beneficial.

Closer ties will be sought with those countries in the Western Hemisphere with which we share a common race, religion, language, and economic interests, for aside from the bonds of tradition and history we are brought together by the fact of our lagging development. In our policy of drawing closer to the rest of Latin America we shall be mindful of the observation made by the Liberator more than a century ago but still pertinent today: "Only the union of the Latin peoples of the Americas will make them great and win them the respect of other nations."

Attention will be given to the possibility of concluding regional agreements with other Latin American countries in economic and cultural matters. The negotiations begun by the provisional government with a view to having the proposed Inter-American Development Bank located in Caracas will be carried forward, so as to support the up-to-now timid policy of not confining the basic agencies of the inter-American system to Washington or New York. We shall collaborate in the exploratory work being done in connection with the long-range plan for a Latin American common market. This movement should not be viewed with short-sighted, narrow isolationism, with the Asian, African, and Arab nations showing us that only through multilateral agreements can the small countries make themselves heard in these times when the world is divided into blocs of great powers.

The government's entire domestic and international policy shall be aired in the form of a constant dialogue between it and the people. Nothing shall be kept from the nation because, after all, those who govern do so only at the people's bidding. Moreover, it is that constant vigilance of public opinion that prevents a head of state from becoming absorbed in himself and turning toward the ill-founded presumption of infallibility. Thus, without arrogance but rather with a humble desire to hear and give attention to all reasonable views, we shall consult all segments of the population with respect to the political and administrative steps to be taken by the nation.

In religious matters, we shall continue the tradition of freedom of worship, so solidly established. Respect for all religious beliefs does not mean, of course, that we fail to recognize that the majority of Venezuelans profess and practice the Catholic religion. We shall maintain cordial relations with the Church, whose highest prelate, Monsignor Rafael Arias Blanco, has contributed much to the warm relations that now exist between the archbishopric and the various political groups. It is my personal belief that the time has come to open conversations with the Holy See in order to present to the Congress of the Republic formulas which, if this body deems it advisable, would substitute for the inoperative clauses of the Law of Church Patronage—a law belonging almost to the prehistory of our public legislation—more flexible provisions of a modern *modus vivendi* carefully worked out by the contracting parties.

The outspoken manner in which I have set forth some of the difficulties and problems that confront our country is, paradoxical though it may seem, in keeping with the unshakeable optimism with which I view the future of Venezuela. True, we have problems, but we are in a position to meet them head on and thus solve them. Our mineral wealth—petroleum and iron—will for many years be a sure source of income; our people are hardworking and dedicated; and the growth of national enterprises has produced groups of businessmen with the force and drive of captains of industry. What is more, this glorious moment in our history is marked by an *esprit de corps*, enthusiasm, and confidence in what the future will bring. By pooling our resources and the efforts of the government and the people alike we can, with determination, go forward in stabilizing a democratic regime in Venezuela, not only to

safeguard human rights but also to help bring about wealth, culture, and general well-being. This is a task in which all citizens should engage, without fear of threat to the stability of the government beginning its term today. The constitutional regime is taking its first steps with the solid indorsement of public opinion and with the loyal backing of the armed forces. As Commander-in-Chief of those forces, a post I occupy as President of the Republic, I have already had considerable contact with officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men in the infantry, the air force, the navy, and the combined services. I have found that the Venezuelans thus serving their country are dedicated to self-improvement, to study, and to work, within a framework of professional competence and nonpartisanship. I have also observed that behind the façades of sumptuous buildings, neither asked for nor desired by the military, there lurk many difficulties and problems in improving the structure of our armed forces. The constitutional government will give those services the attention they merit, for, in guaranteeing public order and the security of our national boundaries, they perform a silent, unselfish, and vital task and, in so doing, are indispensable to the republic.

Through you, I pledge to the nation that I shall return to the Legislature to keep a future appointment. It will be on April 19, 1964, when I shall hand over to my successor, who, like me, shall have been chosen in a peaceful and free election, the tricolor sash that is the symbol of the presidency in Venezuela. It is that sash which Raúl Leoni, the President of the Senate and my good friend and associate for thirty years, has just placed upon my shoulder.

I am certain that five years from now, when I come to fulfill the constitutional obligation of passing on the presidential sash to the man who will succeed me as Chief of State, it will be said that I have made many mistakes, because infallibility is a virtue possessed by no human being. But the country will recognize at that time—of this I am sure, as I am certain of my convictions—that during my term as President I never acted out of any motive other than that of seeking with loyalty, creative persistence, fanatical faith if you wish, the glory of Venezuela and the happiness of its people.

EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA (1911-)

CHILE

Eduardo Frei was born in Santiago on January 16, 1911, the son of Eduardo Frei and Victoria Montalva. Educated in the Instituto de Humanidades, he went on to study law in the Catholic University of Santiago, where he won an honor prize as an outstanding student, despite the fact that he was working part-time. While in the university he took an active part in student organizations. By 1932 he had become President of the Association of Catholic Students, and in 1939 he was Secretary of the Congress of American Catholic Students held in Rome.

Making his home in Iquique, he practised law and edited a newspaper. Soon he was active in politics. In 1938, together with a group of other young men, he left the Conservative party to found the Falange Nacional, later to emerge as the Christian Socialist Party of Chile — a party in which he has played a prominent role since its founding. Meanwhile, he had published his first book, *Chile desconocido* (1937). Other volumes followed. But success in politics was difficult to achieve. He was defeated as a candidate for deputy from Iquique in 1937 and later suffered a similar defeat in Santiago, to which he had moved in the meantime.

Invited into the Cabinet of President Juan Antonio Rios, he served briefly as Minister of Public Works. Then in 1949 he was elected to the Senate from the northern provinces of Atacama and Coquimbo. Re-elected to the Senate in 1957, he was nominated for the presidency by his party the following year. His vigorous speaking campaign in all parts of the country made his party a serious contender in the election of 1958, and he received the third largest vote in a field of five major candidates.

He has been a professor of labor law in the Catholic University since 1939, and his teaching, writing, and speaking have made his voice one to be heard on all major questions of national policy. One of his speeches is presented here, not so much to show him in the role of social philosopher as in the role of an effective spokesman of the philosophy of Chilean Christian socialism. His books consist chiefly of his speeches and newspaper articles, but some of them are more philosophical

than the one here presented. They all show clearly the influence of Jacques Maritain and other neo-thomists.

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THE ROAD TO FOLLOW

BY EDUARDO FREI MONTALVA

("El camino á seguir," from *Una tercera posición*. Lima: Ed. Universitaria, 1960. Pp. 99-106. Closing speech of Fifth Congress of Latin American Christian Democrats, Lima, October 27, 1959.)

GROWTH OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

Mr. President of the Fifth International Congress of Christian Democracy, Mr. President of the Chamber of Deputies of Venezuela, Presidents of the Delegations, Mr. President of the Senate of Peru, Directors of the parties which honor us with their presence, parliamentarians of America, ladies and gentlemen: This is for us a solemn occasion and of very great American and—why not say it—Christian Democratic feeling and pride. Here we are, at the termination of the Congress, speaking in this noble and beautiful city of Lima to the people of Peru, and through them, we say it without boasting, we hope to speak to the people of America. What do we have to say? What is this force called Christian Democracy? What right does it have to raise its voice? Ladies and gentlemen, today our movement is not a mere hope, not merely a concept of ideologues. Twenty years ago this idea was known merely by a few youth groups who fought in syndicates and universities; but today, we have to say, we are a real force.

Municipal elections have just been held in São Paulo, and from 370 municipalities Christian democracy has elected 200 alcaldes. (Applause). And it is well known that whoever gains this state—which today has some 13 million inhabitants—with an unquestionable majority, will in the future gain Brazil. In

Argentina, where the movement began recently, the party chalked up more than 500 thousand votes for the Constitutional Assembly, and in all the complementary elections of recent date it has increased its votes by an average of 30.7 per cent, which leads to the belief that today that party controls securely more than 700 thousand votes.

OUR SUCCESS IN CHILE

We all know of the powerful drive exercised by the COPEI party, the Christian Democracy of Venezuela. We know of its vigorous representation in Congress, of its influence in the syndicates, of its majority in the municipalities. New groups are arising of their own in Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, and Cuba. The Christian Democrats carry on a long and harsh struggle in Bolivia. We have also undergone a long battle, together with the pioneers, the Uruguayans, and we can say that in the last student elections, while the rightists joined on one side and the radicals, communists, and socialists on the other, we defeated them in the University of Chile, in Santiago and Valparaiso, and in The Catholic University in Santiago and Valparaiso, and in the University of Concepción. We have just won the syndicate elections in the Syndicate of Steelworkers of Huachipato, the biggest in Chile, and we have conquered the Bankers Federation and other syndicates.

MILLIONS OF VOTES SUPPORT US

And here in Peru this Congress demonstrates the existence of a Party with great mature human qualities, with great moral contexture. Throughout America Christian Democracy is no longer a dream of youth, Christian Democracy is not [just] the theme of a few more or less eloquent orators, Christian Democracy is not [merely] the vague hope which a few dreamers nourish. Today we can say that millions of votes support Christian Democracy. Today we can say that in large labor unions we are the growing force; today we can say that in various universities of America we have won the direction of the student movements; we can say that we have the intellectual masses, the middle class, the writers; we can say that the America of the future can not be constituted without the determining presence of this force which has ideas, which has men, which has a destiny. That is why we are here and that is why we have a right to speak. We have a right to speak because this force is not built around any personalism. In Christian Democracy there are no caudillos, no *caudillejos*, no supermen.

(Applause) Christian Democracy is founded on a faith, on an idea, on free consent; hence it is growing vigorously and multiplying in America. What are the ideas which sustain the message it brings? I believe that on these occasions we should point out very clearly the matrix lines of our thought and action, because the public opinion upon which we live has the right to know and judge for themselves.

WE ARE DEMOCRATS

In the first place, Christian Democracy not only has affirmed but has given continuous and irrefutable testimony of an inflexible democratic will and of incorruptible adherence to the service of liberty. None of us, no group, no party, no man, has ever—nor would we ever permit it—we have never made a single bargain with the dictatorships nor ever wavered before the dictators. We are for democracy with all its defects, with all its limitations. We are ready to fight, united with all honest men of good will of all the political groups who wish sincerely the rule of law and not the rule of men in these countries, that governments should be elected in these countries by universal secret ballot, that these countries should have independent courts of justice, that we should never be friends of the tyranny (*pasto de la arbitrariedad*) of those who combine political power with the judicial, that in these countries congress should make the laws. We are ready to fight for freedom of speech, for freedom of conscience, because that is the only way to live with dignity; and we will never fall into the trap of those who talk of order to protect privilege, never will we fall into the trap . . . (great applause) . . . of those who wish to preserve the structures by the use of force. We will never fall into the trap of dividing the democratic forces of the nation in such a way that the dialog is not possible, since it is through this gate of civil discord that authoritarian leaders (*mandones*) always enter to ruin the dignity of America and to damage the prestige of our whole continent. This is not a gratuitous assertion. It is endorsed by the attitude of all the Christian Democrats of America.

WE STAND WITH THE POOR

There is also a second great affirmation, which is not sensational, which is simple as life; because the people are not asking us for great words or great names, but concrete things by which to place us. In the process of history, who can

doubt, there are hours in which the course of human life runs tranquilly, with majesty. There are [also] hours in which all is agitated, everything changes, in which the peoples begin to re-examine the world, to make themselves over, in which they change the instruments hitherto deemed immutable, in which the people begin to examine even those precepts considered untouchable. In this moment we want to say that for us the only way to preserve democracy and convert it into an ideal form, is to place ourselves decidedly, as the great Secretary of our Party said, and as Lucas Ayarragaray said, together with the poor of the world. Our motto must be to preach the Gospel to the poor. How tremendously clear this is. What have we done in these last decades? We have been separating ourselves from the poor who are, like the earth and like life, the [source] where all is renewed, all is given. In this hour we can not vacillate, even though we are criticized behind our backs and all the false labels are put on us which liars have always attached, because, as someone said: "there are always evil ones to twist our true words and deceive fools." How many perverse ones there are who change our true words to deceive fools! But we will never stop speaking the truth for fear of being misinterpreted. We believe that the hour of justice has come, and as that great Uruguayan, De la Torre Muller, said: "There is one generation to defend liberty, there is another to achieve social justice."

TRANSFORMATION OF THE STRUCTURES

In this hour we have the obligation to work for justice and to work for justice not merely with declarations. Christian Democracy does not exist for that. Christian Democracy is ready to take its stand on an economic position, planning and giving its ideas to the end of organizing the economic development of Latin America, to increase the rate of capital investment, to change the agrarian and economic structures, to change the structures of our international commerce which are now stifling all our peoples. Because it is no accident that all the peoples of Latin American are undergoing inflationary processes; it is no accident that in all the peoples of Latin America there are farming masses which lack purchasing power; it is no accident that in these peoples the standard of living practically does not improve; it is not accidental that there should be millions and millions of men, as declared here and as all know, who have neither house, nor bread, nor culture. Is it that

all the governors of America are evil? Is it that all are mistaken? Or has something gone wrong in the structure of our economies, in the terms of our economic interchange, in the division of the national income, in the distribution of the land, in the organization of our enterprises, in the symbol which presides over our economic effort? It would not be opportune at this moment for me to wish to enter into so extensive a theme. But I must say that we work on the side of justice and not merely with the good intentions and good will of naive persons, as they would like to paint us.

WE KNOW WHAT WE WANT

We know precisely not only what we want but how we want it and how we must do it: economic development to achieve social justice. These are two great positions which mark out our course. But many will say: Who is not a partisan of democracy? Who is not a partisan of social justice?

FALSE DEMOCRATS

Yes, gentlemen, there are people whom we know very well who are great partisans of democracy but who, as soon as they see in the course of democracy that the people begin to ask justice, then clamor for a dictator or in the obscure silence of certain offices prepare the dictator who will restrain the democratic aspirations. There are others, also, who claim to be democrats, but when they come to power find no truth except in those who belong to their own party and make up the one party which rules the state. They are not democrats. Nor are those democrats who in their own countries, which they paint for us as paradises, have imposed the red terror which destroys the human person by fear. There are others who say they wish justice, but confronted by a just strike they shout communism! As soon as democracy begins to work loyally with the workers' forces they call it suspicious. They are those who desire justice with their words, but only to cover up inequality. From all of those we must separate ourselves.

POLITICS AND ETHICS

Christian Democracy is a moral force, we are not afraid to say so. How many things have failed in our America because the hearts of those who supported them were previously corrupted. We do not believe ourselves better than anyone else, since thus we would be the worst pharisees. But we believe

that men must hold to a moral standard because, otherwise, power which corrupts so greatly begins to destroy the very ones who wish to do justice.

Many years ago, Gabriela Mistral wrote me a letter, saying: "I have gone up the routes of our America and I am sickened at seeing so much licentiousness and voluptuousness among those who rule." Because many who govern rule in order to protect what they have and not to achieve the common good, and they wish to hide themselves behind the cross. And there are others . . . who come up saying they want to redeem the people, yet when they arrive often begin by satiating their own appetites and forget the hunger of the people—the old, sad experience of many governments in Latin America. Therefore, we hold that men who undertake to achieve this task must not be at the service of themselves, nor of a passion, but of an ideal, of a philosophy, of a force which sustains their weakness and will make them serve the cause they advocate.

LIBERALISM: A POOR SOLUTION

We are seeing a great social and human transformation. The humble classes fight to assume positions of direction. Communism and Socialism agitate the conscience of the workers with the promise of revolutionary felicity. Many believe in these anarchic and gigantic forces which contain so much merit and so much truth within their radical and profound error. And liberalism, capitalism, confronting this frightening vision—What do they offer to the poor and the humble? What do they offer to the world? Their sole remedy is free enterprise, free competition.

They are able to see, I do not dispute it, technical formulas to pass a [given] economic moment, to resolve the problem of a budget or draw up tactics for a situation. But confronting those who show the red splendor of a world which is being born—will they fill the heart of the poor of America with this philosophy? Have they nothing more to say to the soul of man? Have they nothing more to say to the youth which rise up with hope and vigor? Have they nothing more to say to the millions and millions of women who have sick and abandoned children? Is this the way we are going to save Christian civilization? Is this the way we are going to revitalize our half destroyed societies, in which we have been losing the

sense of fraternal community, the sense of common ends? It suffices to examine how profound the process of disintegration is in our decadent societies.

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

Thus, Christian Democracy, in this hour of America, is more than a political party. It is an interpretation of human life, it is a sense of the human person with his immortal soul, with his sacred rights which no dictator, no collectivity, no totalitarianism can destroy. The right to life, to independence, to worship God, to express ourselves—all this does not depend on the will of law; it depends upon something which God gave us and of which only God can deprive us; thus we are free. At this juncture we offer a philosophy which interprets man, which inspires poets and dramatists, which is capable of engendering a conception of art, which centuries ago built the Gothic cathedrals, and which in this century can inspire new forms of human creativity. This is a philosophy which can pertain to youth, separating them from vice and purifying them in the strength of a great idea.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION

Christian Democracy, my friends, is not a confessional party, nor is it the Church which we seek to commit. The Church is outside of and above political rivalries. Alas for the parties which wish to take advantage of the Church! Pity the Church when it mixes in political contests!

We act in accord with our responsibility as men, as civilians, as laymen, in a temporal function. A Christian ideal inspires us, but we are the ones responsible for our action in society, in the syndicate, in the university, in life.

THE MESSAGE OF LATIN AMERICA

This, Christian Democrats, people of Peru and America, is the message of these congresses. This force has been born, the force of liberty, of justice, a moral force, a force which inspires, a force which is born of the entrails of the people. University students, workers, the poor of America, here is a road, for this we stand. This is what we come here to say with that faith to which we have dedicated our lives. That is why we are here; we are not here to speak mere words but to give

the testimony of a life, thousands of lives, which have been sacrificed for the ideal. Lucas Ayarragaray has done well in invoking the Peruvian woman with her intelligence and beauty and the man of this broad Peru in which, as her Chancellor said yesterday, all the currents of America have crossed and come to understand each other, and where San Martín and Bolívar shook hands to seal American democracy. Here is the youth which has demonstrated its vigor, its intelligence, and its enthusiasm. Oh my friends, let us speak as a poet in this city of viceroys, which retains its character in the midst of its present splendid progress, let us raise our voices in a single cry, all our arms in a single battering-ram (*ariete*), because we wish to cast off the night of America and give to the peoples true justice, full liberty, cleanness of action, and devotion to a noble cause, which I believe will make all of us great, purer, and more honest. Because, my friends, the occasion which America now lives is not less than that which sounded in the year 1810. And if we sense the voice of world opinion (*rumor del mundo*), this voice is stronger and deeper than that which produced the American Revolution and the French Revolution. And this America, which has a voice to be heard in the world, can no longer go on sleeping. It is necessary to say that here Christian civilization has a new word, a new form, which would give a just basis to democracy and to ourselves as men of this [critical] hour in Latin America.

(Trans. by H.E.D.)

CONCLUSION: CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

The wide variety and manifest vigor of Latin American thought make it difficult to generalize concerning its characteristics and trends. Yet a few generalizations may be ventured. The first is that this speculative thought appears to be more vigorous, and to receive more general attention, than descriptive and analytical studies have received, at least in many of the branches of social concern. While no Latin American philosopher has achieved quite the status of an Ortega y Gasset or an Unamuno, a very considerable number have approached that level, and hardly any country has lacked at least one writer who has focused the attention of students of social developments upon the problems connected with underlying philosophical assumptions.

Twentieth century writers who represent the new trends have commonly turned against the positivist-evolutionist-historical social thought and science which was prevalent at the end of the last century. Hence many of them have been specifically anti-Marxist. Both Marxism and positivism have continued to be important, however, playing a significant role in the ideologies of the Mexican Revolution and in Batllismo, to give but two examples. In neither case, it should be added, was this ideology the corollary of political control by the Socialist party. Nor did the majority of Marxist intellectuals embrace the Communist party, although a few outstanding examples of Communist intellectuals, notably Mariátegui, are found.

Views of cultural pluralism and relativism are widespread, but more commonly in an existentialist mode than in North America. On the other hand, the persistence of older legal, historical-cultural, and intellectual concepts may partially explain a greater Latin American insistence upon the quest for universals. Or this insistence may derive from a more general Latin American trend toward neo-idealism and the important emphasis upon Kantian thought. The reader will almost certainly notice less of the kind of naturalism, pragmatic and empirical, which is prevalent among philosophers in the United States and Britain, although Russell and Whitehead have their followers.

CONCLUSION: CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

The vigor of neo-Thomist thought reflects the new social consciousness of the Church and the growth of Christian socialist parties. Indirectly, this neo-Thomism may explain in part why the philosophy of history seems less pessimistic in Latin America than elsewhere in the Occident. At the same time, one must remember that optimism has generally characterized American views of American history. In their quest for universals, neo-Thomists often find themselves at odds with the pluralistic trends in the search for an American meaning in American history. Yet sometimes the two diverse trends seem to find a common ground (as in Unamuno) in a view of the American as not only Spanish (and Portuguese) American, but in a broader sense Iberian.

The continued preoccupation of Latin American social thought with what is American deserves a special note. It has its basis, as we have seen, in a long tradition of historical and legal thought, and in literary criticism. The prevalent tendencies have sometimes undermined and sometimes strengthened this basis. Whatever the cause, the outcome seems to have been a rather general Latin American insistence upon a view of history in which man has freedom to move toward higher social goals. Most writers have found this freedom to make social decisions to be consistent with democratic process. Many, but not all of course, find its basis in some specifically American concept or set of values. Some find it in *indigenismo*, although this tendency seems to be waning. Some find it in the Aprista variety of Marxism. In any case this Americanism is likely to be identified with thought which is revolutionary, expressing renewed confidence in the possibility of revolutionary social change and confidence in revolutionary leadership. In still another sense, this preoccupation with America may be thought of as reflecting and having a source in the insistent Spanish American quest for the closer cultural, economic, and political unity which was lost upon gaining national independence.

Various aspects of thought deserve more attention than it has been possible to give them in this volume. Esthetics has been the subject of particular attention in twentieth century Latin America, with a tendency, as in Vasconcelos and Deústua, for example, to make it the keystone of the arch of philosophy. Literary critics such as Ricardo Rojas of Argentina, Luis Alberto Sánchez of Peru, German Arciniegas of Colombia, and Pedro

Henríquez Ureña of Mexico (and the Dominican Republic) have insisted upon a social, and usually an American role for literary expression. Manuel Gálvez, and others, as we have noted, have sounded the more traditional, religious, and idealist note. On the other hand, such Communist poets as Pablo Neruda and Nicolás Guillén, and Communist artists such as Portinari, David Siqueiros, and Diego Rivera, have introduced concepts of artistic and esthetic values which stand in sharp contrast to both of the others.

In education, the expansion of schools at all levels has evoked a lively debate on educational philosophy between those who view education chiefly as the means by which society and culture strengthen themselves inwardly, that is the traditionalists, and those for whom education is a principal means for transforming and developing the social order, the progressives. Between them stand a group of essentialists.

On the political horizon, the appearance of such journals as *Combate* (Costa Rica) and *Política* (Venezuela) has given a broader hemispheric audience to the debate upon political philosophy and programs, from a standpoint which we have termed, in this volume, broadly *aprista*. Equally significant has been the increased circulation in the hemisphere of publications emanating from the Christian Socialist parties, while the July 26 movement of the Cuban Revolution has projected its political-social philosophy, based partly on Martí, but bearing some of the more obvious marks of links with international Communism.

That Latin American social thought is coming of age and acquiring autonomy may be seen in the record of the Inter-American Congresses on Philosophy and even more particularly in the series of studies of the history of American ideas sponsored by the Commission on History of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History. It is not on the defensive, as it has sometimes been in the past, voicing an over-simplified "Americanism" which is suspicious of foreign influences, even while adhering to some new trend of European or North American origin. Latin American philosophers now discourse with their foreign colleagues as peers, and their "Americanism," when it is expressed, assumes the form of a sophisticated pluralism or of the "accidental" in the more Aristotelian manner. The roots of their thought in the natural law rationalism of

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the American Revolutionary tradition are still perceptible, and faith in the reality of the American opportunity underlies all the various reactions to European trends. All the contemporary patterns of social thought are present in the Latin American scene, and their very variety faithfully reflects and expresses the many faceted reality of the dynamic processes of social change which constitute the revolutionary socio-political movement of the twentieth century. But in the American scene they have inevitably taken on meanings derived from the American historical experience.

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